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Chapter 1
Introduction
“We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”
(Einstein)
The great revolution of the nineteenth century started with the theory of special and general
relativity and culminated in quantum theory. However, up to date, there are still some fundamental
issues with quantum theory that are yet to be solved. Nonetheless a great deal of effort in fundamental
physics is spent on an elusive theory of quantum gravity which is an attempt to combine the two
above mentioned theories which seem, as they have been formulated, to be incompatible. In the
last five decades, various attempt to formulate such a theory of quantum gravity have been made,
but none have fully succeeded in becoming the quantum theory of gravity. One possibility of the
failure for reaching an agreement on a theory of quantum gravity might be presence of unresolved
fundamental issues already present in quantum theory. Most approaches to quantum gravity adopt
standard quantum theory as there starting point, with the hope that the unresolved issues of the theory
will get solved along the way. However, it might be the case that these fundamental issues should be
solved before attempting to define a quantum theory of gravity.
If one adopts this point of view, the questions that come next are: i) which are the main conceptual
issues in quantum theory ii) How can these issues be solved within a new theoretical frame work of
quantum theory.
Chris Isham, Andreas Do¨ring, Jeremy Butterfield and others have proposed that the main issues in
the standard quantum formalism are: (A) the use of critical mathematical ingredients which seem to
assume certain properties of space and/or time which are not entirely justified. In particular it could
be the case that such a priori assumptions of space and time are not compatible with a theory of
quantum gravity. (B) The instrumental interpretation of quantum theory that denies the possibility
of talking about systems without reference to an external observer. A consequence of this issue is the
problematic notion of a closed system in quantum cosmology.
A possible way to overcome the above mentioned issues is through a reformulation of quantum the-
ory in terms of a different mathematical framework called topos theory. The reason for choosing topos
theory is that it ‘looks like’ sets and is equipped with an internal logic. As we will explain in detail
in the following chapters, both these features are desirable, because they will allow for a reformulation
of quantum theory which is more realist (thus solving issue (B)) and which does not rest on a priori
assumptions about the nature of space and time.
The hope is that such a new formulation of quantum theory will shed some light on how a quantum
theory of gravity should look like.
The main idea in the topos formulation of normal quantum theory [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 1, 2, 3,
16, 24] is that using topos theory to redefine the mathematical structure of quantum theory leads
to a reformulation of quantum theory in such a way that it is made to ‘look like’ classical physics.
1
Furthermore, this reformulation of quantum theory has the key advantages that (i) no fundamental role
is played by the continuum; and (ii) propositions can be given truth values without needing to invoke
the concepts of ‘measurement’ or ‘observer‘. Let us analyse the reasons why such a reformulation is
needed in the first place. These concern quantum theory general and quantum cosmology in particular.
• As it stands quantum theory is non-realist. From a mathematical perspective this is reflected
in the Kocken-Specher theorem 1. This theorem implies that any statement regarding state of
affairs, formulated within the theory, acquires meaning contractually, i.e., after measurement.
This implies that it is hard to avoid the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, which is
intrinsically non-realist.
• Notions of ‘measurement’ and ‘external observer’ pose problems when dealing with cosmology.
In fact, in this case there can be no external observer since we are dealing with a closed system.
But this then implies that the concept of ‘measurement’ plays no fundamental role, which in turn
implies that the standard definition of probabilities in terms of relative frequency of measurements
breaks down.
• The existence of the Planck scale suggests that there is no a priori justification for the adoption
of the notion of a continuum in the quantum theory used in formulating quantum gravity.
These considerations led Isham and Do¨ring to search for a reformulation of quantum theory that
is more realist2 than the existing one. It turns out that this can be achieved through the adoption of
topos theory as the mathematical framework with which to reformulate Quantum theory.
One approach to reformulating quantum theory in a more realist way is to re-express it in such a
way that it ‘looks like’ classical physics, which is the paradigmatic example of a realist theory. This is
precisely the strategy adopted by the authors in [17], [18], [19], [20] and [21]. Thus the first question
is what is the underlining structure which makes classical physics a realist theory?
The authors identified this structure with the following elements:
1. The existence of a state space S.
2. Physical quantities are represented by functions from the state space to the reals. Thus each
physical quantity, A, is represented by a function
fA ∶ S → R (1.0.1)
3. Any propositions of the form “A ∈ ∆” (“The value of the quantity A lies in the subset ∆ ∈ R”)
is represented by a subset of the state space S: namely, that subspace for which the proposition
is true. This is just
f−1A (∆) = {s ∈ S∣fA(s) ∈ ∆} (1.0.2)
The collection of all such subsets forms a Boolean algebra, denoted Sub(S).
4. States ψ are identified with Boolean-algebra homomorphisms
ψ ∶ Sub(S) → {0,1} (1.0.3)
from the Boolean algebra Sub(S) to the two-element {0,1}. Here, 0 and 1 can be identified as
‘false’ and ‘true’ respectively.
1Kochen-Specker Theorem: if the dimension of H is greater than 2, then there does not exist any valuation
function V
Ψ⃗
∶ O → R from the set O of all bounded self-adjoint operators Aˆ of H to the reals R such that for all Aˆ ∈ O
and all f ∶ R→ R, the following holds V
Ψ⃗
(f(Aˆ)) = f(V
Ψ⃗
(Aˆ)).
2By a ‘realist’ theory we mean one in which the following conditions are satisfied: (i) propositions form a Boolean
algebra; and (ii) propositions can always be assessed to be either true or false. As will be delineated in the following, in
the topos approach to quantum theory both of these conditions are relaxed, leading to what Isham and Do¨ring called a
neo-realist theory.
2
The identification of states with such maps follows from identifying propositions with subsets
of S. Indeed, to each subset f−1A ({∆}), there is associated a characteristic function χA∈∆ ∶ S →
{0,1} ⊂ R defined by
χA∈∆(s) =
⎧⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if fA(s) ∈∆;
0 otherwise.
(1.0.4)
Thus each state s either lies in f−1A ({∆}) or it does not. Equivalently, given a state s every
proposition about the values of physical quantities in that state is either true or false. Thus 1.0.3
follows
The first issue in finding quantum analogues of 1,2,3, and 4 is to consider the appropriate math-
ematical framework in which to reformulate the theory. As previously mentioned the choice fell on
topos theory. There were many reasons for this, but a paramount one is that in any topos (which is a
special type of category) distributive logic arise in a natural way: i.e., a topos has an internal logical
structure that is similar in many ways to the way in which Boolean algebras arise in set theory. This
feature is highly desirable since requirement 3 implies that the subobjects of our state space (yet to be
defined) should form some sort of logical algebra.
The second issue is to identify which topos is the right one to use. Isham et al achieved this by
noticing that the possibility of obtaining a ‘neo-realist’ reformulation of quantum theory lied in the idea
of a context. Specifically, because of the Kocken-Specher theorem, the only way of obtaining quantum
analogues of requirements 1,2,3 and 4 is by defining them with respect to commutative subalgebras
(the ‘contexts’) of the non-commuting algebra, B(H), of all bounded operators on the quantum the-
ory’s Hilbert space. Thus ‘locally’ with respect to these contexts quantum theory effectively behaves
classically. So the idea is to try and define each quantum object locally in terms of these abelian
contexts. The key feature, however, is that the collection of all this contexts or classical snapshots form
a category ordered by inclusion. This implies that although one defines each quantum object locally,
the global information is never lost since it is put back into the picture by the categorical structure of
the collection of all these classical snapshots.
Hence the task is to find a topos which allows you to define a quantum object as (roughly speaking) a
collection of classical approximations. As we will see this can be done thought the topos of presheaves
over the category of abelian algebras.
In terms of this topos of presheaves, quantum theory can be re-defined so that it retains some realism
and its interpretation is not riddled with the above mentioned conceptual problems.
3
Chapter 2
Lecture 1
The first lecture will deal with what the main interpretational problems of canonical quantum theory
are.
In particular, we will analyse how the mathematical formalism of quantum theory leads to a non
realist interpretation of the theory. The focus will lie in understanding and analysing the Kochen-
Specker theorem (K-S theorem), which can be thought of as the main mathematical underlying reason
why quantum theory is non realist. The interpretation which comes out is the well known Copen-
hagen interpretation of quantum theory, which is an instrumentalist interpretation. However, such an
interpretation leads to many conceptual problems.
Topos quantum theory is a way of overcoming such problems by re-define quantum theory in the
novel language of topos theory. The advantage of this language is that it renders the theory more
realist, thus solving the above mentioned problems. In the process, however, one ends up with a
multivalued/intuitionistic logic rather than a Boolean logic.
2.1 Conceptual Problems in Quantum Theory
The first natural question to ask is: why do we need a topos reformulation of quantum theory?
The short answer is that such a reformulation is needed since it represents a candidate for solving
certain conceptual issues present in quantum theory, which derive from the mathematical formulation
of the theory. In particular, the canonical mathematical formulation of quantum theory leads to an
interpretation which has many conceptual obstacles to a fully coherent theory.
In order to understand the above mentioned issues present in quantum theory one needs to first
analyse in depths i) what a theory of physics really is and ii) what is it trying to achieve. Obviously we
will not be able to answer these questions fully or give them the attention they deserve since this would
go beyond the scope of theis course. However, we will try and give a brief overview of the situation.
2.1.1 What is a Theory of Physics and What is it Trying to Achieve?
A theory of physics can be seen as a mathematical model which tries to answer three of the fundamental
questions humanity has been and still is struggling to answer:
1. what is a thing. (Heidegger)
2. How are “things” related to one another.
3. How do we know 1) and 2).
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The first two questions are related to ontological1 issues while the third is of an epistemological2 nature.
The two main theories which presuppose to answer the above questions are
• Classical physics.
• Quantum theory.
The way in which these two theories have answered the above questions is by defining a mathemat-
ical model which is supposed to describe nature. The interpretation of this mathematical model then,
in turn, gives rise to a philosophical view of the world. In classical physics the mathematical model
developed is in accordance with our common believes of the world, which provides the desired answer.
In fact it is arguable whether our common believes modelled classical theory, but we will not delve into
this. On the other hand things are not so straightforward in quantum theory in which, as we will see,
the mathematical formalism of the theory seems, at time, to defy our commons sense.
In any case, in order to fully understand how a philosophical picture of the world can be derived
though the mathematical formulation of a theory of physics we need to refine the questions 1-3 defined
above (see [9] for an in depth discussion). In particular, any theory of physics worthy that name,
should address the following issues:
1. What is the system under investigation.
2. Ontological status of physical terms.
3. Epistemological status of physical terms.
4. Relation between the mathematical model and the physical world.
5. How physical statements can be verified or falsified.
6. Nature of space-time.
7. Meaning of probabilities (if they arise in the theory).
As we will see, the different answers given to the above issues by classical theory and quantum
theory, respectively, will hilight the radical differences between the two theories and the different
interpretations each of them gives to the “outside world”.
Mathematical tools used to describe a physical system encode philosophical position regarding the world.
In the following subsection we will briefly analyse how questions 1-7 are dealt with in classical
physics. However we will not address all of them, since that would require more than a course (probably
several) to do so, but we will only focus on certain crucial aspects which are essential in understanding
the philosophical position of classical theory
2.1.2 Philosophical Position of Classical Theory.
When studying classical physics we develops an image of the world which is in accordance to our
common sense. In fact classical theory is such that
i) properties can be ascribed to a system at any given time and do not depend on the act of
measuring;
1Ontology comes from the Greek word meaning “being, that which is” and indicates the study of what things are in
themselves and what can be said to exist.
2Epistemology comes from the Greek word meaning “knowledge” and it is the study concerning what is knowledge
and how do we gain knowledge.
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ii) the underlying logic is Boolean (classical) logic3 which is the same logic we employ in our language.
Generally speaking a theory with the above mentioned properties is called a realist theory. We will
analyse later on, in more details, what exactly are the underlying assumptions which make classical
physics a realist theory but, for now, it suffices to say that the realism of classical physics is associated
to the way in which objects and knowledge of such objects are mathematically expressed.
The realism of classical theory implies that a thing is defined4 in terms of a bundle of properties
which are said to belong to the thing (system). The type of properties that we are dealing with are of
two kinds:
1. Internal properties which belong exclusively to the system, for example the mass, charge etc.
2. External properties which define relations to other systems, for example position, velocity etc.
When defining what a thing is one usually considers internal properties.
In classical physics epistemological questions are answered through the process of measurement. In
fact measurement enables us to know the values of a given system. However, although in the actual
process of measurement there is a momentary distinction between object and subject, such a distinction
has a purely functional role, not an actual distinction. In fact both object and subject, as viewed from
a classical perspective, exist out there independently of one another. This, in turn, implies that no
special role is ascribed to measurement, i.e. in classical physics measurement is just another form of
interaction.
Finally it is worth mentioning that, generally, classical theory is thought of as being a deterministic
theory5, i.e. given initial state of a system at a given time, it is possible to predict with certainty the
state of the system at a subsequent time.
From the above discussion it emerges that the mathematical structure of classical theory implies an
interpretation of the theory which is realist. In fact the mathematical model of classical theory induces
a conceptual descriptions of various elements in the theory which, in turn, imply a realist philosophy
of the outside world.
So the natural question to ask at this point is: what are the mathematical constructs whose
definition ( and in particular the way in which they are defined) directly imply a realist interpretation
of classical theory?
The answer to this question will be given in detail in subsequent lessons, but for now we will restrict
ourselves in answering it in a very conceptual way, so as to give a general idea of the relation between
mathematical constructs and induced philosophical ideas.
The elements/concepts whose mathematical description render classical theory a realist theory are
the following:
1. State space. In classical physics the state space S is defined to be the collection of all states si ∈ S
of the system, such that each si at a given time ti embodies all the properties of the system at
that time.
2. Definition of physical quantities (see lecture 6)
3. Definition of propositions. See lecture 6
4. Boolean logic. The logic governing classical propositions is Boolean logic which is a distributive
logic, which admits only two truth values: {true, false}. Verification of such truth values is
done through the measurement interaction.
3Boolean logic will be described later on in the course. For now we will simply say that Boolean logic is the logic we
use in our every day thinking and in our language. Such a logic is characterised by the fact that i) it is distributive, ii)
it only has two truth values {true, false} and iii) the logical connectives are our linguistic logical connectives: “and ”,
“exclusive or”, “not”, “if then”.
4It is worth noting that our own language reflects a realist view of the world: “ The tree is three meters tall”.
5In a stochastic approach the realist conditions i) and ii) at the beginning of the section still hold.
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5. Probabilities. Classical probabilities are defined as follows:
positive possible outcomes
all admissible outcomes
Later in the course we will describe, in details, how the above classical concepts are mathematically
represented but, for now, it suffices to say that it is precisely the way in which the above elements of
the theory are mathematically expressed which renders classical theory a realist theory. In fact, when
considering quantum theory we will see how the same elements are mathematically described in a very
different way. This will induce a different conceptual understanding of such elements which, in turn,
will imply a different philosophical interpretation of the theory.
2.1.3 Philosophy Behind Quantum Theory
What can be said about the philosophical position of quantum theory? If we analyse the mathematical
formalism of quantum theory we immediately realise that the theory is non-realist (with the definition
of realist given above). In fact the above conditions [i), ii)] do not strictly hold6 in quantum theory,
since the formalism of the latter implies a clear distinction between measuring apparatus and measuring
system, such that the act of measuring gets ascribed a special status. In this setting, measurement
becomes a means for assigning a probabilistic spread of outcomes rather than a means to determine
properties of the system. In fact the very concept of properties ceases to have its common sense
meaning since its definition is now intertwined with the act of measurement. It is as if properties
acquire the status of latent attributes which are brought into existence by the act of measurement, but
which can not be said to exist independently of such measurement. Therefore it becomes meaningless
to talk about a physical system as possessing properties. The interpretation that results is the so called
instrumentalist interpretation of quantum theory which is a non-realist interpretation.
So the feature of quantum theory which render it non-realist can be summarised as follows:
1. Properties can not be said to be possessed by a system a priori . All that can be said is that
after a measurement is performed the system “acquires” the “latent” properties (state-vector
reductio).
2. Any statement regarding ‘states of affairs’ about a system can only be made a posteriori after
measurement. However such statements can not be regarded as describing properties of the
system, on the contrary, it describes probabilities of possible measurement outcomes.
3. Measurement becomes a very special type of interaction.
4. Clear distinction between observe and observed system.
5. States are not seen as bearers of physical properties but are simply the most efficient tools
to enable one to determine/compute predictions for possible measurements, i.e. predictions of
probabilities of outcomes not outcomes themselves.
6. Quantum theory is deterministic but what evolves are now predicted probabilities of measurement
results, not actual measurements.
7. Relative frequency interpretation of probabilities.
The above features of quantum theory which directly derive from the mathematical representation
of the theory imply a non realist interpretation of quantum theory.
Such an interpretation, although works for some situations, causes various conceptual problems in
the context of quantum gravity and quantum cosmology. These difficulties are the following:
6We will clarify this later on in the lecture.
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• Notions of ‘measurement’ and ‘external observer’ pose problems when dealing with cosmology.
In fact, in this case there can be no external observer since we are dealing with a closed sys-
tem. But this then implies that the concept of ‘measurement’ plays no fundamental role which,
in turn, implies that the standard definition of probabilities, in terms of relative frequency of
measurements, breaks down.
• The existence of the Planck scale suggests that there is no a priori justification for the adoption
of the notion of a continuum in the quantum theory used in formulating quantum gravity.
• Standard quantum theory employs in its formulation the use of a fixed spatio-temporal structure
(fixed background). This is needed to make sense of its instrumentalist interpretation, i.e. it needs
a space-time in which to make a measurement. This fixed background seems to cause problems
in quantum gravity where one is trying to make measurements of space-time properties. In fact,
if the action of making a measurement requires a space time background, what does it mean to
measure space time properties?
• Given the concept of superposition present in quantum theory, by applying such concept to
quantum gravity we would have to account for the occurrence of quantum superpositions of
eignestate properties of space, time and space-time.
In the following section we will analyse one of the main theorems (another one would be Bell’s
inequality) which states the impossibility of quantum theory, as it is canonically expressed, to be a
realist theory.
2.2 Kochen Specker Theorem
The Kochen-Specker theorem derives from the incompatibility of two assumptions regarding observ-
ables in quantum theory, namely [9] [10].
1. The need of assigning simultaneous values to all observables in O (collection of all self-adjoint
operators on H).
2. The need for the values of observables to be “mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustable”7
[10].
It follows that the Kochen-Specker theorem is related to the existence, in quantum theory, of a value
function (to be defined) V ∶ O → R from the set of self-adjoint operators (which are the quantum
analogues of physical quantities) to the Reals.
2.2.1 Valuation Function
To understand what a valuation function is let us first analyse how it is defined in classical theory.
2.2.1.1 Valuation Function in Classical Theory
Before giving the definition of what a valuation function is in classical physics we first of all have to
define how a physical quantity is mathematically described in classical physics.
Namely, in classical physics physical quantities are represented by functions from the state space
to the reals. Thus, each physical quantity, A, is represented by a function fA ∶ S → R, such that for
each state si ∈ S, fA(si) ∈ R represents the value of A given the state si. This association of physical
quantities with real valued functions on the state space is 1:1 ( one-2-one: for each quantity A there
corresponds one and only one function fA).
7Mutually exclusive means that only one value of an observable can be realised at a given time, while collectively
exhaustible means that at least one of the values has to be realised at a given time.
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Given the definition of physical quantity in terms of maps on the state space, the definition of
valuation function in classical physics is straightforward. In particular, a valuation function is defined,
for each state si in the state space S, as a map
Vsi ∶ O → R (2.2.1)
from the set of observables (physical quantities) O to the reals, such that for each A ∈ O we obtain:
A↦ Vsi(A) ∶= fA(si) (2.2.2)
where Vsi(A) represents the value of the physical quantity A given the state si.
A condition such a valuation function has to satisfy is the so called functional composition condition
(FUNC) which is defined as follows:
for any h ∶ R → R, Vsi(h(A)) = h(Vsi(A)) (2.2.3)
In this equation h(A) ∈ O and is defined in terms of composition of functions:
h(A) ∶= h ○ fA ∶ S fAÐ→ R hÐ→ R (2.2.4)
IfA represents the physical quantity energy, and h is a function which defines the square, i.e. h(A) = A2,
what equation 2.2.3 would mean is: “the value of the energy squared is equal to the square of the value
of the energy”.
2.2.1.2 Valuation Function in Quantum Theory
If we were to mimic classical theory then we would define a valuation function as follows:
for each state ψ ∈H the valuation function is a function from the set of self-adjoint operators (quantum
analogues of physical quantities) to the reals
V∣ψ⟩ ∶ O → R (2.2.5)
Such that, for each state ∣ψ⟩, V∣ψ⟩ assigns to each self-adjoint operator Aˆ ∈ O, a real number
V∣ψ⟩(Aˆ) ∈ R that represents the value of Aˆ for the state ∣ψ⟩ of the system.
However this definition of a valuation function only makes sense if ∣ψ⟩ is an eigenvector of Aˆ. Other
than that special case, the above definition of a valuation function does not really make sense. So the
question is how to generalise it for an arbitrary state ∣ψ⟩? A possible generalisation is the following:
Definition 2.2.1. A valuation function for quantum theory is a map V ∶ O → R which satisfies the
following two conditions:
i) For each Aˆ ∈ O, V (Aˆ) ∈ R represents the value of the operator Aˆ and it belongs to the spectrum
of Aˆ.
ii) FUNC. For all h ∶ R → R the following holds
V (h(Aˆ)) = h(V (Aˆ)) (2.2.6)
Any function satisfying the above conditions is a valuation function.
At this point it is worth understanding, explicitly, what h(Aˆ) is.
What is h(Aˆ)?
Given a self-adjoint operator Aˆ we have two situations:
9
i) Let ∣ψ⟩ ∈ H be an eigenvector of Aˆ, i.e. Aˆ∣ψ⟩ = a∣ψ⟩. It is then straightforward to define the
following:
Aˆ2∣ψ⟩ = a2∣ψ⟩; Aˆ3∣ψ⟩ = a3∣ψ⟩ (2.2.7)
Thus, generalising for any polynomial function Q we obtain
Q(Aˆ)∣ψ⟩ =Q(a)∣ψ⟩ (2.2.8)
Provided Q(a) is well defined. Given the above we are justified in defining, for any function
h ∶ R→ R the following:
h(Aˆ)∣ψ⟩ = h(a)∣ψ⟩ (2.2.9)
Again, provided h(a) is well defined, (ex. not infinite).
ii) We now would like to generalise it to arbitrary states, not just eigenvectors. To this end we
recall that the set of eigenvectors of a self-adjoint operator forms an orthonormal basis for H.
This means that any state ∣ψ⟩ ∈ H can be written in terms of such an orthonormal basis. Thus,
considering the case in which Aˆ has a discrete spectrum (all that follows can be easily generalised
for the continuum case8) the spectral decomposition of Aˆ is
Aˆ ∶=
M
∑
m=1
amPˆm (2.2.10)
where {a1⋯am} is the set of eigenvalues of Aˆ, while each Pˆm is the projection operator onto the
subspace of eigenvectors with eigenvalue am. In particular
Pˆm ∶=
d(m)
∑
j=1
∣am, j⟩⟨am, j∣ (2.2.11)
Here j = 1⋯d(m) labels the degenerate eigenvectors with common eigenvalue am. In this setting
any state ∣ψ⟩ can be written as follows
∣ψ⟩ =
M
∑
m=1
d(m)
∑
j=1
⟨am, j∣ψ⟩∣am, j⟩ (2.2.12)
Keeping this in mind, and inspired by case (i) above we define
h(Aˆ)∣ψ⟩ ∶=
M
∑
m=1
d(m)
∑
j=1
h(am)⟨am, j∣ψ⟩∣am, j⟩ (2.2.13)
=
M
∑
m=1
h(am)Pˆm∣ψ⟩ (2.2.14)
Obviously this makes sense iff f(am) is well defined.
Since definition 2.2.13 is valid for all ∣ψ⟩ ∈H it follows that
h(Aˆ) ∶=
M
∑
m=1
d(m)
∑
j=1
∣am, j⟩⟨am, j∣ =
M
∑
m=1
h(am)Pˆm (2.2.15)
8In lecture 6/7 we will explain, in detail, what e spectral decomposition is, but for now we will simply state that each
self-adjoint operator Aˆ can be written as Aˆ = ∫σ(A) λdEˆ
Aˆ
λ
Such an expression is called the spectral decomposition of Aˆ.
Here σ(A) ⊆ R represents the spectrum of the operator Aˆ and {EˆAˆ
λ
∣λ ∈ σ(Aˆ)} is the spectral family of Aˆ. In the discrete
case we would have Aˆ = ∑σ(A) λPˆ
Aˆ
λ
, where the projection operators Pˆ Aˆ
λ
project on subspaces of the Hilbert space for
which the states ψ have value λ of A.
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The Conditions FUNC Entails
The conditions on the valuation function implied by FUNC are:
1. The sum rule
V (Aˆ + Bˆ) = V (Aˆ) + V (Bˆ) (2.2.16)
where Aˆ and Bˆ are such that [Aˆ, Bˆ] = 0.
Proof. To prove the above result we need the following theorem:
Theorem 2.2.1. : Given any pair of self-adjoint operators Aˆ and Bˆ, such that [Aˆ, Bˆ] = 0 and
two functions f, g ∶ R → R, then there exists a third operator Cˆ such that Aˆ = f(Cˆ) and Bˆ = g(Cˆ).
Given two commuting operators Aˆ and Bˆ from the above theorem it follows that Aˆ = f(Cˆ)
and Bˆ = g(Cˆ), therefore there exists a function h = f + g ((f + h)(x) ∶= f(x) + h(x)) such that
Aˆ + Bˆ = h(Cˆ), therefore
V (Aˆ + Bˆ) = V (h(Cˆ))
= h(V (Cˆ))
= f(V (Cˆ)) + g(V (Cˆ))
= V (f(Cˆ)) + V (g(Cˆ))
= V (Aˆ) + V (Bˆ)
2. The product rule
V (AˆBˆ) = V (Aˆ)V (Bˆ) (2.2.17)
where Aˆ and Bˆ are such that [Aˆ, Bˆ] = 0
Proof. Given Aˆ = f(Cˆ) and Bˆ = g(Cˆ) there exists a function k = fg (fg(x) ∶= f(x)g(x)) such
that AˆBˆ = k(Cˆ) therefore
V (AˆBˆ) = V (k(Cˆ))
= k(V (Cˆ))
= f(V (Cˆ))g(V (Cˆ))
= V (f(Cˆ)) ⋅ V (g(Cˆ))
= V (Aˆ)V (Bˆ)
As a consequence of the product and sum rules we obtain the following equalities:
V∣ψ⟩(1ˆ) = 1
V∣ψ⟩(0ˆ) = 0
V∣ψ⟩(Pˆ ) = 0 or 1
(2.2.18)
Proof. 1. Given any physical quantity B (with associated self-adjoint operator Bˆ), from the product
rule we have that, for Aˆ ∶= 1ˆ, the following relation holds:
V (1ˆBˆ) = V (Bˆ) = V (1ˆ)V (Bˆ) = V (Bˆ) (2.2.19)
This implies that V (1ˆ) = 1.
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2. Given any physical quantity B (with associated self-adjoint operator Bˆ), from the sum rule we
have that, for Aˆ ∶= 0ˆ, the following relation holds:
V (0ˆ + Bˆ) = V (Bˆ) = V (0ˆ) + V (Bˆ) = V (Bˆ) (2.2.20)
This implies that V (0ˆ) = 0.
3. Given a projection operator Pˆ we know that Pˆ 2 = Pˆ therefore
(V (Pˆ)2 = V (Pˆ 2) = V (Pˆ) (2.2.21)
It follows that
V (Pˆ ) = 1 or 0 (2.2.22)
Since quantum propositions can be expressed as projection operators (the reason will be explained
later on in the course), what the last result implies is that, for any given state Sψ⟩, the valuation
function can only assign value true or false to propositions.
Since the set of all eigenvectors of a self-adjoint operator Aˆ forms an orthonormal basis for H,
then we can define the resolution of unity in terms of the projection operators corresponding to the
eignevectors:
1ˆ =
M
∑
m=1
Pˆm (2.2.23)
From 2.2.16, 2.2.17, 2.2.18 and 2.2.23 we conclude (for discreet case but it can easily be extended to
the continuous case)
V (1ˆ) = V  M∑
m=1
Pˆm = M∑
m=1
V (Pˆm) = 1 (2.2.24)
What this equation means is that one and only one of the projectors that form the resolution of
unity gets assigned the value 1 (true), while the rest gets assigned the value 0 (false), i.e. the value
assignment is said to be “ mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive” [10]. However, the Kochen-
Specker theorem will show that it is impossible to give simultaneous values to all observables associated
with a set of self-adjoint operators, in such a way that the values are “mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive”. Since the property of values of being “mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive” is
a consequence of FUNC, it is worth analysing how the condition FUNC is derived from the formalism
of Quantum theory.
FUNC is a direct consequence of three assumptions and a principle present in quantum theory :
1) Statistical functional compositional principle:given a self-adjoint operator Aˆ that represents
an observable A and a function f ∶ R → R, then for an arbitrary real number a we have the
following equality:
prob[V (f(Aˆ)) = a] = prob[f(V (Aˆ)) = a]
In order to prove the above principle we have to define the relation between projector operators
and their respective characteristic functions.
Let us consider the following characteristic function χr such that
χr(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if t = r
0 otherwise
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It then follows that, given a self-adjoint operator Aˆ, whose spectral decomposition (assume
discrete) contains the spectral projector Pˆm, one can write:
χr(Aˆ) ∶= M∑
m=1
χr(am)Pˆm =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
Pˆm if am = r
0 otherwise
(2.2.25)
What equation 2.2.25 uncovers is that χr(Aˆ) = Pˆm iff r is the eigenvalue am of Aˆ. Moreover,
given a function f ∶ σ(Aˆ)→ R (where σ(Aˆ) represents the spectrum of Aˆ) we have:
χr(f(Aˆ)) = χf−1(a)(Aˆ) (2.2.26)
We know that the statistical algorithm [9] for projection operators is
prob(V ( ˆ(A) = am) = Tr(PˆmPˆ∣ψ⟩) (2.2.27)
where Pˆ∣ψ⟩ ∶= Sψ⟩⟨ψS. This means that if a measurement of an observable A is made on a system
in state Sψ⟩, then the probability of obtaining as a result the eigenvalue am is given by 2.2.27.
Therefore from 2.2.25 and 2.2.27 we get
prob(V (Aˆ) = am) = Tr(χam(Aˆ)Pˆ∣ψ⟩)
We can now prove the statistical functional compositional principle.
Proof. Using equations: 2.2.25 ,2.2.27 and 2.2.26 we can write the statistical algorithm for pro-
jector operators as follows:
prob(V (f(A)) = b) = Tr((χf−1(b)(Aˆ)Pˆ∣ψ⟩)
= Tr(Pˆf−1(b)Pˆ∣ψ⟩)
= prob(V∣ψ⟩(A) = f−1(b))
but
V (A) = f−1(b) ⇔ f(V (A)) = b
therefore
prob(V (f(A)) = b) = prob(f(V (A)) = b)
2) Non-contextuality: the value of observables is independent of the measurement context, i.e.
the value of each observable is independent of any other observables evaluated at the same time.
3) Value definiteness: observables possess definite values at all times.
4) Value realism: to each real number α, such that α = prob(V (Aˆ) = β), for an operator Aˆ there
corresponds an observable A with value β.
From the above conditions (1),(2),(3) and (4) the FUNC condition follows.
Proof. Consider an observable B represented by the self-adjoint operator Bˆ. From (3) we deduce that
Bˆ possesses a value: V (Bˆ) = b. Given a function f ∶ R → R we obtain the quantity f(V (Bˆ)) = f(b) = a.
Applying (1) we get prob[f(V (Bˆ)) = a] = prob[V (f(Bˆ)) = a] which means that there exists a self-
adjoint operator of the form f(Bˆ). From (4) it then follows that the corresponding observable for
f(Bˆ) has value (a), therefore f(V (Bˆ)) = V (f(Bˆ)). From (2) this result is unique, therefore FUNC
follows.
We now state the Kochen-Specker theorem.
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Theorem 2.2.2. Kochen-Specker Theorem: if the dimension of H is greater than 2 then, there
does not exist any valuation function V ∶ O → R from the set O of all bounded self-adjoint operators Aˆ
of H to the reals R, such that the functional composition principle is satisfied for all Aˆ ∈ O.
Another way of stating the theorem which seems more useful for developing a proof is the following:
Theorem 2.2.3. Kochen-Specker Theorem: Given a Hilbert space H such that dim(H) > 2 and
a set O of self-adjoint operators Aˆ which represent observables, then the following two statements are
contradictory:
1. all observables associated with projectors in O have values simultaneously, i.e. they are mapped
uniquely onto the reals.
2. the values of observables follow the functional composition principle (FUNC).
2.3 Proof of Kochen-Specker Theorem
There are various proofs of the Kochen-Specker Theorem. We will report a simplified version of the
proof due to Kernaghan (1994) [11].
In the previous section we saw that the properties of the valuation functions implied that V can
only assign the value true or false to any projection operator Pˆ , in such a way that this assignment is
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustible.
A special case would be when Pˆi ∶= Sei⟩⟨eiS where {Se1⟩, Se2⟩,⋯, Sen⟩} is an orthonormal basis of the
Hilbert space Hn. In this setting the valuation function must assign the value 1 to only one of the
projection operators and zero to all the rest. Moreover, if the same projection operator belongs to two
different ONB, the value assigned to this projection operator by V has to be the same, independently
to which set it is considered to belong. This is what it is meant by non-contextuality. Kernaghan,
in his proof of the K-S theorem considers a real 4 dimensional Hilbert space H4 (there is no loss in
generality in considering the Hilbert space to be real). He then chooses 11 sets of 4 orthogonal vectors.
Each vector is contained in either 2 of these sets or 4, so that there is some correlations between the
ONB. The Kochen-Specker theorem then reduces to a colouring problem, i.e. “within every set of
orthogonal vectors in H4 exactly one must be coloured white (1, true) while the remaining black (0,
false)”. Writing down this collection of vectors, we would end up with the following table where each
column denotes a set of 4 orthogonal vectors in a particular ONB:
∣e1⟩ 1,0,0,0 1,0,0,0 1,0,0,0 1,0,0,0 -1,1,1,1 -1,1,1,1 1,-1,1,1 1,1,-1,1 0,1,-1,0 0,0,1,-1 1,0,1,0
∣e2⟩ 0,1,0,0 0,1,0,0 0,0,1,0 0,0,0,1 1,-1,1,1 1,1,-1,1 1,1,-1,1 1,1,1,-1 1,0,0,-1 1,-1,0,0 0,1,0,1
∣e3⟩ 0,0,1,0 0,0,1,1 0,1,0,1 0,1,1,0 1,1,-1,1 1,0,1,0 0,1,1,0 0,0,1,1 1,1,1,1 1,1,1,1 1,1,-1,-1
∣e4⟩ 0,0,0,1 0,0,1,-1 0,1,0,-1 0,1,-1,0 1,1,1,-1 0,1,0,-1 1,0,0,-1 1,-1,0,0 1,-1,-1,1 1,1,-1,-1 1,-1,-1,1
We now want to assign value true (colour white) to one and only one projection operator associated
to each vector in each column. This requirement represents condition 2.2.24 above. However, it is easy
to see from the table that such condition (2.2.24) is not satisfied. In fact, if it were satisfied we would
end up with 11 entries being coloured white, since each column would have exactly one entry that is
coloured white and there are 11 columns. But, since each vector appears twice we end up with an even
number of white entries which is greater than 11. Therefore, we conclude that it is impossible to obtain
a colouring of a set of orthogonal vectors that is consistent with condition 2.2.24. Remember that we
have assumed a non-contextual assignment of the entries, i.e. we are assuming that same vectors get
assigned same colour independently of the column they belong to.
Although this is a very simplified version of the proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem, the main
idea is the same as the main idea in the original proof, namely: given a set of orthogonal vectors in H
it is impossible to assign to each of them a set of numbers {1,0,0,0....0} where only one entry is equal
to 1, i.e. it is impossible to give simultaneous values to all observables while respecting the FUNC
condition.
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2.4 Consequences of the Kochen-Specker Theorem
The implications of the Kochen-Specker theorem is that one or both of the following two assumptions
must be dropped:
i The set of truth values is represented by {0,1}.
ii The functional composition principle.
In the topos approach we abandon the idea that the set of truth values is only {0,1}. In fact in this
approach we utilise a multivalued logic which, in turn, will imply the adoption of an intuitionistic logic.
On the other hand, abandoning FUNC would entail abandoning some or all of the three assumptions:
1. Non-contextuality
2. Value Definiteness
3. Value Realism
from which it derives.
In particular, if the FUNC principle gets dropped, then quantum theory turns out to be contextual
and non-realist. To understand this situation we first have to introduce the notion of simultaneously
measurable observables:
Definition 2.4.1. Given two observables Aˆ and Bˆ we say that they are simultaneously measurable
iff [AˆBˆ] = 0.
Let us now consider two observables: Aˆ, Bˆ, such that [Aˆ, Bˆ] ≠ 0, and Aˆ and Bˆ have a common
projection in their spectral decomposition
Aˆ = a1Pˆ + a2Pˆa2 + a3Pˆa3 (2.4.1)
Bˆ = b1Pˆ + b2Pˆb2 + b3Pˆb3 (2.4.2)
From equation 2.2.25 it follows that Pˆ can be expressed in terms of Aˆ or of Bˆ, i.e.:
Pˆ = χa1(Aˆ) ∶=
M
∑
m=1
χa1(am)Pˆam
Pˆ = χb1(Bˆ) ∶=
M
∑
m=1
χb1(bm)Pˆbm
Since commuting operators correspond to orthogonal operators, then, if we choose to express Pˆ in
terms of Aˆ i.e. Pˆ = χa1(Aˆ) the commuting operators of Pˆ are: Pˆa2 , Pˆa3 ,Pˆ ∨ Pˆa2 ,Pˆ ∨ Pˆa3 and Pˆ ⊥. If,
instead, we choose to express Pˆ in terms of Bˆ, i.e. Pˆ = χb1(Bˆ), then the commuting operators of Pˆ
would be: Pˆb2 , Pˆb3 ,Pˆ ∨ Pˆb2 ,Pˆ ∨ Pˆb3 and Pˆ
⊥.
Now, as a consequence of the FUNC condition we obtain that
V (Pˆ ) = V (χa1(Aˆ) = χa1(V (Aˆ)) (2.4.3)
V (Pˆ ) = V (χb1(Bˆ) = χb1(V (Bˆ)) (2.4.4)
which implies that χa1(V (Aˆ)) = χb1(V (Bˆ)).
However if the FUNC condition does not hold, then we have that
χa1(V (Aˆ)) ≠ χb1(V (Bˆ)) (2.4.5)
What this implies is that the value of Pˆ will depend on whether Pˆ is considered as belonging to the
spectral decomposition of Aˆ or that of Bˆ. In fact let us assume that χa1(V (Aˆ)) = 1, which means
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that V (Aˆ) = a1. Since a1 is the eigenvalue with corresponding projection operator Pˆ , then it follows
that V (Pˆ ) = 1, since Pˆ projects on the subspace of eigenvectors which have eigenvalue precisely a1.
However, if χa1(V (Aˆ)) ≠ χb1(V (Bˆ)), then χb1(V (Bˆ)) ≠ 1 which must imply (since it is a characteristic
function) that χb1(V (Bˆ)) = 0. If this is the case then Pˆ is false, i.e. V (Pˆ) = 0.
As a consequence of the above, a physical quantity A is not represented by a unique operator
in quantum theory. On the contrary, each operator has different meaning depending on what other
operators are considered at the same time. This implies that the quantisation map A ↦ Aˆ is one to
many.
The contextuality derived from dropping FUNC has great impact on the ‘realism’ of quantum
theory. In fact, when one says that a given quantity has a certain value, we mean that that quantity
“possesses” that value, and the concept of “possession” is independent of the context chosen. However,
if our theory is contextual, what does it mean exactly that a quantity has a given value? It would
seem that in a contextual theory there is not room for a realist interpretation. In fact, if we measured
two pair of quantities (A,B) and (A,C) and obtained the values (a, b) and (a′ , c), respectively, such
that a ≠ a′ , then what values does the quantity A actually posses9?
Thus, if one drops the FUNC principle we would end up with a non-realist contextual interpretation
of quantum theory, which clashes with the realism of classical physics and our common sense.
The question then arises: what if, instead, we dropped the first assumption, namely if we allowed for
the truth values to be in some larger set other than the set {0,1}? This is precisely what is done in topos
quantum theory. In fact in this setting the FUNC principle is conserved, but the set of truth values
is replaced by some larger set than simply {0,1} leading to a multivalued logic. The interpretation
we end up with is not strictly realist, due to the multivalued nature of the resulting logic. However
we reach a more realist interpretation of the theory since now it makes sense to say that values are
possessed by quantities in a context independent way.
At this stage it should be pointed out that in the topos formulation of quantum theory there will
be the notion of contextuality albeit its interpretation will be very different, thus it will not impinge
on the notion of realism (of the interpretation).
9It should be noted that the probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are not affected by the notion of contextuality.
In fact, the result of measuring a property A of a system does not depend on what else is measured at the same time,
since the probability of obtaining am as the value of A will always be ⟨∣ψ∣Pˆam ∣ψ⟩.
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Chapter 3
Lecture 2/3
I this lectures I will explain how, in order to work with category theory, one has to change from
an internal description of mathematical objects (as is done in set theory) to an external/relational
description. To fully understand this change in perspective I will describe how the axioms of a group
can be given by both an internal perspective and an external one.
I will then give an axiomatic definition of what a category is, introducing also the concept of a sub-
category. This will be augmented with various examples of categories and a list of the most common
categories which appear in physics.
I will conclude with the concept of duality, very important in category theory and in what we will be
doing in the rest of the course.
3.1 Change of Perspective
“Category Theory allows you to work on structures without the need first to pulverize them into set
theoretic dust” (Corfiel).
The above quotation explains, in a rather pictorial way, what category theory and, in particular
topos theory are really about. In fact, category theory and, in particular, topos theory allow to abstract
from the specification of points (elements of a set) and functions between these points to a universe of
discourse in which the basic elements are arrows, and any property is given in terms of compositions
of arrows.
The reason for the above characterisation is that the underlining philosophy behind category theory
(and topos theory) is that of describing mathematical objects from an external point of view, i.e. in
terms of relations.
This is in radical contrast to set theory, whose approach is essentially internal in nature. By this we
mean that the basic/primitive notions of what sets are and the belonging relations between sets, are
defined in terms of the elements which belong to the sets in question, i.e. an internal perspective.
In order to be able to implement the notion of external definition we first need to define two
important notions i) the notion of a map or arrow, which is simply an abstract characterisation1 of
the notion of a function between sets; ii) the notion of an “equation” in categorical language. We will
first start with the notion of a map.
Given two general objects A and B ( not necessarily sets) an arrow f is said to have domain A
and codomain B if it goes from A to B, i.e. f ∶ A → B. It is convention to denote A = dom(f) and
B = cod(f).
1By abstract characterisation here we mean a notion that does not depend on the sets or objects between which the
arrow is defined
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We will often draw such an arrow as follows:
A
f
Ð→ B (3.1.1)
Given two arrows f ∶ A → B and g ∶ B → C, such that cod(f) = dom(g) then we can compose the
two arrows obtaining g ○ f ∶ A→ C. The property of composition is drawn as follows:
A
f
Ð→ B
g
Ð→ C (3.1.2)
For each object (or set A) there always exists and identity arrow idA ∶ A→ A
idA ∶ A→ A, such that idA(a) = a∀ a ∈ A (3.1.3)
The collection of arrows between various objects satisfy two laws:
i) Associativity: given three arrows f ∶ A → B, g ∶ B → C and h ∶ C → D with appropriate domain
and codomain relations, we then have
h ○ (g ○ f) = (h ○ g) ○ f (3.1.4)
ii) Unit law : given f ∶ A→ B, idA ∶ A→ A and idB ∶ B → B the following holds
f ○ idA = f = idB ○ f (3.1.5)
The next step is to try and define the analogue of an equation in an abstract categorical language.
This is done through the notion of commutative diagrams. So, what is a diagram? A diagram is
defined as follows:
Definition 3.1.1. A graph is a collection of vertices ●xi and directed edges e ∶ ●x1 → ●x2 where ●x1
is the source vertex while ●x2 is the target. If the vertices are labelled by objects Xi and the edges are
labeled by an arrow, such that each e ∶ ●x1 → ●x2 is now labelled as f ∶ X1 → X2, then we say that the
graph is actually a diagram.
A typical diagram will be either a triangle or a square
X1
f

h
  ❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆
X2
g // X3
X4
i

j // X1
f

X5
k // X2
An “equation” is then given by the concept of commutativity, i.e. we say that the above diagrams
commute iff
g ○ f = h; f ○ j = k ○ i (3.1.6)
Care should be taken since commutativity is not as strict a condition as one might think. In particular,
if we have the following commuting diagram
A
g // B
f //
h
// C
we can only imply that f ○ g = h ○ g, but not that f = h
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Obviously diagrams can be combined together to form a bigger diagram, as long as the rules per-
taining composition of arrows hold. Thus, considering the commuting diagrams in the above example
we can combine them to obtain
X4
i

j // X1
f

h
  ❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆
X5
k // X2
g // X3
An important theorem in diagram language is the following:
consider the diagram
A

// B

// C

D // E // F
If any two of the three rectangles commute then so will the remaining one.
Now that we know how arrows and “equations” are defined we are ready to give some examples
of how the same concepts can be described both internally, using set theory and externally, using a
categorical language.
internal external
Element a ∈ S a=f(∗)↔ {∗} fÐ→ S
Subset A ⊆ S ↔ S → {0,1}
Associative binary operation a ⋅ (b ⋅ c) = (a ⋅ b) ⋅ c ∀a, b, c ∈ S ↔ µ ∶ S × S → S, such that
S × S × S
µ×idS //
idS×µ

S × S
µ

S × S
µ // S
commutes.
It is interesting how the definition and the axioms of a group can be described in an external way.
In particular, we have
1. Associativity: (∀g1, g2, g3 ∈ G, g1(g2g3) = (g1g2)g3).
µ ○ (idG × µ) = µ ○ (µ × idG) (3.1.7)
where
µ ∶ G ×G → G (3.1.8)
⟨g1, g2⟩ ↦ g1g2 (3.1.9)
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and
idG ∶ G → G (3.1.10)
g ↦ g (3.1.11)
Equivalently, associativity can be defined as the condition by which the diagram below commutes
G ×G ×G
µ×idG //
idG×µ

G ×G
µ

G ×G
µ // G
2. Identity Element : (∀g ∈ G, ge = eg = g)
µ ○ (idG × ke) = µ ○ (ke × idG) = idG (3.1.12)
where
ke ∶ G → G (3.1.13)
g ↦ ke(g) ∶= e (3.1.14)
is the constant map which maps each element to the identity element. So explicitly the identity
element condition is equivalent to the fact that the following diagram commutes
G
idG
##❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
idG×ke //
ke×idG

G ×G
µ

G ×G
µ // G
3. Inverse: (∀g ∈ G, gg−1 = g−1g = e).
The existence of an inverse can be written as follows:
µ ○ (idG × i) ○∆ = µ ○ (i × idG) ○∆ = ke (3.1.15)
where the diagonal map ∆ is
∆ ∶ G → G ×G (3.1.16)
g ↦ (g, g) (3.1.17)
while the inverse map is
i ∶ G → G (3.1.18)
g ↦ g−1 (3.1.19)
and
ke ∶ G → G (3.1.20)
g ↦ ke(g) ∶= e (3.1.21)
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is the constant map which maps each element to the identity element. Equivalently, the condition
of having an inverse can be represented by the following commuting diagram:
G
ke
✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
∆ //
∆

G ×G
idG×i

G ×G
i×idG

G ×G
µ

G ×G
µ // G
3.2 Axiomatic Definition of a Category
Definition 3.2.1. A (small2) category C consists of the following elements:
1. A collection Ob(C) of C-objects
2. For any two objects a, b ∈ Ob(C), a set MorC(a, b) of C-arrows (or C-morphisms) from a to b
3. Given any three objects a, b, c ∈ C, a map which represents composition operation
○ ∶MorC(b, c) ×MorC(a, b) → MorC(a, c) (3.2.1)
(f, g) ↦ f ○ g (3.2.2)
Composition is associative, i.e. for f ∈MorC(b, c), g ∈MorC(a, b) and h ∈MorC(c, d) we have
h ○ (f ○ g) = (h ○ f) ○ g (3.2.3)
which in diagrammatic form is the statement that the following diagram commutes
h○(f○g)

a
g //
h○f
❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃
(h○f)○g

b
f

f○g
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
d c
h
oo
4. For each object b ∈ C an identity morphisms idb ∈MorC(b, b), such that the following Identity law
holds: for all g ∈MorC(a, b) and f ∈MorC(b, c) then f = f ○ idb and g = idb ○ g. In diagrammatic
form this is represented by the fact that the diagram
a
g //
g
❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃ b
idb

f
❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃
b
f // c
commutes.
2A category C is called small if Ob(C) is a Set
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So, a category is essentially a collection of diagrams for which certain “equations” (commutative
relations) hold.
Definition 3.2.2. D is a subcategory of C, denoted D ⊆ C, if:
i) Ob(D) ⊆ Ob(C) as sets.
ii) For any two objects c, d ∈ Ob(D), then MorD(c, d) ⊆MorC(c, d).
Thus a subcategory is a sub-collection of objects with a sub-collection of graphs containing these
objects.
Definition 3.2.3. D is a full subcategory of C if an extra requirement is satisfied:
(iii) for any D-objects a and d, then MorD(a, b) =MorC(a, b).
Keeping with our graph description, a full subcategory is a sub-collection of objects but has the
same collection of graphs containing these objects
3.2.1 Examples of Categories
Example 3.2.1. Two object category
Simple example of a two element category is the following:
0
i0
 f01 // 1
i1

This category has 3 arrows:
• i0 ∶ 0→ 0 identity on 0.
• i1 ∶ 1→ 1 identity on 1.
• f01 ∶ 0→ 1.
it is easy to see that the composite arrows are: i0 ○ i0 = i0 ,i1 ○ i1 = i1 ,i1 ○ f01 = f01 and f01 ○ i1 = f01.
Example 3.2.2. Poset A poset is a set in which the elements are related by a partial order, i.e. not
all elements are related to each other. The definition of a poset is as follows:
Definition 3.2.4. Given a set P we call this a poset iff a partial order ≤ is defined on it. A partial
order is a binary relation ≤ on a set P , which has the following properties:
• Reflexivity: a ≤ a for all a ∈ P .
• Antysimmetry: if a ≤ b and b ≤ a, then a = b.
• Transitivity: If a ≤ b and b ≤ c, then a ≤ b.
An example of a poset is any set with an inclusion relation defined on it. Another example is R
with the usual ordering defined on it.
A poset forms a category whose objects are the elements of the poset and, given any two elements
p, q, there exists a map p → q iff p ≤ q in the poset ordering. We will be using such a (poset) category
quite often when defining a topos description of quantum theory. Thus, it is worth pointing out the
following:
Definition 3.2.5. Given two partial ordered sets P and Q, a map/arrow f ∶ P →Q is a partial order
homomorphisms (otherwise called monotone functions or order preserving functions) if
∀x, y ∈ P x ≤ y⇐⇒ f(x) ≤ f(y) (3.2.4)
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Homomorphisms are closed under composition. A trivial example of partial order homomorphisms
is given by the identity maps.
Example 3.2.3. Comma Category
This category (also called slice category) has as objects arrows with fixed domain or codomain, for
example C ↓ R is a comma category with:
• Objects: given A,B ∈ C, the respective objects in C ↓ R are arrows whose codomain is R, i.e.
f ∶ A→ R and g ∶ B → R also written as: (A,f) and (B,g).
• Morphisms: given two objects f and g we define an arrow between them as the arrow k ∶ A → B
in C such that,
A
k //
f
✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
B
g
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌
R
commutes in C ↓ R
The above definition of arrows in C ↓ R implies the following:
• Composition: given the two arrows j ∶ A → B and i ∶ B → C, their composition is defined by the
following commutative diagram:
A
j○i //
j
&&◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆
f
❁
❁❁
❁❁
❁❁
❁❁
❁❁
❁❁
❁❁
❁❁
C
h
  ✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
✁
B
i
88♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣
g

R
Basically you just glue triangles together.
• Identity: given an element f ∶ A→ R, its identity arrow is: idA ∶ (A,f) → (A,f)
A
idA //
f
✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
A
f
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌
R
It is interesting to note that, given a category C for any element A ∈ C we can form the comma category
C~A (C ↓ A) where objects in C~A are all morphisms in C with codomain A, while arrows between two
objects f ∶ B → A and g ∶ D → A are commutative diagrams in C, i.e.
B
h //
f
✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
D
g
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌
A
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For an object f ∶ B → A the identity arrow is simply idB ∶ B → B.
Example 3.2.4. Monoid
A monoid M is a one object category equipped with a binary operation on that object and a unit
element. In particular. the definition is as follows:
Definition 3.2.6. A monoid M is a triplet (M, *, i) such that,
• M is a Set.
• * is a map M ×M →M which is associative.
• i ∈M , such that ∀x ∈M i ∗ x = x ∗ i = x, where i is the two sided identity.
The ∗-map can be identified either with the tensor product or with the direct sum or with the direct
product according to which category M one is tacking into consideration.
Examples of monoinds are (N,+,0) and any type of group (G, ⋅, e).
It is also possible to compare two different monoids as follows:
Definition 3.2.7. Given two monoids M and N a map h ∶M → N is saied to be a monoid homomor-
phism iff
∀m1,m2 ∈M h(m1 ∗m2) = h(m1) ∗ h(m2), h(1) = 1 (3.2.5)
We will now give a list of various categories which are frequently used in physics.
Category Objects morphisms
Sets Sets functions
Top Topological space Continuous maps
Gr Groups Homomorphisms of groups
Ab Abelian groups Homomorphisms of groups
VectK Vector spaces over a filed K K-linear maps
Man Manifolds Smooth maps
Pos Partially ordered sets Monoton functions
N N Natural numbers
Set is a descrete category x ∈ Set Identity arrows
Preoder:P x ∈ P At most one arrow between any two objects.
3.3 The Duality Principle
A very important notion in category theory is the notion of duality. In particular, for any statement
(or “equation”) Y expressed in categorical language its dual Y op is obtained by replacing the domain
with the codomain and the codomain by the domain and reversing the order of arrow composition ,
i.e. h = g ○ f becomes h = f ○ g.
Thus, all arrows and diagrams in Y have the reverse direction in Y op, and the construction /notion
described by Y op is saied to be dual to the notion described by Y . Moreover, we also have the notion
of a dual category.
Definition 3.3.1. Given a category C the dual Cop is defined as follows:
Ob(Cop) ∶= Ob(C) MorCop(a, b) ∶=MorC(b, a) (3.3.1)
the composition law is:
given f ∈MorCop(a, b) and g ∈MorCop(b, c), then
g ○Cop f ∶= f ○C g (3.3.2)
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It is easy to see that (Cop)op = C for any category.
Therefore, given the construction Y op referred to a category C, this can be considered as the construc-
tion Y applied to the dual category Cop.
The notion of opposite categories leads to the very important notion of duality principle, by which a
statement Y is true in C iff its dual Y op is true in Cop. This principle allows us to prove various things
simultaneously. By this we mean that if we have a statement X , which holds in the category C, then
we immediately know that the statement Xop holds for Cop. Moreover, if we derive a theorem T from
the axioms of category theory, then such a theorem holds for any category C. However, by duality T op
holds for every category Cop. But each category can be written as the opposite of some other category
((Cop)op = C), therefore T op holds for all categories. Then the duality principle allows us to derive a
universal theorem from a specific instance of it.
In what follows we will see many examples of statements, theorems and their duals.
3.4 Arrows in a Category
In this section we will explain the notions of injective, surjective and bijective map in a categorical
language, i.e. from an external point of view.
3.4.1 Monic Arrow
Monic arrow is the “arrow-analogue” of an injective function.
Definition 3.4.1. A C-arrow f ∶ a → b is monic if for any pair of parallel arrows g ∶ c → a, h ∶ c → a,
the equality f ○ g = f ○ h implies that h = g, i.e. f is left cancellable. Monic arrows are denoted as:
a // // b
We now want to show how it is possible to derive a monic arrow from an injective one and vice
versa in Sets.
Proof. Consider the sets A,B,C, an injective function f ∶ A → B (i.e. if f(x) = f(y), then x = y) and
a pair of parallel functions g ∶ C → A and h ∶ C → A, such that
C
g //
h

A
f

A
f
// B
commutes, i.e. f ○ g = f ○ h.
Now if
x ∈ C Ô⇒ f ○ g(x) = f ○ h(x)
f(g(x)) = f(h(x))
Since f is injective it follows that g(x) = h(x), i.e f is left cancellable. Vice versa, let f be left
cancellable, and consider the following diagram:
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y
33❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣
++❲❲❲❲
❲❲❲❲❲
❲❲❲❲❲
❲❲❲❲
f(x) = f(y),,❩❩
❩❩❩❩❩❩❩
❩❩❩❩❩❩❩
❩❩❩❩❩❩❩
❩❩❩
22❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞❞
g
h
f
From the above diagram it is easy to deduce that f ○ g = f ○ h, since f(x) = f(y). Given that
x = g(0) and y = h(0) by construction, and f is left cancellable by assumption, we get: g = h, therefore
x = y for f(x) = f(y), i.e. f is injective.
3.4.2 Epic Arrow
An epic arrow is the “arrow-analogue” of a surjective function.
Definition 3.4.2. An arrow f ∶ a → b in a category C is epic in C if, for any parallel pair g ∶ b → c
and h ∶ b → c of arrows, the equality g ○ f = h ○ f implies that h = g, i.e. f is right cancellable. Monic
arrows are denoted as:
a // // b
An epic is a dual of a monic.
In Sets the epic arrows are the surjective set functions.
Proof. Let us consider three sets A,B,C such that the set function f ∶ A→ B is surjective but it is not
right cancellable, i.e. given two functions g, h ∶ B → C although h ○ f = g ○ f , h ≠ g. What this implies
is that there exists an a element y ∈ B such that h(y) ≠ g(y). However since f is surjective y = f(x)
for some x ∈ A, then, h ○ f(x) ≠ g ○ f(x) which contradicts the assumption that h ○ f = g ○ f .
3.4.3 Iso Arrow
An iso arrow is the “arrow-analogue” of a bijective function.
Definition 3.4.3. A C-arrow f ∶ a → b is iso, or invertible in C if there is a C-arrow g ∶ b → a, such
that g ○ f = 1a and f ○ g = 1b. Therefore, g is the inverse of f i.e. g = f−1.
Theorem 3.4.1. g is unique.
Proof. Consider any other g
′
such that g
′
○ f = 1a and f ○ g′ = 1b, then we have
g
′ = 1a ○ g′ = (g ○ f) ○ g′ = g ○ (f ○ g′) = g ○ 1b = g
An iso arrow has the following properties:
1. An iso arrow is always monic.
Proof. Consider an iso f , such that f ○ g = f ○ h (f ∶ a → b and g, h ∶ c → a), then
g = 1a ○ g = (f−1 ○ f) ○ g = f−1 ○ (f ○ g)
= f−1 ○ (f ○ h) = (f−1 ○ f) ○ h = h
therefore f is left cancellable.
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2. An iso arrow is always epic
Proof. Consider an iso f such that g ○ f = h ○ f (f ∶ a → b and g, h ∶ b→ c)
g = g ○ 1b = g ○ (f ○ f−1) = (g ○ f) ○ f−1 = (h ○ f) ○ f−1
= h ○ (f ○ f−1) = h
therefore f is right cancellable
Note: not all arrows which are monic and epic are iso, for example:
1. An inclusion map is both monic and epic, but it is not iso, otherwise it would have an inverse
and, as a set function, it would have to be a bijection, but it is not.
2. In poset, eventhough all functions are monic and epic, the only iso is the identity map.
In fact, consider a function f ∶ p → q, this implies that p ≤ q. If f is an iso, then f−1 ∶ q → p
exists, therefore, q ≤ p. However, from the antisymmetry property p ≤ q and q ≤ p imply that
p = q, therefore f = 1p is a unique arrow.
Iso arrows are used to determine isomorphic objects within a given category.
Definition 3.4.4. Given two objects a, b ∈ C, we say that they are isomorphic a ≃ b if there exists an
iso C-arrow between them.
As we have seen from the above definitions, we managed to give an external characterisation for
the set theoretic concepts of injective, surjective and bijective functions.
3.5 Elements and Their Relations in a Category
In this section we will describe certain fundamental constructions or elements present in category
theory. While reading this, it is useful to try and understand what the corresponding elements would
be in Sets.
3.5.1 Initial Object
Definition 3.5.1. An initial object in a category C is a C-object 0 such that, for every C-object A,
there exists one and only one C-arrow from 0 to A.
An initial object is unique up to isomorphism, i.e. all initial objects in a category are isomorphic.
To see this, consider two initial objects A1 ∈ C and A2 ∈ C. Being both initial, we have the unique
arrows f1 ∶ A1 → A2 and f2 ∶ A2 → A1. Moreover, the fact that they are initial implies that it is possible
to uniquely compose the above arrows obtaining f1 ○ f2 = idA2 and f2 ○ f1 = idA1 . Therefore f1 and f2
are isomorphic functions and A1 ≃ A2.
Examples
1. In C ↓ R the initial object is f ∶ ∅→ R, such that the following diagram commutes:
∅
k //
f
✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
A
g
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌
R
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2. In Sets the initial object is the ∅ element.
3. In Pos, the initial object is the poset (∅,∅).
4. In Top, the initial object is the space (∅,{∅}).
5. In Vectk, the one-element space {0} is the initial object.
6. In a poset, the initial object is the least element with respect to the ordering.
An initial object is the dual of a terminal object.
3.5.2 Terminal Object
Definition 3.5.2. A terminal object in a category C is a C-object 1 such that, given any other C-object
A, there exists one and only one C-arrow from A to 1.
Examples
1. in C ↓ R the terminal object is (R, idR), such that the diagram
A
k //
f
✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
R
idR
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌
R
commutes (∴ k=f)
2. In Sets a terminal object is a singleton {∗}, since given any other element A ∈ Sets there exist
1 and only 1 arrow A→ {∗}.
3. In Pos the poset ({∗},{(∗,∗)}) is the terminal object.
4. In Top, the space({∗},{∅,{∗}}) is the terminal object.
5. In Vectk, the one-element space {0} is the terminal object.
6. In a poset, the terminal object is the greatest element with respect to the ordering.
Given the notion of a terminal object we can now define the notion of an element of a C-object. Note
that, so far, the definition of every categorical object that was introduced never rested on specific
characteristic of its composing elements. This is because, as stated above, concepts in category theory
are defined externally. In fact, it is the case that certain objects in a given category do not have
elements. We will return to this later. For now we will give the categorical description of what an
element of an object actually is.
Definition 3.5.3. Given a category C, with terminal object 1, then an element of a C-object b is a
C-arrow x ∶ 1→ b.
Example 3.5.1. In Sets, an element x ∈ A, can be identified with the singleton subset {∗}, therefore
with an arrow {∗}→ A from the terminal object to A.
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3.6 Products
We will now give the external/categorical description of the cartesian product. Such a definition will
be a general notion of what a product is, which will be valid in any category independent of the
details of that category. This is, in fact, one of the powerful aspects of category theory: an abstract
characterization of objects in terms of universal properties. In this way, definitions become independent
of the peculiarity of individual cases, becoming a more objective, universally valid construction. One
can compare the level of abstraction in category theory with the level of abstraction in differential
geometry, where one defined objects without the use of a specific coordinate reference frame.
Let us now turn to our task of defining what a product is in categorical language. It should be
pointed out that, as with all the other objects defined so far, if a product exists, it is uniquely up to
isomorphism. Given a particular category, we can then verify whether or not the product exists in that
category. It is only at this point that the particularity of the category in question enters the game,
i.e. only into the proof of existence3.All the useful properties of the product follow from the general
definition. So, what is a product?
Definition 3.6.1. A product of two objects A and B in a category C is a third C-object A×B together
with a pair of C-morphisms (arrows):
prA ∶ A ×B → A prB ∶ A ×B → B (3.6.1)
such that, given any other pair of C-arrows f ∶ C → A and g ∶ C → B, there exists a unique arrow⟨f, g⟩ ∶ C → A ×B, such that the following diagram commutes4
C
g
!!❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
⟨f,g⟩
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
f
}}④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④
A A ×B
prB
//
prA
oo B
i.e.
prA ○ ⟨f, g⟩ = f and prb ○ ⟨f, g⟩ = g
Given two products we would now like to know if and how is possible to relate them. To this end
one needs to introduce the concept of a map between two product objects. Such a map will be called
a product map. The definition is straightforward.
Definition 3.6.2. Consider a category C which allows products. Then consider two C-arrows f ∶ A→ B
and g ∶ C →D. The product map f × g ∶ A×C → B ×D is the C-arrow ⟨f ○prA, g ○prB⟩. Such an arrow
3The proof of existence is done by constructing an object and verifying if it satisfies the requirements of being a
product.
4Note that an arrow drawn as
//❴❴❴❴❴❴
indicates uniqueness, up to isomorphisms of that arrow.
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is the unique arrow which makes the following diagram commute:
C
g // D
A ×C
prC
==④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④
prA
!!❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
⟨f○prA,g○prB⟩ //❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ B ×D
prD
OO
prB

A
f
// B
Theorem 3.6.1. In Sets the product of two sets always exists and it is the cartesian product with
projection maps.
Proof. Given a set R with maps q1 ∶ R → S, q2 ∶ R → T , then the map
ψ ∶ R → S × T (3.6.2)
r ↦ (q1(r), q2(r)) (3.6.3)
would satisfy the commutativity property of the cross product, i.e. ∀r ∈ R
(p1 ○ ψ)(r) = q1(r) (3.6.4)
(p2 ○ ψ)(r) = q2(r) (3.6.5)
We now need to prove its uniqueness. This is done as follows:
if there exists a φ which satisfies p1 ○ φ = q1 and p1 ○ φ = q2 then, for all r ∈ R we have
ψ(r) = (q1(r), q2(r)) = (p1(ψ(r)), p2(ψ(r))) = φ(r) (3.6.6)
where the last equality holds, since (s, t) = p1(s, t), p2(s, t)) for all (s, t) ∈ S × T .
It follows that ψ is unique.
We now want to show that the products are commutative, i.e. A1 ×A2 ≃ A2 ×A1. To this end let
us consider each product separately. Being products, there exist unique arrows i and j such that the
following diagrams commute:
A1 ×A2
i
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
pr1
||②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②
pr2
""❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
A1 A2 ×A1 //oo A2
A2 ×A1
j
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
pr2
||②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②
pr1
""❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
A2 A1 ×A2 //oo A1
Composition of these diagrams in both orders gives us the following commuting diagrams:
A1 ×A2
j○i
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
pr1
||②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②
pr2
""❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
A1 A1 ×A2
pr2 //
pr1
oo A2
A2 ×A1
i○j
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
pr2
||②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②
pr1
""❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
A2 A2 ×A1
pr1 //
pr2
oo A1
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It is clear that j ○ i = idA1×A2 and i ○ j = idA2×A1 , thus i and j are isomorphic.
The proof given above can be easily extended to give the associativity of the product operation in
general, i.e. for an arbitrary amount of factors.
It should be noted that the product of an empty set of objects is just the terminal object, and the
product of the family consisting of a single object A is A itself with projection 1A ∶ A→ A.
3.6.0.1 Examples
• In Pos, products are cartesian products with the pointwise order.
• In Top, products are cartesian products with the product topology.
• In Vectk, products are direct sums.
• In a poset products are greatest lower bounds.
3.6.1 Co-Products
We now define the categorical/external definition of disjoint union.
Definition 3.6.3. A co-product of two objects A and B in a category C is a third C-object A + B
together with a pair of C-arrows:
iA ∶ A→ A +B iB ∶ B → A +B (3.6.7)
such that, given any other pair of C-arrows f ∶ A → C and g ∶ B → C, there exists a unique arrow[f, g] ∶ A +B → C which makes the following diagram commute:
A
iA //
f
!!❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
A +B
[f,g]

B
iBoo
g
}}④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④
C
i.e. the co-product is the dual of the product. In the above, the arrows iA and iB indicate canonical
injection maps.
Again, it is possible to define a map between two co-products. In fact, in defining such a map one
can simply dualise the definition of the product map, thus obtaining the following definition:
Definition 3.6.4. Assuming that co-products exist in C, we consider two C-arrows f ∶ A → B and
g ∶ C → D. The co-product map f + g ∶ A +C → B +D is the unique C-arrow [iD ○ f, iB ○ g], such that
the following diagram commutes:
A
iA

f // D
iD

A ×C
[iD○f,iB○g] //❴❴❴❴❴❴ B +D
C
iC
OO
g
// B
iB
OO
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Theorem 3.6.2. In Sets the co-product of any two elements X,Y ∈ Sets always exists and it is the
disjoint union
X∐Y = {(x, j) ∈ (X ∪ Y ) × {0,1}Sx ∈ X iff j = 0 , x ∈ Y iff j = 1} (3.6.8)
We then have
iX ∶X → X∐Y (3.6.9)
x ↦ (x,0) (3.6.10)
and
iY ∶ Y → X∐Y (3.6.11)
y ↦ (y,1) (3.6.12)
It should be noted that the co-product of an empty set is the initial object.
3.6.1.1 Examples
• In Pos, co-products are identified with disjoint unions (with the inherited orders).
• In Top, co-products are identified with topological disjoint unions.
• In Vectk, co-products are identified with direct sums.
• In a poset, co-products are identified with least upper bounds.
3.6.2 Equaliser
We now describe the categorical analogue of the concept of the largest set for which two functions
coincide. This is the concept of an equaliser.
Definition 3.6.5. Given a category C, a C-arrow i ∶ E → A is an equaliser of a pair of C-arrows
f, g ∶ A→ B if
1. f ○ i = g ○ i.
2. Given another C-arrow h ∶ C → A such that f ○ h = g ○ h, there is exactly one C-arrow k ∶ C → E
such that the following diagram commutes:
E
i // A
f //
g
// B
C
k
XX✶
✶
✶
✶
✶
✶
✶
h
FF✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌
i.e. i ○ k = h
In Sets, the equaliser of a pair of maps f, g ∶ A → B is the largest subset for which the two maps
coincide, i.e. {x ∈ ASf(x) = g(x)} ⊆ A (3.6.13)
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3.6.3 Co-Equaliser
Dual to the equaliser, there exists the co-equaliser which is defined as follows:
Definition 3.6.6. Given two C-arrows f, g ∶ A→ B, the C-arrow h ∶ B → C is a co-equaliser of f and
g if the following conditions hold:
1) h ○ f = h ○ g
2) Given any other C-arrow h
′
∶ B → C
′
such that h
′
○ f = h′ ○ g, there exists a unique C-arrow
u ∶ C → C
′
such that the following diagram commutes
A
f //
g
// B
h //
h
′
❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅ C
u
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
C
′
In Sets the co-equaliser of a pair of maps f, g ∶ A→ B is the quotient of B by the least equivalence
relation for which f(x) = g(x) for all x ∈ A. The condition of being the least equivalence relation is
required by condition 2) above.
The construction of such an equivalence relation is done as follows:
Consider the co-equaliser
S = {⟨f(x), g(x)⟩Sx ∈ A} ⊆ B ×B (3.6.14)
Although it is a co-equaliser it is not necessarily an equivalence relation on B. However, one can
construct a minimal equivalence relation on B which contains S. In particular, such an equivalence
relation R ⊆ B ×B would be such that
• S ⊆ R.
• Given any other equivalence relations T on B such that S ⊆ T then, R ⊆ T .
Such a relation is obviously
S = {x ∈ ASf(x) = g(x)} (3.6.15)
3.6.4 Limits and Co-Limits
In the description of the elements/objects that we gave so far we have always utilised the notion of
a universal property, which the object in question had to satisfy. In particular, we never constructed
any object in terms of the characteristics of its elements, but rather through its relations to other
objects, such that these relations had to satisfy a universal property, thus obtaining a universal con-
struction. As can be easily deduced from the universal constructions given above, these are unique up
to isomorphisms.
So, what are these universal constructions and universal properties?
The precise characterisation of these concepts is given in terms of the notion of diagrams, limits and
co-limits of these diagrams.
Definition 3.6.7. Given a category C, a diagram D in C is defined to be a collection of C-objects
ai ∈ C (i ∈ I) and a collection of C-arrows ai → aj between some of the C-objects above.
Using the notion of graphs given at the start of this lecture, a diagram can be defined as one graph
in the collection of graphs composing a category.
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Now a special type of diagram D is the D-cone, i.e. a cone for a diagram D. This consists of a
C-object c and a C-arrow fi ∶ c→ ai one for each ai ∈ D, such that
ai
g // aj
c
fj
FF✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌
fi
XX✶✶✶✶✶✶✶✶✶✶✶✶✶
commutes when ever g is an arrow in the diagram D.
A cone is denoted as {fi ∶ c→ ai} and c is called the vertex of the cone. We now come to the definition
of a limit.
Definition 3.6.8. A limit for a diagram D is a D-cone {fi ∶ c→ ai} such that, given any other D-cone{f ′i ∶ c′ → ai}, there is only one C-arrow g ∶ c′ → c such that, for each ai ∈ D the following diagram
commutes:
ai
c
′
fi
FF✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌✌
f
// c
g
XX✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵
The limiting cone of a diagram D has the universal property with respect to all other D-cones, in
the sense that any other D-cone factors out through the limiting cone.
Examples:
Example 3.6.1. i) The product of two objects A and B in C, defined above, is actually the limiting
cone of the diagram containing only two elements A and B and no arrows, i.e. it is the limiting cone
of the arrowless diagram
A B
In fact a cone for this diagram is given by any C-object C together with two arrows f ∶ C → A and
g ∶ C → B giving the cone
C
g
✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
f
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌
A B
Now, in order for this cone to be a limiting cone, we require that any other cone factors through it.
This means that given another cone
C
′
g
′
✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
f
′
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌✌
✌
A B
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there exists a unique map h ∶ C
′
→ C, such that
C
′
g
′
❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅
f
′
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧

A C
g
//
f
oo B
But this is precisely the definition of the product, i.e. C = A ×B.
Example 3.6.2. The terminal object is the limiting cone of the empty diagram.
Example 3.6.3. The equaliser is the limiting cone of the diagram
A
f //
g
// B
By duality we also have the notion of a co-limit whose definition requires (as expected) the notion
of a co-cone (dual to a cone).
Given a diagram D a co-cone consists of an object c and arrows {fi → c}, one for each element ai ∈ D.
A co-cone is denoted {fi ∶ ai → c}.
We now define a co-limit as follows:
Definition 3.6.9. A co-limit of D is a co-cone with the (co)-universal property that given any other
D-cone {f ′i ∶ ai → c′} there exists one and only one map f ∶ c → c′ such that the following diagram
commutes
ai
f
′
i
✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶✶
✶
fi
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍
c
f
// c
′
for all ai ∈ D
From the duality principle one can figure out what exactly the co-product, initial object and co-
equaliser, are.
3.7 Categories in Quantum Mechanics
In this section we will delineate different categories that arise in quantum theory, however we will not
go into the details of how each of these categories is used. The aim is simply to show that category
theory arises in many more contexts than one can imagine. The list of examples of categories in
quantum theory is by no means complete.
3.7.1 The Category of Bounded Self Adjoint Operators
Definition 3.7.1. [1] [2] the Set O of bounded self-adjoint operators is a category, such that
• the objects of O are the self-adjoint operators;
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• given a function f ∶ σ(Aˆ) → R (from the spectrum of Aˆ to the Reals) such that Bˆ = f(Aˆ) then
there exists a morphism fO ∶ Bˆ → Aˆ in O between operators Bˆ and Aˆ.
To show that the category O, so defined, is a category, we need to show that it satisfies the identity
law and composition law. This can be shown in the following way:
• Identity Law : given any O-object Aˆ, the identity arrow is defined as the arrow idOA ∶ Aˆ→ Aˆ that
corresponds to the arrow id ∶ R → R in R.
• Composition Condition: given two O-arrows fO ∶ Bˆ → Aˆ and gO ∶ Cˆ → Bˆ, such that Bˆ = f(Aˆ)
and Cˆ = g(Bˆ), then, the composite function fOogO in O corresponds to the composite function
fog ∶ R → R in R.
The category O, as defined above, represents a pre-ordered set. In fact, the function f ∶ σ(Aˆ) → R is
unique up to isomorphism, therefore it follows that for any two objects in O there exists, at most, one
morphism between them, i.e. O is a pre-ordered set. However, O fails to be a poset since it lacks the
antisymmetry property . In fact, it can be the case that two operators Bˆ and Aˆ in O are such that
Aˆ ≠ Bˆ, but they are related by O-arrows fO ∶ Bˆ → Aˆ and gO ∶ Aˆ→ Bˆ in such a way that:
gO ○ fO = idB and fO ○ gO = idA (3.7.1)
It is possible to transform the set of self-adjoint operators into a poset by defining a new category[O] in which the objects are taken to be equivalence classes of operators, whereby two operators are
considered to be equivalent if the O-morphisms, relating them, satisfies equation 3.7.1.
3.7.2 Category of Boolean Sub-Algebras
Definition 3.7.2. [1] [2] The category W of Boolean sub-algebras of the lattice P (H) has:
• as objects, the individual Boolean sub-algebras, i.e. elements W ∈ W which represent spectral
algebras associated with different operators.
• as morphisms, the arrows between objects of W, such that a morphism iW1W2 ∶ W1 → W2 exists
iff W1 ⊆W2.
From the definition of morphisms it follows that there is, at most, one morphisms between any two
elements of W , therefore W forms a poset under sub-algebras inclusion W1 ⊆W2.
To show that W , as defined above, is indeed a category, we need to define the identity arrow and the
composite arrow. The identity arrow in W is defined as idW ∶W →W , which corresponds to W ⊆W ,
whereas, given two W-arrows iW1W2 ∶ W1 → W2 (W1 ⊆ W2) and iW2W3 ∶ W2 → W3 (W2 ⊆ W3) the
composite iW2W3 ○ iW1W2 corresponds to W1 ⊆W3.
Example 3.7.1. An example of the category W can be formed in the following way:
consider a category consisting of four objects (operators): Aˆ,Bˆ,Cˆ,1ˆ such that the spectral decomposition
is:
Aˆ = a1Pˆ1 + a2Pˆ2 + a3Pˆ3
Bˆ = b1(Pˆ1 ∨ Pˆ2) + b2Pˆ3
Cˆ = C1(Pˆ1 ∨ Pˆ3) + c2Pˆ2
then the spectral algebras are the following:
WA = {0ˆ, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Pˆ3, Pˆ1 ∨ Pˆ3, Pˆ1 ∨ Pˆ2, Pˆ3 ∨ Pˆ2, 1ˆ}
WB = {0ˆ, Pˆ3, Pˆ1 ∨ Pˆ2, 1ˆ}
WC = {0ˆ, Pˆ2, Pˆ1 ∨ Pˆ31ˆ}
W1 = {1ˆ}
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The relation between the spectral algebras is given by the following diagram:
WB
''❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖
W1
77♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦
''❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖ WA
WC
77♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦
where the arrows are subset inclusions.
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Chapter 4
Lecture 4
In this lecture I will describe how it is possible to define maps between categories. There are two
types of such maps called covariant functors and contravariant functors. I will describe both and give
examples of both. We will then abstract a bit further and define maps between functors them selves.
These are called Natural Transformations. Such transformations will enable us to define equivalent
categories.
4.1 Functors and Natural Transformations
So far we have introduced the notion of a category. However, if we can not compare categories together
we could not do much in terms of category theory. Thus, there must be a way of comparing categories
or, at least, define maps between them. This is done through the notion of a functor. Generally
speaking a functor is a transformation from one category C to another category D, such that the
categorical structure of the domain C is preserved, i.e. gets mapped onto the structure of the codomain
category D.
There are two types of functors:
1. Covariant Functor
2. Contravariant Functor
4.1.1 Covariant Functor
Definition 4.1.1. : A covariant functor from a category C to a category D is a map F ∶ C → D that
assigns to each C-object a, a D-object F(a) and to each C-arrow f ∶ a→ b a D-arrow F (f) ∶ F (a)→ F (b),
such that the following are satisfied:
1. F (1a) = 1F (a)
2. F (f ○ g) = F (f) ○ F (g) for any g ∶ c → a
It is clear from the above that a covariant functor is a transformation that preserves both:
• The domain’s and the codomain’s identities.
• The composites of functions, i.e. it preserves the direction of the arrows.
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A pictorial description if a covariant functor is as follows:
a
f //
h
❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄ b
g

c
F +3 F (a) F (f) //
F (h)
!!❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
F (b)
F (g)

F (c)
4.1.1.1 Examples
Example 4.1.1. Identity functor:
idC ∶ C → C is such that idCA = A for all A ∈ C and idC(f) = f for all C-arrows f . Similarly one can
define the insertion functor for any subcategory D ⊆ C. This is trivially defined as follows
I ∶ D → C (4.1.1)
A ↦ A (4.1.2)
(f ∶ A→ B) ↦ (f ∶ A→ B) (4.1.3)
Given such a definition it follows that
I(idA) = idI(A) (4.1.4)
I(f ○ g) = = I(f) ○ I(g) (4.1.5)
Example 4.1.2. Power set functor:
P ∶ Sets → Sets assigns to each object X ∈ Sets its power set1 PX, and to each map f ∶ X → Y the
map P (f) ∶ PX → PY , which sends each subset S ⊆X to the subset f(S) ⊆ Y .
Example 4.1.3. Forgetful functor:
Given a category C with some structure on it, for example the category of groups Grp, the forgetful
functor F ∶ Grp → Sets takes each group to its underlining set forgetting about the group structure,
and each C-arrow to itself.
Example 4.1.4. Hom functor:
Given any C-object A, then the Hom functor C(A,−) ∶ C → Sets takes each object B to the set of all
C-arrows C(A,B) from A to B, and to each C-arrow f ∶ B → C it assigns the map
C(A,f) ∶ C(A,B) → C(A,C) (4.1.6)
g ↦ C(A,f)(g) ∶= f ○ g (4.1.7)
such that the following diagram commutes
A
g //
f○g
❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄ B
f

C
1Sets of all subsets of X.
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Example 4.1.5. Free Group Functor:
Given the categories Sets and Grp the free group functor is a functor F ∶ Sets→Grp which assigns, to
each set A ∈ Sets, the free group2 generated by A and, to each morphism f , the induced homomorphism
between the respective groups which coincides with f on the free generators.
Example 4.1.6. Functors between Preorders
Given two preorders (P,≤), (Q,≤). A covariant functor F ∶ (P,≤) → (Q,≤) is defined as a covariant
functor F ∶ P → Q which is order preserving, i.e.
∀p1, p2 ∈ P if p1 ≤ p2 then F (p1) ≤ F (p2) (4.1.8)
It can be easily seen that indeed the above map satisfies the conditions of being a functor. It follows
that, in this case, F is simply a monotone map.
Example 4.1.7. Given two monoids (M,∗,1), (N,∗,1), a covariant functor F ∶ (M,∗,1) → (N,∗,1)
is such that it maps M to N , i.e. F (M) = N since monoids are categories with a single object. The
functoriality condition is then defined as follows3:
∀m1,m2 ∈M F (m1 ∗m2) = F (m1) ∗ F (m2) and F (1) = 1 (4.1.9)
Hence, a covariant functor between monoids is just a monoid homomorphism.
Example 4.1.8. Given a group (G,∗,1) (which, as we previously saw, can be considered as a monoid),
a covariant functor F ∶ G→ Sets represents the action of G on a set X ∈ Sets. In particular F (G) =X
and each map gi ∶ G → G gets mapped to an endofunction on X, i.e. F (gi) ∶= g1 ∗ − ∶ X → X. The
functorial condition then amounts to the following:
∀g1, g2 ∈ G F (g1 ∗ g2) = F (g1) ○ F (g2) and F (1) = idX (4.1.10)
Therefore, given any x ∈ X the above maps imply
(g1 ∗ g2)x = g1 ⋅ g1 ⋅ x and 1 ⋅ x = x (4.1.11)
Thus F defines an action of G on X.
4.1.2 Contravariant Functor
Let us now analyse the other type of functor: contravariant functor
Definition 4.1.2. A contravariant functor from a category C to a category D is a map X ∶ C → D
that assigns to each C-object a a D-object X(a) and to each C-arrow f ∶ a→ b a D-arrow X(f) ∶X(b)→
X(a), such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. X(1a) = 1X(a)
2. X(f ○ g) =X(g) ○X(f) for any g ∶ c → a
A diagrammatic representation of a contravariant functor is the following:
a
f //
h
❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄ b
g

c
X +3 F (a) X(b)
X(f)
oo
X(c)
X(h)
aa❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉
X(g)
OO
2A group G is called free if there exists a subset S ⊆ G, such that any element of G can be uniquely written as a
product of finitely many elements of S and their inverses.
3Recall that in a monoid with set M maps have both domain and codomain equal to M (technically these type of
morphisms are called endomorphisms), i.e. mi ∶M →M and represent elements of M .
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Thus, a contravariant functor in mapping arrows from one category to the next reverses the di-
rections of the arrows, by mapping domains to codomains and vice versa. A contravariant functor is
also called a presheaf. These types of functors will be the principal objects which we will study when
discussing quantum theory in the language of topos theory.
4.1.2.1 Examples
Example 4.1.9. Contravariant power set functor is a functor P˜ ∶ Sets → Sets which assigns to each
set X its power set P˜ (X) and, to each arrow f ∶ X → Y the inverse image map P˜(f) ∶ P˜ (Y ) → P˜ (X),
which sends each set S ∈ P (Y ) to the inverse image f−1(S) ∈ P (X).
Example 4.1.10. Contravariant Hom-functor:
For any object A ∈ C we define the contravariant Hom functor to be the functor C(−,A) ∶ C → Sets,
which assigns to each object B ∈ C the set of C-arrows C(B,A) and, to each C-arrow f ∶ B → C, it
assigns the function
C(f,A) ∶ C(C,A) → C(B,A) (4.1.12)
g ↦ C(B,A)(f) ∶= g ○ f (4.1.13)
such that the following diagram commutes
B
f //
g○f
❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅ C
g

A
4.1.2.2 Characterising Functors
Irrespectively of whether we are talking about covariant or contravariant functors, there are several
properties which distinguish different functors, these are the following:
Definition 4.1.3. A functor F ∶ C → D is called
1. Faithful if
F ∶MorC(x, y) →MorD(Fx,Fy) ∀x, y ∈ Ob(C) (4.1.14)
is injective
2. Full if
F ∶MorC(x, y) →MorD(Fx,Fy) ∀x, y ∈ Ob(C) (4.1.15)
is surjective
3. fully faithful if
F ∶MorC(x, y) →MorD(Fx,Fy) ∀x, y ∈ Ob(C) (4.1.16)
is bijective
4. Forgetful if F takes each C object to its underlining set, forgetting about any structure which
might be present in C, while mapping each C-arrow to itself. Thus, all that is remembered by this
forgetful functor is the fact that the C-arrows are set functions.
5. Essentially surjective. A functor F ∶ C → D is essentially surjective (or dense) if each object d ∈ D
is isomorphic to an object of the form F (c) for some object c ∈ C.
41
6. Embedding if F is full, faithful, and injective on objects.
7. An equivalence if F is full, faithful, and essentially surjective.
8. An isomorphism if there exists another functor G ∶ D → C such that
G ○ F = IdC , F ○G = IdD (4.1.17)
It should be noted that the definition of a full and faithful functor only requires that there is a
bijection between the morphisms of the categories, not between the objects. In fact if F ∶ C → D is a
full and faithful functor, than it could be the case that:
i there exists some y ∈ Ob(D), such that there is no object x ∈ Ob(C) for which y = F (x), i.e. F is
not surjetive on objects.
ii Given two elements x1, x2 ∈ Ob(C), then if F (x1) = F (x2) this does not entail that x1 = x2, i.e.
F is not injective on objects.
4.1.2.3 Preservation and Reflection
So far we have classified functors according to how they act the collection of objects and morphisms
seen as sets. However, one can abstract a little more and try understanding how functors behave on
more complex structures, such as properties of arrows. In particular consider a property P of arrows,
a functor F ∶ C → D preserves P iff
f satisfies P Ô⇒ F (f) satisfies P (4.1.18)
F reflects P iff
F (f) satisfies P Ô⇒ f satisfies P (4.1.19)
4.1.3 Natural Transformations
So far we have defined categories and maps between them called functors. We will now abstract a step
more and define maps between functors. These are called natural transformations.
Definition 4.1.4. A natural transformation from Y ∶ C → D to X ∶ C → D is an assignment of an
arrow N ∶ Y → X that associates to each object A in C an arrow NA ∶ Y (A) → X(A) in D such that,
for any C-arrow f ∶ A→ B the following diagram commutes
A
f

Y (B) NB //
Y (f)

X(B)
X(f)

B Y (A)
NA
// X(A)
i.e.
NA ○ Y (f) =X(f) ○NB
Here NA ∶ Y (A) →X(A) are the components on N, while N is the natural transformation.
From this diagram it is clear that the two arrows NA and NB turn the Y-picture of f ∶ A→ B into the
respective X-picture. If each NA (A ∈ C) is an isomorphism, then N is a natural isomorphism
N ∶ Y
≃
Ð→X (4.1.20)
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4.1.3.1 Examples
Example 4.1.11. Consider the operation of taking the dual of a vector space defined over some field
K. This operation is actually a functor as follows
∗ ∶ V ectK → V ect
∗
K (4.1.21)
V ↦ V ∗ ∶=Homk(V,K) (4.1.22)
Moreover, given a linear map f ∶ V → W we obtain the map f∗ ∶ W ∗ → V ∗ such that f∗(φ) = φ ○ f
where φ ∈W ∗. By reiterating this functor we can define a double dual functor as follows:
∗∗ ∶ V ectK → V ectK (4.1.23)
V ↦ V ∗∗ (4.1.24)
such that v∗∗(f) = f(v) for f ∈ V ∗ and v ∈ V .
It is then possible to define a natural transformation between the identity functor 1V ectK ∶ V ectK →
V ectk and the double dual functor as follows:
N ∶ 1V ectk → ∗∗ (4.1.25)
whose components are
V
f

1V ectk(V ) NV //
1V ectk (f)

V ∗∗
f∗∗

W 1V ectk(W ) NW // W ∗∗
Example 4.1.12. Given a map f ∶ A→ B in a category C, we obtain a natural transformation between
covariant Hom-functors as follows:
C(f,−) ∶ C(B,−)→ C(A,−) (4.1.26)
such that for each C ∈ C we obtain
C(f,C) ∶ C(B,C) → C(A,C) (4.1.27)
(g ∶ B → C) ↦ C(f,C)(g) ∶= (g ○ f ∶ A→ C) (4.1.28)
To show that C(f,−) is indeed a natural transformation we need to show that for all h ∶ C → D the
following diagram commutes
C(B,C) C(B,h) //
C(f,C)

C(B,D)
C(f,D)

C(A,C) C(A,h) // C(A,D)
Chasing the diagram around we have on the one hand
C(A,h)(C(f,C)(g)) = C(A,h)(g ○ f) = h ○ (g ○ f) (4.1.29)
and on the other hand
C(f,D)(C(B,h)(g)) = C(f,D)(h ○ g) = (h ○ g) ○ f (4.1.30)
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such that
h ○ (g ○ f) = (h ○ g) ○ f (4.1.31)
This equality follows from associativity.
Example 4.1.13. Given a map f ∶ A → B in a category C it is possible to define a natural transfor-
mation between contravariant Hom-functors as follows:
C(−, f) ∶ C(−,B)→ C(−,A) (4.1.32)
That this is indeed a well defined natural transformation. In fact, given any object C ∈ C the action of
C(−, f) is
C(C,f) ∶ C(C,A) → C(C,B) (4.1.33)
h ↦ C(C,f)(h) = f ○ h (4.1.34)
While for morphisms g ∶ C →D we get
C(D,f) ∶ C(D,A) → C(D,B) (4.1.35)
k ↦ f ○ k (4.1.36)
such that the following diagram commutes
C(C,A) C(C,f) // C(C,B)
C(D,A) C(D,f) //
C(g,A)
OO
C(D,B)
C(g,B)
OO
Thus C(C,f) ○ C(g,A)(k) = C(C,f)(k ○ g) = f ○ (k ○ g) while C(g,B) ○ C(D,f)(k) = C(g,B)(f ○ k) =(f ○ k) ○ g by associativity (f ○ k) ○ g = f ○ (k ○ g)
We will state and prove a lemma which is a version of the very important Yoneda Lemma which
will be analysed in details in subsequent lectures.
Lemma 4.1.1. Given a category C and two objects A,B ∈ C, then for each natural transformation
t ∶ C(A,−)→ C(B,−) for covariant functors, there exists a unique f ∶ B → A in C such that t = C(f,−)
Proof 4.1.1. Let us define
f ∶ B → A ∶= tA(idA) (4.1.37)
Since t ∶ C(A,−) → C(B,−) is a natural transformation, given any arrow g ∶ A → C we have the
following commutative diagram
C(A,A) C(A,g) //
tA

C(A,C)
tC

C(B,A) C(B,g) // C(B,C)
Chasing the diagram around we have
tC(C(A,g)(idA)) = tC(g) (4.1.38)
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On the other hand
C(B,g)(tA(idA)) = C(B,g)f = g ○ f (4.1.39)
thus, from the requirement of commutativity
tC(g) = g ○ f (4.1.40)
However from the definition in equation 4.1.27 we know that
C(f,C)(g) ∶= g ○ f (4.1.41)
thus
tC = C(f,−) (4.1.42)
To prove uniqueness we need to show that if C(f,−) = C(f ′ ,−) then f = f ′ . To this end consider
f = idA ○ f = C(f,A)(idA) = C(f ′ ,A)(idA) = idA ○ f ′ = f ′ (4.1.43)
4.1.4 Equivalence of Categories
Now that we have defined maps between categories, i.e. functors and maps between functors, i.e.
natural transformations, it is possible to compare two categories and see if they are equivalent or not.
To this end we need the notion of isomorphic functors.
Definition 4.1.5. Two functors F,G ∶ C → D are said to be naturally isomorphic if there exists a
natural transformation η ∶ F → G, which is invertible.
We can now define equivalent categories in terms of naturally isomorphic functor.
Definition 4.1.6. Two categories C and D are said to be equivalent if there exists functors F ∶ C → D
and G ∶ D → C, such that the functors F ○G ≃ idD and G ○ F ≃ idC are naturally isomorphic to the
identities. In this case F is called an equivalence of categories.
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Chapter 5
Lecture 5/6
In this lecure I will first of all introduce the category of functors whose objects are functors (lecture 4)
and whose morphisms are natural transformations (lecture 4). Such a category is denoted as DC for
C and D being categories themselves. As we will see later on in the course, for a particular choice of
D and C we obtain the quantum topos. I will then give the axiomatic definition of what a topos is.
In particular I will focus on two main objects which are present in a topos, these are:
i) Sub-object Classifier;
ii) Internal logic: Heyting algebra.
These will be very important when defining the topos version of quantum theory.
5.1 The Functor Category
We will now introduce a type of category which is very important for the topos formulation of quantum
theory since i) it is actually a topos, ii) for an appropriate choice of base category it will be the topos
in terms of which quantum theory is defined.
The functor category is, in a way more abstract than any of the categories we have encountered
so far since it has as objects contravariant functors, and as maps natural transformations. So it is
one level higher in abstraction of the ‘standard’ category, which had as objects simpler elements with
not so much structure and as maps simpler function between these elements. On the other hand the
elements in the functor categories are complicated object being themselves maps between categories,
thus they carry a lot of structure. The maps between these objects are now required to preserve such
complicated structures. However, on a general level, we still simply have a collection of objects with
maps between them, the only difference is that now the hidden level of complexity has to be taken
into consideration when defining any categorical construction. So, for example, as we will see in the
examples below, when defining the product, the equaliser, etc, the structure of the individual elements
of the category has to be taken into consideration.
The definition of the functor category is as follows:
Definition 5.1.1. Given two categories C and D, the functor category DC has:
• Objects: all functors of the form F ∶ C → D.
• Morphisms: natural transformations between the above mentioned functors.
Given two natural transformations N1 ∶ F → G and N2 ∶ G → H in D
C composition is defined as
follows
N2 ○N1 ∶ F →H (5.1.1)
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such that, for each C ∈ C the individual components are
(N2 ○N1)C ∶ F (C)→H(C) (5.1.2)
∶ F (C) (N1)CÐÐÐ→ G(C) (N2)CÐÐÐ→H(C) (5.1.3)
Composition is associative
Of particular importance for us is the case in which D is the category Sets. In fact SetsC , for
a particular C, will be the category which we will use to describe quantum theory. In particular, for
quantum theory we will be using the presheaves SetsC
op
1 for an appropriate C.
So let us analyse SetsC
op
5.2 The Functor Category with Domain Sets
We will now describe in detail the functor category SetsC
op
for some category C. The reason we are
interested in this category is two fold:
i) It is actually a topos
ii) It will be the topos in which quantum theory will be defined.
Given a contravariant functor between a category C and Sets, we can form a category SetsC
op
such
that we have the following:
• Objects: all contravariant functors P ∶ C → Sets
1
A
h
66♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠
B
g
hh◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗
o
f
66♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠
k
hh◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗◗
⇓P
P (1)
P (g)
''PP
PPP
PPP
PPP
P
P (h)
ww♥♥♥
♥♥♥
♥♥♥
♥♥♥
P (A)
P (k) ''PP
PPP
PPP
PPP
P P (B)
P (f)ww♥♥♥
♥♥♥
♥♥♥
♥♥♥
P (0)
• Arrows: all natural transformation N ∶ P → P
′
between contravariant functors such that, given
1Note that Cop represents the opposite of the category C. Objects in Cop are the same as the objects in C, while the
morphisms are the inverse of the morphisms in C, i.e. ∃ a Cop-morphisms f ∶ A → B iff ∃ a C- morphisms f ∶ B → A.
Thus the category SetsC
op
has as objects covariant functors from Cop to Sets or, equivalently, contravariant functors
from C to Sets.
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a function f ∶ D → C in C the following diagram commutes
P (C) P (f) //
NC

P (D)
ND

P
′(C)
P
′
(f)
// P
′(D)
The morphisms satisfy the following conditions:
• Identity maps for each object X in SetsC
op
are identified with natural transformations iX , whose
components iXA are the identity maps of the set X(A) in Sets.
• Composition of maps in SetsC
op
:
Consider the functors X,Y and Z that belong to SetsC
op
, such that there exist maps2 X
N
Ð→ Y
and Y
M
Ð→ Z between them. We can then form a new map X
MoN
ÐÐÐ→ Y , whose components would
be (M ○N)A =MA ○NA, i.e. graphically we would have
X(A) X(f) //
NA

X(B)
NB

Y (A) Y (f) //
MA

Y (B)
MB

Z(A) Z(f) // Z(B)
Depending on the choice C, there are a number of relevant elements of the category SetsC
op
in
quantum theory. Here we will only give a few example of such presheaves (see [1], [2], [16]). A more
in depth analysis will be given in subsequent lectures.
5.2.1 Spectral Presheaf on the Category of Self-Adjoint Operators with
Discrete Speactra
Definition 5.2.1. Spectral Presheaf on Od (subcategory of O, in which the operators have discrete
spectra)3 Σ ∶ Od → Sets is defined such that:
1. Objects Aˆ ∈ O get mapped to Σ(Aˆ) = σ(Aˆ) where σ(Aˆ) is the spectrum of Aˆ.
2. Morphisms fO ∶ Bˆ → Aˆ in Od, such that Bˆ = f(Aˆ) (f ∶ σ(Aˆ) ⊆ R → R), gets mapped to Σ(fO) ∶
Σ(Aˆ) → Σ(Bˆ), which is equivalent to Σ(fO) ∶ σ(Aˆ) → σ(Bˆ) and is defined by Σ(fO)(α) ∶= f(α)
for all α ∈ σ(Aˆ).
2Here it is intended natural transformations, but we will often simply call them maps. The specification of what type
of maps we are considering should be clear from the context.
3The condition of the spectrum being discrete implies that given a Borel function f ∶ σ(Aˆ) ⊆ R → R, then σ(f(Aˆ)) =
f(σ(Aˆ)).
48
In order to prove that Σ, as defined above is indeed a presheaf, we need to prove that, given any
function gO ∶ Cˆ → Bˆ such that Cˆ = g(Bˆ) then, the following equation is satisfied:
Σ(gO) ○Σ(fO) = Σ(fO ○ gO)
Proof. If we consider the composite function fO ○ gO = hO ∶ Cˆ → Aˆ from the definition of Σ we have
Σ(fO) ∶ σ(Aˆ)→ σ(Bˆ)
Σ(gO) ∶ σ(Bˆ)→ σ(Cˆ)
Σ(fO ○ gO) = Σ(hO) ∶ σ(Aˆ)→ σ(Cˆ)
therefore
Σ(fOogO)(α) = Σ(hO)(α)
= h(α)
= (g ○ f)(α)
= g ○ (Σ(fO)(α))
= [Σ(gO) ○Σ(fO)](α)
5.2.1.1 Example of Spectral Presheaf
Let us consider a simple category whose elements are defined by
Aˆ = a1P1 + a2P2 + a3P3
Bˆ = b1(P1 ∨P3) + b2P2
Cˆ = c1P3 + c2(P1 ∨ P2)
This can be represented in the following diagram:
1ˆ
fO
&&▲▲
▲▲▲
▲▲▲
▲▲▲
▲▲
gO
xxrrr
rrr
rrr
rrr
r
Bˆ
iO
&&▲▲
▲▲▲
▲▲▲
▲▲▲
▲▲ Cˆ
jO
xxrrr
rrr
rrr
rrr
r
Aˆ
0ˆ
kO
OO
The elements of the presheaf Σ are the following:
σ(Aˆ) = {a1, a2, a3}
σ(Bˆ) = {b1, b2}
σ(Cˆ) = {c1, c2}
From definition 5.2.1 it follows that, for example, the map jO ∶ Cˆ → Aˆ gets mapped to Σ(jO) ∶ σ(Aˆ) →
σ(Cˆ) such that, component-wise, we get the following mapping:
Σ(jO)(a3) = c1
Σ(jO)(a1) = c2
Σ(jO)(a2) = c2
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5.2.2 The Dual Presheaf on W
Another presheaf which can de defined in quantum theory is the dual presheaf on the category W of
Boolean algebras under sub-algebra inclusion. In particular we have:
Definition 5.2.2. The dual presheaf on W is the contravariant functor D ∶ W → Sets defined as
follows:
• On objects: D(W ) is the dual of W ; thus it represents the set Hom(W,{0,1}) of all homo-
morphisms from the Boolean algebra W to the Boolean algebra {0,1}.
• On morphisms: given iW2,W1 ∶ W2 → W1 then D(iW2,W1) ∶ D(W1) → D(W2) is defined by
D(iW2W1)(χ) ∶= χSW2 where χSW2 denotes the restriction of χ ∈ D(W1) to the sub-algebra W2 ⊆
W1.
5.3 Topos Theory
In this lecture we will analyse, in details, what a topos is. The very hand wavy definition of a topos
is that of a category with extra properties. What these extra properties are we will see later on, the
important thing for the time being is what this extra properties imply. The implications of these extra
properties are that they make a topos “look like” Sets, in the sense that any mathematical operation
which can be done in set theory can be done in a general topos.
In the previous lecture we gave an account (not complete) on how set theoretical structures can
be given an external characterisation through category theory. Although it is true that all of the
set theoretic constructions can be defined in a categorical language, however, it is not true that all
categories have all these set theoretical constructions.
A topos, on the other hand, is a category for which all the categorical versions of set constructs exist
and are well defined. It is precisely in this sense that a topos “looks like” Sets.
Before giving the axiomatic definition of what a topos is we, first of all, need to define certain extra
constructs of category theory, which are required to be present for a given category to be a topos.
5.3.1 Exponentials
Given two sets A and B, let us imagine we would like to group all arrows between them, i.e., we would
then define the set {fi ∶ A→ B}. An important property of the set {fi ∶ A→ B} is that
if A,B ∈ Sets then {fi ∶ A→ B} ∈ Sets (5.3.1)
We will call this object (which in this particular situation is the set {fi ∶ A → B}) an exponential and
we will denoted it as BA.
We now would like to abstract the characterisation of such an object for a general category. Thus
we would like to define an object BA with the properties i) if A ∈ C and B ∈ C then BA ∈ C; ii) it
represents a certain relation between A and B.
Since in categorical language objects are defined according to the relations with other objects, we
will define BA in terms of what it ‘does’ operationally. To this end let us consider all three objects
involved: A, B, BA. Taking inspiration from what they actually represent in Sets, a possible relation
between then can be defined as follows:
ev ∶ BA ×A → B (5.3.2)
(fi, a) ↦ ev(fi, a) ∶= fi(a) (5.3.3)
This definition seems very plausible, however, for it to make sense in the categorical world it has to
be universal, in the sense that any other arrow g ∶ C ×A → B will factor through ev in a unique way.
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Thus, there will exist a unique arrow gˆ ∶ C → BA, which makes the following diagram commute
BA ×A
ev // B
C ×A
gˆ×1A
OO✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
g
==③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③
where
gˆ ∶ C → BA (5.3.4)
c ↦ gˆ(c) ∶= g(c,−) (5.3.5)
such that
g(c,−) ∶ A → B (5.3.6)
a ↦ g(c, a) (5.3.7)
Thus the map gˆ assigns to any c ∈ C a function A→ B by taking g and keeping the first term fixed at
c, while ranging over the elements of A. Thus for each c ∈ C we have that gˆ = gc ∶= g(c,−).
We are now ready to give the abstract categorical definition of what an exponential is.
Definition 5.3.1. Given two C-objects A and B, their exponentiation is a C-object BA together with
an evaluation map ev ∶ BA × A → B with the property that, given any other C-object C and C-arrow
g ∶ C ×A→ B, there exists a unique arrow gˆ ∶ C → BA, such that the following diagram commutes
BA ×A
ev // B
C ×A
gˆ×1A
OO✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
g
==③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③
Therefore for any ⟨c, a⟩ ∈ C ×A we get that
ev ○ (gˆ × 1A)(⟨c, a⟩ = ev(⟨gˆ(c), a⟩) = gc(a) = g(⟨c, a⟩) (5.3.8)
Now that we have abstractly defined what an exponentiation is, we would like to know what its
elements are. Remember that we started off with the example in Sets and in that case we knew that
the objects in BA are maps {fi ∶ A→ B}. We then abstracted from this particular example and defined
a general notion of an exponential in terms of the universal property of the exponential map. However,
such definition did not relay on what type of elements BA had, if any. We now would like to go back
full circle and see what we can say about the elements of BA. We know from previous lectures that
an element in any object C is identified with a map 1 → C. This correspondence will be used in the
following definition.
Definition 5.3.2. Objects of BA are in one-to-one correspondence with maps of the form f ∶ A→ B.
To see this let us consider the following commuting diagram
BA ×A
ev // B
1 ×A
fˆ×1A
OO✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
f
′
==③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③
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where f
′
∶ 1 ×A → B is unique given f . But 1 ×A ≡ A, therefore to each element of BA (fˆ ∶ 1 → BA)
there corresponds a unique function f ∶ A→ B.
The above definition of exponentials allows us to define a subset of categories called cartesian closed
categories. The precise definition is as follows:
Definition 5.3.3. A category C is said to be cartesian closed (CCC) if it has terminal object, products
and exponentials.
Examples of CCC are Sets and Boolean algebras, seen as categories. For those who are interested
in logic, a Boolean algebra is defined as a CCC as follows:
• Products are given by conjunctions
A ∧B (5.3.9)
• Exponentials are implications
A⇒ B ∶= ¬A ∨B (5.3.10)
• Evaluation is Modus Ponens, (A⇒ B) ∧A ≤ B (5.3.11)
• Universality is the Deduction Theorem,
C ∧A ≤ B⇔ C ≤ A⇒ B. (5.3.12)
5.3.1.1 Examples of Exponentiation
In the following, we will give examples of cartesian closed categories and how the exponentials in each
of them are formed.
Example 5.3.1. In Sets, given two objects A and B, the exponential BA is defined as follows:
BA = {f Sf is a function from A to B} (5.3.13)
In this case the evaluation map would be the following:
ev(⟨f, x⟩) = f(x) with x ∈ A
Example 5.3.2. Consider the category Finord of all finite ordinals. In such a category we have as
objects numbers 0,1,⋯, n where
0 = ∅ (5.3.14)
1 = {0} (5.3.15)
2 = {0,1} (5.3.16)
3 = {0,1,2} (5.3.17)
⋮ (5.3.18)
n = {1,2,⋯, n − 1} (5.3.19)
The maps are then simply the set functions between these cardinals. Given two such elements n and
m, then the exponential would be nm where m is the exponent. Such an element should be considered
as a finite ordinal with nm elements in it.
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5.3.2 Pullback
We will now define another construction which is present in any topos. This is the notion of pullback
or fiber product.
Definition 5.3.4. A pullback or fibered product of a pair of functions f ∶ A → C and g ∶ B → C
(with common codomain) in a category C, is a pair of C-arrows h ∶ D → A and k ∶ D → B, such that
the following conditions are satisfied:
1. f ○ h = g ○ k i.e the following diagram commutes
D
k //
h

B
g

A
f
// C
One usually writes D = A ×C B.
2. Given two functions i ∶ E → A and j ∶ E → B, where f ○ i = g ○ j then, there exists a unique
C-arrow l from E to D such that the outer rectangle of the following diagram commutes
E
j
((
l
&&◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
i

D
k //
h

B
g

A
f
// C
i.e.
i = h ○ l j = k ○ l
We then say that f (respectively g) has been pulled back along g (respectively f).
A pullback of a pair of C-arrows A
f
Ð→ C
g←Ð B is a limit of the diagram
B
g

A
f
// C
In fact a cone4 for this diagram is a pair of C-arrows A
i←ÐD hÐ→ B which compose to give the commu-
4Strictly speaking one has two cones C
j
←Ð D
i
Ð→ A and C
j
←Ð D
h
Ð→ B, but when composing the diagrams it turns out
that j = g ○ h = f ○ i, thus we can omit the j map.
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tative diagram
D
h //
i

B
g

A
f
// C
A limiting cone is such that given any other two cones A
k←Ð E lÐ→D and B j←Ð E lÐ→D it factors uniquely
through it, i.e. it gives rise to the following commuting diagram.
E
j
((
l
&&◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
k

D
h //
i

B
g

A
f
// C
5.3.2.1 Examples of Pullback
Example 5.3.3. If A,C,D and B are sets, then
D = A ×C B = {(a, b) ∈ A ×BSf(a) = g(b)} ⊆ A ×B} (5.3.20)
with maps
k ∶ A ×C B → B (5.3.21)
(a, b) ↦ b (5.3.22)
and
h ∶ A ×C B → A (5.3.23)
(a, b) ↦ a (5.3.24)
satisfies the conditions of being a pullback.
Proof. Given a set E with maps j ∶ E → B and i ∶ E → A, then the map l ∶ E → A×CB, (e z→ (i(e), j(e))
would make the diagram
E
j
((
l
&&◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
i

D
k //
h

B
g

A
f
// C
commute. In fact we have the following identities for all e ∈ E, h ○ l(e) = i(e) and k ○ l(e) = j(e).
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Moreover l is unique since, given any other map m ∶ E → A×C B, such that h ○m = i and k ○m = j,
then for all e ∈ E the following holds:
l(e) = (i(e), j(e)) = (h(m(e)), k(m(e))) =m(e) = (h(a, b), k(a, b)) = (a, b) (5.3.25)
Therefore l is unique.
5.3.3 Pushouts
As usual, any notation in category theory has a dual, thus we will now define the dual of a pullback
which is a push out.
Definition 5.3.5. A Pushout or fibered co-product of a pair of functions f ∶ A→ B and g ∶ A→ C
in a category C is a pair of C-arrows h ∶ B → D and k ∶ C → D, such that the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. h ○ f = k ○ g, i.e the following diagram commutes
A
f //
g

B
h

C
k
// D
One usually writes D = C +A B.
2. Given two functions i ∶ B → E and j ∶ C → E, where i ○ f = j ○ g, then there exists a unique
C-arrow l from D to E, such that the outer rectangle of the following diagram commutes
A
f //
g

B
h

i

C
k
//
j --
D
l
&&◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
E
i.e.
i = l ○ h j = l ○ k
We then say that f (respectively g) has been pushed out along g (respectively f).
5.3.3.1 Examples
Example 5.3.4. In Sets, given three sets A,B,C, the set D = C+AB always exists and it is identified
with the disjoint union of C and B, i.e.
D = C ∐B ∶= (x, t) ∈ (C ∪B) × {0,1}S⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
x ∈ B if t = 0
x ∈ C if t = 1 
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where, in this case, the arrows h and k are defined as follows:
h ∶ B → C ∐B (5.3.26)
b ↦ (b,0) (5.3.27)
and
k ∶ C → C ∐B (5.3.28)
c ↦ (c,1) (5.3.29)
We now want to prove that C ∐B, as defined, does indeed satisfy the conditions of a pushout.
Proof. :
Given a set E and two maps j ∶ C → E, i ∶ B → E, we define the map l ∶ C ∐ B → E, such that(c,1)z→ j(c) and (b,0)z→ i(b).
It is then easy to see that the diagram
A
f //
g

B
h

i

C
k
//
j
--
D
l
&&◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
E
commutes. In fact we have the following:
(l ○ h)(b) = l(b,0) = i(b) (5.3.30)
and (l ○ k)(b) = l(c,1) = j(c) (5.3.31)
The second step in the proof is showing that the map l is unique. In fact, given another map m ∶
C ∐B → E, such that m ○ h = i and m ○ k = j, then we would have the following equality:
l(b,0) = i(b) =m(h(b)) =m(b,0) (5.3.32)
and
l(c,1) = j(c) =m(k(c)) = j(c) (5.3.33)
This shows that l is unique.
5.3.4 Sub-Objects
Everyone is familiar with the notion of a subset in the category Sets. We now would like to generalise
this notion and describe it in categorical language, i.e. in terms of relation.
Let us start with Sets and see how much we can abstract from the already known definition of
subset. Consider two sets A and B such that A ⊆ B. This means that there is an inclusion map
f ∶ A ↪ B. In categorical language the map f is monic. So if we went the other way round and
considered a monic arrow f ∶ A↣ B, this would determine a subset of B, namely Imf ∶= {f(x)Sx ∈ A}.
Thus Imf ⊆ B and Imf ≃ A.
What this means is that the domain of a monic arrow is isomorphic to a subset of the codomain of
the arrow, i.e. up to isomorphisms the domain of a monic arrow is a subset of the codomain.
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As you might have noticed, going from a subset of a set to the set itself requires a change of type, we
are in a different object (namely going from domain object to codomain object). This implies that in
the categorical version of subset, there is no feasible way to say that the same element x is in both a set
and a subset of the set. All we can say is that two elements are isomorphic. This might seem striking
at first since we are used to think in Sets-language terms, where object are determined/defined by the
elements which comprise them thus, saying that two sets are the same means saying that the elements
which compose them are the same. However, in categorical language “the same” now becomes “are
isomorphic” since all is defined in terms of relations, i.e. arrows between objects.
So, preliminary, we will define a sub-object of a C object B as an arrow in C which is monic and
which has codomain B.
However, this is not the end of the story, since we are not taking into account that some objects might be
isomorphic which in categorical language means the same, thus, we should only really consider them
once. Therefore our definition of a sub-object should take into account the existence of equivalent
objects. In order to do so we need the following definition:
Definition 5.3.6. Given an arrow f ∶ A → B in some category C, if for some arrow g ∶ C → B in C,
there exists another arrow h ∶ A → C in C such that f = g ○ h, then we say that f factors through g,
since f = g ○ h can be solved for h.
Diagrammatically what factorising means is that the following diagrams commute
A
f //
h

B
C
g
??⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦
We now consider two sub-objects g ∶ C → B and f ∶ A → B, such that they both factor through
each other, i.e., the following diagram commutes
A //
f //
h

B C //
g //
k

B
C
??
g
??⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦
A
??
f
??⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦
We then consider such sub-objects as equivalent. This leads to the definition of the following
equivalence relation.
Definition 5.3.7. Given two monic arrows f, g with the same codomain we say that they are equivalent
f ∼ g iff they factor though each other.
Given the above we are now ready to define the categorical version of a sub-object.
Definition 5.3.8. In a category C, a sub-object of any object in C is an equivalence class of monic
arrows under the equivalence condition ∼ defined in 5.3.7. We will denote such an equivalence class as[f]. The sub-object is a proper sub-object if it does not contain idC.
This definition of sub-objects allows us to define the collection of all sub-objects of a given object
as a poset under subset inclusion. In particular, we know from set theory that the collection of all
subsets of a given set X is a poset, such that there is an arrow between any two such subsets A and B
iff A ⊆ B. Thus, diagrammatically, we have
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B  t
&&◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆
X
A
*


88♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣?
OO
Therefore abstracting such a definition to categorical language we say that two monic arrows f ∶ A↣ B
and g ∶ C ↣ B are such that f ⊆ g iff the following diagram commutes
C &&
g
&&◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆
B
A
88
f
88♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣
h
OO
i.e. f = g ○ h. (h is monic5
If we now consider all sub-objects of a given object B
Sub(B) ∶= {[f]Sf is monic and codf = B} where [f] = {gSf ≃ g} (5.3.35)
then such a collection of sub objects forms a poset under subset inclusion defined by
[f] ⊆ [g] iff f ⊆ g (5.3.36)
Proof.
• Reflexive: [f] ⊆ [f] implying that f ⊆ f . The latter is satisfied since
A &&
f
&&◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆◆
◆◆
B
A
88
f
88♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣
1A
OO
• Transitive: [f] ⊆ [g] and [g] ⊆ [h] then [f] ⊆ [h]. The fact that [f] ⊆ [g] and [g] ⊆ [h] implies
5Given f ∶ A→ B, and h, k ∶ D → A, assume that f ○ h = f ○ k. Then consider g ∶ B → C such that (g ○ f) is monic. It
follows that
(g ○ f) ○ h = g ○ (f ○ h) = g ○ (f ○ k) = (g ○ f) ○ k implies that h = k (5.3.34)
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that the diagram
C 
h
❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅
B //
g //
i
OO
D
A
??
f
??⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦
k
OO
commutes, where f ∈ [f], g ∈ [g] and h ∈ [h]. If f ○ g = k and g = h ○ i then it follows that
f = h ○ (i ○ k) thus f ⊆ h and [f] ⊆ [h]
• Antisymmetric: If [f] ⊆ [g] and [g] ⊆ [f] then f ⊆ g and g ⊆ f . This implies that f ∼ g thus[f] = [g].
If we had only considered equivalence classes then f ⊆ g and g ⊆ f would only imply f ∼ g but
not f = g. This would only be the case iff the only arrow allowing the factorisation of f via g (or
other way round) would be the identity arrow.
From now on, when we will talk about sub-objects it will be implicit that we are referring to
equivalence classes of sub-objects, even though it is not explicitly stated.
It is interesting to note that sub-objects, given by a categorical definition, are not the same as
subsets, but each subset determines and is determined by a unique sub-object. In fact we have the
following definition of a sub-object in Sets:
Definition 5.3.9. In Sets a sub-object is an equivalence class of injections (set theoretic equivalence
of monic map).
The 1:1 (one to one) correspondence between sub-objects and sets in set theory is given by the
statements in lemma 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.
In particular , lemma 5.3.1 shows that given a sub-object O of a set S there corresponds a unique
subset I of S. On the other hand lemma 5.3.2 shows the reverse, given a subset I ⊆ S there corresponds
a unique sub-object O of S.
Lemma 5.3.1.
Given a set S and a sub-object O (equivalence class of injective maps with codomain S) we have the
following:
a) any two injections f ∶ A → S and g ∶ B → S which are in O (i.e. they are equivalent) have the
same image I in S.
b) The inclusion i ∶ I → S is equivalent to any injection in O, thus it is an element of O.
c) If j ∶ J → S is an inclusion of a subset J into S that is in O, then I = J and i = j.
d) It follows from the above statements that every sub-object O of S contains one and only one
injective map which represents the inclusion of a subset of S into S. This subset is the image of
any element of O.
Lemma 5.3.2.
On the other hand, given an inclusion map i ∶ I → S of a subset I into S, we have that:
59
1. i is injective, thus it is an element of some sub-object O of S.
2. Any two distinct equivalence classes are disjoint, thus i can not belong to two different sub-objects.
3. Hence each subsets of S (and their inclusion maps) defined a unique sub-object of S.
Proof. We now proof both of the above lemmas.
1. O ∶= [fi], fi ∶ A→ S where f1 ∼ f2 iff
A
f1 //
g

S
B
f2
??⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧
and A
f1 // S
B
h
OO
f2
??⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧
Since f1 ○ h = f2 ( im(f1 ○ h) = im(f2)) and f1 and f2 are monic then h is monic which in Sets
means it is injective. Thus im(h) ⊆ A which in Sets can be written as im(B) ⊆ A it follows that
im(f1) ⊆ im(f2). On the other hand f2 ○ g = f1 thus im(f2 ○ g) = im(f1) g is monic. Therefore
im(g) ⊆ B implying that im(f1) ⊆ im(f1). Thus im(f1) = im(f2).
2. j ∶ J → S is an inclusion in O, thus an injection, i.e. an element. Each element in O has the same
image therefore im(j) = I. but im(j) = J since J ⊆ S thus J = I and j = i.
The difference between the categorical definition of a sub-object, as an equivalence class of monic
arrows and the standard definition of a subset in set theory is quite important at a conceptual level,
although, from an operational point of view they are equivalent. To understand this consider the
integers Z. In standard set theory they are simply a subset of the reals R, such that each integer is
actually a real. On the other hand in category theory sub-object relations only require the existence
(or definition) of a monic map between Z and R. Thus, in this case, an integer needs not be a real
number, it could, in principle, be something different. Reiterating, in standard set theory, the image of
each integer is represented by the same integer, so that the integers are a subset of the real numbers.
From the categorical point of view, instead, this condition can be relaxed, and all that is needed is
that there exists a monic map m ∶ Z→ R. If one wants to recover the standard definition in which such
monic arrow picks out the same integer, then an extra condition has to be placed, namely, that m is
an equivalent monic, i.e. picks out the same sub-object. However, from an operational point of view
the integers, as defined by a monic map Z → R behave the same way, whether this extra condition is
taken into consideration or not.
5.3.5 Sub-Object Classifier (Truth Object)
Now that we have defined what a sub-object is we would like to understand how to identify sub-objects.
To this end let us consider a specific example in Sets. Here we have the following isomorphisms which
we will prove later.
Sub(S) ≃ 2S ∶= {S → 2 = {0,1}} (5.3.37)
In fact, given a subset A of S, i.e A ⊆ S, the notion of being a subset can be expressed mathematically
using the so called characteristic function: χA ∶ S → {0,1}, which is defined as follows:
χA(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 if x ∉ A
1 if x ∈ A (5.3.38)
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(here we interpret 1=true and 0=false). The role of the characteristic function is to determine which
elements belong to a certain subset.
Remembering that in any category sub-objects are identified as monic arrows, we define the value
true in terms of the following monic map:
true ∶ 1 = {0} → 2 = {0,1} (5.3.39)
0 → 1 (5.3.40)
Given this definition, it can be easily seen that
A = {xSx ∈ S and χA(x) = 1} = χ−1A (1) (5.3.41)
This equation is equivalent to the statement that the following diagram
Diagram 5.3.1.
A
  //
!

S
χA

1
true
// 2
is a pullback, i.e. A is the pullback of true ∶ 1→ {0,1} along χA. In fact, if we consider the following
diagram
C
g
((
l
&&◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
!

A
  f //
!

S
χA

1
true
// 2
such that the outer square commutes, we then have that for any c ∈ C; χA(g(c)) = true(!(c)) = 1.
From the definition of A above it follows that g(c) ∈ A. Thus we can define the map l for each c ∈ C
as l(c) ∶= g(c). Obviously such choice makes the whole diagram commute and is the only arrow that
would do so. It follows that A ⊆ S iff the diagram 5.3.1 is a pullback. χA is the only arrow that makes
such a diagram a pullback.
Proof. Given the pullback diagram
C
g
((
l
&&◆
◆◆
◆◆
◆◆
!

A
  f //
!

S
h

1
true
// 2
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We want to show that h = χA. Since the diagram is indeed a pullback and f a monic, we have that
for all x ∈ A, f(x) = true(!(x)) = 1 therefore A = f−1(1), but this is precisely the definition of the
characteristic map χA.
When diagrams like this arise:
A
  f //
!

S
φ

1
true
// 2
we say that φ classifies f or the sub-object represented by f .
We can now give an abstract characterisation of what it means to classify sub-objects.
Definition 5.3.10. Given a category with a terminal object 1, a sub-object classifier is an object
Ω, together with a monic arrow T ∶ 1 → Ω (topos analogue of the set theoretic arrow true) such that,
given a monic C-arrow f ∶ a → b, there exists one and only one χf arrow, which makes the following
diagram
a //
f //
!

b
χf

1
T
// Ω
a pullback.
Axiom 5.3.1. Given a category C with sub-object classifier Ω and sub-objects, there exists (in C) an
isomorphisms
y ∶ SubC(X) ≃ C(X,Ω) ∀X ∈ C (5.3.42)
In order to prove the above axiom we need to show that y is a) monic, b) epic c) has an inverse.
Since the prove of the above theorem in topos is quite complicated and needs definitions not yet given
we will use an analogous proof in Sets, which essentially uses the same strategy as the proof in topos,
but, is much more intuitive. In Sets we can write the above axiom as follows:
Axiom 5.3.2. The collection of all subsets of S denoted by P(S) and the collection of all maps from S
to the set {0,1} = 2 denoted by 2S are isomorphic. This means that the function y ∶ P(S)→ 2S, which
in terms of single elements of P(S) is A→ χA, is a bijection.
Proof. Let us consider the Diagram 5.3.1
a) y is injective (1:1): consider the case in which χA = χB, where
χB(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 iff x ∈ B
0 iff x ∉ B
while χA was defined as in equation 5.3.38.
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Since the two functions are the same, they both associate the same domain to the codomain 1,
therefore A = B (A = χ−1A (1) = χ−1B (1) = B).
b) y is surjective (onto): given any function f ∈ 2S , then there must exist a subset A of S, such that
Af = {x ∶ x ∈ S and f(x) = 1}, i.e. Af = f−1({1}). Therefore f = χAf .
c) The inverse is simply given by χ−1(1).
Corollary 5.3.1. The domain of the arrow true: 1→ Ω is always the terminal object.
Proof. Let us assume that instead of the terminal object being the domain of the true map we have
a general element Q, obtaining true ∶ Q → Ω. We now want to consider the identity arrow idA on an
object A. Being an identity, such a map is iso, thus monic. We then want to analyse what sub-objects
this map defines. We already know the answer since it is simply an identity map, but nonetheless we
apply the sub-object classifier procedure and define the pull back diagram
A
idA //
h

A
χA

Q
true
// Ω
Thus we obtain that χA = true ○ h.
On the other hand, given any arrow k ∶ A → Q, we can define the following pullback classifying
diagram
A
idA //
h

A
k

Q
idQ

idQ
// Q
true

Q
true
// Ω
This means that in this case true ○ k = true ○ h. We know that true is monic, thus k = h. What this
means is that for a given object (in this case) A there is one and only one (up to isomorphisms) arrow
from A to Q, this Q must be the terminal object.
5.3.6 What is a Sub-Object Classifier in Topos ?
In the case of Sets, Ω ≅ {0,1} therefore the elements of Ω are simply 0 and 1, which can be identified
with the values false and true in the context of the theory of logic. This is not the case for a general
topos.
Since we are mainly interested in the topos SetsC
op
, which will be the topos in which quantum
theory will be expressed (and will be explained in details in Lecture 9), we will analyse what the
elements of the sub-object classifier are in this case. To fully understand the nature of these elements
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it is not necessary that you know the details of the topos SetsC
op
. For now it suffices to know that it
is actually a category with objects and morphisms. The details of either are irrelevant at this point.
Given the category SetsC
op
, the elements of the sub-object classifier are sieves.
In what follows we will first define what a sieve is and, then, we will show that they can be identified
with elements of Ω.
5.3.7 Sieve
Definition 5.3.11. A sieve on an object A ∈ C is a collection S of morphisms in C whose codomain
is A and such that, if f ∶ B → A ∈ S then, given any morphisms g ∶ C → B we have f ○ g ∈ S, i.e. S is
closed under left composition:
B
f // A
C
g
OO
fog
??⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧
It is also possible to define maps between different sieves when the objects these sieves are defined
on are related in some way. For example, if we have a C-arrow f ∶ A → B then it is possible to define
a map from the set of all sieves on B, which we denote Ω(B) to the set Ω(A) of all sieves on A as
follows:
ΩBA ∶ Ω(B) → Ω(A) (5.3.43)
S ↦ ΩBA(S) ∶= {gScod(g) = A and f ○ g ∈ S} (5.3.44)
Sometimes you can symbolically write ΩBA(S) = S∩ ↓ A where ↓ A is the principal sieve on A, i.e. the
sieve that contains the identity morphism of A, therefore it is the biggest sieve on A6.
An important property of sieves is the following:
if f ∶ B → A belongs to S which is a sieve on A, then the pullback of S by f determines the principal
sieve on B, i.e.
f∗(S) ∶= {h ∶ C → BSf ○ h ∈ S} = {h ∶ C → B} =↓ B
For example
C
~~⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
B
f
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
A Doo
f∗ +3
B
iB

Coo
An important property of sieves is that the set of sieves defined on an object forms a Heyting algebra
with partial ordering given by subset inclusion. The fact that the set of sieves forms a Heyting algebra
is very important since, as we will see later on, such an algebra will represent the logic of truth values.
Thus the next question to address is: what is an Heyting algebra? The answer to this question will be
the topic of the next section.
5.3.7.1 Heyting Algebra
Definition 5.3.12. A Heyting Algebra H is a relative pseudo complemented distributive lattice.
6Essentially ↓ A is the sieve which contains all possible C-arrows, which has as codomain A, i.e. ↓ A ∶= {fi ∈ C∣cod(fi) =
A}.
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We will explain these attributes one at a time. The definition of a lattice was already given in the
handout of lecture 3, but for sake of completeness we will nontheless restate it here.
Definition 5.3.13. Given a poset (L,≤), we say that this is a lattice if the following conditions are
satisfied.
1) Given any two elements a, b ∈ L it is always possible to define a third element a ∨ b ∈ L called the
join or least upper bound or supremum.
2) Given any two elements a, b ∈ L it is always possible to define a third element a ∧ b ∈ L called the
meet or greatest lower bound or infimum.
because the elements of the lattice involved in defining join and meet are two, the operations ∨ and
∧ are the binary operations of the lattice.
If only the first condition holds we say that L is a join-semilattice, if only the second holds L is a
meet-semilattice.
A lattice L is saied to be distributive if for any ai ∈ L the following relations hold:
a1 ∧ (a2 ∨ a3) = (a1 ∧ a2) ∨ (a1 ∧ a3)
a1 ∨ (a2 ∧ a3) = (a1 ∨ a2) ∧ (a1 ∨ a2)
In order to understand the property of being a relative pseudo complemented lattice we first of all have
to introduce the notion of least upper bound (l.u.b) (and dually of greatest lower bound (g.l.b)) of a
set. We are already acquainted with the notion of the l.u.b for two elements a, b in a lattice L with
ordering ≤. This is simply given by the element a ∨ b. Similarly, the g.l.b. is a ∧ b. But how do we
define such notions with respect to a set A ⊆ L? The definition is quite intuitive: the g.l.b. of a set A
is an element c ∈ L, such that for all a ∈ A, c ≤ a and given any other element b ≤ a for all a ∈ A then
b ≤ c. The condition of c being the g.l.b. of A is denoted by c ≤ A. Moreover, we say that c is the
greatest element of A if c is the g.l.b and c ∈ A.
Dually the l.u.b y ∈ L ofA, denoted A ≤ y is such that for all a ∈ A, a ≤ y and, given any other element
z ∈ L, such that A ≤ z, then y ≤ z. We can now define the notion of a relative pseudo-complement as
follows:
Definition 5.3.14. L is a relative-pseudo complemented lattice iff for each two elements a, b ∈ L there
exists a third element c, such that
1. a ∧ c ≤ b
2. ∀x ∈ L x ≤ c iff a ∧ x ≤ b
where c is defined as the pseudo complement of a relative to b i.e., the greatest element of the set{x ∶ a ∧ x ≤ b}, and it is denoted as a⇒ b, i.e.
a→ b = ⋁{x ∶ x ∧ a ≤ b} (5.3.45)
If in the above definition we replace b with the element 0, then we obtain the notion of pseudo-
complement.
Definition 5.3.15. Given a lattice (L,≤) with a zero element, the pseudo-complement of a is the
greatest element of L disjoint from a, i.e. the greatest element of the set {x ∈ LSa∧x = 0}. The pseudo
complement of a will be denoted as a⇒ 0
If every element of L has a pseudo-complement, then L is a pseudo-complemented lattice.
The pseudo complement in a Heyting algebra is identified with the negation operation, i.e. ¬a ∶=
a ⇒ 0. From the above definition of negation operation (¬a ∶ a⇒ 0) in a Heyting algebra, we obtain
the following corollary:
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Corollary 5.3.2. Given any element S of an Heyting algebra, we have the following:
S ∨ ¬S ≤ 1 (5.3.46)
Proof. Let us consider S ∨¬S. This represents the least upper bound of S and ¬S therefore, given any
other element S1 in the Heyting algebra, such that S ≤ S1 and ¬S ≤ S1, then, S ∨¬S ≤ S1. But, since
for any S we have S ≤ 1 and ¬S ≤ 1, it follows that S ∨ ¬S ≤ 1.
5.3.8 Understanding the Sub-Object Classifier in a Topos
As previously stated, the role of a sub-object classifier is to identify sub-objects. This is done in terms
of associating for each sub-object A, of a given object X , an element of the sub-object classifier. For
Sets this is very straightforward since in this case Ω = {0,1}, which can be interpreted as the values
true and false. Thus, in this case, each sub-object A is uniquely identified in terms of the elements x
which belong to them, i.e. for which χA(x) = 1.
The fact that in Sets the set of truth values is simply {0,1} implies that the logic which is derived
is a Boolean logic, i.e. a classical logic. This is basically the logic that each of us adopts when speaking
any western language. It is the logic of the classical world, and the logic of the western way of reasoning.
On the other hand, for a general topos the sub-object classifier will not simply be the two valued
set {0,1} as it is for Sets. This ‘complicates’ (depending on the point of view) the situation however,
at an interpretative level, the role of the sub-object classifier is still unchanged and the elements still
represent truth values. Since these truth values will, in general, not be simply true or false, we will not
end up with a Boolean Logic. Instead, we will end up with an intuitionistic logic which, mathematically,
is represented by a Heyting algebra described above.
In particular, in classical logic, either a statement is true or it is false there is nothing in between.
This is not the case for intuitionistic logic. If one thinks about it, examples of intuitionistic logic
can be found in our language. In fact, although the way we reason is governed by classical logic,
some aspects of our language can, in a way, be considered more intuitionistic in nature. For example,
statements regarding more subjective issues. Consider the statement “I am tired” or “ I am hungry”
the truthfulness of these statements is not simply true or false. In fact, if you asked the question “are
you tired?” or “are you hungry?” in most cases you will not get a simple yes or no answer but you
could get something more elaborated such as “I am a little tired” (“I am a bit hungry”) or “I am not
so tired” (“ I am not so hungry”), extremely , not at all etc. This is because the expressions tired,
hungry, can be quantified, i.e. graded. At the extreme points there will be the answers “yes I am
tired” (true) and “no, I am not tired” (false) and similarly for “hungry”. However, as we have just
seen, there will be many different statements in between (different truth values).
Can these truth values be quantified? The answer is “yes”, as long as we remain in the real of
language since we know that, for example, the expressions “very”, “a little”, “quite”, have the following
relations in terms of strength:
a little ≤ quite ≤ very (5.3.47)
In this case if you are “very hungry” but just “a little tired”, the statement “ you are hungry” is
more true than the statement “you are tired”. However, this analysis relies only on the meaning that
language has given to such expressions. The question is if it would be possible to define relations of
truthfulness on a more objective ground. To this end let us consider the statement “ the 1 litre bottle
is full” which we symbolically denote as X . Let us also consider two identical bottles b1 and b2 one half
full and the other three quarters full, respectively. Obviously, the statement X , when referred to b1, is
less true than when referred to b2. The objectiveness of such truth values can be defined by measuring
how much water there is in each bottle (1/2 and 3/4).
Alternatively, one can also assert how true the proposition X is in a more operational way by
measuring how much water needs to be added, such that the proposition X is true in the classical
sense, i.e. such that there is 1 litre of water in the bottle. Thus, if proposition X is true when there
is exactly one litre of water in a bottle, such that no more water has to be added, it is then possible
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to define the truth value of X , given a system bi, as (1 −water to be added). This tells you precisely
how far away you are from the truth, i.e. from one litre of water.
Thus, the truth value of the proposition X , given the ‘states’ b1 and b2 is now given by
v(X,b1) = (1 − 1~2) ≤ v(X,b2) = (1 − 1~4) (5.3.48)
Obviously, the extreme points of such truth values are 0 and 1; for example when the bottle is empty
(1 litre of water has to be added v(X,b) = 1 − 1 = 0) and when the bottle is full (no water has to be
added v(X,b) = 1 − 0 = 1), respectively.
This way of defining truth values is based on the idea of how much one has to change the system
(fill up the bottles) in order for the untouched proposition to be true. However, it is also possible to
proceed the other way, i.e. generalise the proposition so that the now unchanged system satisfies the
more general proposition. Therefore, keeping with our water bottle7 examples, let us assume we have
a litre bottle b1 which has 1/10 of a litre of water in it. Again, we have the proposition X stating “the
bottle is full”. We can’t say that X is true given bi, but we can’t even say it is false since b1 is not
empty. So the question is what can we say about the truth value of X given b1 without changing the
system? Well, we simply do the ‘inverse’ procedure as we did before, i.e. we generalise the proposition
X .
To understand this it is convenient to re-write X as “bi has 1 litre of water”. We then start generalising
such a proposition by subtracting amounts of water to the bottle and forming new propositions. For
example, we consider the proposition X1/2 = “bi has (1-1/2) litres of water”. However, given our bottle
b1 which has only 1/8 of water we still can not say that X1/2 is true. So we keep generalising the
proposition till we reach the proposition X7/8 = “b1 has (1-7/8) litres of water”. Such a proposition is
true given b1.
This example shows how it is possible to identify truth values of propositions, given a state, in
terms of how much the original proposition had to be generalised such that this new coarse grained
proposition is true (given that state).
Thus, in our case, the truth value of the original proposition X , given the state bi, is defined in
terms of how much we have to generalise X , in this case we coarse grain it to X7/8, such that X7/8 is
true given bi. Mathematically this is given by the equation
v(X,b1) ∶= 1 − inf{xSv(Xx, b1) = 1} = 1 − 7~8 = 1~8 (5.3.49)
It is now straight forward to see how truth values can be compared. In particular, if we have a bottle
which contained 1~2 litre of water then its truth value would be
v(X,b2) ∶= 1 − inf{xSv(Xx, b2) = 1} = 1 − 1~2 = 1~2 (5.3.50)
It then follows that v(X,b2) ≥ v(X,b1).
In this schema we obviously don’t just have ‘true’ or ‘false’ as truth values, but we have many more
truth values, whose limiting points are precisely 1 (true) and 0 (false).
Although this is a very general description of how different truth values, other than ‘true’ or ‘false’,
can be obtained, it still helps shedding some light on how intuitionistic logic works. In such a logic
truth values are not constricted to be only true or false but there are many more values in between.
Obviously, the two limiting points will then coincide with the classical notions of true and false.
What the above implies is that, differently from a Boolean algebra, in a Heyting the law of excluded
middle does not hold: S∨¬S ≤ 1 (in a Boolean logic we would simply have S∨¬S = 1). Thus, differently
from ordinary logic where something is either true or false, in intuitionistic logic this is not the case. As
a consequence, the sum of a proposition and its negation doesn’t give the ‘whole story’, which implies
that double negation does not give back the original element, i.e. ¬¬S ≥ S. On the other hand strict
equality would hold for Boolean algebras.
Above we have given a very intuitive definition of what a sub-object classifier does in a general
topos, while the technical definition was given in 5.3.10. However the important point to understand
7I don’t know about you but I’m getting very thirsty writing this :)
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is that in a general topos the sub-object classifier together with the Heyting algebras of sub-objects
enables us to render mathematically precise the notion of a proposition being nearly true, almost true
etc. Moreover, it allows for a well defined mathematical notion of how ‘far away’ from the truth a
proposition, given a state, actually is. This ‘distance’ from the truth is in the end what a truth value
represents in a general topos.
In particular, in the yet to be defined topos SetsC
op
, the elements of the sub-object classifier are
sieves and these represent truth values, thus the bigger the sieve is the truer a proposition will be. The
principal sieve, which is the biggest sieve, represents the analogue of the classical value true, while the
empty sieve represents the classical value false.
5.3.9 Axiomatic Definition of a Topos
Now that we have defined all the above constructions we are ready to give the axiomatic definition of
a topos.
Definition 5.3.16. An elementary topos is a category with all finite limits, exponentials and a sub-
object classifier.
An alternative but equivalent definition is:
Definition 5.3.17. A topos is a category τ with the following extra properties:
1. τ has an initial object (0).
2. τ has a terminal object (1) .
3. τ has pullbacks.
4. τ has pushouts.
5. τ has exponentiation, i.e. τ is such that for every pair of objects X and Y in τ , the map Y X
exists.
6. T has a sub-object classifier.
It is straightforward to see that condition (1) and (3) above are equivalent to stating that a topos τ
has all finite limits. By duality, if τ has all finite limits it also has all finite co-limits. This requirement
is equivalent to conditions (2) and (4).
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Chapter 6
Lecture 7
In this lecture I will describe some categorical constructs present in the topos of contravariant presheeaves
SetsC
op
. This topos is important since, for a particular choice of C is will be the topos we will utilised
to express quantum theory.
6.1 Categorical Constructs in the Topos of Presheaves Taking
Values in Sets
We will now show how some of the categorical construct, which we delineated in lecture 2, apply to
the category SetsC
op
.
6.1.1 Pullbacks
Pullbacks exist in any category of presheaves SetsC
op
. In fact, if X,Y,B ∈ SetsCop , then P ∈ SetsCop
is a pullback in SetsC
op
iff
P (C) k //
h

Y (C)
g

X(C)
l
// B(C)
is a pullback in set. This implies that P (C) = (X ×B Y )C ≃X(C) ×B(C) Y (C)1.
The fact that a pullback in SetsC
op
is defined in terms of a pullback in Sets, implies that the former
always exists, since the latter does. In fact, given any object C ∈ C and any three functors X, Y, B,
it is always possible to construct (in Sets) a diagram as the one above, where P (C) = (X ×B Y )C ≃
X(C) ×B(C) Y (C). This implies that it is always possible to define a functor P ∶ C → Sets which
assigns, for each C ∈ C an object P (C) = (X ×B Y )C ≃ X(C) ×B(C) Y (C) (a set) and, for each arrow
f ∶ A → C in C the unique arrow P (f) ∶ P (C) → P (A) in Sets, which makes the following cube a
1Note that the last product is all in Sets
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pullback in SetsC
op
P (C) k //
P (f)
$$❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
h

Y (C)
g

Y (f)
##❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
P (A)

// Y (A)

X(C) l //
X(f) $$❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
B(C)
B(f)
##❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
X(A) // B(A)
Where, again the outer square is a pullback in Sets and, as such, it always exists.
6.1.2 Sub-objects
A sub-object of a presheaf is defined as follows:
Definition 6.1.1. Y is a sub-object of a presheaf X if there exists a natural transformation i ∶ Y →
X which is defined, component wise, as iA ∶ Y (A) → X(A) and where iA defines a subset embedding
i.e. Y (A) ⊆X(A).
Since Y is itself a presheaf, the maps between the objects of Y are the restrictions of the corre-
sponding maps between the objects of X. This can be easily seen with the aid of the following diagram:
Y (A) Y (f)
X(A)
//
X(B)
X(f)
Y (B)//
An alternative way of expressing this condition is through the following commutative diagram:
Y (A) Y (f) //
iA

Y (B)
iB

X(A)
X(f)
// X(B)
6.1.3 Initial and Terminal Object
An initial object in the topos of presheaves is defined as follows:
Definition 6.1.2. See Exercise
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An initial object is the dual of a terminal object. A terminal object in the Topos of presheaves
SetsC
op
is defined as follows:
Definition 6.1.3. A terminal object in SetsC
op
is the constant functor 1 ∶ C → Sets that maps every
C-object to the one element Set {∗} and every C-arrow to the identity arrow on {∗}.
C
~~⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
E

B
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
A Doo
1 +3
{∗}
id{∗}}}④④
④④
④④
④④
{∗}
id{∗}

{∗}
id{∗}}}④④
④④
④④
④④
{∗} {∗}
id{∗}
oo
6.1.4 Sub-object Classifier in the Topos of Presheaves
We will now describe the most important object in SetsC
op
: the sub-object classifier. As previously
described this will allow us to define truth values in our topos representation of quantum theory.
Definition 6.1.4. A Sub-object Classifier Ω is a presheaf Ω ∶ C → Sets such that:
• To each object A ∈ C there corresponds an object Ω(A) ∈ Sets, which represents the set of all
sieves on A.
• To each C-arrow f ∶ B → A, there corresponds a Sets-arrow Ω(f) ∶ Ω(A) → Ω(B), such that
Ω(f)(S) ∶= {h ∶ C → BSf ○ h ∈ S} is a sieve on B, where Ω(f)(S) ∶= f∗(S).
We now want to show that this definition of sub-object classifier is in agreement with definition
1.10 in lecture 5. In order to do that we need to define the analogue of arrow true (⊺) and of the
characteristic function in a topos.
Definition 6.1.5. ⊺ ∶ 1→ Ω is the natural transformation that has components ⊺A ∶ {∗}→ Ω(A) given
by ⊺A(∗) =↓ A = principal sieve on A.
To understand how ⊺ works, let us consider a monic arrow σ ∶ F → X in SetsC
op
, which is defined
component-wise by σA ∶ F (A)→X(A) and represents subset inclusion.
Now let us define the character χσ ∶ X → Ω of σ which is a natural transformation in the category of
presheaves, such that the components χσA represent functions from X(A) to Ω(A), as depicted in:
F (A)   σA //

X(A)
χσA
{∗} ⊺A // Ω(A)
where T {∗} =↓ A.
From the above diagram we can see that χσA assigns to each element x ∈ X(A) a sieve χσA(x) ∈ Ω(A)
on A. For an arrow f ∶ B → A in C to belong to the sieve χσA(x) on A we require that the following
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diagram commutes
F (A)   σA //
F (f)

X(A)
X(f)

F (B)   σB // X(B)
Such that F (f) is the restriction of X(f) to F (A), since F is a sub-presheaf of X . Therefore
χσA(x) ∶= {f ∶ B → ASX(f)(x) ∈ F (B)} (6.1.1)
This condition is expressed by the following diagram:
X(f)
F (A) X(A)
X(B)F (B)
●
x


✖✖
✖✖
✖✖
✖✖
✖✖
✖✖
✖✖
✖✖
✖✖
✖✖
✖✖
i.e. f belongs to χσA(x) iff X(f) maps x into F (B).
χFA(x), as defined by equation 6.1.1, represents a sieve on A.
Proof. Consider the following commuting diagram which represents sub-object F of the presheaf X .
F (A) F (f) // _

F (B) F (g) // _

F (C) _

X(A) X(f) // X(B) X(g) // X(C)
If f ∶ B → A belongs to χσA(x) then, given g ∶ C → B it follows that f ○ g belongs to χσA(x), since from
the above diagram it can be deduced that X(f ○ g)(x) ∈ F (C). This is precisely the definition of a
sieve, so we have proved that χσA(x) ∶= {f ∶ B → ASX(f)(x) ∈ F (B)} is a sieve.
As a consequence of axiom 3.1 in lecture 5 the condition of being a sub-object classifier can be
restated in the following way.
Axiom 6.1.1. Omega Axiom: Ω is a sub-object classifier iff there is a “one to one” correspon-
dence between sub-object of X and morphisms from X to Ω.
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Given this alternative definition of a sub-object classifier, it is easy to prove that Ω, as defined in
6.1.4 is a sub-object classifier. In fact, from equation 6.1.1, we can see that indeed there is a 1:2:1
correspondence between sub-objects of X and characteristic morphisms (character) χ.
Moreover, for each morphism χ ∶ X → Ω we have
Fχ(A) ∶= χ−1A {1Ω(A) ∶=↓ A} = {x ∈ X(A)SχA(x) =↓ A} = sub-object ofX(A) (6.1.2)
6.1.4.1 Elements of Sub-Object Classifier
The elements of the sub-object classifier Ω in a topos are derived from the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1.1. Given an object A ∈ C (where C is a locally small category), the a sieve on A can be
identified with representable functor (defined below) y(C) ∶=HomC(−,A) ∈ SetsCop .
In order to prove the above theorem we need the following lemma:
Lemma 6.1.1. Preliminary: if C is a locally small category 2, then each object A of C induces a
natural contravariant functor from C to Sets called a hom-functor y(A) ∶= HomC(−,A)3. Such a
functor is defined on objects C ∈ C as
y(A) ∶ C → Sets (6.1.3)
C ↦ HomC(C,A) (6.1.4)
on C-morphisms f ∶ C → B as
y(A)(f) ∶HomC(B,A) → HomC(C,A) (6.1.5)
g ↦ y(A)(f)(g) ∶= g ○ f (6.1.6)
Yoneda lemma: Given an arbitrary presheaf P on C there exists a bijective correspondence between
natural transformations y(A) → P and elements of the set P (A) (A ∈ C) defined as an arrow
θ ∶ NatC(y(A), P ) ≃→ P (A) (6.1.7)
α ∶ y(A) → P ↦ θ(α) = αA(1A) (6.1.8)
We have now the right tools to prove the above theorem.
Proof. Let us consider Ω to be a sub-object classifier of Cˆ = SetsCop , i.e. we want Ω to classify sub-
objects in SetsC
op
.
Consider now a presheaf y(C) =HomC(−,C) ∈ Cˆ. We know from axiom 3.1 lecture 5 that
Sub
Cˆ
(HomC(−,C)) ≅HomCˆ(HomC(−,C),Ω)
From Yonedas lemma it follows that
Hom
Cˆ
(HomC(−,C),Ω) = Ω(C)
therefore the sub-object classifier Ω must be a presheaf Ω ∶ C → Sets, such that
Ω(C) =Sub
Cˆ
(HomC(−,C))
= {SSS a sub − functor of HomC(−,C)}
Now if Q ⊂HomC(−,C) is a sub-functor of HomC(−,C), then the set
S = {f S for some object A, f ∶ A→ C and f ∈ Q(A)}
2A Category C is said to be locally small iff its collection of morphisms form a proper set.
3We have already encounter this in lecture 4.
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is a sieve on C. Conversely, given a sieve S on C we define
Q(A) = {f Sf ∶ A→ C and f ∈ S} ⊆HomC(A,C)
which determines a presheaf Q ∶ C → Sets which is a sub-functor of HomC(−,C), i.e to each object
A ∈ C, Q assigns the set Q(A) ⊆HomC(A,C). The above discussion shows that there exist a bijective
correspondence between sub-functors Q ⊆HomC(−,C) and sieves S on C. Therefore
Sieve on C ≃ sub − functor of HomC(−,C)
For each object A in a category C we can now define a presheaf y(A) such that:
• Given an object D of C we have
y(A)D =HomC(D,A)
• Given morphisms α ∶ B →D and θ ∶D → A we obtain:
y(A)(α) ∶HomC(D,A) → HomC(B,A) (6.1.9)
θ ↦ y(A)(α)(θ) = θ ○ α (6.1.10)
A very simple graphical example of the above is the following:
E
A
h
44✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐
B
g
jj❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯
D
α
44✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐✐
θ
jj❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯❯
⇓y(A)
HomC(E,A)
y(A)(g)
**❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚y(A)(h)
tt❥❥❥❥
❥❥❥❥
❥❥❥❥
❥❥❥
HomC(A,A)
y(A)(θ) **❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚
HomC(B,A)
y(A)(α)tt❥❥❥❥
❥❥❥❥
❥❥❥❥
❥❥❥
HomC(D,A)
Considering the above construction it follows that, for any morphism on C of the form f ∶ A → A1
there exists a natural transformation y(A) → y(A1) between the respective presheaves as constructed
above.
We can therefore deduce that y is actually a functor from the category C to the set of presheaves defined
on C, i.e y ∶ C → SetsC
op
, such that to each object A in C, y assigns the Hom-functor HomC(−,A), i.e.
y ∶ C → SetsC
op
(6.1.11)
A ↦ y(A) ∶=HomC(−,A) (6.1.12)
where Hom(−,A) corresponds to a Presheaf on C.
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In this setting, given a C-arrow f ∶ C →D and a C-objectA the induced morphisms is
y(f) ∶HomC(−,C) →HomC(−,D) (6.1.13)
whose natural components, for any A ∈ C are
y(f)(A) =HomC(A,f) ∶HomC(A,C) →HomC(A,D) (6.1.14)
i.e., they correspond to y(A)(f).
The importance of Yoneda’s Lemma is really that it enables us to identify the elements of a sub-
object classifier for the topos SetsC
op
as sieves. Since elements of the sub-object classifier are identified
with truth values, it follows that in the topos SetsC
op
we will end up with a multivalued logic differently
from the logic we obtain in Sets, where Ω = {0,1}, i.e. where the only truth values are true and false.
We will talk more about this in coming lectures.
6.1.5 Global sections
Other important features of topos theory are the global and local sections which we will define below.
Definition 6.1.6. A global section or global element of a presheaf X in SetsC
op
is an arrow
k ∶ 1→X from the terminal object 1 to the presheaf X.
What k does is to assign to each object A in C an element kA ∈ X(A) in the corresponding set of
the presheaf X. The assignment is such that, given an arrow f ∶ B → A the following relation holds
X(f)(kA) = kB (6.1.15)
What 6.1.15 uncovers, is that the elements of X(A) assigned by the global section k, are mapped into
each other by the morphisms in X . Presheaves with a local or partial section can exist even if they do
not have a global section.
A particular important type of global sections are the global elements of Ω. In fact the collection
Γ(Ω) of all such global section forms a Heyting algebra and represents the collection of all truth values
in a topos logic. We thus obtain as an internal logic in a topos a multivalued logic which is of an
intuitionistic type.
6.1.6 Local sections
Definition 6.1.7. A local or partial section of a presheaf X in SetsC
op
is an arrow ρ ∶ U →X where
U is a subobject of the terminal object 1.
In a presheaf, a subobject U of 1 can either be the empty set ∅, or a singleton {∗}. Thus for each
object C ∈ Cop we either obtain the empty set U(C) = ∅ or a singleton U(C) = {∗}, to each such
singleton we then assign an element of X(C). This assignment is said to be “closed downwards”, i.e.
given a subobject U(A)={∗} of 1 and a C-morphisms f ∶ B → A then we have U(B)={∗}, therefore
ρa({∗}) =∶ ρa ∈X(A) and X(f)(ρa) = ρb.
To better explain the above let us consider a category with 4 elements {A,B,C,D} such that the
following relations hold between the elements:
A
f //
i

B
g

D
p
// C
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Given a subobject U of 1 we then have the following relations
U(A) U(f) //
U(i)

U(B)
U(g)

U(D)
U(p)
// U(C)
If U(A)=∅ then U(f) is either the unique function ∅ → {∗} iff U(B) = {∗} or ∅ → ∅ iff U(B) = ∅. If
instead U(A) = {∗} then the only possibility is that U(B) = {∗} since there does not exist a function{∗}→ ∅. Therefore ρ assigns to particular subsets of objects A ∈ C, elements ρA. namely those objects
A ∈ C for which U(A) = {∗}. These objects A are called the domain of ρ (dom ρ) and are such that
the following conditions are satisfied:
• The domain is closed downwards i.e. if A ∈ dom ρ and if there exists a map f ∶ B → A then
B ∈ dom ρ
• If A ∈ domρ and if there exists a map f ∶ B → A, then the following condition is satisfied:
X(f)(ρA) = ρB
6.2 Exponential
In SetsC
op
the exponentiation can be defined as follows: Consider a functor F ∈ SetsCop such that,
given an object a ∈ C, F defines a functor4 Fa ∶ C ↓ a→ Sets. Fa assigns to each object f ∶ b→ a ∈ C ↓ a
an object Fa(f) ∶= F (b), and to each arrow h ∶ (b, f)→ (b, g), such that
b
h //
f
✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
c
g
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍
a
commutes in C, it assigns the arrow F (h) ∶ F (c)→ F (b).
Given this context we define the exponential GF ∶ C → Sets between the contravariant functors F,G ∈
SetsC
op
as the functor with
• Objects:
GF (a) = Nat[Fa,Ga] (6.2.1)
i.e. the elements of GF (a) are the collection of all natural transformations from Fa to Ga5.
• Morphisms: given an arrow k ∶ a→ d we get
GF (k) ∶ Nat[Fd,Gd]→Nat[Fa,Ga] (6.2.2)
4Recall from lecture 2/3 that C ↓ a is the comma category described in example 2.3
5Here the functor Ga ∶ C ↓ a → Sets is the induced functor from G thus, for a given element f ∶ b → a it assigns the
element Ga(f) ∶=G(b), and to each morphism i ∶ f → g ( g ∶ c→ a) it assigns the morphism G(i) ∶ G(c) → G(b).
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To better understand this definition consider the natural transformation α ∈ Nat[Fd,Gd] and θ ∈
Nat[Fa,Ga]. The action of GF (k) can then be illustrated as follows:
Fd
α

Gd
G
F (k) //
Fa
θ

Ga
i.e an arrow in GF (k) assigns, to each natural transformation α from Fd to Gd a natural transformation
θ from Fa to Ga. The way in which the natural transformation θ is picked given α can be understood
by considering the individual components. In particular, an element h ∶ c→ d ∈ C ↓ d, then
αh ∶ Fd(h) → Gd(h) (6.2.3)
F (d) → G(d) (6.2.4)
On the other hand an element f ∶ c→ a ∈ C ↓ a gives
θf ∶ Fa(f) → Ga(f) (6.2.5)
F (c) → G(c) (6.2.6)
Now, if we consider a map k ∶ d→ a ∈ C, such that the following diagram commutes
a d
k
oo
c
f
__❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄
h
OO
we require that θf = αk○h.
In this formulation the evaluation function is the map: ev ∶ GF ×F → G in SetsC
op
, such that
eva ∶ G
F (a) ×F (a) → G(a) (6.2.7)
⟨θ, x⟩ ↦ eva(⟨θ, x⟩) = θ1a(x) (6.2.8)
where θ ∈ Nat[Fa,Ga] and x ∈ F (a).
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Chapter 7
Lecture 8
In this lecture I will describe how topos quantum theory can be seen as a contextual quantum theory,
in the sense that each element is defined as a collection of ‘context dependent’ descriptions. Such
context dependent descriptions will turn out to be classical snapshots.
I will then describe the above mentioned contexts which are Abelian Von Neumann sub-algebras,
the collection of which forms a category. What this implies is that, although locally quantum theory
can be defined in terms of local classical snapshots, the global/quantum information is put back into
the picture by the categorical structure of the collection of all such classical snapshots. I will give an
example of the category of Abelian Von Neumann sub-algebras for a 4 dimensional Hilbert space.
Given the definition of our base category we will then define the topos analogue of the state space.
This is the spectral presheaf. I will end with a specific example on how such a presheaf is constructed
in the case of a 4 dimensional complex Hilbert space.
7.1 The Notion of Contextuality in the Topos Approach
In previous lectures we have seen how the Knochen-Specker theorem seems to imply that quantum
theory is contextual, since values of quantities depend on which other quantities are being measured
at the same time. However, that is not the notion of contextuality that we want to address here. In
fact, in the topos approach to quantum theory there is another type of contextuality arising which is
fundamental for the formulation of the theory. Surprisingly enough also this notion of contextuality
is derived from the Kochen-Speker theorem, but in a very different fashion. In particular, although
the K-S theorem prohibited us to define values for all quantities at the same time in a consistent
way, it nonetheless allowed for the possibility of assigning values to commuting subsets of quantities.
These commuting subsets can be considered as classical snapshots since all the peculiarities of quantum
theory arise from non-commuting operators. Thus, with respect to these classical snapshots (contexts),
quantum theory behaves like classical theory.
The idea is then to define quantum theory locally with respect to these classical snapshots but, then,
on has to consider all the information coming from the collection of these classical snapshots all at
the same time. Thus, in this way, quantum theory could be seen as a collection of local classical
approximations.
Although it seems like one is cheating by doing this, it turns out that this is not the case. The
reason being that the collection of all the above mentioned classical snapshots actually forms a category
which means that it is always possible two relate (compare) any two contexts.
What is happening is the following: we first consider different contexts which represent classical
snapshots, we then define our quantum theory locally in terms of such classical snapshots, therefore in
a way performing a classical approximation. The quantum information, which is lost at the local level
is, however, put back into the picture by the categorical structure of the collection of all the classical
contexts. In this way no information is lost and we therefore did not cheat.
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The category of classical snapshots we will be utilising is the category of abelian von Neuman
sub-algebras of the algebra B(H) of bounded operators on the Hilbert space.
7.1.1 Category of Abelian von Neumann Sub-Algebras
In what follows we will first give the axiomatic definition of what this category is and, then, explain
through an example what exactly these von Neumann algebras are.
In particular, consider the algebra of bounded operators on a Hilbert space which we denote as
B(H). A quantum system can be represented by a von Neumann algebra N which is identified with a
sub-algebra of B(H). A von Neumann algebra is a *-algebra of bounded operators. We will give the
technical definition of a von Neumann algebra below, however we will also give a concrete example
on how it is constructed, which might be much more clear to understand. For all practical purposes
it is not necessary to understand in details what a von Neumann algebra is, since the study of these
algebras is quite complex and would be behind the scope of this lecture course. All that is needed is
to understand roughly what they are, how they can be formed and the philosophical implications of
their usage in topos quantum theory.
In order to give the technical definition of a von Neumann algebra we need to make a regression
in ring theory and give a few definitions (you are not required to know these definitions or learn them
since they will not be examinable, but they might help to get a general understanding. )
Definition 7.1.1. A ring is a set X on which two binary operations are defined :
+ ∶ X ×X → X (7.1.1)
(x1, x2) ↦ x1 + x2 (7.1.2)
and
⋅ ∶ X ×X → X (7.1.3)
(x1, x2) ↦ x1 ⋅ x2 (7.1.4)
called addition and multiplication. Generally a ring is denoted as (X,+, ⋅) and it has to satisfy the
following axioms:
• (X,+) must be an abelian group under addition.
• (X, ⋅) must be a monoid under multiplication.
In the above definition only the addition operation is required to be commutative, while the multi-
plication is not. However both operations are required to be associative. For this reason rings are often
also called associative rings to distinguish them from non-associative rings, which are a subsequent
generalisation of the concept of a ring in which (X, ⋅) is not a monoid but all that is required is that
the multiplication operation be linear in each variables.
Of particular importance to us is the concept of a *-ring which is defined as follows
Definition 7.1.2. A *-ring is an associative ring with a map ∗ ∶ A→ A s.t.
(x + y)∗ = x∗ + y∗ (7.1.5)
(x ⋅ y)∗ = y∗ ⋅ x∗ (7.1.6)
1∗ = 1 (7.1.7)
(x∗)∗ = x (7.1.8)
for all x,y in A. We say that ∗ is an anti-automorphism and an involution. Elements such that x∗ = x
are called self-adjoint or Hermitian.
Given all the above definition we are now ready to define what a von Neumann algebra is
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Definition 7.1.3. A von Neumann algebra is a *-algebra1 of bounded operators on a Hilbert space
that is closed in the weak operator topology and contains the identity operator.
The above definition can be trivially extended to the notion of abelian von Neumann sub-algebras.
The way in which von Neumann algebras are generated given a Hilbert space is through the double
commutant theorem. In particular, given an algebra B ⊂ B(H) of bounded operators on a Hilbert
space H, which contains the identity and is closed under taking the adjoint, then the commutant of
such an algebra is
B
′
∶= {Aˆ ∈ B(H)S[Aˆ, Bˆ] = 0 ∀ Bˆ ∈ B} ⊂ B(H) (7.1.9)
The double commutant is then the commutant of B
′
: (B′)′ = B′′ . This algebra B′′ is the von- Neumann
algebra generated by B iff B = B′′ . In the example below we will give a concrete example of how such
algebras are generated.
Given a Hilbert space H, the collection of all the abelian von Neumann sub-algebras, denoted as
V(H), forms a category. The importance of this lies in the fact that although each algebra only gives
a partial classical information of the system, the collection of all such algebras retains the full quan-
tum information, since the categorical structure relates information coming from different contexts. In
particular, let us consider two contexts V1 and V2. If they have a non-trivial intersection V1 ∩ V2 then
we have the following relation-arrows:
V1 ← V1 ∩ V2 → V2
Now, given any self adjoint operator Aˆ in V1∩V2 it can be written as g(Bˆ) for a self adjoint operator
Bˆ ∈ V1 and a Borel function g ∶ R → R. On the other hand Aˆ = f(Cˆ) for Cˆ ∈ V2 and f is another Borel
function. It follows that [Aˆ, Bˆ] = [Aˆ, Cˆ] = 0, however it is not necessarily the case that [Bˆ, Cˆ] = 0.
Thus, although the elements in V(H) are abelian the categorical structure knows about the relation
of non commutative operators.
The formal definition of the category V(H) is as follows:
Definition 7.1.4. The category V(H) of abelian von Neumann sub-algebras has
1. Objects: V ∈ V(H) abelian von Neumann sub-algebras.
2. Morphisms: given two sub-algebras V1 and V2 there exists an arrow between them i ∶ V1 → V2 iff
V1 ⊆ V2
From the definition it is easy to understand that V(H) is a poset, whose ordering is given by subset
inclusion.
It is interesting to understand what this poset structure actually means from a physics perspective.
In particular, if we consider an algebra V
′
such that V
′ ⊆ V , then the set of self-adjoint operators
present in V
′
, which we denote V
′
sa, will be smaller than the set of self-adjoint operators in V , i.e.
V
′
sa ⊆ Vsa. Since self-adjoint operators represent physical quantities, the context V
′
contains less
physical information, so that, by viewing the system from the context V
′
, we know less about it then
when viewing it form the context V . This idea represents a type of coarse graining which takes place
when going from a context with more information V to a context with less information V
′
. If we went
the revers direction we would instead have a process of fine graining.
This idea of coarse graining is central in the formulation of the topos quantum theory. We will see
later in the course how it is actually implemented in detail.
7.1.2 Example
Let us consider a four dimensional Hilbert space H = C4. The first step is to identify the poset of
abelian von Neumann sub-algebras V(C4). Such algebras are sub-algebras of the algebra B(C4) of all
1A *-algebra A is a *-ring that is a module over a commutative *-ring R, with the * agreeing. on R ⊆ A
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bounded operators on H. Since the Hilbert space is C4, B(C4) is the algebra of all 4× 4 matrices with
complex entries which act as linear transformations on C4.
In order to form the abelian von Neumann sub-algebras one considers an orthonormal basis (ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, ψ4)
and projection operators (Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Pˆ3, Pˆ4) which project on the one-dimensional sub-spaces Cψ1, Cψ2,
Cψ3, Cψ4, respectively. One possible von Neumann sub-algebra V is, then, generated by the double
commutant of collections of the above projection operators, i.e. V = linC(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Pˆ3, Pˆ4).
In matrix notation possible representatives for the projection operators are
Pˆ1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Pˆ2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Pˆ3 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Pˆ4 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
The largest abelian von Neuamnn sub-algebra generated by the above projectors is V = linC(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Pˆ3, Pˆ4),
i.e. the algebra consisting of all 4 × 4 diagonal matrices with complex entries on the diagonal. Since
this algebra is the largest, i.e. not contained in any other abelian sub-algebra of B(C4) it is called
maximal.
Any change of bases (ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, ψ4)→ (ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4) would give another maximal von Neumann sub-
algebra V
′ = linC(ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4). In fact, there are uncountably many such maximal algebras. If two
basis are related by a simple permutation or phase factor then the abelian von Neumann sub-algebras
they generate are the same.
Now considering again our example, the algebra V will have many non maximal sub-algebras which
however can be divided into two kinds as follows:
V
PˆiPˆj
= linC(Pˆi, Pˆj , Pˆk + Pˆl) = CPˆi +CPˆj +C(Pˆk + Pˆl) = CPˆi +CPˆj +C(1ˆ − Pˆi + Pˆj) (7.1.10)
for i ≠ j ≠ k ≠ l ∈ {1,2,3,4}
and
V
Pˆi
= linC(Pˆi, Pˆj + Pˆk + Pˆl) = CPˆi +C(Pˆj + Pˆk + Pˆl) = CPˆi +C(1ˆ − Pˆi) (7.1.11)
for i ≠ j ≠ k ≠ l = 1,2,3,4
Again there are uncountably many non maximal abelian sub-algebras. It is the case though that
different maximal sub-algebras have common non-maximal sub-algebras, as could be the case that
non-maximal abelian sub-algebras contain the same non-maximal abelian sub-algebra.
Thus, for example, the context V above contains all the sub-algebras Vij and Vi for i, j ∈ {1,2,3,4}.
Now consider other 4 pair wise orthogonal projection operators Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Qˆ3, Qˆ4, such that the maximal
abelian von Neumann algebra V
′ = linC(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Qˆ3, Qˆ4) ≠ V . We then have that
V ∩ V
′ = {V
Pˆ1
, V
Pˆ2
, V
Pˆ1,Pˆ2
} (7.1.12)
From the above discussion it is easy to deduce that the sub-algebras V
Pˆi
are contained in all the other
sub-algebras which contain the projection operator Pˆi and all the sub-algebras VPˆiPˆj are contained in
all the sub-algebras which contain both projection operators Pˆi and Pˆj .
We should mention that there is also the trivial algebra V
′′ = C1ˆ but we will not consider such algebra
when considering the category V(H) since, otherwise, as will be clear later on, we will never end up
with a proposition being false, but the minimal truth value we would end up would be the trivially
true one.
7.2 Topos Analogue of the State Space
We would now like to define the topos analogue of the state space. The way in which we would like to
construct such a state space is in analogy with how it is constructed in classical physics. In particular
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we would like a state space which allows a definition of physical quantities in terms of maps from the
state space to the reals, as is the case in classical physics.
Since we are in the realm of presheaves on V(H), the state space will itself be a presheaf, thus it will
be defined context wise, i.e. for each abelian von Neumann algebra V ∈ V(H). It is precisely of such
algebras that we will take advantage of when trying to define the state space. In fact, each algebra V
has associated to it its Gelf’and spectrum which is the topological space ΣV of all multiplicative linear
functionals of norm 1 on V , i.e. ΣV ∶= {λ ∶ V → CSλ(1ˆ) = 1}. The property of being multiplicative
means that
λ(AˆBˆ) = λ(Aˆ)λ(Bˆ); ∀Aˆ, Bˆ ∈ V (7.2.1)
So the elements λ of the spectrum ΣV are, in essence, algebra homomorphisms from V to C. The
topology on ΣV is that of a compact Hausdorff space in the weak *-topology.
Now, what is interesting is the action of such homomorphisms λ ∈ ΣV on self adjoint operators
Aˆ ∈ V . In fact it turns out that such maps λ actually represent valuations which respect the FUNC
principle. To see this consider an operator Aˆ ∈ V , then, for each element λ of the spectrum ΣV we
obtain a value λ(Aˆ) ∈ sp(Aˆ) of A. On the other hand, for each element a of the spectrum of Aˆ ∈ V ,
i.e., a ∈ sp(Aˆ) there exists a corresponding element λi such that a is defined as a = λi(Aˆ).
Moreover, given a Borel function g ∶ R→ R, then
λ(g(Aˆ)) = g(λ(Aˆ)) (7.2.2)
This is precisely the FUNC principle. Therefore the elements of the Gel’fand spectrum can each be
interpreted as (different) valuations, i.e. maps which send each self adjoint operator to an element of
its spectrum such that FUNC holds.
Given the topological space ΣV it is possible to represent a self-adjoint operator Aˆ ∈ V as a map
from ΣV to C. This is because of the existence of the Gelfand representation theorem which states that
each von Neumann algebra V is isomorphic 2 to the algebra of continuous, complex-valued functions
(denoted as C(ΣV ) ) on its Gelfand spectrum ΣV . That is to say the following map is an isomorphisms
V → C(ΣV ) (7.2.3)
Aˆ ↦ (A¯ ∶ ΣV → C) (7.2.4)
where A¯ is the Gel’fand transform of the operator Aˆ and is defined as A¯(λ) ∶= λ(Aˆ) for all λ ∈ ΣV . If
Aˆ is self adjoint then A¯ is real valued and is such that A¯(ΣV ) = sp(Aˆ).
Thus, for each context V ∈ V(H) we have managed to reproduce a situation analogous to classical
physics in which self-adjoint operators are identified with functions from a space to the reals. In this
sense the topological space ΣV can be interpreted as a local state space, one for each V ∈ V(H).
Obviously the complete quantum picture is only given when we consider the collection of all the local
state spaces, since not all operators are contained in a single algebra V . It is precisely such a collection
of local state spaces which will define the topos analogue of the state space. This will be called the
spectral presheaf and it is defined as follows:
Definition 7.2.1. The spectral presheaf, Σ, is the covariant functor from the category V(H)op to Sets
(equivalently, the contravariant functor from V(H) to Sets) defined by:
• Objects: Given an object V in V(H)op, the associated set Σ(V ) = ΣV is defined to be the
Gel’fand spectrum of the (unital) commutative von Neumann sub-algebra V , i.e. the set of all
multiplicative linear functionals λ ∶ V → C, such that λ(1ˆ) = 1.
• Morphisms: Given a morphism iV ′V ∶ V
′
→ V (V
′ ⊆ V ) in V(H)op, the associated function
Σ(iV ′V ) ∶ Σ(V ) → Σ(V ′) is defined for all λ ∈ Σ(V ) to be the restriction of the functional
λ ∶ V → C to the sub-algebra V
′ ⊆ V , i.e. Σ(iV ′V )(λ) ∶= λ∣V ′ .
2Technically it is an isometrically *-isomorphic (i.e., isomorphic as a C∗-algebra), but this precise definition does not
really matter here, we will simply call it isomorphisms.
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7.2.1 Example
Given the category C(C4) defined in the previous example will define the spectral presheaf. Let us first
consider the maximal abelian sub-algebra V = linC(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Pˆ3, Pˆ4), the Gel’fand spectrum ΣV (which
has a discrete topology) of this algebra contains 4 elements
λi(Pˆj) = δij (i = 1,2,3,4) (7.2.5)
We then consider the sub-algebra V
Pˆ1Pˆ2
= linC(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Pˆ3 + Pˆ4). Its Gel’fand spectrum ΣVPˆ1Pˆ2 will
contain the elements
ΣVPˆ1Pˆ2
= {λ′1, λ′2, λ′3} (7.2.6)
such that λ
′
1(Pˆ1) = 1, λ′2(Pˆ2) = 1 and λ′3(Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) = 1, while all the rest will be zero.
Since V
Pˆ1Pˆ2
⊆ V , there exists a morphisms between the respective spectra as follows ( for notational
simplicity we will denote V
Pˆ1Pˆ2
as V
′
):
ΣV V ′ ∶ ΣV → ΣV ′ (7.2.7)
λ ↦ λ∣V ′ (7.2.8)
Such that we obtain the following:
ΣV V ′ (λ1) = λ′1 (7.2.9)
ΣV V ′ (λ2) = λ′2
ΣV V ′ (λ3) = λ′3
ΣV V ′ (λ4) = λ′3
ΣVPˆi
V
Pˆi
OO
iV
Pˆi
,V
PˆiPˆj
✾
✾✾
✾✾
✾✾
✾✾
✾✾
✾✾
✾✾
✾✾
✾✾
✾✾
✾✾
ΣVPˆiPˆj
Σ
V
PˆiPˆj
,V
Pˆj
✆✆
✆✆
✆✆
✆✆
✆✆
✆✆
✆✆
✆✆
✆✆
✆✆
✆✆
Σ
V
PˆiPˆj
,V
Pˆi
\\✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾✾
ΣVΣ
V,V
PˆiPˆj
oo
ΣVPˆj
V
PˆiPˆj
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iV
PˆiPˆj ,V // V
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V
Pˆj
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iV
Pˆj
,V
PˆiPˆj
BB✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆✆
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From the above simple example we can generalise the definition of the spectrum for all sub-algebras
V
′ ⊆ V . In particular we get
ΣVPˆi,Pˆj
= {λi, λj , λkl} (7.2.10)
where
λi(Pˆj) = δij (7.2.11)
λkl(Pˆk + Pˆl) = 1 (7.2.12)
(7.2.13)
and all the rest equals zero. On the other hand for contexts V
Pˆi
we obtain:
ΣVPˆi
= {λi, λjkl} (7.2.14)
where
λi(Pˆi) = 1 (7.2.15)
λjkl(Pˆj + Pˆk + Pˆk) = 1 (7.2.16)
and all the rest is equal to zero.
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Chapter 8
Lecture 9
In this lecture I will do the following:
i) I will first of all introduce the very important concept of daseinisation;
ii) I will then give examples of daseinisation;
iii) Such a concept will be used to define the topos analogue of a proposition.
I will then give a concrete example on how a proposition regarding the value of the spin of a particle
is defined, for the case of a 4 dimensional Hilbert space.
8.1 Propositions
We will now describe how certain terms of type P (Σ) (sub-objects of the state object) are represented
in SetsV(H)
op
, namely propositions. These, represented by projection operators in quantum theory, are
identified with clopen (both open and closed) sub-objects of the spectral presheaf. A clopen subobject
S ⊆ Σ is an object such that, for each context V ∈ V(H), the set S(V ) is a clopen subset of Σ(V ),
where the latter is equipped with the usual compact and Hausdorff spectral topology. We will now
show, explicitly, how propositions are defined.
As a first step we have to introduce the concept of ‘daseinization’. Roughly speaking, what da-
seinization does is to approximate operators so as to ‘fit’ into any given context V . In fact, because the
formalism defined so far is contextual, any proposition one wants to consider has to be studied within
(with respect to) each context V ∈ V(H).
To see how this works consider the case in which we would like to analyse the projection operator
Pˆ , which corresponds via the spectral theorem to the proposition “A ∈ ∆”1. In particular, let us take
a context V such that Pˆ ∉ P (V ) (the lattice of projection operators in V ). We, somehow need to
define a projection operator which does belong to V and which is related, in some way, to our original
projection operator Pˆ . This can be achieved by approximating Pˆ from above in V , with the ‘smallest’
projection operator in V , greater than or equal to Pˆ . More precisely, the outer daseinization, δo(Pˆ ),
of Pˆ is defined at each context V by
δo(Pˆ)V ∶= ⋀{Rˆ ∈ P (V )SRˆ ≥ Pˆ} (8.1.1)
Since projection operators represent propositions, δo(Pˆ)V is a coarse graining of the proposition “A ∈
∆”.
1It should be noted that different propositions correspond to the same projection operator, i.e. the mapping from
propositions to projection operators is many to one. Thus, to account for this, one is really associating equivalence class
of propositions to each projection operator. The reason why von Neumann algebras were chosen instead of general C∗
algebras is precisely because all projections representing propositions are contained in the former, but not necessarily in
the latter.
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This process of outer daseinization takes place for all contexts and hence gives, for each projection
operator Pˆ , a collection of daseinized projection operators, one for each context V, i.e.,
Pˆ ↦ {δo(Pˆ )V SV ∈ V(H)} (8.1.2)
Because of the Gel’fand transform, to each operator Pˆ ∈ P (V ) there is associated the map P¯ ∶ ΣV → C,
which takes values in {0,1} ⊂ R ⊂ C since Pˆ is a projection operator. Thus, P¯ is a characteristic
function of the subset S
Pˆ
⊆ Σ(V ) defined by
S
Pˆ
∶= {λ ∈ Σ(V )SP¯ (λ) ∶= λ(Pˆ ) = 1} (8.1.3)
Since P¯ is continuous with respect to the spectral topology on Σ(V ), then P¯ −1(1) = S
Pˆ
is a clopen
subset of Σ(V ), since both {0} and {1} are clopen subsets of the Hausdorff space C.
Through the Gel’fand transform it is then possible to define a bijective map between projection
operators, δo(Pˆ )V ∈ P (V ), and clopen subsets of ΣV where, for each context V,
S
δo(Pˆ )V
∶= {λ ∈ ΣV Sλ(δo(Pˆ )V ) = 1} (8.1.4)
This correspondence between projection operators and clopen sub-objects of the spectral presheaf
Σ, which we denote as Subcl(Σ), implies the existence of a lattice homeomorphism for each V
S ∶ P (V )→ Subcl(Σ)V (8.1.5)
such that
δo(Pˆ )V ↦S(δo(Pˆ )V ) ∶= Sδo(Pˆ )V (8.1.6)
where Subcl(Σ)V is the lattice of subsets of the spectrum ΣV with lattice operations given by inter-
section and union while the lattice ordering is given by subset inclusion.
It can be shown that the collection of subsets {S
δ(Pˆ )V
}, V ∈ V(H), induces a subobject of Σ.
In order to understand how this is done let us first give the definition of what a general sub-object of
the topos analogue of the state space actually is.
Definition 8.1.1. A sub-object S of the spectral presheaf Σ is a contravariant functor S ∶ V(H)→ Sets
such that:
• SV is a subset of ΣV for all V ∈ V(H) .
• Given a map iV ′V ∶ V
′ ⊆ V , then S(iV ′V ) ∶ SV → S ′V is simply the restriction of the map Σ(iV ′V )
to the subset SV ⊆ ΣV , thus it is given by λ↦ λ∣V ′ .
Obviously, for clopen sub-objects we simply require that SV be clopen in the above definition.
Theorem 8.1.1. For each projection operator Pˆ ∈ P (H), the collection
δ(Pˆ ) ∶= {S
δ(Pˆ )V
SV ∈ V(H)} (8.1.7)
forms a (clopen) sub-object of the spectral presheaf .
Proof. We already know that for each V ∈ V(H), S
δ(Pˆ )V
⊆ ΣV . Therefore, what we need to show is
that these clopen subsets get mapped one to another by the presheaf morphisms. To see that this is
the case consider an element λ ∈ S
δ(Pˆ )V
. Given any V
′ ⊆ V , then by the definition of daseininsation
we get δo(δo(Pˆ)V )V ′ = ⋀{αˆ ∈ P (V ′)Sαˆ ≥ δo(Pˆ )V } ≥ δo(Pˆ )V . Therefore, if δo(Pˆ )V ′ − δo(Pˆ )V = βˆ, then
λ(δ(Pˆ )V ′ ) = λ(δ(Pˆ )V ) + λ(βˆ) = 1 since λ(δ(Pˆ )V ) = 1 and λ(βˆ) ∈ {0,1}. Therefore
{λ∣V ′ Sλ ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V } ⊆ {λ ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ } (8.1.8)
however λ∣V ′ is precisely Σ(iV ′V )λ therefore
{λ∣V ′ Sλ ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V } = Σ(iV ′V )Sδ(Pˆ )V (8.1.9)
It follows that δ(Pˆ ) is a sub-object of Σ.
86
We can now define the (outer) daseinization as a mapping from the projection operators to the
subobject of the spectral presheaf given by
δ ∶P (H)→ Subcl(Σ) (8.1.10)
Pˆ ↦ (S(δo(Pˆ )V ))V ∈V(H) =∶ δ(Pˆ ) (8.1.11)
We will sometimes denote S(δo(Pˆ )V ) as δ(Pˆ )
V
.
Since the sub-objects of the spectral presheaf form a Heyting algebra, the above map associates propo-
sitions to a distributive lattice. Actually, it is first necessary to show that the collection of clopen
sub-objects of Σ is a Heyting algebra. We will report the proof below.
Theorem 8.1.2. The collection, Subcl(Σ), of all clopen sub-objects of Σ is a Heyting algebra.
Proof. First of all let us consider how the logical connectives are defined.
The ∧- and ∨-operations. Given two sub-objects T and S of Σ, then the ∧- and ∨-operations are
defined by
(S ∧ T )V ∶= SV ∩ TV (8.1.12)(S ∨ T )V ∶= SV ∪ TV (8.1.13)
for all contexts V ∈ V(H) . From the properties of open and closed subsets, it follows that if SV and
TV are clopen as subsets then so are SV ∩ TV and SV ∪ TV .
The zero and unit elements. The zero element in Subcl(Σ) is the empty sub-object
0 ∶= {∅V SV ∈ Ob(V(H))} (8.1.14)
Where ∅V is the empty subset of ΣV and Ob(V(H) simply indicates the objects in the category V(H) .
The unit element in Subcl(Σ) is the unit sub-object.
Σ ∶= {ΣV SV ∈ Ob(H(V))} (8.1.15)
Clearly both 0 and Σ are clopen sub-objects of Σ.
The ‘⇒’-operation. We have seen in previous lectures that the negation operation in a Heyting
algebra is given by the relative pseudo complement. In particular ¬S ∶= S ⇒ 0. To understand exactly
how such an operation is defined let us first describe S ⇒ T . This is
(S ⇒ T )V ∶= {λ ∈ ΣV S∀V ′ ⊆ V if Σ(iV ′V )(λ) ∈ SV ′ then Σ(iV ′V )(λ) ∈ TV ′ } (8.1.16)
= {λ ∈ ΣV S∀V ′ ⊆ V if λ∣V ′ ∈ SV ′ then λ∣V ′ ∈ TV ′} (8.1.17)
From the above it follows that the negation operation in the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ) is defined as
follows:
(¬S)V ∶= (S ⇒ 0)V = {λ ∈ ΣV S∀V ′ ⊆ V,Σ(iV ′V )λ ∉ SV ′} (8.1.18)
= {λ ∈ ΣV S∀V ′ ⊆ V,λ∣V ′ ∉ SV ′} (8.1.19)
It is also possible to write the negation in terms of the complement of sets as follows:
(¬S)V = ⋂
V
′⊆V
{λ ∈ ΣV Sλ∣V ′ ∈ ScV ′} (8.1.20)
where Sc
V
′ represents the standard complement of the set SV ′ . Since SV ′ is clopen so will S
c
V
′ . The
map Σ(iV ′V ) ∶ ΣV → Σ′V is continuous and surjective, thus Σ(iV ′V )−1(ScV ′ ) is clopen. Such a subset
is defined as
Σ(iV ′V )−1(ScV ′ ) = {λ ∈ ΣV Sλ∣V ′ ∈ ScV ′ } (8.1.21)
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Substituting for the formula of the negation operation we obtain
(¬S)V = ⋂
V
′⊆V
Σ(iV ′V )−1(ScV ′ ) (8.1.22)
However, the right hand side of the above formula is not guaranteed to be clopen, in fact it is closed
and it would only be clopen if the set {V ′ SV ′ ⊆ V } over which the intersection ranges is actually finite.
Now we know that the collection of all clopen subsets for each ΣV is a complete lattice, thus given a
family of decreasing subsets there will exist a limiting point of such subsets which will belong to the
lattice.
In our case the collection of Σ(iV ′V )−1(ScV ′ ) for all {V ′ SV ′ ⊆ V } is a decreasing net of clopen subsets
of ΣV . This means that if V
′′ ⊆ V ′ and λV ′′ ∈ ScV ′′ then λ∣V ∈ ScV ′ . That this is the case can be proved
by contradiction, in fact if λ∣V ∈ SV ′ then ΣV ′′V ′λ∣V = λ∣V ′′ ∈ SV ′′ which would be a contradiction.
Therefore Σ(iV ′′V ′ )−1(ScV ′′ ) ⊆ Σ(iV ′V )−1(ScV ′ ). Therefore the right hand side of 8.1.22 represents a
decreasing net of clopen sub-sets of ΣV . If we now define the limit point of such a net and call it (¬S)V
we have a definition of the negation of an element as a clopen subset. Thus we define
(¬S)V ∶= int ⋂
V
′⊆V
Σ(iV ′V )−1(ScV ′ ) (8.1.23)
= int ⋂
V
′⊆V
{λ ∈ ΣV Sλ∣V ′ ∈ (ScV ′ )} (8.1.24)
Particular properties of the daseinization map worth mentioning are:
1. δ(P ∨Q) = δ(P ) ∨ δ(Q), i.e. it preserves the “or” operation.
2. δ(P ∧Q) ≤ δ(P ) ∧ δ(Q), i.e. it does not preserve the “and” operation.
3. If Pˆ ≤ Qˆ, then δ(P ) ≤ δ(Q).
4. The daseinisation map is injective but not surjective.
5. δ(0ˆ) = {∅V SV ∈ Ob(V(H))}.
6. δ(1ˆ) = {ΣV SV ∈ Ob(V(H))}.
8.1.1 Physical Interpretation of Daseinisation
What exactly does it mean to daseinise a projection? Let us consider a projection Pˆ which represents
the proposition A ∈ ∆. We now consider a context V such that Pˆ ∉ V , thus we approximate this
projection so as to be in V obtaining δo(Pˆ )V . If the projection δo(Pˆ)V is a spectral projector of
the operator, Aˆ, representing the quantity, A, then it represents the proposition A ∈ Γ where ∆ ⊆ Γ.
Therefore, the mapping
δoV ∶ P (H) → P (V) (8.1.25)
Pˆ ↦ δo(Pˆ )V (8.1.26)
is the mathematical implementation of the idea of coarse graining of propositions, i.e. of generalizing
a proposition.
If, on the other hand, δo(Pˆ )V is not a spectral projector of the operator Aˆ representing the quantity,
A, then δo(Pˆ)V represents the proposition B ∈ ∆′ . The physical quantity B is now represented by
the projection operator Bˆ ∈ P (V ). Given the fact that Pˆ ≤ δo(Pˆ )V , the proposition B ∈ ∆′ is a
coarse graining of A ∈ Γ, in fact a general form of B ∈ ∆′ could be f(A) ∈ Γ, for some Borel function
f ∶ sp(Aˆ)→ R.
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Obviously, for many contexts it is the case that δo(Pˆ )V = 1ˆ, which is the most general proposition of
all.
From the analysis above we can deduce that, in this framework, there are two types of propositions:
i) Global propositions, which are the propositions we start with and which we want to represent in
various contexts, i.e. (A ∈ ∆).
ii) Local propositions, which are the individual coarse graining of the global propositions, as referred
to individual contexts V .
Thus, for every global proposition we obtain a collection of local propositions
Pˆ → (δo(Pˆ )V )V ∈V(H) (8.1.27)
In the topos perspective we consider the collection of all these local propositions at the same time, as
exemplified by equation 8.1.10.
8.1.2 Example
To illustrate the concept of daseinisation of propositions let us consider a 2 spin system. We are
interested in the spin in the z-direction, which is represented by the physical quantity Sz. In particular,
we want to consider the following proposition Sz ∈ [1.3,2.3]. Since the total spin in the z direction can
only have values −2, 0, 2, the only value in the interval [1.3,2.3] which Sz can take is 2.
The self-adjoint operator representing Sz is
Sˆz =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
The eigenstate with eigenvalue 2 would be ψ = (1,0,0,0), whose associated projector Pˆ ∶= Eˆ[Sz ∈[1.3,2.3]] = Sψ⟩⟨ψS would be
Pˆ1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
From our definition of V(C4) we know that the operator Sˆz is contained in all algebras which contain
the projector operators Pˆ1 and Pˆ4. These algebras are: i) the maximal algebra V and ii) the non
maximal sub-algebra V
Pˆ1Pˆ4
. We will now analyse how the proposition Sz ∈ [1.3,2.3], represented by
the projection operator Pˆ1, gets represented in the various abelian von Neumann algebra in V(C4).
1. Context V and its sub-algebras.
Since V , V
Pˆ1Pˆi
( i ∈ {2,3,4}) and V
Pˆ1
contain the projection operator P1, then, for all these
contexts we have
δo(Pˆ1)V = δo(Pˆ1)VPˆ1Pˆi = δo(Pˆ1)VPˆ1 = Pˆ1 (8.1.28)
Instead for context V
Pˆi
for i ≠ 1 we have
δo(Pˆ1)VPˆi = Pˆ1 + Pˆj + Pˆk j ≠ i ≠ k ∈ {2,3,4} (8.1.29)
For contexts of the form V
PˆiPˆj
, where i ≠ j ≠ 1, we have
δo(Pˆ1)VPˆiPˆj = Pˆ1 + Pˆk j ≠ i ≠ k ∈ {2,3,4} (8.1.30)
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2. Other maximal algebras which contain Pˆ1 and their sub-algebras.
Let us consider 4 pairwise orthogonal projection operators Pˆ1, Qˆ2, Qˆ3, Qˆ4, such that the max-
imal abelian von Neumann algebra generated by such projections is different from V , i.e.
V
′ = linC(Pˆ1, Qˆ2, Qˆ3, Qˆ4) ≠ V
We then have the following dasenised propositions:
For contexts V
′
and V
′
Pˆ1
, as before, we have
δo(Pˆ1)V ′ = δo(Pˆ1)V ′
Pˆ1
= Pˆ1 (8.1.31)
for contexts V
Qˆi
we have
δo(Pˆ1)VQˆi = Pˆ1 + Qˆj + Qˆk i ≠ j ≠ k ∈ {2,3,4} (8.1.32)
Instead, for context V
QˆiQˆj
, we have
δo(Pˆ1)VQˆiQˆj = Pˆ1 + Qˆk i ≠ j ≠ k ∈ {2,3,4} (8.1.33)
3. Contexts which contain a projection operator which is implied by Pˆ1.
Let us consider contexts V˜ which contain the projection operator Qˆ, such that Qˆ ≥ Pˆ1, but
do not contain Pˆ1 (if they did contain Pˆ1, we would be in exactly the same situation as above).
In this situation the daseinisated propositions will be
δo(Pˆ1)V˜ = Qˆ (8.1.34)
4. Context which neither contain Pˆ1 or a projection operator implied by it.
In these contexts V ′′ the only coarse grained proposition related to Pˆ1 is the unity operator,
therefore we have
δo(Pˆ1)V ′′ = 1ˆ (8.1.35)
Now that we have defined all the possible coarse grainings of the proposition Pˆ1, for all possible contexts,
we can define the presheaf δ(Pˆ1) which is the topos analogue of the proposition Sz ∈ [1.3,2.3]. As
explained in the previous section, in order to obtain the presheaf δ(Pˆ1) from the projection Pˆ1, we
must apply the daseinisation map2 defined in 8.1.10, so as to obtain
δ ∶ P (C4) → Subcl(Σ) (8.1.36)
Pˆ1 ↦ (S(δo(Pˆ1)V ))V ∈V(C4) =∶ δ(Pˆ ) (8.1.37)
where the map S was defined in 16.4.8, in particular
S(δo(Pˆ1)V ) ∶= Sδo(Pˆ1)V ∶= {λ ∈ ΣV Sλ(δo(Pˆ1)V ) = 1} (8.1.38)
We now want to define the δ(Pˆ1)-morphisms. In order to do so we will again subdivide our analysis
in different cases, as above.
2Note that so far we have only used the outer daseinisation.
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1. Maximal algebra V and its sub-algebras.
The sub-algebras of V are of two kinds: V
Pˆi,Pˆj
and V
Pˆk
for i, j, k ∈ {1,2,3,4}, such that in
V(C4) we obtain the morphisms iVPˆiPˆj ,V ∶ VPˆiPˆj ⊆ V and iVPˆk ,V ∶ VPˆk ⊆ V . Correspondingly
δ(Pˆ1)-morphisms with domain δ(Pˆ1)
V
will be of two kinds. We will analyse one at the time.
First we analyse the morphism
δ(Pˆ1)(iVPˆiPˆj ,V ) ∶ δ(Pˆ1)V → δ(Pˆ1)VPˆi,Pˆj (8.1.39)
In this context we have
δ(Pˆ1)
V
= {λ ∈ ΣV Sλ(δ(Pˆ1)V ) = λ(Pˆ1) = 1} = {λ1} (8.1.40)
This is the case since, as we saw in the previous lecture ΣV = {λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4} where λiPˆj = δij .
On the other hand for the contexts V
Pˆi,Pˆj
i, j ∈ {1,2,3,4} we have the following:
δ(Pˆ1)
VPˆ1,Pˆj
= {λ1} where λ1δ(Pˆ1)VPˆ1,Pˆj = Pˆ1 = 1; j ∈ {2,3,4} (8.1.41)
δ(Pˆ1)
VPˆi,Pˆj
= {λ1k} where λ1kδ(Pˆ1)VPˆi,Pˆj = (Pˆ1 + Pˆk) = 1; i ≠ j ≠ k ≠ 1 (8.1.42)
The δ(Pˆ1)-morphisms for the above contexts would be
δ(Pˆ1)(iVPˆ1,Pˆj ,V )(λ1) ∶= λ1 (8.1.43)
δ(Pˆ1)(iVPˆi,Pˆj ,V )(λ1) ∶= λ1k (8.1.44)
The remaining δ(Pˆ1)-morphisms with domain δ(Pˆ1)
V
are
δ(Pˆ1))iVPˆi ,V ∶ δ(Pˆ1)V → δ(Pˆ1)VPˆi (8.1.45)
In this case the local propositions δ(Pˆ1)
VPˆi
, i ∈ {1,2,3,4} are
δ(Pˆ1)
VPˆ1
= {λ1} (8.1.46)
δ(Pˆ1)
VPˆi
= {λ1jk} i, j, k ∈ {2,3,4} (8.1.47)
The δ(Pˆ1)-morphisms are then
δ(Pˆ1)(iVPˆ1 ,V (λ1) ∶= λ1 (8.1.48)
δ(Pˆ1)(iVPˆi ,V )(λ1) ∶= λ1kl (8.1.49)
2. Other maximal algebras which contain Pˆ1 and their sub-algebras.
As before we consider 4 pairwise orthogonal projection operators Pˆ1, Qˆ2, Qˆ3, Qˆ4, such that the
maximal abelian von Neumann algebra generated by such projections is different from V , i.e.
V
′ = linC(Pˆ1, Qˆ2, Qˆ3, Qˆ4) ≠ V .
We then obtain the following morphisms with domain δ(Pˆ1)
V
:
δ(Pˆ1)(iVPˆ1 ,V ) ∶ δ(Pˆ1)V → δ(Pˆ1)VPˆ1 (8.1.50)
λ1 ↦ λ1 (8.1.51)
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δ(Pˆ1)(iVQˆi ,V ) ∶ δ(Pˆ1)V → δ(Pˆ1)VQˆi (8.1.52)
λ1 ↦ ρ1jk (8.1.53)
where Σ
Qˆi
∶= {ρi, ρ1jk}, such that ρi(Qˆi) = 1 and ρ1jk(Pˆ1 + Qˆj + Qˆk) = 1.
δ(Pˆ1)(iVQˆi,Qˆj ,V ) ∶ δ(Pˆ1)V → δ(Pˆ1)VQˆi ,Qˆj (8.1.54)
λ1 ↦ ρ1k (8.1.55)
where Σ
Qˆi,Qˆj
∶= {ρi, ρj , ρ1k}, such that ρi(Qˆi) = 1, ρj(Qˆj) = 1 and ρ1k(Pˆ1 + Qˆk) = 1. The
computation of the remaining maps is left as an exercise.
3. Contexts which contain a projection operator which is implied by Pˆ1.
We now consider a context V˜ which contains an operator Qˆ, such that Qˆ ≥ Pˆ .
For such a context we have δ(Pˆ1)
V˜
= {λSλ(Qˆ) = 1}. Therefore, for sub-algebras which contain the
operator Qˆ the morphisms will simply map λ to itself. The rest of the maps are easily derivable.
4. Context which neither contain Pˆ1 or a projection operator implied by it.
In such a context V
′′
, whatever its spectrum is, each of the multiplicative linear functionals
λi ∈ ΣV ′′ will assign value 1 to δ(Pˆ1) = 1ˆ. And so will the elements of the spectrum of the sub-
algebras V¯ of V
′′
. Thus, all the maps δ(Pˆ1)(iV¯ ,V ′′ will simply be equivalent to spectral presheaf
maps.
8.2 The Spectral Preshaef and the Kochen-Specker Theorem
We will now show how the non existence of global elements of the spectral presheaf Σ is equivalent to
the Kochen-Specker theorem.
Let us consider the topos SetsV(H)
op
. In order to define a global element we first of all have to
define what a terminal object looks like. This is identified as the preheaf
1 ∶ V(H)→ Sets
such that for each V ∈ V(H)
1V ∶= {∗} (8.2.1)
Given a map iV ′V ∶ V
′
→ V (V
′ ⊆ V ), the corresponding morphisms is simply the constant map
1(iV ′V ) ∶ {∗}→ {∗} (8.2.2)
We now want to define a global element of the presheaf Σ. Recall that this is defined as a map
γ ∶ 1→ Σ (8.2.3)
such that for each context we get
γV ∶ 1V → ΣV (8.2.4){∗} → ΣV (8.2.5){∗} ↦ γV ({∗}) ∶= λ (8.2.6)
Thus at the level of the stalks we retrieve the usual set definition of global element.
The connection between global sections and the Kochen-Specker theorem is given by the following
theorem:
92
Theorem 8.2.1. The spectral presheaf Σ has no global elements iff FUNC does not hold, i.e. V (f(Aˆ)) ≠
f(V (Aˆ)) for some Borel function f ∶ R → R, such that Bˆ = f(Aˆ).
Proof. Let us assume that Σ did have global sections. This would imply that there existed maps
γ ∶ 1 → Σ, such that to each element V ∈ V(H), γV ∈ ΣV , i.e. γV = λ ∶ V → C. In particular, for each
self adjoint operator Aˆ ∈ Vsa, γV (Aˆ) = λ(Aˆ) ∈ σ(Aˆ) is an element of the spectrum of Aˆ. Given a map
iV ′ ,V ∶ V
′
→ V (V
′ ⊆ V ), then from the properties of global sections we have that
Σ(iV ′ ,V )γV = γV ′ (8.2.7)
Now consider a self-adjoint operator Aˆ, such that Aˆ ∈ V but Aˆ ∉ V ′ . Given the fact that V ′ ⊆ V it
is always possible to find an operator Bˆ ∈ V ′ such that f(Aˆ) = Bˆ for some Borel function f ∶ R → R.
Since γV (Aˆ) ∈ σ(Aˆ), by applying equation 8.2.7 to Aˆ we obtain
f(γV (Aˆ)) = γV ′ Bˆ (8.2.8)
which is precisely FUNC.
The above theorem leads immediately to the following statement
Corollary 8.2.1. The Kochen-Specker theorem is equivalent to the statement that, if dimH > 2, the
spectral presheaf Σ has no global elements.
Proof. We now want to show that the K-S theorem is equivalent to the statement that Σ˜ has no global
elements. So let us assume it does, it then follows that there exists a function γ ∶ 1→ Σ which assigns
to each (bounded, discrete spectrum) self-adjoint operator Aˆ, a real number3 γ(Aˆ) ∈ sp(Aˆ). From the
definition of a section it follow that if Aˆ = f(Aˆ) then f(γ(Aˆ)) = γ(Bˆ). This is precisely the FUNC
condition. However the K-S theorem tells us that this can not be the case, thus Σ˜ has no global
sections.
3Here for notational simplicity we simply wirte γ(∗) as γ.
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Chapter 9
Lecture 10
In this lecture I will describe what a sub-object classifier looks like in our quantum topos. I will then
give a concrete example for the case of a 4 dimensional Hilbert space. I will then define the topos
analogue of a state, and give a concrete example of such a state.
9.1 Representation of Sub-object Classifier
We will now describe how the sub-object classifier is defined in the topos SetsV(H)
op
. Such an object
represents the truth value object whose elements (global sections) are truth values, which get assigned
to propositions (clopen sub-objects of Σ). As we will see, we end up with a multi valued logic. In the
topos SetsV(H)
op
the sub-object classifier Ω is identified with the following presheaf.
Definition 9.1.1. The presheaf Ω ∈ SetsV(H)op is defined as follows:
1. For any V ∈ V(H), the set ΩV is defined as the set of all sieves on V .
2. Given a morphism iV ′V ∶ V
′
→ V (V ′ ⊆ V ), the associated function in Ω is
Ω(iV ′V ) ∶ΩV → ΩV ′ (9.1.1)
S ↦ Ω((iV ′V ))(S) ∶= {V ′′ ⊆ V ′ SV ′′ ∈ S} (9.1.2)
We have seen, in previous lectures, what a sieve is, however, for the particular case in which we
are interested, namely sieves defined on the poset V(H), the definition of a sieve can be simplified as
follows:
Definition 9.1.2. For all V ∈ V(H), a sieve S on V is a collection of sub-alebras (V ′ ⊆ V ) such that,
if V
′ ∈ S and (V ′′ ⊆ V ′), then V ′′ ∈ S. Thus S is a downward closed set.
In this case a maximal sieve on V is
↓V ∶= {V ′ ∈ V(H)SV ′ ⊆ V } (9.1.3)
In order for Ω to be a well defined presheaf, we need to show that indeed Ω((iV ′V ))(S) ∶= {V ′′ ⊆
V
′ SV ′′ ∈ S} defines a sieve on V ′ . Thus we need to show that Ω((iV ′V ))(S) ∶= {V ′′ ⊆ V ′ SV ′′ ∈ S} is a
downward closed set with respect to V
′
. It is straightforward to deduce this from the definition.
As previously stated, truth values are identified with global section of the presheaf Ω. For each
context, such global sections assign the ‘local’ truth value. Therefore the picture we obtain is the
following:
each proposition and each state is defined as a collection of ‘local’ representations, one for each V ∈
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V(H). Such ‘local’ representations, are glued together by the categorical structure of V(H). Now for
each context we obtain a ‘local’ truth value of the ‘local’ proposition given the ‘local’ state. Such ‘local’
truth values are represented by the global element computed at that particular context. All such ‘local’
truth values are ‘glued’ together by the global section which, in turn, follows the categorical structure
of the base category V(H). Thus, again, we obtain the quantum picture by considering a collection of
‘local’ representatives. However, it is only the collection that corresponds to a well defined object in
our theory, each local representative on its own is meaningless.
Coming back to truth values, the global section that consists entirely of principal sieves, is inter-
preted as representing ‘totally true’. In classical Boolean logic this is just ‘true’. Similarly, the global
section that consists of empty sieves is interpreted as ‘totally false’. In classical Boolean logic this is
just ‘false’.
A very important property of sieves is that the set ΩV of sieves on V has the structure of a Heyting
algebra, where the unit element 1Ω
V
∈ ΩV is represented by the principal sieve ↓ V and, the null element
0Ω
V
∈ ΩV , is represented by the empty set ∅.
Moreover ΩV is equipped with a partial ordering given by subset inclusion, such that Si ≤ Sj iff Si ⊆ Sj .
In this context the logical connectives are given by
Si ∧ Sj ∶= Si ∩ Sj (9.1.4)
Si ∨ Sj ∶= Si ∪ Sj (9.1.5)
Si ⇒ Sj ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V S∀V ′′ ⊆ V ′ if V ′′ ∈ Si then V ′′ ∈ Sj} (9.1.6)
Being a Heyting algebra, the negation is given by the pseudo-complement. In particualr, given an
element S, its pseudo-complement (negation) is the element
¬S ∶= S ⇒ 0 (9.1.7)
¬S ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V S∀V ′′ ⊆ V ′ , V ′′ ∉ S} (9.1.8)
9.1.1 Example
We will now describe an example of the truth object for the case of our 4 dimensional Hilbert space
H = C4. Let us start with the maximal algebras V = linC(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Pˆ3, Pˆ4). What follows can be
generalised to any maximal sub-alebra, not just V .
The collection of sieves on V will be
ΩV ∶= {0Ω
V
, S,S12, S13, S14, S23, S24, S34, S1, S2, S3, S4,⋯} (9.1.9)
where the sieves in ΩV are defined as follows:
S = {V,V
Pˆi,Pˆj
, V
Pˆk
, Si, j, k ∈ {1,2,3,4,}} = principal sieve on V (9.1.10)
Sij = {VPˆi,Pˆj , VPˆi , VPˆj } = principal sieve on VPˆi,Pˆj (9.1.11)
Si = {VPˆi} (9.1.12)
0ΩV
= {∅} (9.1.13)
We now consider a non maximal algebra V
Pˆi,Pˆj
, the collection of sieves on such an algebras is
ΩVPˆi,Pˆj
∶= {0VPˆi,Pˆj , Sij , Si, Sj ,⋯} (9.1.14)
where the definitions of the individual sieves are the same as before.
Similarly, for the context V
Pˆi
we have
ΩVPˆi
∶= {Si} (9.1.15)
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We now want to define the Ω-morphisms. To this end, let us first consider the Ω-morphism with
domain ΩV . There are various such morphisms, one for each pair i, j ∈ {1,2,3,4}, as follows:
Ω(iVPˆi,Pˆj ,V ) ∶ ΩV → ΩVPˆi,Pˆj (9.1.16)
where iVPˆi,Pˆj ,V
∶ V
Pˆi,Pˆj
⊆ V . Ω(iVPˆi,Pˆj ,V ) is defined component wise as follows:
S ↦ Sij Sij ↦ Sij (9.1.17)
Sik ↦ Si Skj ↦ Sj (9.1.18)
Si ↦ Si Skl ↦ 0VPˆi,Pˆj
(9.1.19)
Sj ↦ Sj Sk ↦ 0VPˆi,Pˆj
(9.1.20)
Moreover, for each k ∈ {1,2,3,4} such that iVPˆk ,V ∶ VPˆk ⊆ V , we have the following Ω-morphisms:
ΩV,VPˆk
∶ ΩV → ΩVPˆk
(9.1.21)
which component wise are defined as follows:
S ↦ Sk Sij ↦ 0VPˆk
(9.1.22)
Sik ↦ Sk Sl ↦ 0VPˆk
(9.1.23)
Sk ↦ Sk Sj ↦ 0VPˆk
(9.1.24)
Si ↦ 0VPˆk
(9.1.25)
It is straightforward to extend the definition of Ω-morphisms for all contexts Vi ∈ V(C4).
9.2 States
In classical physics a pure state, s, is a point in the state space. It is the smallest subset of the state
space which has measure one with respect to the Dirac measure δs.
Recall that a Dirac measure δs on some set S is defined by
δs(A) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if s ∈ A
0 if s ∉ A (9.2.1)
for any s ∈ S and any measurable subset A ⊆ S.
Identifying states with subsets which have measure one is a consequence of the one-to-one corre-
spondence which subsists between pure states and Dirac measure. In particular, for each pure state, s,
there corresponds a unique Dirac measure δs. Moreover, propositions which are true in a pure state s
are given by subsets of the state space which have measure one, with respect to the Dirac δs, i.e. those
subsets which contain s. The smallest such subset is the one-element set {s}. Thus, a pure state can
be identified with a single point in the state space.
In classical physics, more general states are represented by more general probability measures on
the state space. This is the mathematical framework that underpins classical statistical physics.
However, the spectral presheaf Σ has no points1. Indeed, this is equivalent to the Kochen-Specker
theorem! Thus the analogue of a pure state must be identified with some other construction. There
are two (ultimately equivalent) possibilities: a ‘state’ can be identified with (i) an element of P (P (Σ))
(the set of all possible sub-objects of the set of all possible subsets of Σ); or (ii) an element of P (Σ)
1Recall that in a topos τ , a ‘point’ (or ‘global element’ or just ‘element’) of an object O is defined to be a morphism
from the terminal object, 1τ , to O.
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(the set of all sub-object of Σ). The first choice is called the truth-object option, the second is the
pseudo-state option. In what follows we will concentrate on the second option. The first option will
be described later.
The second choice is the one that most resembles the notion of a point state since it represents
the smallest sub-object of the state space Σ. Since Σ is a presheaf, a sub-object of it will be itself a
presheaf, thus the pseudo state is a presheaf, i.e. an object in SetsV(H)
op
.
Specifically, given a pure quantum state ψ ∈H, we define the presheaf
w
∣ψ⟩
∶= δ( Sψ⟩⟨ψS) (9.2.2)
such that for each context V we have
δ( Sψ⟩⟨ψS)
V
∶=S(⋀{αˆ ∈ P (V )S Sψ⟩⟨ψS ≤ αˆ}) =S(δo( Sψ⟩⟨ψS)) ⊆ Σ(V ) (9.2.3)
Where the map S was defined in equation (1.5) lecture 9 but we will report it below for the sake of
completeness:
S ∶ P (V )→ Subcl(Σ)V (9.2.4)
such that
δo( Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ↦S(δo( Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ) ∶= Sδo( ∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣)V (9.2.5)
Thus, for each context V ∈ V(H), the projection operator δ( Sψ⟩⟨ψS)
V
is the smallest projection
operator implied by Sψ⟩⟨ψS. Since Sψ⟩⟨ψS projects on a 1-dimensional sub-space of the Hilbert space,
i.e. it projects on a state, δ( Sψ⟩⟨ψS)
V
identifies the smallest sub-space of H equal or bigger than the
one dimensional sub-space Sψ⟩. It is in this sense that w ∣ψ⟩ ∶= δ( Sψ⟩⟨ψS) represents the closest one can
get to a point in Σ.
The map Sψ⟩→ w ∣ψ⟩ (9.2.6)
is injective.
Proof. We want to show that if T∣ψ⟩ = T∣φ⟩ then Sφ⟩ = eiλSψ⟩. Now applying the definitions for each
V ∈ V(H) we have
T
∣ψ⟩
V = {Pˆ ∈ P (V )SPˆ ≥ Sψ⟩⟨ψS} (9.2.7)
= {Pˆ ∈ P (V )S⟨ψSPˆ Sψ⟩ = 1} (9.2.8)
= T∣φ⟩
V
(9.2.9)
= {Pˆ ∈ P (V )S⟨φSPˆ Sφ⟩ = 1} (9.2.10)
However if ⟨ψSPˆ Sψ⟩ = 1 then ⟨ψe−iλSPˆ Seiλψ⟩ = ⟨φSPˆ Sφ⟩ = 1 for some λ. Moreover that will be the only
stat would satisfy this for all Pˆ therefore Sφ⟩ = eiλSψ⟩, i.e. Sψ⟩→ T∣ψ⟩ is injective. Since the association
T
∣ψ⟩ → w ∣ψ⟩ is injective the result follows.
Thus, for each state Sψ⟩, there is associated a topos pseudo-state, w ∣ψ⟩, which is defined as a
subobject of the spectral presheaf Σ.
This presheaf w ∣ψ⟩ is interpreted as the smallest clopen subobject of Σ, which represents the
proposition2 which is totally true in the state Sψ⟩, namely the proposition δ(Sψ⟩⟨ψS). Roughly speaking,
it is the closest one can get to defining a point in Σ. The formal definition of the pseudo state is as
follows:
Definition 9.2.1. For each state Sψ⟩ ∈H we obtain the pseudo state w ∣ψ⟩ ∈ SetsV(H)op which is defined
on
2Recall that in the topos framework propositions are identified with clopen sub-objects of the state space
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• Objects: For each context V ∈ V(H) we obtain
δ( Sψ⟩⟨ψS)
V
∶= {λ ∈ ΣV Sλ(δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ) = 1} (9.2.11)
• Morphisms: For each iV ′V ∶ V
′ ⊆ V the corresponding map is simply the spectral presheaf map
restricted to w ∣ψ⟩, i.e.
w
∣ψ⟩(iV ′V ) ∶ w ∣ψ⟩V → w ∣ψ⟩V ′ (9.2.12)
λ ↦ λ∣V ′ (9.2.13)
9.2.1 Example
We will now give an example of how to define pseudo states in our 4 dimensional Hilbert space C4. This
is very similar to the example for propositions, since also for pseudo states the concept of daseinisation
is utilised. However, for pedagogical reasons we will, nonetheless, report it below.
Let us consider a state ψ = (0,1,0,0). The respective projection operator is
Pˆ2 = Sψ⟩⟨ψS =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
We now want to compute the outer daseinisation of such a projection operator for various contexts
V ∈ V(C4). As was done for the proposition, we will subdivide our analysis in different cases:
1. Context V and its sub-algebras.
Since the maximal algebra V is such that Sψ⟩⟨ψS ∈ P (V ), it follows that:
δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V = Sψ⟩⟨ψS (9.2.14)
This also holds for any sub-algebra of V containing Sψ⟩⟨ψS, i.e. V
Pˆ2,Pˆi
for i = {1,3,4} and V
Pˆ2
.
Instead, for the algebras V
Pˆi,Pˆj
, where i, j ∈ {1,3,4}, we have
δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)VPˆi,Pˆj = Pˆ2 + Pˆk for k ≠ i ≠ j (9.2.15)
On the other hand, for contexts V
Pˆi
for i ∈ {1,3,4} we have
δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)VPˆi = Pˆ2 + Pˆk + Pˆj for k ≠ i ≠ j (9.2.16)
2. Other maximal algebras which contain Sψ⟩⟨ψS and their sub-algebras.
Let us consider the 4 pairwise orthogonal operators (Qˆ1, Pˆ2, Qˆ3, Qˆ4), such that
V
′
∶= linC(Qˆ1, Pˆ2, Qˆ3, Qˆ4) ≠ V . For these contexts we obtain
δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ′ = Pˆ2 (9.2.17)
δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)VQˆi = Pˆ2 + Qˆj + Qˆk (9.2.18)
δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)VQˆi.Qˆj = Pˆ2 + Qˆk (9.2.19)
3. Contexts which contain a projection operator which is implied by Sψ⟩⟨ψS.
If V
′′
contains Qˆ ≥ Sψ⟩⟨ψS then
δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ′ = Qˆ (9.2.20)
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4. Contexts which neither contain Sψ⟩⟨ψS or a projection operator implied by it.
δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ′ = 1ˆ (9.2.21)
We now would like to define the w ∣ψ⟩-morphisms. This is left as an exercise.
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Chapter 10
Lecture 11
This is a brief overview of the tight link between topos theory and logic. In particular it will be showed
that to each topos there is associated a language with associated logic, but also the revers is true,
given a language one can defined a corresponding topos. Given this tight connection, it is also possible
to view a theory of physics, as expressed within the mathematical formulation of topos theory, as a
representation, in a topos, of an abstract language.
10.1 Topos and Logic
In this section we will try to describe the deep connection between topos and logic. The nature and
scope of such a connection is deep and wide, so we will not be able to expose it in its full details.
We will, however, try to give a general account of this intimate connection and, where possible, try to
describe such a connection with explicit examples in physics.
We first of all need the definition of a language.
10.1.1 First Order Languages l
A language, in its most raw definition, comprises a collection of atomic variables, and a collection
of primitive operations called logical connectives, whose role is to combine together such primitive
variables transforming them into formulas or sentences. Moreover, in order to reason with a given
language one also requires rules of inference, i.e. rules which allow you to generate other valid sentences
from the given ones.
The semantics or meaning of the logical connectives, however, is not given by the logical connectives
themselves but it is defined through a so called evaluation map, which is a map from the set of atomic
variables and sentences to a set of truth values. Such a map enables one to determine when a formula
is true and, thus, defines its semantics/meaning.
In this perspective it turns out that the meaning of the logical connectives is given in terms of
some set of objects which represent the truth values. The logic that a given language will exhibit
will depend on what the set of truth values is considered to be. In fact, the above is a very abstract
characterisation of what a language is. To actually use it as a deductive system of reasoning one
needs to define a mathematical context in which to represent this abstract language. In this way the
elementary and compound propositions will be represented by certain mathematical objects, and the
set of truth values will itself be identified with an algebra.
For example, in standard classical logic, the mathematical context used is Sets and the algebra of
truth values is the Boolean algebras of subsets of a given set. However, as we will see, in a general
topos the internal logic/algebra will not be Boolean but will be a generalisation of it, i.e. a Heyting
algebra. We will explain, later on, the implications of this fact.
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In order to get a better understanding of what has been said above we will start with a very simple
language called propositional language P (l).
10.1.2 Propositional Language
The propositional language P (l) contains a set of symbols and a set of formation rules.
Symbols of P (l)
i) An infinite list of symbols α0, α1, α2⋯ called primitive propositions.
ii) A set of symbols ¬,∨,∧,⇒ which for now have no explicit meaning.
iii) Brakets ), (.
Formation Rules
i) Each primitive proposition αi ∈ P (l) is a sentence.
ii) If α is a sentence, then so is ¬α.
iii) If α1 and α2 are sentences, then so are α1 ∧ α2, α1 ∨ α2 and α1 ⇒ α2.
Note also that P (l) does not contain the quantifiers ∀ and ∃. This is because it is only a propositional
language. To account for quantifiers one has to go to more complicated languages called higher-order
languages, which will be described later.
The inference rule present in P (l) is the modus ponens (the rule of detachment) which states that
from αi and αi ⇒ αj the sentence αj may be derived. Symbolically this is written as
αi, αi ⇒ αj
αi
(10.1.1)
We will see, later on, what exactly the above expression means.
In order to use the language P (l) one needs to represent it in a mathematical context. The choice
of such context will depend on what type of system we want to reason about. For now we will consider
a classical system, thus the mathematical context in which to represent the language P (l) will be Sets.
In Sets the truth object (object in which the truth values lie) will be the Boolean set {0,1}, thus the
truth values will undergo a Boolean algebra. This, in turn, implies that the logic of the language P (l),
as represented in Sets, will be Boolean.
The rigorous definition of a representation of the language P (l) in a mathematical context is a map
φ from the set of primitive propositions to elements in the algebra in question (in this case a Boolean
algebra); α → φ(α). The specification of the algebra, as we will see, will depend on what type of theory
we are considering, i.e. classical or quantum.
In the example (classical system) above the propositions are represented in the Boolean algebra of
all (Borel) subsets of the classical state space (how this is done and why will be explained later on, for
now we will just consider this statement as given)
Now that we have a representation of the abstract language we can also define the semantics of this
language as follows:
φ(αi ∨ αj) ∶= φ(αi) ∨ φ(αj) (10.1.2)
φ(αi ∧ αj) ∶= φ(αi) ∧ φ(αj)
φ(αi ⇒ αj) ∶= φ(αi)⇒ φ(αj)
φ(¬αi) ∶= ¬(φ(αi))
where, on the left hand side, the symbols {¬,∧,∨,⇒} are elements of the language P (l), while on the
right hand side they are the logical connectives in algebra, in which the representation takes place. It
is in such an algebra that the logical connectives acquire meaning.
101
For the classical case, since the algebra of representations is the Boolean algebra of subsets, the logical
connectives on the right hand side of 10.1.2 are defined in terms of set theoretic operations. In
particular, we have the following associations:
φ(αi) ∨ φ(αj) ∶= φ(αi) ∪ φ(αj) (10.1.3)
φ(αi) ∧ φ(αj) ∶= φ(αi) ∩ φ(αj)
¬(φ(αi)) ∶= φ(αi)c
φ(αi)⇒ π(αj) ∶= φ(αi)c ∪ φ(αj) (10.1.4)
So far we have seen how logical connectives are represented in the topos Sets (since we have been
considering the classical case). However, it is possible to give a general definition of logical connectives
in terms of arrows. Such a definition would then be valid for any topos. To retrieve the logical
connectives for the classical case, in which the topos is Sets, we then simply replace, in the definitions
that will follow, the general truth object Ω with the Boolean algebra {0,1} = 2.
The way in which logical connectives are defined in a general topos is as follows:
• Negation
We will now describe how to represent negation as an arrow in a given topos τ . Let us assume
that the τ -arrow representing the value true is ⊺ ∶ 1→ Ω, which is the arrow used in the definition
of the sub-object classifier. Given such an arrow true, negation is identified with the unique arrow
¬ ∶ Ω→ Ω, such that the following diagram is a pullback
1
⊥ //

Ω
¬

1
⊺
// Ω
Where ⊥ is the topos analogue of the arrow false in Sets, i.e. ⊥ is the character of !1 ∶ 0→ 1
0
!1 //
!1

1
⊥

1
⊺
// Ω
• Conjunction
Conjunction is identified with the following arrow:
∩ ∶ Ω ×Ω→ Ω
which is the character of the product arrow ⟨⊺,⊺⟩ ∶ 1 → Ω ×Ω, such that the following diagram
commutes
1
id1 //
⟨⊺,⊺⟩

1
⊺

Ω ×Ω
∩
// Ω
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where ⟨⊺,⊺⟩ is defined as follows:
1
⊺ // Ω
1
I1
88qqqqqqqqqqqqq ⟨⊺,⊺⟩ //
I1
&&▼▼
▼▼▼
▼▼▼
▼▼▼
▼▼ Ω ×Ω
pr1
OO
pr2

1
⊺
// Ω
• Disjunction
Disjunction is identified with the arrow
∪ ∶ Ω ×Ω→ Ω (10.1.5)
which is the character of the image of the arrow
[⟨⊺,1Ω⟩, ⟨1Ω,⊺⟩] ∶ Ω +Ω→ Ω ×Ω (10.1.6)
such that the following diagram commutes
Ω +Ω
[⟨⊺,1Ω⟩,⟨1Ω,⊺⟩] //
!Ω+Ω

Ω ×Ω
∪

1
⊺ // Ω
• Implication
Implication is identified with the arrow
⇒∶ Ω ×Ω→ Ω (10.1.7)
which is the character of the equaliser map
e ∶≤→ Ω ×Ω (10.1.8)
such that the following diagram commutes
≤ e //
!e

Ω ×Ω
⇒

1
⊺ // Ω
where ≤∶= {⟨x, y⟩Sx ≤ y in Ω}.
Now the above arrow e is actually the equaliser of
Ω ×Ω
∩ //
pr1
// Ω
i.e. ∩ ○ e = pr1 ○ e.
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In order to complete the definition of a propositional language in a given topos, we also need to define
the valuation functions (which gives us the semantics) in terms of arrows in that topos.
We recall from the definition of the sub-object classifier that a truth value in a general topos τ is
given by a map 1 → Ω (in Sets we have 1 → {0,1} = 2 = Ω). The collection of such functions τ(1,Ω)
represents the collection of all truth values. Thus, a valuation map in a general topos is defined to be
the map V ∶ {π(αi)}→ τ(1,Ω).
It is, then, easy to show that the following equalities hold:
V (¬(π(αi))) = ¬ ○ V (π(αi)) (10.1.9)
V (π(αi) ∨ π(αj)) = ∨ ○ ⟨V (π(αi)), V (π(αj))⟩ (10.1.10)
V (π(αi) ∧ π(αj)) = ∧ ○ ⟨V (π(αi)), V (π(αj))⟩ (10.1.11)
V (π(αi)⇒ π(αj)) = ⇒ ○⟨V (π(αi)), V (π(αj))⟩ (10.1.12)
10.1.2.1 Example In Classical Physics
We have stated above that classical physics uses the topos Sets. We now want to represent in Sets
the propositional language P (l) as defined for a classical system S. Since such a language, in this case,
will be used to talk about S, we will denote it Pl(S) so as to make it explicit that we are talking about
S. Now, since S is a (classical) physical system, the standard propositions which it will contain will be
of the form A ∈ ∆ meaning “ the quantity A which represents some physical observable, has value in a
set ∆”. These are normally the types of propositions we deal with in classical physics and in physics
in general.
We now define the representation map from this language to Sets as follows:
πcl ∶ Pl(S) → Sets (10.1.13)
A ∈∆ ↦ {s ∈ SSA˜(s) ∈∆} = A˜−1(∆) (10.1.14)
where S is the classical state space and A˜ ∶ S → R is the map from the state space to the reals which
identifies the physical quantity A.
We now define the truth values of such represented propositions. Normally, such truth values are state
dependent, i.e. they depend on the state with respect to which we are preforming the evaluation. In
classical physics states are simply identified with elements s of the state space S. Thus, for all s ∈ S
we define the truth value of the proposition A˜−1(∆) as follows:
v(A ∈∆; s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 iff s ∈ A˜−1(∆)
0 otherwise
(10.1.15)
Thus the truth values lie in the Boolean algebra Ω = {0,1}.
It is interesting to note that the application of the propositional language P (l) for quantum theory
fails. This is because in quantum theory propositions are identified with projection operators, thus the
representation map would be
πq ∶ {αi} → P (H) (10.1.16)
A ∈∆ ↦ πq(A ∈ ∆) ∶= Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] (10.1.17)
where Eˆ[A ∈∆] is the projection operator which projects onto the subset ∆ of the spectrum of Aˆ.
Now the problem with this construction is that the set of all projection operators undergoes a logic
which is not distributive, but the logic of the propositional language is distributive. Therefore, such a
representation will not work. We will see later on how to fix this problem. However, to arrive at the
solution we need to introduce a higher order language which we will examine in the next section.
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10.1.3 The Higher Order Type Language l
We now go a step higher and define a first order type language l. Such a language consists of a set of
symbols and terms.
Symbols
1. A collection of “sorts ” or “types”. If T1, T2,⋯, Tn, n ≥ 1, are type symbols, then so is T1 × T2 ×
⋯ × Tn. If n = 0 then T1 × T2 ×⋯× Tn = 1.
2. If T is a type symbol, then so is PT .
3. Given any type T there are a countable set of variables of type T .
4. There is a special symbol ∗.
5. A set of function symbols for each pair of type symbols, together with a map which assigns
to each such functions its type. This assignment consists of a finite non-empty list of types.
Thus, for example, if we have the pair of type symbols (T1, T2), the associated set of function
symbols would be Fl(T1, T2). A given f ∈ Fl(T1, T2) has type T1, T2, this is indicated by writing
f ∶ T1 → T2.
6. A set of relation symbols Ri together with a map which assigns the type of the arguments of
the relation. This consists of a list of types. Thus, for example, a relation taking an argument
x1 ∈ T1 of type T1 to an argument x2 ∈ T2 of type T2 is denoted as R = R(x1, x2) ⊆ T1 × T2.
Terms
1. The variables of type T are terms of type T , ∀T .
2. The symbol ∗ is a term of type 1.
3. A term of type Ω is called a formula. If the formula has no free variables then we call it a
sentence.
4. Given a function symbol f ∶ T1 → T2 and t a term of type T1, then f(t) is term of type T2.
5. Given t1, t2,⋯, tn which are terms of type T1, T2,⋯, Tn respectively, then ⟨t1, t2,⋯, tn⟩ is a term
of type T1 × T2 ×⋯× Tn.
6. If x is a term of type T1 × T2 ×⋯× Tn, then for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ti is a term of type Ti.
7. If ω is a term of type Ω and α is a variable of type T , then {αSω} is a term of type PT .
8. If x1, x2 are terms of the same type, then x1 = x2 is a term of type Ω.
9. If x1, x2 are terms of type T and PT respectively, then x1 ∈ x2 is a term of type Ω.
The entire set of formulas in the language l are defined recursively through repeated applications of
formation rules, which are the analogue of the standard logical connectives. In particular, we have
atomic formulas and composite formulas The former are:
1. The terms of relation.
2. Equality terms defined above.
3. Truth ⊺ is an atomic formula with empty set of free variables.
4. False ⊥ is an atomic formula with empty set of free variables.
We can now built more complicated formulas through the use of the logical connectives ∨, ∧, ⇒ and
¬. These are the composite formulas :
105
1. Given two formulas α and β then α∨β is a formula such that, the set of free variables is defined
to be the union of the free variables in α and β.
2. Given two formulas α and β then α∧β is a formula such that, the set of free variables is defined
to be the union of the free variables in α and β.
3. Given a formula α its negation ¬α is still a formula with the same amount of free variables.
4. Given two formulas α and β, then α⇒ β is a formula with free variables given by the union of
the free variables in α and β.
It is interesting to note that the logical operations just defined can actually be expressed in terms of
the primitive symbols as follows:
1. true ∶= ∗ = ∗.
2. α ∧ β ∶= ⟨α,β⟩ = ⟨ true, true⟩ = ⟨∗ = ∗,∗ = ∗⟩.
3. α⇔ β ∶= α = β.
4. α⇒ β ∶= (α ∧ β)⇔ α ∶= ⟨α,β⟩ = ⟨ true, true⟩ = α.
5. ∀xα ∶= {x ∶ α} = {x ∶ true}.
6. false ∶= ∀ww ∶= {w ∶ w} = {w ∶ true}.
7. ¬α ∶= α⇒ false.
8. α ∧ β ∶= ∀w[(α⇒ w ∧ β ⇒ w)⇒].
9. ∃xα ∶= ∀w[∀x(α⇒ w)⇒ w].
In the above the notation {x ∶ y} indicates the set of all x, such that y.
10.1.4 Representation of l in a Topos
We now want to show how a representation of the first order language l takes place in a topos. The
main idea is that of identifying each of the terms in l with arrows in a topos. In particular we have:
Definition 10.1.1. Given a topos τ the interpretation/representation (M) of the language l in τ
consists of the following associations:
1. To each type T ∈ l an object T τM ∈ τ .
2. To each relation symbol R ⊆ T1 × T2 ×⋯× Tn a sub-object RτM ⊆ T τM1 × T τM2 ×⋯× T τMn .
3. To each function symbol f ∶ T1 × T2 ×⋯ × Tn →X a τ-arrow f
τM ∶ T τM1 × T
τM
2 ×⋯ × T
τM
n →X.
4. To each constant c of type T a τ-arrow c ∶ 1τM → T τM .
5. To each variabe x of type T a τ-arrow x ∶ T τM → T τM .
6. The symbol Ω is represented by the sub-object classifier ΩτM .
7. The symbol 1 is represented by the terminal object 1τM .
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Now that we understand how the basic symbols of the abstract language l are represented in a topos
we can proceed to understand also how the various terms and formulas are represented. Needless to
say these are all defined in recursive manner.
Given a term t(x1, x2,⋯, xn) of type Y with free variables xi of type Ti, i.e. t(x1, x2,⋯, xn) ∶ T1 ×⋯×
Tn → Y , then the representative in a topos of this term would be a τ -map
t(x1, x2,⋯, xn) ∶ T τM1 ×⋯× T τMn → Y τM (10.1.18)
Formulas in the language are interpreted with terms of type Ω. In the topos τ this object Ω is identified
with the sub-object classifier Ω.
In particular, a term of type Ω of the form φ(t1, t2,⋯tn) with free variables ti of type Ti is represented
by an arrow
φ(t1, t2,⋯tn)τM ∶ T τM1 ×⋯× T τMn → ΩτM
On the other hand, a term, φ of type Ω with no free variables is represented by a global element
φ ∶ 1τM → ΩτM As we will see these arrows will represent the truth values.
The reason that in a topos formulas are identified with arrows with codomain Ω rests in the fact that
sub-objects, of a given object in a topos, are in 1:2:1 correspondence with maps from that object to
the sub-object classifier. In fact, by construction, formulas single out sub-objects of a given object in
terms of a particular relation which they satisfy, i.e. they define elements of Sub(X). Such sub-objects
are in 1:2:1 correspondence with maps X → Ω .
In particular, given a formula φ(x1,⋯, xn) with free variables xi of type Ti, which in the language l is
associated with the subset {xiSφ} ⊆ ∏i Ti, we obtain the topos representation
{(x1,⋯, xn)Sφ}τM ⊆ T τM1 ×⋯ × T τMn (10.1.19)
which, through the Omega Axiom, gets identified with the map
{(x1,⋯, xn)Sφ}τM → T τM1 ×⋯× T τMn χ{(x1,⋯,xn)∣φ}τMÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ ΩτM (10.1.20)
To illustrate this correspondence let us consider the formula stating that two terms are the same,
i.e. t(x1, x2,⋯, xn) = t′(x1, x2,⋯, xn). The representation of such a formula in a topos τ is identified
with the equalizer of the two τ -arrows representing the terms t(x1, x2,⋯, xn) and t′(x1, x2,⋯, xn). In
particular we have
{x1, x2,⋯, xnSt = t′}τM // // T τM1 ×⋯× T τMn t
τM //
t
′τM
// Y τM
Instead, if we consider a relation R(t1,⋯tn) of terms ti of type Yi with variables xj of type Tj, then
the formula pertaining this relation {x1⋯xnSR(t1,⋯tn)} is represented in τ by pulling back the sub-
object RτM ⊆ Y τM1 ×⋯×Y τMn (representing the relation R(t1,⋯tn)) along the term arrow ⟨tτM1 ,⋯tτMn ⟩ ∶
T τM1 ×⋯ × T
τM
n → Y
τM
1 ×⋯× Y
τM
n :
{x1, x2,⋯, xnSR(t1,⋯tn)}τM

// RτM

T τM1 ×⋯ × T
τM
n
⟨t
τM
1
,⋯t
τM
n ⟩ // Y τM1 ×⋯× Y
τM
n
The atomic formulas meaning truth and false (⊺ and ⊥ respectively) will be represented in a topos τ by
the greatest and lowest elements of the Heyting algebra of the sub-objects of any object in the topos.
Thus, for example, we have that
{x1⋯xnS⊺}τM = T τM1 × T τM2 ×⋯ × T τMn (10.1.21){x1⋯xnS ⊥}τM = ∅τM (10.1.22)
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So far we have established how to define formulas in a topos. In the following, we will delineate
how to represent logical connectives between formulas in a topos. In particular, given a collection of
formulas represented as sub-objects of the type object ∏i Ti, the logical connectives between these are
represented by the corresponding operations in the Heyting algebra of sub-objects of the object∏i T τMi
in τ . As before, since we are dealing with sub-object we can also represent the logical connective with
τ -arrow with codomain Ω as follows:
Consider two formulas φ, ρ, of type Ω with free variables x1 and x2 of type T
τM
1 and T
τM
2 , respectively.
The conjunction φ ∧ ρ is the map
φ ∧ ρ ∶ T τM1 × T
τM
2
⟨φ,ρ⟩
ÐÐÐ→ ΩτM ×ΩτM
∧
Ð→ ΩτM (10.1.23)
Similarly, we have
φ ∨ ρ ∶ T τM1 × T
τM
2
⟨φ,ρ⟩
ÐÐÐ→ ΩτM ×ΩτM
∨
Ð→ ΩτM (10.1.24)
φ⇒ ρ ∶ T τM1 × T
τM
2
⟨φ,ρ⟩
ÐÐÐ→ ΩτM ×ΩτM
⇒
Ð→ ΩτM (10.1.25)
¬ρ ∶ T τM1 × T
τM
2
ρ
Ð→ ΩτM
¬
Ð→ ΩτM (10.1.26)
Given a language l a theory T in l is a set of formulas which are called the axioms of T . A model of
such a theory is then a representation M in which all the axioms of T are valid. Such axioms are then
represented by the arrow true ∶ 1→ Ω.
An example of this is given by the theory of abelian groups which can be seen as model of a theory in
a given language as follows.
The language required will only contain one type of elements G, no relations, two function symbols
+ ∶ G ×G→ G
− ∶ G→ G
and a constant 0. An interpretation of this language, which will lead us to the theory of groups, will
be defined in the topos Sets. Such a representation of G will be identified as a set GM , on which the
function symbols
+ ∶ GM ×GM → GM (10.1.27)
⟨g1, g2⟩ ↦ g1g2 (10.1.28)
and
− ∶ GM → GM (10.1.29)
g ↦ −g (10.1.30)
act upon. The constant 0 will be an element of the set 0M ∈ GM . Such an interpretation will be a
model for the theory of abelian groups if the function symbols satisfy the axioms of abelian groups,
i.e. the following hold
(g1 + g2) + g3 = g1 + (g2 + g3) (10.1.31)
g1 + g2 = g2 + g1 (10.1.32)
g1 + 0 = g1 (10.1.33)
g1 + (−g1) = 0 (10.1.34)
Given two models M and M
′
of a theory T in a language L, we say that these two models are
homomorphic if there is a homomorphism of the respective interpretations of the model, i.e. for each
symbol type X in l, the following maps are homomorphisms:
HX ∶ X
M →XM
′
(10.1.35)
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where XM and XM
′
are the representations of the symbol type X of L in the representation M and
M ′, respectively.
Such a homomorphism has to respect every relation symbols, function symbols and constants.
In the example of abelian groups, model homomorphisms would simply be group homomorphisms.
The definition of homomorphic representations gives rise to a category I, whose objects are all
possible representations of a given language l in a topos τ , and whose morphisms are the above men-
tioned homomorphisms of representations. Given such a category, each theory T gives rise to a full
subcategory of I called Mod(T , τ), whose objects are models of the theory T in the topos τ , and
whose morphisms are homomorphisms of models.
In this section we have seen how, given a first order type language l it is possible to represent such
a language in a topos τ . However, interestingly enough the converse is also true, namely, given a topos
τ , it has associated to it an internal first order language l, which enables one to reason about τ in a
set theoretic way, i.e. using the notion of elements. Thus, we have:
Definition 10.1.2. Given a topos τ , its internal language l(τ) has as type symbol ⌜A⌝ for each object
A ∈ τ . A function symbol ⌜f⌝ ∶ ⌜A⌝1 × ⌜A⌝2 ×⋯ × ⌜A⌝n → ⌜B⌝ for each map f ∶ A1 ×A2 ×⋯ ×An → B
in τ . And a relation ⌜R⌝ ⊆ ⌜A⌝1 × ⌜A⌝2 ×⋯ × ⌜A⌝n for each sub-object R ⊆ A1 ×A2 ×⋯ ×An in τ .
10.1.5 A Theory of Physics in the Language l Represented in a Topos τ
We will now try to construct a physics theory for a system S. The construction of such a theory is
defined by an interplay between a language l(S), associated to the system S, a topos and the repre-
sentation of the theory in the topos. In particular we can say that a theory of the system S is defined
by choosing a representation/model, M , of the language l(S) in a topos τM . The choice of both topos
and representation depend on the theory-type being used, i.e. if it is classical or quantum theory.
As we have seen above, since each topos τ has an internal language l(τ) associated to it, constructing
a theory of physics consists in translating the language, l(S), of the system in the local language l(τ)
of the topos.
For now we will not specify what the theory type is, but we will analyse what ground type terms and
formulas would be present in a first order language l, which wants to describe and talk about a physical
system. However, if the theory type one is utilising is classical physics, than the topos in which to
represent your model will be Sets. For a quantum theory, as will be explained in details later on, the
topos utilised will be of the form SetsC
op
for an appropriate category C.
The minimum set of type symbols and formulas, which are needed for a language to be able to talk
about a physical system S, are the following:
1. The state space object and the quantity value object are represented in l(S) by the ground type
symbols Σ and R. Given a representation M of l in a topos τ , these objects are represented by
the objects ΣM and RM in τ .
2. Given a physical quantity A, it is standard practice to represent such a quantity in terms of a
function from the state space to the quantity value object. Thus, we require l(S) to contain
the set function symbols Fl(S)(Σ,R) of signature Σ → R, such that the physical quantity is
A ∶ Σ → R. Given a topos τ , these physical quantities are defined in terms of τ -arrows between
the τ -objects ΣM and RM .
We will generally require the representation to be faithful, i.e. the map A→ AM is one-to-one.
3. We would like to have values of physical quantities. These are defined in l(S) as terms of type
R with free variables s of type Σ, i.e. A(s), where A ∶ Σ → R ∈ Fl(S)(Σ,R). Such terms are
represented in the topos by terms of type RM , i.e. AM ∶ ΣM →RM .
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4. We generally would like to talk about values of physical quantities for a given state of the system,
thus we require the presence of formulas of the type A(s) ∈∆, where ∆ is a variable of type PR1
and S is a variable of type Σ, which represents a state (being an element of the state space).
Since A(s) ∈∆ is a formula, i.e. a term of type Ω it is represented in a topos τ by an arrow
[A(s) ∈ ∆] ∶ Σ ×PR→ Ω
Such an arrow gets factored as follows:
[A(s) ∈ ∆] = eR ○ ⟨[A(s)], [∆]⟩ (10.1.36)
where eR ∶ R × PR → Ω is the evaluation map, [A(s)] ∶ Σ → R is the arrow representing the
physical quantity A and ∆ ∶R→R is simply the identity arrow. Putting the two results together
we have
Σ ×PR
A×id
ÐÐÐ→R × PR
eR
Ð→ Ω (10.1.37)
5. We would also like to talk about collections of states of the system with a particular property.
Such a collection is represented in terms of sub-objects of the state space, which comprises the
states with that particular property in question. Thus we have terms {sSA(s) ∈ ∆} which are of
type PΣ with a free variable ∆ of type PR. Such a term is represented in a topos by an arrow
[{sSA(s) ∈∆}] ∶ PR→ PΣ (10.1.38)
Using this term of type P (Σ) a proposition A ∈ ∆ can be represented as follows:
[{sSA(s) ∈ Ξ}] ○ [∆] ∶ 1→ P (Σ) (10.1.39)
6. A formula w with no free variables, which we denoted as a sentence, is a special element of Ω
which is represented in a topos by a global element of Ω, i.e.
[w] ∶ 1→ Ω (10.1.40)
These, as we will see later on, will represent truth values for propositions about the system.
7. Any axioms added to the language have to be represented by the arrow true T ∶ 1→ Ω.
10.1.6 Deductive System of Reasoning for First Order Logic
Once we have defined the symbols and formation rules for the first order language l, in order to actually
use it as a language that enables us to talk about things, we also require rules of inference. Such rules
will allow us to derive true statements from other true statements.
In order to describe this better we need to introduce the notion of a sequent.
Definition 10.1.3. Given two formulae ψ and φ a sequent is an expression ψ ⊢x⃗ φ which indicates
that φ is a logical consequence of ψ in the context x⃗2.
What this means is that any assignment of values of the variables in x⃗, which makes ψ true will
also make φ true.
The deduction system will then be defined as a sequent calculus, i.e. a set of inference rules which
will allow us to infer a sequent from other sequents. Symbolically, the rule of inference is written as
follows:
Γ
ψ ⊢x⃗ φ
(10.1.41)
1By PR we mean the power set (collection of all subsets) of R.
2A context x⃗ is a list of distinct variables. When applied to a formula it indicates the fact that, that formula, has free
variables only within that context, i.e. a formula in a context.
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which means that the sequent ψ ⊢x⃗ φ can be inferred by the collection of sequents Γ. We can also have
a double inference as follows:
Γ
ψ ⊢x⃗ φ
This can be read in both directions, thus it means that ψ ⊢x⃗ φ can be inferred by the collection of
sequents Γ, but also that the collection of sequents Γ can be inferred by ψ ⊢x⃗ φ.
We will now define a list of inference rules. In the following, the symbol Γ will represent a collection
of sequents, the letters γ, β,α will represent formulae while the letters σ, τ,⋯ will represent terms of
some type and α ∪ Γ represent the collections of formulas in both Γ and the formula α.
• Thinning
β ∩ Γ ⊢x⃗ α
Γ ⊢x⃗ α
• Cut
Γ ⊢x⃗ α ,α ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ β
Γ ⊢x⃗ β
For any free variable of γ free in Γ or β.
• Substitution
Γ ⊢x⃗ α
Γ(x~σ) ⊢x⃗ α(x~σ)
where Γ(x~σ) indicates the term obtained from Γ by substituting σ (which is a term of some
type) for each occurrence of x and σ is free for x in Γ and α.
• Extentionality
Γ ⊢x⃗ x ∈ σ⇔ x ∈ ρ
Γ ⊢x⃗ σ = ρ
where x is not free in either Γ, σ or ρ.
• Equivalence
α ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ β β ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ α
Γ ⊢x⃗ α⇔ β
• Finite Conjuction
The rules for finite conjunction consist of the following axioms:
α ⊢x⃗ α = ⊺ , α ∧ β ⊢x⃗ β ,α ∧ β ⊢x⃗ α (10.1.42)
Note that we have used part of the definition of the logical connective ‘if then’.
The rule of inference is (α ⊢x⃗ β)(α ⊢x⃗ γ)
α ⊢x⃗ γ ∧ β (10.1.43)
Proof.
α ⊢x⃗ β
α ⊢x⃗ γ
β ⊢x⃗ β = true
(3)
γ ⊢x⃗ γ = true (1) γ = true ∪ β = true ⊢x⃗ γ ∧ β
(2)
γ ∪ β = true ⊢x⃗ γ ∧ β
(4)
α ∪ β ⊢x⃗ γ ∧ β
(5)
α ∪ β ⊢x⃗ α ∧ β
(6)
α ⊢x⃗ γ ∧ β
(7)
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This proof should be read from top to bottom and consists, as one can see, with a finite collection
of sequents called a finite tree, in which the bottom vertex represents the conclusion of the proof.
All the sequents of the proof are correlated to each other in the following way:
1. A sequent belonging to a node3 which has nodes above it is derived by applying a rule of
inference to the sequents belonging to the above nodes.
2. Every top most node is either a basic axiom or a premise of the proof.
In the proof above we have that
γ ⊢x⃗ γ = true
is derived by the thinning axiom, the equivalence axiom and the axioms γ ⊢x⃗ γ and ⊢x⃗ true as
follows:
Proof. ⊢x⃗ true
γ ⊢x⃗ true (1)
γ ∪ γ ⊢x⃗ true (3)
γ ⊢x⃗ γ
true ∪ γ ⊢x⃗ γ (2)
γ ⊢x⃗ γ = true (4)
where the lines (1), (2) and (3) are an application of the thinning axiom, while line (4) is the
application of the equivalence axiom where the equivalence α⇔ β ∶= α = β was used.
Going back to the proof of the conjunction axiom the remaining lines are derived as follows:
i) Line (2) is the definition of the logical connective ∧.
ii) All the other lines are derived from applications of the cut axiom.
It should be noted that it is also possible to form a more general version of the conjunction
axiom by replacing the single sequent α by a collection of sequents Γ as follows:
Γ ⊢x⃗ β Γ ⊢x⃗ γ
Γ ⊢x⃗ β ∧ γ
• Finite Disjunction
The rules for finite conjunction consist of the following axioms:
 ⊢x⃗ α α ⊢x⃗ α ∨ β β ⊢x⃗ α ∨ β (10.1.44)
and the following rule of inference:
(α ⊢x⃗ γ)(β ⊢x⃗ γ)
α ∨ β ⊢x⃗ γ (10.1.45)
whose generalization is
α ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ γ β ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ γ
α ∨ β ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ γ
3A node is an inference step:Γ1
Γ2
.
112
• Implication
For implication we have the double inference rule
β ∧ α ⊢x⃗ γ
α ⊢x⃗ β ⇒ γ
Again the general form of which the above is a specification is
β ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ γ
Γ ⊢x⃗ β ⇒ γ
To see why that is the case we will prove the above generalisation, but only one way:
Proof.
β ⊢x⃗ β
β ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ β
(1)
β ∧ γ ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ β
(2)
β ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ β β ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ γ
β ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ β ∧ γ
(3)
Γ ⊢x⃗ β ⇒ γ
(4)
• Negation
For negation we only have one axiom
 ⊢x⃗ α (10.1.46)
while the inference rules are (α ∪ Γ) ⊢x⃗ 
Γ ⊢x⃗ ¬α
and
Γ ⊢x⃗ α(¬α ∪ Γ) ⊢x⃗ 
• Universal Quantification
We have the following double inference rule
α ⊢x⃗y β
α ⊢x⃗ ∀yβ
where y is a free variable 4 in β.
Again the generalization is
Γ ⊢x⃗y β
Γ ⊢x⃗ ∀yβ
• Existential Quantifier
We have the double inference rule
α ⊢x⃗y β
(∃y)α ⊢x⃗ β
where y is a free variable in β.
Again the generalization would be
α ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗y β
(∃y)α ∪ Γ ⊢x⃗ β
4A variable x in a term α is said to be bounded if it appears in a context of the form x ⊢ α, otherwise it is said to be
free.
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• Distributive Axiom (α ∧ (β ∨ γ)) ⊢x⃗ ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ)) (10.1.47)
• Frobenious Axiom ((α ∧ (∃y)β) ⊢x⃗ (∃y)(α ∧ β) (10.1.48)
where y ∉ x⃗.
• Law of Excluded Middle
⊺ ⊢x⃗ α ∨ β (10.1.49)
It should be noted that for intuitionistic type of first order languages, the law of excluded middle
does not hold. All the rest does.
With this we end our definition of the first order language L which is comprised of a set of term
types, a set of logical connectives and a set of rules of inference which determine the logic.
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Chapter 11
Lecture 12
In this lecture I will describe how in the quantum topos it is possible to define the truth value of a
proposition given a state. The collection of such truth values will be a Heyting algebra thus leading
to a multivalued logic (intuitionistic logic). I will then give specific examples. I will also define an
analogue of the pseudo state called the truth object. This will have the same role as the pseudo sate
but can be generalised to represent density matrices not only pure states. We will then compute the
truth values of certain propositions with respect to this truth object and check if they reproduce the
truth values computes in terms of the pseudo state.
11.1 Truth Values Using the Pseudo-State Object
We are now ready to turn to the question of how truth values are assigned to propositions which, in
this case, are represented by daseinized operators δ(Pˆ). For this purpose it is worth thinking again
about classical physics. There, as previously stated, we know that a proposition Aˆ ∈ ∆ is true for a
given state s if s ∈ f−1
Aˆ
(∆), i.e. if s belongs to those subsets f−1
Aˆ
(∆) of the state space for which the
proposition Aˆ ∈∆ is true. Therefore, given a state s, all true propositions of s are represented by those
measurable subsets which contain s, i.e. those subsets which have measure 1 with respect to the Dirac
measure δs.
In the quantum case, a proposition of the form “A ∈∆” is represented by the presheaf δ(Eˆ[A ∈∆])
where Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] is the spectral projector for the self-adjoint operator Aˆ, which projects onto the
subset ∆ of the spectrum of Aˆ. On the other hand, states are represented by the presheaves w ∣ψ⟩. As
described above, these identifications are obtained using the maps S ∶ P (V ) → Subcl(ΣV ), V ∈ V(H),
and the daseinization map δ ∶ P (H)→ Subcl(Σ), with the properties that
{S(δ(Pˆ)V ) S V ∈ V(H)} ∶= δ(Pˆ ) ⊆ Σ
{S(w ∣ψ⟩V ) S V ∈ V(H)} ∶= w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ Σ (11.1.1)
As a consequence, within the structure of formal, typed languages, both presheaves w ∣ψ⟩ and δ(Pˆ ) are
terms of type PΣ, i.e. they are sub-objects of the spectral presheaf.
We now want to define the condition by which, for each context V , the proposition (δ(Pˆ))V is
true given w
∣ψ⟩
V
1. To this end we recall that, for each context V , the projection operator w
∣ψ⟩
V can be
1Recall that w
∣ψ⟩
V
represents the projection operator while w
∣ψ⟩
V
indicated the subset of ΣV . Although ultimately they
are equivalent, it is always worth specifying what specific role w ∣ψ⟩ has.
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written as follows:
w
∣ψ⟩
V = ⋀{αˆ ∈ P (V )S Sψ⟩⟨ψS ≤ αˆ}
= ⋀{αˆ ∈ P (V )S⟨ψSαˆ Sψ⟩ = 1}
= δo( Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (11.1.2)
This represents the smallest projection in P(V) which has expectation value equal to one with respect
to the state Sψ⟩. The associated subset of the Gel’fand spectrum is defined as
w
∣ψ⟩
V = S(⋀{αˆ ∈ P (V )S⟨ψSαˆ Sψ⟩ = 1}) (11.1.3)
= {λ ∈ ΣV Sλ(δo( Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ) = 1} (11.1.4)
It follows that w ∣ψ⟩ = {w ∣ψ⟩
V
S V ∈ V(H)} is the sub-object of the spectral presheaf Σ, such that at each
context V ∈ V(H) it identifies those subsets of the Gel’fand spectrum which correspond (through the
map S) to the smallest projections of that context, which have expectation value equal to one with
respect to the state Sψ⟩, i.e. which are true in Sψ⟩.
On the other hand, as previously defined, at a given context V , the operator δ(Pˆ)V is:
δo(Pˆ )V ∶= ⋀{αˆ ∈ P (V )SPˆ ≤ αˆ} (11.1.5)
Thus the sub-presheaf δ(Pˆ ) is defined as the sub-object of Σ, such that at each context V it defines
the subset δ(Pˆ )
V
of the Gel’fand spectrum ΣV , which represents (through the map S) the projection
operator δ(Pˆ)V .
We are interested in defining the condition by which the proposition represented by the sub-object
δ(Pˆ ) is true given the state w ∣ψ⟩. Let us analyse this condition for each context V. In this case, we
need to define the condition by which the projection operator δ(Pˆ )V , associated to the proposition
δ(Pˆ ) is true, given the pseudo state w ∣ψ⟩. Since at each context V the pseudo-state defines the
smallest projection in that context which is true with probability one, i.e. (w ∣ψ⟩)V , for any other
projection to be true given this pseudo-state, this projection must be a coarse-graining of (w ∣ψ⟩)V ,
i.e. it must be implied by (w ∣ψ⟩)V . Thus, if (w ∣ψ⟩)V is the smallest projection in P (V ), which is true
with probability one, then the projector δo(Pˆ )V will be true if and only if δo(Pˆ )V ≥ (w ∣ψ⟩)V . This
condition is a consequence of the fact that, if ⟨ψSαˆ Sψ⟩ = 1, then for all βˆ ≥ αˆ it follows that ⟨ψSβˆ Sψ⟩ = 1.
So far we have defined a ‘truthfulness’ relation at the level of projection operators, namely δo(Pˆ )V ≥(w ∣ψ⟩)V . Through the map S it is possible to shift this relation to the level of sub-objects of the
Gel’fand spectrum:
S((w ∣ψ⟩)V ) ⊆S(δo(Pˆ )V ) (11.1.6)
w
∣ψ⟩
V ⊆ δ(Pˆ)V
{λ ∈ Σ(V )Sλ((δo( Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ) = 1} ⊆ {λ ∈ Σ(V )Sλ((δo(Pˆ ))V ) = 1} (11.1.7)
What the above equation reveals is that, at the level of sub-objects of the Gel’fand spectrum, for each
context V , a ‘proposition’ can be said to be (totally) true for given a pseudo-state if, and only if, the
sub-objects of the Gel’fand spectrum, associated to the pseudo-state, are subsets of the corresponding
subsets of the Gel’fand spectrum associated to the proposition. It is straightforward to see that if
δ(Pˆ )V ≥ (w ∣ψ⟩)V , then S((w ∣ψ⟩)V ) ⊆ S(δ(Pˆ )V ) since for projection operators the map λ takes the
values 0,1 only.
We still need a further abstraction in order to work directly with the presheaves w ∣ψ⟩ and δ(Pˆ ).
Thus we want the analogue of equation (11.1.6) at the level of sub-objects of the spectral presheaf, Σ.
This relation is easily derived to be
w
∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ) (11.1.8)
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Equation (11.1.8) shows that, whether or not a proposition δ(Pˆ) is ‘totally true’ given a pseudo
state w ∣ψ⟩ is determined by whether or not the pseudo-state is a sub-presheaf of the presheaf δ(Pˆ ).
With this motivation, we can now define the generalised truth value of the proposition “A ∈ ∆” at
stage V , given the state w ∣ψ⟩, as:
v(A ∈ ∆; Sψ⟩)V = v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]))V (11.1.9)
∶= {V ′ ⊆ V S(w ∣ψ⟩)V ′ ⊆ δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])V ′} (11.1.10)
= {V ′ ⊆ V S⟨ψSδ(Eˆ[A ∈∆])V Sψ⟩ = 1}
The last equality is derived by the fact that (w ∣ψ⟩)V ⊆ δ(Pˆ )
V
is a consequence that at the level of
projection operator δo(Pˆ )V ≥ (w ∣ψ⟩)V . But, since (w ∣ψ⟩)V is the smallest projection operator such
that ⟨ψS(w ∣ψ⟩)V Sψ⟩ = 1, then δo(Pˆ)V ≥ (w ∣ψ⟩)V implies that ⟨ψSδo(Pˆ ) Sψ⟩ = 1.
The right hand side of equation (11.1.9) means that the truth value, defined at V of the proposition
“A ∈∆”, given the state w ∣ψ⟩, is given in terms of all those sub-contexts V ′ ⊆ V for which the projection
operator δ(Eˆ[A ∈∆])V has expectation value equal to one with respect to the state Sψ⟩. In other words,
this partial truth value is defined to be the set of all those sub-contexts for which the proposition is
totally true.
So we can see how a local truth value can be seen as a measure of how for the proposition is from
being true. In fact what the sieve v(A ∈ ∆; Sψ⟩)V tells you is how much you have to generalise your
original proposition for it to be true.
We now need to show that indeed v(A ∈ ∆; Sψ⟩)V = S is a sieve. To this end we simply need to
show that it is closed under left composition.
Proof. Consider an algebra V
′ ∈ S then given any other algebra V ′′ ⊆ V then we want to show that
V
′′ ∈ S. Now since V ′ ∈ S, then δo(Pˆ )V ′ ≥ (w ∣ψ⟩)V ′ , however from the definition of daseinisation we
have that δo(Pˆ )V ′′ ≥ δo(Pˆ)V ′ therefore δo(Pˆ )V ′′ ≥ (w ∣ψ⟩)V ′ , which implies that V ′′ ∈ S.
Thus pictorially we have the following situation
w
∣ψ⟩ 
 //

δ(Pˆ)

1
γ // Ω
where to each sub-object relations which identifies the mathematical concept of evaluation we associate
a global element γ ∶ 1→ Ω which represents the global truth value. Such a global truth value will have
local components defined as follows
(w ∣ψ⟩)V   //

δo(Pˆ )V

1V
γV // ΩV
Which pick out a particular sieve for each context.
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The reason why all this works is that generalised truth values defined in this way form a sieve on
V ; and the set of all of these is a Heyting algebra. Specifically: v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ )) is a global element
defined at stage V of the sub-object classifier Ω ∶= (ΩV )V ∈V(H), where ΩV represents the set of all
sieves defined at stage V.
The set of truth values is defined as Γ(Ω) and it forms a Heyting algebra.
11.2 Example
We will consider again a 4 dimensional Hilbert space C4 whose category is V(C4), the state space
Σ we have already computed in previous examples. We now want to define the truth values of the
proposition Sz ∈ [−3,−1] which has corresponding projector operator Pˆ ∶= Eˆ[Sz ∈ [−3,−1]] = Sφ⟩⟨φS.
This proposition is equivalent to the projection operator Pˆ4.
The state we will consider will be ψ = (1,0,0,0) with respective operator Sψ⟩⟨ψS = Pˆ1. First of all
we will consider the context V = linC(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Pˆ3, Pˆ4). Since Pˆ4 ∈ V it follows that δo(Pˆ4)V = Pˆ4, but⟨ψSPˆ4Sψ⟩ = 0, thus we need to go to smaller contexts. In particular, only contexts in which δo(Pˆ4)) is
an operator which is implied by Pˆ1 will contribute to the truth value. We thus obtain
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ4))V ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V S⟨ψSδ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) Sψ⟩ = 1} (11.2.1)
= {V
Pˆi∈{2,3}
, V
Pˆ2Pˆ3
} (11.2.2)
On the other hand for sub contexts we obtain
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ4))VPˆ1 ∶= {∅} (11.2.3)
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ4))VPˆ2 ∶= {VPˆ2} (11.2.4)
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ4))VPˆ3 ∶= {VPˆ3} (11.2.5)
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ4))VPˆ4 ∶= {∅} (11.2.6)
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ4))VPˆ1,Pˆ2 ∶= {VPˆ2} (11.2.7)
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ4))VPˆ1,Pˆ3 ∶= {VPˆ3} (11.2.8)
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ4))VPˆ1,Pˆ4 ∶= {∅} (11.2.9)
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ4))VPˆ2,Pˆ3 ∶= {VPˆ2,Pˆ3 , VPˆ2 , VPˆ3} (11.2.10)
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ4))VPˆ2,Pˆ4 ∶= {VPˆ2} (11.2.11)
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ4))VPˆ3,Pˆ4 ∶= {VPˆ3} (11.2.12)
(11.2.13)
As can be seen, the truth values obtained by using the pseudo state object coincide with the truth
values obtained using the truth object.
11.3 Truth Object
We will now analyse the truth object option2. The reason for introducing such an object is because it
enables one to also define the topos analogue of density matrices, which was not possible when only
considering the pseudo-state option which allowed only a topos representation for pure states.
2We have seen in previous lectures how to represent propositions, which are linguistic objects of type P (Σ) in a
topos τ . Moreover, in this lecture we have defined such a representation for τ = SetsV(H)
op
. We are now interested in
understanding how propositions get assigned truth values. We know that at a linguistic level a truth value is defined as
an element of the Heyting algebra Γ(Ω), therefore we need to associate to the elements {s∣A(s) ∈∆} or A(s) ∈∆ of type
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In order to define the truth-object we need to first introduce a new presheaf called the outer presheaf
whose definition is as follows
Definition 11.3.1. The outer presheaf O ∶ V(H)→ Sets is defined on
1. Objects: for each V ∈ V(H) we obtain OV ∶= P (V ), i.e. the collection of all projection operators
in V .
2. Morphisms: given a map i ∶ V
′ ⊆ V in V(H) the corresponding presheaf map is
O(i′V V ) ∶ OV → OV ′ (11.3.6)
αˆ ↦ δo(αˆ)V ′ (11.3.7)
The above is a well defined presheaf. To see this all we need to show is that, given another inclusion
map j ∶ V
′′ ⊆ V ′ then the following holds
O(i ○ j) =O(j) ○O(i) (11.3.8)
Computing the left hand side we get
O(i ○ j) ∶ OV → OV ′′ (11.3.9)
αˆ ↦ δo(αˆ)V ′′ (11.3.10)
Computing the right hand side we get
OV
O(i)
ÐÐ→ OV ′
O(j)
ÐÐÐ→ OV ′′ (11.3.11)
αˆ ↦ δo(αˆ)V ′ ↦ δo(δo(αˆ)V ′ )V ′′ (11.3.12)
P (Σ), which represent propositions, an element of type Γ(Ω).
Since in a representation M an element of Γ(Ω) is defined as a term of type Ω with no free variables, finding the truth
value of a proposition would be equivalent in finding a way of transforming a term of type P (Σ) to a term of type Ω,
with no free variables. This can be done in two ways:
1. Truth Object
This method consists in defining a term T of type P (P (Σ)), then given a term t of type P (Σ), the term t ∈ T
would be the desired term of type Ω.
2. Psuedo-State Object
This method consists in defining a term w of type P (Σ), which was defined above and represents the topos
analogue of a state of the system. Then the truth value of a proposition t (term of type P (Σ)) would be w ⊆ t,
which is a term of type Ω.
We will now analyse the truth object option. The reason for introducing such an object is because it enables one to
also define the topos analogue of density matrices, which was not possible when only considering the pseudo-state option.
Our aim is to define a term T of type P (P (Σ)) such that, given the representation {s∣A(s) ∈ ∆} of a proposi-
tion, the term ({s∣A(s) ∈ ∆} ∈ T) is a term of type Ω. Such a term has free variables ∆ of type P (R) and T of type
P (P (Σ)). Therefore, its representation in a topos τ would be
[{s∣A(s) ∈∆} ∈ T]τM ∶ P (R) × P (P (Σ))→ Ω (11.3.1)
which can be factored as follows:
[{s∣A(s) ∈∆} ∈ T]τM = eP (Σ) ○ [{s∣A(s) ∈∆}] × [T] (11.3.2)
where eP (Σ) ∶ P (σ) × P (P (Σ))→ Ω is the evaluation map and
[{s∣A(s) ∈∆}] ∶ P (R) → P (Σ) (11.3.3)
⌜
T
⌝ ∶ P (P (Σ)) idÐ→ P (P (Σ)) (11.3.4)
Given the above, the truth value of the proposition A ∈∆ is represented as
v(A ∈∆;T) ∶ [{s∣A(s) ∈∆} ∈ T]τM ○ ⟨
⌜∆⌝,⌜ T⌝⟩ (11.3.5)
where ⟨⌜∆⌝,⌜ T⌝⟩ ∶ 1→ P (R) × P (P (Σ))
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where δo(δo(αˆ)V ′ )V ′′ ≥ δo(αˆ)V ′ . In particular, applying the definition of daseinisation recursively it
follows trivially that δo(δo(αˆ)V ′ )V ′′ = δo(αˆ)V ′
∣V
′′
= δo(αˆ)V ′ .
From the above definition it follows that for each projection operator Pˆ , the assignment V → δo(Pˆ)V
defines a global element of O. We thus arrive at an alternative, but ultimately equivalent definition of
the daseinisation map
δ ∶ P (H) → Γ(O) (11.3.13)
Pˆ ↦ {δo(Pˆ )V SV ∈ V(H)} (11.3.14)
11.3.0.1 Property of the daseinisation map
We will now state some properties of the daseinisation map as defined above
1. For all V ∈ V(H) we obtain δo(0ˆ)V = 0ˆ. Thus the null projection operator represents the
proposition of the form A ∈ ∆ such that sp(Aˆ) ∩∆ = ∅ (false proposition).
2. For all V ∈ V(H) we obtain δo(1ˆ)V = 1ˆ. Thus the unit projection operator represents the
proposition of the form A ∈ ∆ such that sp(Aˆ) ∩∆ = sp(Aˆ) (true proposition).
3. The map δ is not surjective but it is injective.
Proof. Given two global elements which we denote δ(Pˆ ) and δ(Qˆ) such that δ(Pˆ) = δ(Qˆ), we
want to show that Pˆ = Qˆ. Now is is easy to see that Pˆ = ⋀V ∈V(H) δo(Pˆ)V since there will exist a
context V such that Pˆ ∈ V . It follows that
Pˆ = ⋀
V ∈V(H)
δo(Pˆ )V = ⋀
V ∈V(H)
δo(Qˆ)V = Qˆ (11.3.15)
11.3.0.2 Properties of the Outer-Daseinisation Presheaf
In order to show that O ⊆ Pcl(Σ) we need to show that there exists a monic arrow i ∶ O → Pcl(Σ). To
this end recall from previous lectures (exponential) that there exists, in any topos τ , a bijection
Homτ(A,CB)→Homτ(A ×B,C) (11.3.16)
We would like to utilise this bijection to define the map i, to do so we need to utilise another result
of topos theory which states that sub-objects of a given object are in bijective correspondence with
maps from the object in question to the sub-object classifier3. Thus for the case at hand P (Σ) ≃ ΩΣ.
Substituting this in equation 11.3.16 we get
HomSetsV(H)op (O, P (Σ)) →HomSetsV(H)op (O ×Σ,Ω) (11.3.17)
Consider a map j ∈HomSetsV(H)op (O ×Σ,Ω) which, for each V ∈ V(H) we define as follows
jV ∶ (O ×Σ)V → ΩV (11.3.18)
(αˆ, λ) ↦ jV (αˆ, λ) ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V SΣ(iV ′V )λ ∈ SO(i
V
′
V
)αˆ} (11.3.19)
where αˆ ∈ P (V ), O(iV ′V )αˆ = δo(αˆ)V ′ and SO(i
V
′
V
)αˆ ∶= {λ ∈ ΣV ′ S⟨λ, δo(αˆ)V ′ ⟩ = 1}
However we know that
SΣ(i
V
′
V
)αˆ = Σ(iV ′V )Sαˆ (11.3.20)
3This was shown when we defined the subobject classifier.
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for all V
′ ⊆ V and αˆ ∈ OV . Therefore we can write jV (αˆ, λ) as follows
jV (αˆ, λ) ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V SΣ(iV ′V )λ ∈ Σ(iV ′V )Sαˆ} (11.3.21)
for all (αˆ, λ) ∈ O(V ) ×ΣV . As defined above jV (αˆ, λ) is a sieve in ΩV .
Proof. We want to show that
jV (αˆ, λ) ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V SΣ(iV ′V )λ ∈ Σ(iV ′V )Sαˆ} (11.3.22)
is a sieve.
To this end we need to show that if V
′ ∈ jV (αˆ, λ) then for all V ′′ ⊆ V ′ V ′′ ∈ jV (αˆ, λ). So let
us assume that V
′ ∈ jV (αˆ, λ) then it follows that λ∣V ′ ∈ Sδo(αˆ)V ′ . Therefore λ∣V ′ (δo(αˆ)V ′ ) = 1 Now
let us consider any V
′′ ⊆ V ′ . It follows that Σ(iV ′′V ′ )λ∣V ′ ∈ ΣV ′′ and Σ(iV ′′V ′ )Sδo(αˆ)
V
′ = Sδo(αˆ)
V
′′ .
Now since δo(αˆ)V ′′ ≥ δo(αˆ)V ′ then λ∣V ′ (δo(αˆ)V ′′ ) = 1 in particular (λ∣V ′ )∣V ′′ (δo(αˆ)V ′′ ) = 1. Therefore
Σ(iV ′′V ′ )λ∣V ′ ∈ Σ(iV ′′V ′ )Sδo(αˆ)V ′ = Sδo(αˆ)V ′′ , i.e. V ′′ ∈ jV (αˆ, λ).
We now need to show that the collection of maps jV ∶ (O×Σ)V → ΩV for each V ∈ V(H) as defined
above, combine together to form a natural transformation j ∶ O ×Σ→ Ω.
Proof. We want to show that j ∶ O ×Σ→ Ω is indeed a natural transformation. Thus we need to show
that for all pairs V
′ ⊆ V the following diagram commutes
OV ×ΣV
jV //
f(i
V
′
V
)

ΩV
Ω(i
V
′
V
)

uoV ′ ×ΣV ′
j
V
′
// ΩV ′
If we chaise the diagram around we obtain
Ω(iV ′V ) ○ jV (αˆ, λ) = (jV (αˆ, λ))∣V ′ = jV (αˆ, λ)∩ ↓ V ′ (11.3.23)
= {V ′′ ⊆ V ′ SV ′′ ∈ jV (αˆ, λ)} (11.3.24)
= {V ′′ ⊆ V ′ SΣ(iV ′′V )λ ∈ Σ(iV ′V )(Sαˆ)} (11.3.25)
In order to define the left path of the diagram we need to define what the maps f(iV ′V ) are.
f(iV ′V ) ∶ (OV ×ΣV ) → (OV ′ ×ΣV ′ ) (11.3.26)(αˆ, λ) ↦ f(iV ′V )(αˆ, λ) ∶= (O(iV ′V )αˆ,Σ(iV ”V )λ) (11.3.27)
Therefore going around the diagram we obtain
jV ′ ○ f(iV ′V )(αˆ), λ) = jV ′ (O(iV ′V )αˆ,Σ(iV ”V )λ) (11.3.28)
= jV ′ (δo(αˆ)V ′ , λ∣V ′ ) (11.3.29)
= {V ′′ ⊆ V ′ SΣ(iV ′′V ′ )(λ∣V ′ ) ∈ Σ(iV ′′V ′ )Sδo(αˆ)
V
′ } (11.3.30)
Now since
Σ(iV ′′V )α = λV ′′ = Σ(iV ′′V ′ )(λ∣V ′ ) (11.3.31)
Σ(iV ′V )(Sαˆ) = Sδo(αˆ)V ′′ = Σ(iV ′′V ′ )Sδo(αˆ)V ′ (11.3.32)
It follows that the above diagram commutes.
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Because of the equivalence in equation 11.3.17 to the map j there corresponds a map i ∶ O → P (Σ).
However we are interested in i ∶ O → Pcl(Σ), but this restriction poses no problems.
Proof. We are interested in restriction our attention only to clopen sub-objects of Σ, i.e. we want
i ∶ O → Pcl(Σ) rather than i ∶ O → P (Σ). Now let us consider O. For each context we have OV = P (V )
which is a lattice of operator with the usual lattice ordering. Now it is possible to put some topology
on this set. Whatever topology we choose the entire set OV will be both open and closed. Thus, for
each clopen sub-objects A ⊆ Σ we now form clopen sub-objects of O ×Σ as follows
O ×A ⊆ O ×Σ (11.3.33)
is a clopen sub-object iff for each V ∈ V(H), OV ×AV is a clopen subset of OV ×ΣV . We then have
that Subcl(O ×Σ) ⊆ Sub(O ×Σ).
However we know that
Sub(X) ≃Hom(X → Ω) (11.3.34)
Therefore
Subcl(O ×Σ) ⊆ Sub(O ×Σ) ≃Hom(O ×Σ,Ω) ≃Hom(O, P (Σ)) (11.3.35)
But
Subcl(O ×Σ) ≃Homcl(O ×Σ,Ω) ⊆Hom(O ×Σ,Ω) (11.3.36)
A moment of thought reveals that
Homcl(O ×Σ,Ω) ≃Hom(O, Pcl(Σ)) (11.3.37)
The map i ∶ O → Pcl(Σ) is the desired map, which is injective: for each V ∈ V(H), iV ∶ OV →
Pcl(Σ)V is injective.
Proof. To this end let us consider first the definition of Pcl(Σ). This is given as follows
Definition 11.3.2. The power object PΣ of of Σ is the presheaf given by
1. (i) On objects V ∈ V(H)
PΣV ∶= {νV ∶ Σ↓V → Ω↓V SηV is a natural transformation}
Here Σ↓V is the restriction of Σ to a smaller poset namely ↓ V ⊆ V(H).
2. On morphisms : for i ∶ V
′ ⊆ V the presheaf maps are
PΣ(iV ′V ) ∶ PΣV → PΣV ′ (11.3.38)
η ↦ η∣V ′ (11.3.39)
where here η∣V ′ ∶ Σ↓V ′ → Ω↓V ′
Form the isomorphism
Sub(X) ≃Hom(X,Ω)
It follows that
P (Σ)V ∶= Sub(Σ↓V )
If we then restrict to clopen sub-objects we get
Pcl(Σ)V ∶= Subcl(Σ↓V ) (11.3.40)
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Therefore, for each context V ∈ V(H) we have that
iV ∶ OV → Pcl(ΣV ) (11.3.41)
P (V ) → Subcl(Σ↓V ) (11.3.42)
Pˆ ↦ (S
Pˆ
)↓V (11.3.43)
Thus the map is clearly monic.
The above reasoning showed us that, since T∣ψ⟩ is a subobject of O and since O ⊆ Pcl(Σ) it follows
that T∣ψ⟩ ∈ P (Pcl(Σ)).
It is interesting to now compare the two definitions of daseinisation given so far in the lecture
course.
δ ∶ P (H) → Γ(O) (11.3.44)
P (H) → Subcl(Σ) (11.3.45)
These two definition, although seemingly different are exactly the same. In fact as we just showed,
O ⊆ Pcl(Σ), thus a global element γ of O will pick out, for each V ∈ V(H) an element γV ∈ OV ⊆ Pcl(Σ).
Clearly considering all the context together γ will give rise to a (clopen due to how O is defined) sub-
object of Σ, hence Γ(O) ∈ Pcl(Σ).
11.3.1 Example of Truth Object in Classical Physics
Let us consider a proposition (A ∈ ∆) meaning that the value of the quantity A lies in ∆. We want to
define the truth value of such a proposition with respect to a given state s ∈ X where X is the state
space. In classical theory, the truth value of the above proposition in the state s is given by
v(A ∈∆; s) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 iff s ∈ f−1A∈∆(∆)
0 otherwise
where f−1A∈∆(∆) ⊆X is the subset of the state space for which the proposition (A ∈∆) is true.
Another way of defining truth values is through the truth object Ts, which is state dependent. The
definition of the truth object is as follows:
for each state s, we define the set
T
s
∶= {S ⊆X Ss ∈ S}
Since (s ∈ f−1A∈∆(∆)) iff f−1A∈∆(∆) ∈ Ts, we can now write the truth value above in the following equivalent
way:
v(A ∈∆;T) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 iff f−1A∈∆(∆) ∈ Ts
0 otherwise
In classical physics propositions A ∈∆ are identified with subsets S ∶ {sSA(s) ∈∆} of the state space X ,
for which that proposition is true. Therefore, the truth value v(A ∈ ∆;Ts) is equivalent to the truth
value of the mathematical statement [{sSA(s) ∈ ∆} ∈ Ts]4.
4In terms of arrows in a topos we have that the truth value term ({s∣A(s) ∈ ∆} ∈ Ts) with free variables ∆ of type
P (R) and Ts of type P (P (Σ)), is defined by the function
v(A ∈∆;T) ∶= [{s∣A(s) ∈∆} ∈ Ts] ∶ P (R) × P (P (Σ))→ {0,1} (11.3.46)
such that
v(A ∈∆;Ts)(∆,T ) =
⎧⎪⎪
⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if {s ∈ Σ∣A(s) ∈∆} ∈ T
0 otherwise
(11.3.47)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if A−1(∆) ∈ T
0 otherwise
(11.3.48)
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11.3.2 Truth Object in Quantum Theory
We now want to define the state dependent truth object T∣ψ⟩ for quantum theory. We recall that the
topos we utilise to express quantum theory is SetsV(H)
op
, thus we need to define an object T∣ψ⟩ of
type P (P (Σ)). However, since propositions are represented by clopen subobjects we actually need to
restrict our attention to an element of type P (Pcl(Σ)). Thus T∣ψ⟩ has to be a subpresheaf of Pcl(Σ),
i.e. T∣ψ⟩ ⊆ Pcl(Σ). Given a state ψ, the precise way in which this presheaf is defined is as follows:
Definition 11.3.3. The presheaf T∣ψ⟩ has as:
i) Objects: For each context V we get the set
T
∣ψ⟩
V ∶= {αˆ ∈ OV SProb(αˆ, Sψ⟩) = 1} (11.3.49)
= {αˆ ∈ OV S⟨ψSαˆSψ⟩ = 1} (11.3.50)
ii) Morphisms: Given two contexts i ∶ V
′ ⊆ V the associated morphisms is
T
∣ψ⟩(iV ′ ,V ) ∶ T∣ψ⟩V → T∣ψ⟩V ′ (11.3.51)
αˆ ↦ δ(αˆ)V ′ (11.3.52)
What about the truth object as defined for a density matrix? In that case the definition if as
follows:
Definition 11.3.4. Given a density matrix ρ, the truth-object Tρ associated to it is defined on
1. Objects: for each V ∈ V(H) we obtain
T
ρ
V ∶= {αˆ ∈ OV SProb(αˆ, ρ) = 1} (11.3.53)
= {αˆ ∈ OV Str(ρˆαˆ) = 1} (11.3.54)
2. Morphisms: Given two contexts i ∶ V
′ ⊆ V the associated morphisms is
T
ρ(iV ′ ,V ) ∶ T∣ψ⟩V → TρV ′ (11.3.55)
αˆ ↦ δ(αˆ)V ′ (11.3.56)
11.3.3 Truth Values Using the Truth-Object
Given the above definition of truth object we can deduce that the truth value of a given proposition,
at a given context V ∈ V(H), can be defined as follows:
v(δ(Pˆ ) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)V ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V Sδ(Pˆ )
V
′ ∈ T∣ψ⟩V ′ } (11.3.57)
= {V ′ ⊆ V S⟨ψSδ(Pˆ )
V
′ Sψ⟩ = 1} (11.3.58)
and
v(δ(Pˆ ) ∈ Tρ)V ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V Sδ(Pˆ )
V
′ ∈ TρV ′ } (11.3.59)
= {V ′ ⊆ V Str(ρδ(Pˆ )
V
′ ) = 1} (11.3.60)
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11.3.4 Relation Between Pseudo-State Object and Truth Object
We are now interested in understanding the relation between the two distinct ways in which a pure
state is defined in the topos formulation of quantum theory. We expect that the two definitions turn
out to be equivalent. We will first analyse the relation in classical physics then turn our attention to
quantum theory.
Thus we are trying to understand in classical physics what is the relation between {s} and Ts.
Recall that Ts ∶ {X ⊆ SSs ∈X}. It then follows trivially that
{s} = ⋂{X ∈ SSs ∈ X} = ⋂{X ∈ Ts} (11.3.61)
Following the example of classical physics we will now try to define w ∣ψ⟩ in terms of T∣ψ⟩ and vice
versa.
To this end, consider the assignment
V ↦⋀{αˆ ∈ T∣ψ⟩V } = ⋀{αˆ ∈ OV SSψ⟩⟨ψS ≤ αˆ} (11.3.62)
where the last equality follows from the application of the definition of T
∣ψ⟩
V . But
w
∣ψ⟩
∶ V ↦ δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V = ⋀{αˆ ∈ OV SSψ⟩⟨ψS ≤ αˆ} (11.3.63)
such that w
∣ψ⟩
V
is the smallest projection operator in V such that w
∣ψ⟩
V
≥ Sψ⟩⟨ψS. Therefore
w
∣ψ⟩
V
= ⋀{αˆ ∈ T∣ψ⟩V } (11.3.64)
On the other hand, since
T
∣ψ⟩
V = {αˆ ∈ OV Sαˆ ≥ Sψ⟩⟨ψS} (11.3.65)
However, as said above, w
∣ψ⟩
V is the smallest projection operator in V such that w
∣ψ⟩
V ≥ Sψ⟩⟨ψS. Therefore
T
∣ψ⟩
V = {αˆ ∈ OV Sαˆ ≥ w ∣ψ⟩V } (11.3.66)
It follows that there is a one to one correspondence between w ∣ψ⟩ and T∣ψ⟩.
11.3.4.1 What About the Truth Values
Let us reiterate the relation between T∣ψ⟩ and w ∣ψ⟩
1. Since for each V ∈ V(H), w ∣ψ⟩V is the smallest projection operator in V such that w ∣ψ⟩V ≥ Sψ⟩⟨ψS.
Then if αˆ ∈ T∣ψ⟩V it follows that αˆ ≥ w ∣ψ⟩V .
2. If αˆ ≥ w ∣ψ⟩V , then from the definition of T∣ψ⟩ it follows that αˆ ∈ T∣ψ⟩V
The above relations imply the following
αˆ ∈ T∣ψ⟩V iff αˆ ≥ w ∣ψ⟩V (11.3.67)
which, when applied to a daseinised proposition becomes
δo(Pˆ )V ∈ T∣ψ⟩V iff δo(Pˆ )V ≥ w ∣ψ⟩V (11.3.68)
Alternatively we can express this relation in terms of subsets of the state space ΣV as follows:
Sδo(Pˆ )V ∈ T∣ψ⟩V iff Sδo(Pˆ)V ⊇ Sw ∣ψ⟩V (11.3.69)
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Therefore equation 11.3.57 can be written as
v(δ(Pˆ) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)V = {V ′ ⊆ V Sδo(Pˆ )V ≥ w ∣ψ⟩V } (11.3.70)
but this is precisely v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ))V , thus as presheaves
δ(Pˆ) ∈ T∣ψ⟩ is equivalent to w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ ) (11.3.71)
Therefore the truth values as computed with respect to the pseudo state or with respect to the truth
object are exactly the same:
v(w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ δ(Pˆ)) = v(δ(Pˆ ) ∈ T∣ψ⟩) (11.3.72)
11.3.5 Example
We will now construct the truth object for the 4 dimensional Hilbert space H(C4) as defined with
respect to the state Sψ⟩ = (1,0,0,0). In our analysis we will only consider the maximal algebra
V ∶= linC(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Pˆ3, Pˆ4) and all its subalgebras. We then have:
T
∣ψ⟩
V = {αˆ ∈ OV S⟨ψSαˆSψ⟩ = 1} (11.3.73)
= {Pˆ1, Pˆ1 + Pˆj∈{2,3,4}, Pˆ1 + Pˆl∈{2,3} + Pˆk∈{3,4}, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4} (11.3.74)
T
∣ψ⟩
VPˆ1
= {Pˆ1, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4} (11.3.75)
T
∣ψ⟩
VPˆ2
= {Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4} (11.3.76)
T
∣ψ⟩
VPˆ3
= {Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ4, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4} (11.3.77)
T
∣ψ⟩
VPˆ4
= {Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4} (11.3.78)
T
∣ψ⟩
VPˆ1,Pˆ2
= {Pˆ1, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2, Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4} (11.3.79)
T
∣ψ⟩
VPˆ1,Pˆ3
= {Pˆ1, Pˆ1 + Pˆ3, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ4, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4} (11.3.80)
T
∣ψ⟩
VPˆ1,Pˆ4
= {Pˆ1, Pˆ1 + Pˆ4, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4} (11.3.81)
T
∣ψ⟩
VPˆ2,Pˆ3
= {Pˆ1 + Pˆ4, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ4, Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4} (11.3.82)
T
∣ψ⟩
VPˆ2,Pˆ4
= {Pˆ1 + Pˆ3, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3, Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4} (11.3.83)
T
∣ψ⟩
VPˆ3,Pˆ4
= {Pˆ1 + Pˆ2, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ4, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4} (11.3.84)
(11.3.85)
The maps between the different truth objects are:
T
∣ψ⟩(iV,V1)(Pˆ1) = Pˆ1 (11.3.86)
T
∣ψ⟩(iV,V1)(Pˆ1 + Pˆj∈{2,3,4}) = Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4 (11.3.87)
T
∣ψ⟩(iV,V1)(Pˆ1 + Pˆl∈{2,3} + Pˆk∈{2,4}) = Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4 (11.3.88)
T
∣ψ⟩(iV,V1)(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) = Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4 (11.3.89)
The remaining maps are left as an exercise.
We can now define the truth values of the proposition Sz ∈ [−3,−1], which has corresponding projector
operator Pˆ ∶= Eˆ[Sz ∈ [−3,−1]] = Sφ⟩⟨φS. This proposition is equivalent to the projection operator Pˆ4.
We then obtain the following:
v(δ(Pˆ4) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)V ∶= {VPˆi∈{2,3} , VPˆ2Pˆ3} (11.3.90)
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v(δ(Pˆ4) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)VPˆi∈{2,3} ∶= {VPˆi} (11.3.91)
v(δ(Pˆ4) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)VPˆi∈{1,4} ∶= {∅} (11.3.92)
v(δ(Pˆ4) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)VPˆ1,Pˆ2 ∶= {VPˆ2} (11.3.93)
v(δ(Pˆ4) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)VPˆ1,Pˆ3 ∶= {VPˆ3} (11.3.94)
v(δ(Pˆ4) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)VPˆ1,Pˆ4 ∶= {∅} (11.3.95)
v(δ(Pˆ4) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)VPˆ2,Pˆ3 ∶= {VPˆ2 , VPˆ3 , VPˆ2,Pˆ3} (11.3.96)
v(δ(Pˆ4) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)VPˆ2,Pˆ4 ∶= {VPˆ2} (11.3.97)
v(δ(Pˆ4) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)VPˆ3,Pˆ4 ∶= {VPˆ3} (11.3.98)
(11.3.99)
11.3.6 Example for Density Matrix
Let us consider again a 4 dimensional Hilbert space C4 representing our 2-spin system. We would like
to consider a density matrix
ρ = ∑
i
piSψ⟩⟨ψS (11.3.100)
In particular we consider a situation in which 1~2 get Sz = 2 while 1~2 get Sz = −2, thus our density
matrix is
ρˆ = 1~2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
+ 1~2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
We now consider the context V = linC(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Pˆ3, Pˆ4) and compute
T
ρ)V = {αˆ ∈ OV Str(ρˆαˆ) = 1} (11.3.101)
By considering all possible operators in V we obtain
T
ρ)V = {(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2), (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ4), (Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4), (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4)} (11.3.102)
For context V
Pˆ1,Pˆ2
= linC(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) we obtain
T
ρ)VPˆ1,Pˆ2 = {(Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4), (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4)} (11.3.103)
For context V
Pˆ2,Pˆ3
= linC(Pˆ2, Pˆ3, Pˆ1 + Pˆ4) we obtain
T
ρ
VPˆ2,Pˆ3
= {(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2), (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ4), (Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4), (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4)} (11.3.104)
For context V
Pˆ3,Pˆ4
= linC(Pˆ3, Pˆ4, Pˆ1 + Pˆ2) we obtain
T
ρ
VPˆ3,Pˆ4
= {(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ4), (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4)} (11.3.105)
For context V
Pˆ1
= linC(Pˆ1, Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) we obtain
T
ρ
VPˆ1
= {(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4)} (11.3.106)
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For context V
Pˆ2
= linC(Pˆ2, Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) we obtain
T
ρ
VPˆ2
= {((Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4), (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4)} (11.3.107)
Morphisms:
T
ρ
V → T
ρ
VPˆ1,Pˆ2
(11.3.108)
(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2) ↦ (Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) (11.3.109)
(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ4) ↦ (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) (11.3.110)
(Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) ↦ (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) (11.3.111)
(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) ↦ (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) (11.3.112)
T
ρ
V
→ Tρ
VPˆ3,Pˆ4
(11.3.113)
(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2) ↦ (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ4) (11.3.114)
(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ4) ↦ (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ4) (11.3.115)
(Pˆ1 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) ↦ (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) (11.3.116)
(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) ↦ (Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4) (11.3.117)
Let us now consider the proposition Sz ∈ [1.3,2.3] represented by the projection operator Pˆ1 we now
want to compute
v(δ(Pˆ ) ∈ Tρ)V ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V Sδ(Pˆ )
V
′ ∈ TρV ′ } (11.3.118)
= {V ′ ⊆ V Str(ρδ(Pˆ )
V
′ ) = 1} (11.3.119)
We consider context V , here the daseinised proposition is simply itself: δo(Pˆ1) = Pˆ1 but Pˆ1 ∉ TρV (
tr(ρˆPˆ1) ≠ 1) thus we need to go to a smaller algebra, i.e. we need to generalise our proposition.
Lets consider V
Pˆ3,Pˆ4
in this context we get δo(Pˆ1) = Pˆ1+Pˆ2 but again Pˆ1+Pˆ2 ∉ TρVPˆ3,Pˆ4 (tr(ρˆ(Pˆ1+Pˆ2) ≠
1).
On the other hand for V
Pˆ2,Pˆ3
we obtain δo(Pˆ1) = Pˆ1+Pˆ4. In this case Pˆ1+Pˆ4 ∈ TρVPˆ2,Pˆ3 (tr(ρˆ(Pˆ1+Pˆ4) =
1).
In fact we get
v(δ(Pˆ ) ∈ Tρ)V = {VPˆ2,Pˆ3 , VPˆ2 , VPˆ3} (11.3.120)
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Chapter 12
Lecture 13
I thins lecture I will describe the topos analogue of the real numbers. I will then introduce a new
presheaf called inner presheaf which is related to the process of inner daseinisation. Such presheaves
will be used to define physical quantities in topos quantum theory
12.1 Topos Representation of the Type Symbol R
In the topos SetsV(H) the representation of the quantity value object R is given by the following
presheaf:
Definition 12.1.1. The presheaf R↔ has as
i) Objects1:
R↔V ∶= {(µ, ν)Sµ, ν ∶↓ V → RSµ is order preserving , ν is order reversing ;µ ≤ ν} (12.1.1)
ii) Arrows: given two contexts V
′ ⊆ V the corresponding morphism is
R↔V,V ′ ∶ R
↔
V → R
↔
V
′ (12.1.2)
(µ, ν) ↦ (µ∣V ′ , ν∣V ′ ) (12.1.3)
This presheaf is where physical quantities take their values, thus it has the same role as the reals
in classical physics.
The reason why the quantity value object is defined in terms of order reversing and order preserving
functions is because, in general, in quantum theory one can only give approximate values to the quan-
tities. In particular, in most cases, the best approximation to the value of a physical quantity one can
give is the smallest interval of possible values of that quantity.
Let us analyse the presheaf R↔ in more depth. To this end we assume that we want to define the value
of a physical quantity A given a state ψ. If ψ is an eigenstate of A, then we would get a sharp value
of the quantity A say a. If ψ is not an eigenstate, then we would get a certain range ∆ of values for
A, where ∆ ∈ sp(Aˆ).
Let us assume that ∆ = [a, b], then what the presheaf R↔ does is to single out this extreme points a
and b, so as to give a range (unsharp) of values for the physical quantity A. Obviously, since we are in
the topos of presheaves, we have to define each object contextually, i.e. for each context V ∈ V(H). It
is precisely to accommodate this fact that the pair of order reversing and order preserving functions
1A map µ ∶↓ V → R is said to be order reversing if V
′
⊆ V implies that µ(V
′
) ≤ µ(V ). A map ν ∶↓ V → R is order
reversing if V
′
⊆ V implies that ν(V
′
) ⊇ ν(V ).
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was chosen to define the extreme values of our intervals.
To understand this we consider a context V , such that the self-adjoint operator Aˆ, which represents
the physical quantity A, does belong to V and such that the range of values of A at V is [a, b]. If we
then consider the context V
′ ⊆ V , such that Aˆ ∉ V , we will have to approximate Aˆ so as to fit V ′ . The
precise way in which self-adjoint operators are approximated will be described later on, however, such
an approximation will inevitably coarse-grain Aˆ, i.e. it will make it more general.
It follows that the range of possible values of such an approximated operator Aˆ1 will be bigger. There-
fore the range of values of Aˆ1 at V
′
will be, [c, d] ⊇ [a, b] where c ≤ a and d ≥ b. These relations
between the extremal points can be achieved by the presheaf R↔ through the order reversing and
order preserving functions. Specifically, given that a ∶= µ(V ), b ∶= ν(V ) since V ′ ⊆ V , it follows that
c ∶= µ(V ′) ≤ µ(V ) (µ being order preserving) and d ∶= ν(V ′) ≥ ν(V ) (ν being order reversing). More-
over, the fact that, by definition, µ(V ) ≤ ν(V ), it implies that as one goes to smaller and smaller
contexts the intervals (µ(V )i, ν(V )i) keep getting bigger or stay the same.
12.2 Inner Daseinisation
We will now introduce a different kind of daseinisation called inner daseinisation. The role of such
daseininsation is to approximate projection operators but from below. In fact while outer daseinisa-
tion would pick the smallest projection operator implied by the original projection operators (hence
approximation from above), inner daseinisation picks the biggest projection operators which implies
the original one (hence approximation form below). So how is such daseinisation defined?
Definition 12.2.1. Given a projection operator Pˆ , for each context V ∈ V(H), inner daseinisation is
defined as:
δi(Pˆ )V = ⋁{αˆ ∈ P (V )Sαˆ ≤ Pˆ} (12.2.1)
It follows that δi(Pˆ)V is the best approximation in V of Pˆ obtained by taking the ‘largest’ projection
operator in V which implies Pˆ . From the definition, given V
′ ⊆ V then
δi(δi(PˆV ))V ′ = δi(Pˆ )V ′ ≤ δi(Pˆ )V (12.2.2)
This implies that
δi(Pˆ )V ≤ δo(Pˆ)V (12.2.3)
Given this definition we can construct the analogue of the inner presheaf which is the analogue of
the outer presheaf as follows
Definition 12.2.2. The inner presheaf I is defined over the category V(H) as follows:
1. Objects: for each V ∈ V(H) we obtain IV ∶= P (V ).
2. Morphisms: for each iV ′V ∶ V
′ ⊆ V the corresponding presheaf map is
I(iV ′V ) ∶ IV → IV ′ (12.2.4)
αˆ ↦ I(iV ′V )(αˆ) ∶= δi(αˆ)V ′ (12.2.5)
for all αˆ ∈ P (V ).
Similarly as was the case for the outer presheaf, the assignment
Pˆ ↦ {δi(Pˆ )V SV ∈ V(H)} (12.2.6)
defines a global element of I. Thus we can write inner daseinisation as
δi ∶ P (H) → Γ(I) (12.2.7)
Pˆ ↦ {δi(Pˆ)V SV ∈ V(H)} (12.2.8)
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Equivalently we can define inner daseinisation as a mapping from projection operators to sub-objects
of the spectral presheaf
δi ∶ P (H) → Subcl(Σ) (12.2.9)
Pˆ ↦ {T δi(Pˆ )V SV ∈ V(H)} (12.2.10)
Where, for each V ∈ V(H), T δi(Pˆ )V ∶= {λ ∈ ΣV Sλ(δi(Pˆ)V ) = 1}. The collection of all these clopen
subsets forms a clopen sub-objects δi(Pˆ ) ⊆ Σ
It is interesting to see how the inner daseinisation helps in the definition of the negation operation.
In particular we would like to understand the presheaf
δ(¬Pˆ ) where ¬Pˆ = 1ˆ − Pˆ in the lattice P (H) (12.2.11)
In order to define δ(¬Pˆ) one makes use of both inner and outer daseinisation obtaining for each
context V ∈ V(H)
O(iV ′V )(¬Pˆ ) = ¬I(iV ′V )(αˆ) (12.2.12)
Proof. We want to show that
O(iV ′V )(¬Pˆ) = ¬I(iV ′V )(Pˆ) (12.2.13)
where Pˆ ∈ V .
Applying the definition to the left hand side we obtain
O(iV ′V )(¬Pˆ) = δo(¬Pˆ )′V = δo(1ˆ − Pˆ )′V = ⋀{βˆ ∈ P (V ′)Sβˆ ≥ 1ˆ − Pˆ} (12.2.14)
Let us assume that the right hand side of the above equation is the projection operator βˆ. Then such
projection operators is the smallest projection operator in V
′
which is bigger than Pˆ , i.e. βˆ ≥ Pˆ .
Therefore 1ˆ − βˆ = βˆc is the biggest projection operator in P (V ′) such that 1ˆ − βˆ = βˆc ≤ Pˆ . Thus
βˆc = δi(Pˆ )V ′ .
If we now consider the right hand side of 12.2.13 we obtain
¬I(iV ′V )(Pˆ) = 1ˆ − δi(Pˆ )V ′ = 1ˆ − βˆc = 1ˆ − 1ˆ + βˆ = βˆ (12.2.15)
Hence 12.2.13 is proved.
It follows that for each Pˆ ∈ P (H) and each context V ∈ V(H) we obtain
δo(¬Pˆ)V = 1ˆ − δi(Pˆ )V (12.2.16)
12.3 Topos Representation of Physical Quantities
We will now define the topos analogue of a physical quantity. Since we are trying to render quantum
theory more realist we will mimic, in the context of the topos SetsV(H)
op
, the way in which physical
quantities are defined in classical theory. To this end we recall that in classical theory, physical
quantities are represented by functions from the state space to the reals, i.e. each physical quantity,
A, is represented by a map fA ∶ S → R. Similarly we want to define, in topos quantum theory, physical
quantities as a functor A ∶ Σ → R↔. Before attempting such a definition we have to do a small digression
in measure theory.
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12.3.1 Spectral Decomposition
In quantum theory, observables, i.e. things that we measure, are identified with self adjoint operators.
Thus, the study of their eigenvalues and how these eigenvalues are measured is very important. Here
is where the spectral theorem and consequently the spectral decomposition come into the picture.
Given a self adjoint operator Aˆ, the spectral theorem essentially tells us that it is possible to write
Aˆ as
Aˆ = ∫
σ(A)
λdEˆAˆλ (12.3.1)
Such an expression is called the spectral decomposition of Aˆ. Here σ(A) ⊆ R represents the spectrum
of the operator Aˆ and {EˆAˆλ Sλ ∈ σ(Aˆ)} is the spectral family of Aˆ. Such family determines the set of
spectral projection operators of Aˆ, namely Eˆ[A ∈∆] as follows
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ∶= ∫
∆
dEˆAˆλ (12.3.2)
where ∆ is a Borel subset of the spectrum σ(Aˆ) of A. What such projection operators represent are
subspaces of the Hilbert space for which the states Sψ⟩ have a value of A which lies in the interval ∆.
Therefore, if a is a value in the discrete spectrum of Aˆ, then
Eˆ[A ∈ {a}] (12.3.3)
projects onto the eignestates of Aˆ with eignevalue a.
In this setting, given a bounded Borel function f ∶ R → R, then the ‘transformed’ operator f(Aˆ)
has spectral decomposition given by
f(Aˆ) = ∫
σ(A)
f(λ)dEˆAˆλ (12.3.4)
The formal theorem for the spectral decomposition for bounded operators is as follows
Theorem 12.3.1. Given a bounded self adjoint operator Aˆ on H there exists a family of projection
operators {EˆλSλ ∈ R} called the spectral family of A such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Eˆλ ≤ Eˆλ′ for λ ≤ λ
′
2. The net λ → Eˆλ of projection operators in the lattice P (H) is bounded above by 1ˆ, and below by
0ˆ, i.e.
lim
λ→∞
Eˆλ = 1ˆ (12.3.5)
lim
λ→−∞
Eˆλ = 0ˆ (12.3.6)
3. Eˆλ+0 = Eˆλ
4. Aˆ = ∫σ(A)⊆R λdEˆAˆλ
5. The map λ→ Eˆλ is right-continuous
2:
⋀
ǫ↓0
Eˆλ+ǫ = Eˆλ (12.3.7)
for all λ ∈ R.
2Could equivalently require left continuity.
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Given the spectral decomposition it is possible to define a different type of ordering3 on operators
called spectral ordering The reason why this order was chosen rather than the standard operator
ordering is because the former preserves the relation between the spectrums of the operator, i.e. if
Aˆ ≤s Bˆ, then sp(Aˆ) ⊆ sp(Bˆ). This feature will reveal itself very important when defining the values
for physical quantitates.
We will now define what the spectral order is. Consider two self adjoint operators Aˆ and Bˆ with
spectral families (EˆAˆr )r∈R and (EˆBˆr )r∈R, respectively. The spectral order is then defined as follows:
Aˆ ≤s Bˆ iff ∀r ∈ R EˆAˆr ≥ EˆBˆr (12.3.8)
From the definition it follows that the spectral order implies the usual order between operators, i.e. if
Aˆ ≤s Bˆ then Aˆ ≤ Bˆ, but the converse is not true.Thus the spectral order is a partial order on B(H)sa
(the self-adjoint operators in B(H)) that is coarser than the usual one.
It is easy to see that the spectral ordering defines a genuine partial ordering on B(H)sa. In fact, each
bounded set S of self-adjoint operators has a minimum ⋀S ∈ B(H)sa and a maximum ⋁S ∈ B(H)sa
with respect to the spectral order, i.e. B(H)sa is a boundedly complete lattice with respect to the
spectral order.
If we defined the spectral oder for projection operators then we would obtain exactly the usual par-
tial ordering. In fact if we consider two projection operators Pˆ and Qˆ then their spectral decomposition
is
EˆPˆλ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < 0
1ˆ − Pˆ if 0 ≤ λ < 1
Pˆ if 1 ≤ λ
(12.3.9)
It follows that
Pˆ ≤s Qˆ iff Pˆ ≤ Qˆ (12.3.10)
Thus the spectral order coincides with the usual partial order on P (H).
Moreover, if Aˆ and Bˆ are self-adjoint operators such that (i) either Aˆ or Bˆ is a projection, or (ii)[Aˆ, Bˆ] = 0, then Aˆ ≤s Bˆ iff Aˆ ≤ Bˆ.
12.3.2 Daseinisation of Self Adjoint Operators
Given the discussion above regarding the spectral order we are now ready to define the concept of
both inner and outer daseinisation of self adjoint operators. To this end let us consider a self adjoint
operator Aˆ and a context V , such that Aˆ ∉ Vsa (Vsa denotes the collection of self adjoint operators in
V ). We then need to approximate Aˆ, so as to be in V . However, since we eventually want to define
an interval of possible values of Aˆ at V , we will approximate Aˆ both from above and from below. In
particular, we will consider the pair of operators
δo(Aˆ)V ∶= ⋀{Bˆ ∈ VsaSAˆ ≤s Bˆ} (12.3.11)
δi(Aˆ)V ∶= ⋁{Bˆ ∈ VsaSAˆ ≥s Bˆ}
In the above equation δo(Aˆ)V represents the smallest self adjoint operator in V , which is spectrally
larger or equal to Aˆ, while δi(Aˆ)V represents the biggest self adjoint operator in Vsa, that is spectrally
smaller or equal to Aˆ. The process represented by δi is what we defined as inner dasainisation, while
δo represents the outer daseinisation.
From the definition of δi(Aˆ)V it follows that if V ′ ⊆ V then δi(Aˆ)V ′ ≤s δi(Aˆ)V . Moreover, from 12.3.11
it follows that:
sp(Aˆ) ⊆ sp(δi(Aˆ)V ), sp(δo(Aˆ)V ) ⊆ sp(Aˆ) (12.3.12)
3Recall that the standard operator ordering is given as follows: Aˆ ≤ Bˆ iff ⟨ψ∣Aˆ∣ψ⟩ ≤ ⟨ψ∣Bˆ∣ψ⟩ for all ⟨ψ∣− ∣ψ⟩ ∶ Nsa → C,
where Nsa represents the collection of self adjoint operators on the Hilbert space H.
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which, as mentioned above, is precisely the reason why the spectral order was chosen.
GIven the spectral decomposition of Aˆ: Aˆ = ∫R λd(EˆAˆλ , if we apply the definition of spectral order to
inner and outer daseinisation we obtain:
δi(Aˆ)V ≤s δo(Aˆ)V iff ∀r ∈ R Eˆδi(Aˆ)Vr ≥ Eˆδo(Aˆ)Vr (12.3.13)
Since δi(Aˆ)V ≤ δo(Aˆ)V , it follows that for all r ∈ R
Eˆδ
i(Aˆ)V
r ∶= δo(EˆAˆr )V (12.3.14)
Eˆδ
o(Aˆ)V
r ∶= δi(EˆAˆr )V (12.3.15)
The spectral family described by the second equation is right-continuous, while the first is not. To
overcome this problem we define the following:
Eˆδ
i(Aˆ)V
r ∶= ⋀
s>r
δo(EˆAˆs )V (12.3.16)
What this amounts to is that given a spectral family λ → Eˆλ then it is possible to construct, for
each V ∈ V(H) other two spectral families
λ → ⋀
s>r
δo(EˆAˆs ) (12.3.17)
λ → δi(Eˆλ) (12.3.18)
(12.3.19)
These will be precisely the spectral families we will utilise to define the inner and outer daseinin-
sation of self-adjoint operators. In particular, we can now write inner and outer diaseinisation for self
adjoint operators as follows:
δo(Aˆ)V ∶= ∫
R
λdδi(EˆAˆλ ) (12.3.20)
δi(Aˆ)V ∶= ∫
R
λd ⋀
µ>λ
δo(EˆAˆµ ) (12.3.21)
Note that in these contexts the above integrals should be interpreted as Riemann Stieltjes integrals,
which explains the condition of right-continuity:
Aˆ = ∫
R
λdPˆλ means ⟨ψSAˆSψ⟩ = ∫
R
λ⟨ψSdPˆλ Sψ⟩ (12.3.22)
We can now define the analogues of the inner and outer presheaves but for self adjoint operators
rather than projection operators.
Definition 12.3.1. The outer de Groote presheaf O ∶ V(H)→ Sets is defined on:
1. Objects: for each V ∈ V(H) we define O
V
∶= Vsa (the collection of self adjoin operators in V ).
2. Morphisms: given a map i ∶ V
′ ⊆ V the corresponding prehseaf map is O(iV ′V ) ∶ OV → OV ′ which
is defined as follows
O(iV ′V )(Aˆ) ∶= δo(Aˆ)V ′ (12.3.23)
= ∫
R
λdδi(EˆAˆλ )V ′  (12.3.24)
= ∫
R
λdI(iV ′V )(EˆAˆλ ) (12.3.25)
for all Aˆ ∈ O
V
.
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In the above definition, I is the inner presheaf for projeciton operators defined in previous sections.
On the other hand the inner de Groote presheaf is:
Definition 12.3.2. The inner de Groote presheaf I ∶ V(H)→ Sets is defined as follows:
1. Objects: for each V ∈ V(H) we obtain IV ∶= Vsa.
2. Morphisms: given a map i ∶ V
′ ⊆ V then the corresponding presheaf map is I(iV ′V ) ∶ IV → IV ′
such that
I(iV ′V )(Aˆ) ∶= δi(Aˆ)V ′ (12.3.26)
= ∫
R
λd ⋀
µ>λ
(δo(EˆAˆµ )V ′ ) (12.3.27)
= ∫
R
λd ⋀
µ>λ
(O(iV ′V )(EˆAˆµ ) (12.3.28)
For all Aˆ ∈ IV (here O is the outer presheaf for projection operators).
As can be expected, the inner and outer daseinisation map give rise to global elements of the inner
and outer de Groote presheaves:
δo(Aˆ) ∶ V ↦ δo(Aˆ)V (12.3.29)
δi(Aˆ) ∶ V ↦ δi(Aˆ)V (12.3.30)
We then reach the following theorem
Theorem 12.3.2. The maps
δi ∶ B(H)sa → ΓI (12.3.31)
Aˆ ↦ δi(Aˆ) (12.3.32)
and
δo ∶ B(H)sa → ΓO (12.3.33)
Aˆ ↦ δo(Aˆ) (12.3.34)
are injective.
Proof. Given the definition of inner daseinisation we know that Aˆ ≥s δi(Aˆ)V for each V ∈ V(H).
Therefore, since there exists a V such that Aˆ ∈ Vsa it follows that
Aˆ = ⋁
V ∈V(H)
δi(Aˆ)V (12.3.35)
therefore, if δi(Aˆ) = δi(Bˆ) it follows that
Aˆ = ⋁
V ∈V(H)
δi(Aˆ)V = ⋁
V ∈V(H)
δi(Bˆ)V = Bˆ (12.3.36)
Similarly for outer daseinisation, if δo(Aˆ) = δo(Bˆ) then
Aˆ = ⋀
V ∈V(H)
δi(Aˆ)V = Bˆ = ⋀
V ∈V(H)
δo(Bˆ)V (12.3.37)
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12.3.3 Physical Quantities
Given the definition of inner and outer daseinisation outlined in the previous section we can now define
how physical quantities are represented in the topos framework of quantum theory.
A physical quantity A with associated self adjoint operator Aˆ is represented by the map
δ˘(Aˆ) ∶ Σ → R↔ (12.3.38)
which, at each context V , is defined as
δ˘(Aˆ)V ∶ ΣV → R↔V (12.3.39)
λ ↦ δ˘(Aˆ)V (λ) ∶= δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ) (12.3.40)
Where δ˘o(Aˆ)V is the order reversing function is defined by:
δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ) ∶↓ V → sp(Aˆ) (12.3.41)
such that
δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ)(V ′) ∶= δo(Aˆ)V ′ (Σ(iV ′V )(λ)) (12.3.42)
= δo(Aˆ)V ′ (λ∣V ′ ) (12.3.43)
= ⟨λ∣V ′ , δo(Aˆ)V ′ ⟩ (12.3.44)
= ⟨λ, δo(Aˆ)V ′ ⟩ (12.3.45)
= λ(δo(Aˆ)V ′ ) (12.3.46)
Here we have used the Gel’fand transform δo(Aˆ)V ∶ ΣV → R.
The choice of order reversing functions was determined by the fact that, for all V
′ ⊆ V since
δo(Aˆ)V ′ ≥ δo(Aˆ)V then
δo(Aˆ)V ′ (λ∣V ′ ) = δo(Aˆ)V ′ (Σ(iV ′V )(λ)) ≥ δo(Aˆ)V (λ) (12.3.47)
On the other hand, the order preserving function is defined by:
δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ) ∶↓ V → sp(Aˆ) (12.3.48)
such that
δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ)(V ′) ∶= δi(Aˆ)V ′ (Σ(iV ′V )(λ)) (12.3.49)
= δi(Aˆ)V ′ (λ∣V ′ ) (12.3.50)
= ⟨λ∣V ′ , δi(Aˆ)V ′ ⟩ (12.3.51)
= ⟨λ, δi(Aˆ)V ′ ⟩ (12.3.52)
= = λ(δi(Aˆ)V ′ ) (12.3.53)
In this case the appropriate Gel’fand transform to use is δi(Aˆ)V ′ ∶ ΣV → R. Here the choice of such an
order preserving function is because, for i ∶ V
′ ⊆ V , since δi(Aˆ)V ′ ≤ δi(Aˆ)V then
δi(Aˆ)V ′ (λ∣V ′ ) = δo(Aˆ)V ′ (Σ(iV ′V )(λ)) ≤ δi(Aˆ)V (λ) (12.3.54)
The definition of δ˘(Aˆ) ∶ ΣV → R represents the mathematical implementation of the idea explained
in the first section. There we saw that when going to smaller contexts the coarse graining of the self
adjoint operators implied/induced an equivalent coarse graining in the interval of possible values for
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that operator. Therefore such an interval either becomes bigger or stays the same. This enlarging
of the interval is precisely what is achieved by δ˘(Aˆ). In fact as we go to smaller context V ′ ⊆ V the
interval of possible values of the operator Aˆ which gets picked by δ˘(Aˆ) becomes bigger or stays the
same: [(δi(Aˆ)V ′ (λ), δo(Aˆ)V ′ (λ)] ≥ [(δi(Aˆ)V (λ), δo(Aˆ)V (λ)] (12.3.55)
We now need to show that indeed the map δ˘(Aˆ) ∶ Σ→ R↔ is a well defined natural transformation.
Therefore, given any V
′ ⊆ V we need to show that the following diagram commutes
ΣV
δ˘(Aˆ)V //
Σ(i
V
′
V
)

R↔V
R↔(i
V
′
V
)

ΣV ′
δ˘(Aˆ)
V
′
// R↔V ′
Going one way round the diagram we obtain
R↔(iV ′V )δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ) = δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ)V ′ (12.3.56)
= (δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ))∣V ′ , (δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ))∣V ′  (12.3.57)
= δ˘i(Aˆ)V ′ (λ∣V ′ ), δ˘o(Aˆ)V ′ (λ∣V ′ ) (12.3.58)
On the other hand
δ˘i(Aˆ)V (⋅), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (⋅)Σ(iV ′V )(λ) = δ˘i(Aˆ)V (⋅), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (⋅)(λ∣V ′ ) (12.3.59)
= δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ∣V ′ ), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ∣V ′ ) (12.3.60)
= δ˘i(Aˆ)V ′ (λ∣V ′ ), δ˘o(Aˆ)V ′ (λ∣V ′ ) (12.3.61)
Thus δ˘(Aˆ) is a well defined natural transformation.
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Chapter 13
Lecture 14
In this Lecture we will start by giving a simple example of spectral order and outer daseinisation of
self adjoint operators. We will then analyse the physical interpretation of the map δ˘(Aˆ) ∶ Σ → R↔
representing physical quantities and show how it can indeed be ‘used’ to compute the value of a given
physical quantity given a state.
13.1 Example of Spectral Decomposition
Let us consider again the 4 dimensional Hilbert space C4. We would like to define the spectral decom-
position of the self-adjoint operator
Sˆz =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
For such an operator the spectral family is
EˆSˆz
λ
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
Pˆ4 if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Pˆ4 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ2 if 0 ≤ λ < 2
Pˆ4 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ1 if 2 ≤ λ
(13.1.1)
If we now considered the coarsed grained Sˆ2z whose matrix representation would be
Sˆ2z =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
4 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 4
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
with corresponding spectral decomposition
Eˆ
Sˆ
2
z
λ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < 0
Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 if 0 ≤ λ < 4
Pˆ4 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ1 if 4 ≤ λ
(13.1.2)
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If we then utilised the spectral ordering to define which one is ‘bigger’ we would obtain the following
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Eˆ
Sˆ2z
λ
= EˆSˆz
λ
= 0ˆ for λ < −2
Eˆ
Sˆ2z
λ
≤ EˆSˆz
λ
for − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Eˆ
Sˆ2z
λ
≤ EˆSˆz
λ
for 0 ≤ λ < 2
Eˆ
Sˆ2z
λ
≤ EˆSˆz
λ
for 2 ≤ λ < 4
Eˆ
Sˆ2z
λ
= EˆSˆz
λ
for 4 ≤ λ
(13.1.3)
It follows that
Sˆ2z ≥s Sˆz (13.1.4)
We now would like to define the outer daseinisation of Sˆz. To this end we note that Sˆz ∈ V thus
δo(Sˆz)V = Sˆz. We then go to smaller sub-algebras and consider VPˆ2,Pˆ3 = linC(Pˆ2, Pˆ3, Pˆ1 + Pˆ4 and
compute
δo(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ3 ∶= ∫R λdδi(EˆSˆzλ ) (13.1.5)
By looking at the spectral decomposition of Sˆz we can immediately define
δi(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆ2,Pˆ3 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
0ˆ if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Pˆ3 + Pˆ2 if 0 ≤ λ < 2
Pˆ4 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ1 if 2 ≤ λ
(13.1.6)
Therefore in matrix representation we get
δo(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ3 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Thus
δo(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ3 ≥s Sˆz (13.1.7)
implies that
sp(δo(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ3 ) ⊆ sp(Sˆz) (13.1.8)
As can be easily deducible from the matrices them selves.
13.2 Interpreting the Map Representing Physical Quantities
In order to really understand the map δ˘(Aˆ) ∶ Σ→ R↔ and how exactly once can use it in topos quantum
theory, we need to analyse how expectation values are computed. To this end consider a vector Sψ⟩ in
a Hilbert space H. We are interested in computing the expectation value of the self adjoint operator
Aˆ. This is defiend (in standard quantum theory) as follows
⟨ψSAˆSψ⟩ = ∫ ∣∣Aˆ∣∣
∣∣Aˆ∣∣
λd⟨ψS ˆE ˆAλSψ⟩ (13.2.1)
We can now re-write the above expression using the map δ˘(Aˆ). To do so we note that for each
V ∈ V(H) the Gel’fand spectrum ΣV of that algebra will contain a special element λ∣ψ⟩ defined by
λ∣ψ⟩(Aˆ) ∶= ⟨ψSAˆSψ⟩ for all Aˆ ∈ V . Such an element of the spectrum is characterised by the properties i)
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λ∣ψ⟩(Sψ⟩⟨ψS) = 1 and ii) λ∣ψ⟩(Pˆ ) = 0 for all Pˆ ∈ P (V ) such that Pˆ Sψ⟩⟨ψS = 0.
Given such a definition, it follows that
λ∣ψ⟩ ∈ ΣV iff Sψ⟩⟨ψS ∈ P (V ) (13.2.2)
We can now re-write equation 13.2.1 as follows: for each context V such that Sψ⟩⟨ψS ∈ P (V )
⟨ψSAˆSψ⟩ = ∫ δ
o(Aˆ)V λ
∣ψ⟩
δi(Aˆ)V λ∣ψ⟩
λd⟨ψSEˆAˆλ Sψ⟩ (13.2.3)
= ∫
⟨ψ∣δo(Aˆ)V ∣ψ⟩
⟨ψ∣δi(Aˆ)V ∣ψ⟩
λd⟨ψSEˆAˆλ Sψ⟩ (13.2.4)
Therefore it is possible to interpret (in the language of canonical quantum theory) δo(Aˆ)V λ∣ψ⟩ and
δi(Aˆ)V λ∣ψ⟩ as the largest, respectively smallest result of measurements of a physical quantity Aˆ given
the state Sψ⟩. Obviously if Sψ⟩ is an eigenstate of Aˆ then
⟨ψSAˆSψ⟩ = ⟨ψSδo(Aˆ)V Sψ⟩ = ⟨ψSδi(Aˆ)V Sψ⟩ (13.2.5)
However, if it is not an eigenstate then
⟨ψSδo(Aˆ)V Sψ⟩ ≥ ⟨ψSAˆSψ⟩ ≥ ⟨ψSδi(Aˆ)V Sψ⟩ (13.2.6)
If we now go to smaller context i ∶ V
′ ⊆ V , then the properties of inner and outer daseinisations
imply that δo(Aˆ)V ′ ≥ δo(Aˆ)V while δi(Aˆ)V ′ ≤ δi(Aˆ)V . It follows that
δo(Aˆ)V λ∣ψ⟩ = ⟨ψSδo(Aˆ)V Sψ⟩ ≤ δo(Aˆ)V ′λ∣ψ⟩ = ⟨ψSδo(Aˆ)V ′ Sψ⟩ (13.2.7)
δi(Aˆ)V λ∣ψ⟩ = ⟨ψSδi(Aˆ)V Sψ⟩ ≥ δi(Aˆ)V ′λ∣ψ⟩ = ⟨ψSδi(Aˆ)V ′ Sψ⟩ (13.2.8)
Therefore the interval between the smallest and largest possible value for Aˆ becomes bigger and bigger
as we go to smaller and smaller algebras. This is because we approximate our self adjoint operator
more and more.
In this setting, for each context V ∈ V(H), the map
δ˘(Aˆ)V ∶ ΣV → R↔V (13.2.9)
λ ↦ δ˘(Aˆ)V (λ) = δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ) (13.2.10)
defines the interval or range of possible values of the quantity A at stages V
′ ⊆ V . In particular, for
each λ ∈ ΣV we obtain a mapδ˘(Aˆ)V (λ) ∶↓ V → sp(Aˆ) × sp(Aˆ), such that, for each V ∈ V(H) it picks
the range of values [δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ)] ∩ sp(Aˆ) (13.2.11)
As we go to smaller and smaller contexts V
′ ⊆ V the range of values becomes bigger1
[δ˘i(Aˆ)V ′ (λ), δ˘o(Aˆ)V ′ (λ)] ∩ sp(Aˆ) (13.2.12)
Thus reiterating, the map δ˘(Aˆ) ∶ Σ → R↔ is defined such that as we go down to smaller sub-algebras
V
′ ⊆ V , the range of possible values of our physical quantity becomes bigger. This is because Aˆ gets
approximated both from above through the process of outer daseininsation and from below through the
process of inner daseinisation. Such an approximation gets coarser as V
′
gets smaller, which basically
means that V
′
contains less and less projections, i.e. less and less information. However, such an
interpretation, can only be local since the state space Σ has no global elements.
1Recall that δo(Aˆ)V ≥ Aˆ and δi(Aˆ)V ≥ Aˆ implied that sp(δi(Aˆ)V ) ⊆ sp(Aˆ) and sp(δo(Aˆ)V ) ⊆ sp(Aˆ) respectively.
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13.2.1 Computing Values of Quantities Given a State
We would now like to define the value of a physical quantity Aˆ given a state w ∣ψ⟩. Again as for all the
constructs we have defined so far, we would like to mimic classical physics, i.e. we would like to define
values for quantities given a state, in the same way is it is done in classical physics. To this end recall
that in classical physics, given a state s, and a physical quantity fA, the value of the latter given the
former is fA(s).
Similarly we would like to define the value of δ˘(Aˆ) given w ∣ψ⟩ as something like δ˘(Aˆ)(w ∣ψ⟩). Is this
possible?
Let us recall how the pseudo-state w ∣ψ⟩ is defined. For each context V we first define the approxi-
mate operator
δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ∶= ⋀{αˆ ∈ OV SSψ⟩⟨ψS ≤ αˆ} (13.2.13)
We then associate a subset of the state space ΣV :
w
∣ψ⟩
V
∶= {λ ∈ ΣV Sλ(δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ) = 1} (13.2.14)
Thus for each state Sψ⟩, we get the presheaf w ∣ψ⟩ ⊆ ΣV . Now since the physical quantity δ˘(Aˆ) is defined
in terms of a map whose codomain is Σ (δ˘(Aˆ) ∶ Σ → R↔), such a map has to be define also on any
sub-object of Σ. Thus we obtain the composite
w
∣ψ⟩ → Σ
δ˘(Aˆ)
ÐÐ→ R↔ (13.2.15)
In this setting one can indeed write the value of a physical quantity given a state as
δ˘(Aˆ)(w ∣ψ⟩) (13.2.16)
Such that for each context V ∈ V(H) we obtain
δ˘(Aˆ)V ∶ w ∣ψ⟩V → R↔V (13.2.17)
λ ↦ δ˘(Aˆ)V ∶= δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ) (13.2.18)
Theorem 13.2.1. δ˘(Aˆ)(w ∣ψ⟩) is a well defined subobject of R↔
Proof. We first need to show that δ˘(Aˆ)V (w ∣ψ⟩)V ⊆ R↔V for each V ∈ V(H). This follows trivially from
the definition in 13.2.17. Thus what remains to show is that for each V
′ ⊆ V
R↔(iV ′V )(δ˘(Aˆ)V (w ∣ψ⟩V )) ⊆ δ˘(Aˆ)V ′ (w ∣ψ⟩)V ′ (13.2.19)
Given λ ∈ w ∣ψ⟩V then
R↔(iV ′V )(δ˘(Aˆ)V (λ)) = (δ˘(Aˆ)V (λ))∣V ′ = δ˘(Aˆ)V ′ (λ∣V ′ ) (13.2.20)
However form the definition of pseudo-state we have
w
∣ψ⟩
V
′ = Σ(iV ′V )(w ∣ψ⟩V ) = {λ∣V ′ Sλ ∈ w ∣ψ⟩V } (13.2.21)
Therefore, each element in w
∣ψ⟩
V
′ comes form restricting an element in w
∣ψ⟩
V . It follows that
R↔(iV ′V )(δ˘(Aˆ)V (w ∣ψ⟩V )) = δ˘(Aˆ)V ′ (w ∣ψ⟩)V ′ (13.2.22)
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We thus obtain a commuting diagram
w
∣ψ⟩
V
δ˘(Aˆ)V //
Σ(i
V
′
V
)

R↔V
R
↔(i
V
′
V
)

w
∣ψ⟩
V
′
δ˘(Aˆ)
V
′
// R↔V ′
13.2.2 Examples
We will now give two simle examples to show how the map representing self-adjoint operators actually
works.
13.2.2.1 Eigenvalue-Eigenstate Link
We will first consider the case in which the state Sψ⟩ is an eigenstate of Aˆ. We then consider abelian
sub-algebras for which Aˆ ∈ V such that δo(Aˆ) = δi(Aˆ) = Aˆ. The condition Aˆ ∈ V also implies that
Sψ⟩⟨ψS ∈ P (V ) thus w ∣ψ⟩V will contain the single element λ∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣ ∈ ΣV such that λ∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣(Sψ⟩⟨ψS) = 1 while
λ∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣(Qˆ) = 0 for all QˆSψ⟩⟨ψS = 0. It follows that
δ˘(Aˆ)V (w ∣ψ⟩V ) = δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣), δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣) (13.2.23)
Since Aˆ ∈ V , then δ˘i(Aˆ)V (λ∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣) = δ˘o(Aˆ)V (λ∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣) = λ∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣(Aˆ) which is the eigenvalue of Aˆ given
the state Sψ⟩. Thus we get the usual eignevalue eigenstate link.
13.2.3 Interval
We now give both a simple example and a more complicated example on how to define values for
quantities.
Simple Example
Let us consider the simple self adjoint projection operator Sψ⟩⟨ψS. Such an operator has sp(Sψ⟩⟨ψS) =
{0,1}. For each context V ∈ V(H) the map δ˘(Sψ⟩⟨ψS) ∶ Σ→ R↔ is
δ˘(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ∶ ΣV → R↔V (13.2.24)
λ ↦ δ˘i(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (λ), δ˘o(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (λ) (13.2.25)
However, given the spectrum of Sψ⟩⟨ψS, we obtain
δ˘i(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (λ) ∶↓ V → {0,1} (13.2.26)
δ˘o(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (λ) ∶↓ V → {0,1} (13.2.27)
(13.2.28)
such that for all V
′ ⊆ V we have
δ˘i(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (λ)(V ′) ∶= ⟨λ, δi(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ′ ⟩ (13.2.29)
δ˘o(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (λ)(V ′) ∶= ⟨λ, δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ′ ⟩ (13.2.30)
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We then consider the pseudo-state w ∣ψ⟩ and want to evaluate δ˘(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)(w ∣ψ⟩). From the definition of
pseudo-state, given a context V , it follows that for all λ ∈ w ∣ψ⟩V then, for all V
′ ⊆ V
δ˘o(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (λ)(V ′) = ⟨λ, δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V ′ ⟩ = 1 (13.2.31)
We call the constant function with value 1 on all V
′ ⊆ V as 1↓V .
On the other hand, δ˘i(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (λ) is such that for all V ′ ⊆ V we obtain
δ˘i(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (λ)(V ′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if Sψ⟩⟨ψS ∈ V ′
0 if Sψ⟩⟨ψS ∉ V ′ (13.2.32)
We then arrive at a complete description of δ˘(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)(w ∣ψ⟩) as follows, given any context V ∈ V(H)
if λ ∈ w ∣ψ⟩V then we obtain
δ˘(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (λ) = δ˘i(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)V (λ),1↓V ) (13.2.33)
More Complicated Example
Let us consider the 2 spin system in C4 defined in previous examples. We are interested in the
spin in the z-direction, which is represented by the physical quantity Sz. The self-adjoint operator
representing Sz is
Sˆz =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
We want compute δ˘(Sˆz) ∶ Σ → R↔. Since we are dealing with presheaves we need to compute this
contextwise, for each V , i.e.
δ˘(Sˆz) ∶ Σ → R↔ (13.2.34)
λ ↦ δ˘(Sˆz)(λ) = δ˘i(Sˆz)V (λ), δ˘o(Sˆz)V (λ) (13.2.35)
Where
δ˘i(Sˆz)V (λ) ∶↓ V → R (13.2.36)
V
′
↦ λ(δi(Sˆz)V ′ ) (13.2.37)
and similar for δ˘o(Sˆz)V (λ). Thus, in order to compute δ˘i(Sˆz)V and δ˘o(Sˆz)V we need to find the inner
and outer daseinisation of the spectral family of Sˆz since we want to apply the formulas
δo(Sˆz)V = ∫
R
λdδi(EˆSˆz
λ
 (13.2.38)
δi(Sˆz)V = ∫
R
λd ⋀
µ>λ
δo(EˆSˆz
λ
 (13.2.39)
(13.2.40)
We know from previous examples that the spectral family of Sˆz is
EˆSˆz
λ
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
Pˆ4 if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Pˆ4 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ2 if 0 ≤ λ < 2
Pˆ4 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ1 if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.41)
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Therefore, j = {2,4} we obtain for
δi(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆj Pˆ3 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
0ˆ if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Pˆj + Pˆ3 if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.42)
For j = {2,3}
δi(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆ1Pˆj =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
0ˆ if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4 if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.43)
For V
Pˆ1,Pˆ4
δi(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆ1Pˆ4 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
Pˆ4 if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4 if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.44)
For V
Pˆ2,Pˆ4
δi(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆ2Pˆ4 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
Pˆ4 if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Pˆ2 + Pˆ4 if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.45)
For j = {2,3}
δi(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆj =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
0ˆ if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Pˆj if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.46)
For V
Pˆ1
δi(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆ1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
0ˆ if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4 if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.47)
Finally for V
Pˆ
δi(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆ4 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
Pˆ4 if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Pˆ4 if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.48)
Similarly for outer daseinisation we obtain for i, j = {2,3}
δo(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆj Pˆ1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
Pˆ4 + Pˆi if − 2 ≤ λ < 0 i ≠ j
Pˆj + Pˆ4 + Pˆ3 if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.49)
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For j = {1,2,3}
δo(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆj =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
1ˆ − Pˆj if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
1ˆ(−Pˆj if j = 1) if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.50)
For j = {2,3}
δo(EˆSˆzλ )VPˆj Pˆ4 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
Pˆ4 if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
1ˆ if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.51)
For V
Pˆ1,Pˆ4
δo(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆ4Pˆ1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
Pˆ4 if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 + Pˆ4 if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.52)
For V
Pˆ2,Pˆ3
δo(EˆSˆz
λ
)VPˆ2Pˆ3 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0ˆ if λ < −2
Pˆ4 + Pˆ1 if − 2 ≤ λ < 0
1ˆ if 0 ≤ λ < 2
1ˆ if 2 ≤ λ
(13.2.53)
We can now compute the daseinisations of Sˆz for each contexts. These are for VPˆ4
δo(Sˆz)VPˆ4 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 2 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
and δi(SˆZ)VPˆ4 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 2 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(13.2.54)
For V
Pˆ1
δo(Sˆz)VPˆ4 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
and δi(SˆZ)VPˆ1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 −2 0 0
0 0 −2 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(13.2.55)
For V
Pˆ1
δo(Sˆz)VPˆ2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 2 0
0 0 0 2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
and δi(SˆZ)VPˆ2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 −2 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(13.2.56)
For V
Pˆ3
δo(Sˆz)VPˆ3 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
and δi(SˆZ)VPˆ3 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
−2 0 0 0
0 −2 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(13.2.57)
For V
Pˆ1,Pˆ2
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δo(Sˆz)VPˆ1,Pˆ2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
and δi(SˆZ)VPˆ1,Pˆ2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 −2 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(13.2.58)
For V
Pˆ1,Pˆ3
δo(Sˆz)VPˆ1,Pˆ3 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
and δi(SˆZ)VPˆ1,Pˆ3 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 −2 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(13.2.59)
For V
Pˆ1,Pˆ4
δo(Sˆz)VPˆ1,Pˆ4 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
and δi(SˆZ)VPˆ1,Pˆ4 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(13.2.60)
For V
Pˆ2,Pˆ3
δo(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ3 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
and δi(SˆZ)VPˆ2,Pˆ3 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
−2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(13.2.61)
For V
Pˆ3,Pˆ4
δo(Sˆz)VPˆ3,Pˆ4 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
and δi(SˆZ)VPˆ3,Pˆ4 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(13.2.62)
Now given a state Sψ⟩ = (1,0,0,0) we want to compute the physical quantity δ˘(Sˆz). Thus for each
context V we need to compute the pair (δ˘i(Sˆz)V (⋅), δ˘o(Sˆz)V (⋅)) which will then act on λ ∈ w ∣ψ⟩V
For V
Pˆ4
, w
∣ψ⟩
VPˆ4
= {λ} is such that λ(δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)VPˆ4 ) = 1 where
δo(Sψ⟩⟨ψS)VPˆ4 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(13.2.63)
Hence
δ˘o(Sˆz)VPˆ4 (λ)(VPˆ4) = 2 (13.2.64)
δ˘i(Sˆz)VPˆ4 (λ)(λ)(VPˆ4) = 0 (13.2.65)
Note that this is equivalent to
⟨ψSδo(Sˆz)VPˆ4 Sψ⟩ = 1 0 0 0 ⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 2 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
0
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
= 2 (13.2.66)
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and
⟨ψSδi(Sˆz)VPˆ4 Sψ⟩ = 1 0 0 0 ⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
0
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
= 0 (13.2.67)
Similarly, for context V
Pˆ2,Pˆ4
we obtain
⟨ψSδo(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ4 Sψ⟩ = 1 0 0 0 ⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 2 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
0
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
= 2 (13.2.68)
and
⟨ψSδi(Sˆz)VPˆ2 Sψ⟩ = 1 0 0 0 ⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
0
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
= 0 (13.2.69)
For V
Pˆ2
we obtain
⟨ψSδo(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ4 Sψ⟩ = 1 0 0 0 ⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 2 0
0 0 0 2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
0
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
= 2 (13.2.70)
and
⟨ψSδi(Sˆz)VPˆ2 Sψ⟩ = 1 0 0 0 ⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
−2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 −2 0
0 0 0 −2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
0
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
= −2 (13.2.71)
Given the above results we have that for V
Pˆ2,Pˆ4
then the pair of order preserving, order reversing
functions for the physical quantity δ˘(Sˆz) is δ˘i(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ4 (λ), δ˘o(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ4 (λ) where
δ˘i(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ4 (λ) ∶↓ VPˆ2,Pˆ4 → sp(Sˆz) (13.2.72)
δ˘o(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ4 (λ) ∶↓ VPˆ2,Pˆ4 → sp(Sˆz) (13.2.73)
(13.2.74)
Since the latter as we have seen as constant value 2 we can write
δ˘i(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ4 (λ), δ˘o(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ4 (λ) = δ˘i(Sˆz)VPˆ2,Pˆ4 (λ),2↓VPˆ2,Pˆ4  (13.2.75)
Similar analysis can be performed for all the remaining contexts.
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Chapter 14
Lecture 14
In this lecture we will describe the concept of a sheaf and its relation to presheaves and certain bundles
called etale´ bundles. We will also introduce the very important concept of adjoint functors which will
then be utilised to define geometric morphisms which are maps between topoi. The reason we will need
all this is because we will eventually change the topos we are working with from a topos of presheaves
over the category V(H) to the topos of sheaves over the same category but now seen as a topological
space. Such a change is needed to define the topos analogue of probabilities and the concept of a group
and group transformation in a topos.
14.1 Sheaves
We will now describe what a sheaf is. In order to do this we will first give the bundle theoretical
definition and then give the categorical definition. This equivalence of descriptions is possible since
there is a 1:1 (one two one) correspondence between sheaves and a special type of budles namely: etale´
bundles.
So what is an etale´ bundle?
Definition 14.1.1. Given a topological space X, a bundle pE ∶ E → X is said to be etale´ iff pA is a
local homeomorphism. By this we mean that, for each e ∈ E there exists an open set V with e ∈ V ⊆ E,
such that pV is open in X and p∣V is a homeomorphism V → pV .
If for example X = R2 then for each point of a fibre there will be an open disc isomorphic to an
open disc in R2. It is not necessary that these discs have the sane size. Such a collection of open discs
on each fibre are glued together by the topology on E.
Another example of etale´ bundles are covering spaces. However, although all covering spaces are
etale´, it is not the case that all etale´ bundles are covering spaces.
Given an etale´ bundle pE ∶ E →X and an open subset U ⊆X , then the pullback of pE via i ∶ U ⊆X
is etale´:
EU //
µ

E
pE

U
i
// X
i.e. EU → U is etale´.
This result generalises as follows
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Lemma 14.1.1. Given any continuous map f ∶ X → Y and an etale´ bundle pE ∶ E → Y then g ∶ f
∗E →
X is etale´ over X.
Proof. We want to show that g is a local homeomorphism. From the definition of pullback f∗E ∶={(x, e)Sf(x) = pE(e)} ⊆ X ×E. Therefore, given an element (x, e) ∈ f∗E, we want to show that there
exists an open neighbourhood (V,U) ∋ (x, e) which is mapped homeomorphically onto U via g. Since
pE is etale´, then there exists an open neighbourhood U ∋ e which is mapped homeomorphically into
an open set pE(U) in Y . Then since f is continuous, it follows that f−1(pE(U))×U is open in X ×E
and is a neighbourhood of some (x, e). If we then define f−1(pE(U))×U∩ f∗E this will be an open
set since its the intersection of two opens, and it will be a neighbourhood of (x, e) in f∗E. Given the
definition of pullback, then g(f−1(pE(U)) × U) = f−1(pE(U)), i.e. f−1(pE(U)) × U will be mapped
homeomorphically onto f−1(pE(U)). Thus g is etale´.
Each etale´ bundle is equipped with an etale´ topology on the stalk space. Such a topology is defined
in terms of sections of the bundle as follows
Definition 14.1.2. Given an etale´ bundle pE ∶ E →X, both p and any section s ∶ X → E of pE are open
maps. Through every point e ∈ E there is at least one section s ∶ U → X, and the images of s(U) for
all sections form a base for the topology of E. If s and t are two sections, the set W = {xSs(x) = t(x)}
where both sections are defined and agree on, is open in X.
From the definition it follows that each stalk has a discrete topology, since by definition of a section,
s will pick an element in each stalk p−1(x) for all x ∈ U
Summarising, a sheaf can essentially be thought of as a bundle with some extra topological proper-
ties. In particular, given a topological spaceX , a sheaf overX is a pair (A,p) consisting of a topological
space A and a continuous map p ∶ A→X , which is a local homeomorphism.
Thus, pictorially, one can imagine that to each point, in each fibre, one associates an open disk
(each of which will have a different size) thus obtaining a stack of open disks for each fibre. These
different open discs are then glued together by the topology on A.
The above is the more intuitive definition of what a sheaf is. Now we come to the technical definition
which is the following:
Definition 14.1.3. A sheaf of sets F on a topological space X is a functor1 F ∶ O(X)op → Sets, such
that each open covering U = ⋃iUi, i ∈ I of an open set U of X determines an equaliser
F (U) // e // ∏i F (Ui) p //
q
// ∏i,j F (Ui ∩Uj)
where for t ∈ F (U) we have e(t) = {tSUi Si ∈ I} and for a family ti ∈ F (Ui) we obtain
p{ti} = {tiSUi∩Uj}, q{ti} = {tj SUi∩Uj} (14.1.1)
Given the definition of product it follows that the maps e, p, and q above are dermined though the
1Here O(X) indicates the category of open sets of X ordered by inclusions.
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diagram
F (Ui) F (Ui∩Uj⊆Ui) // F (U1 ∩Uj)
F (U) // e //
;;①①①①①①①①①①①①①①①①①①①
##●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
● ∏i F (Ui)
p //
q
//
OO

∏i,j F (Ui ∩Uj)
OO

F (Uj) F (Ui∩Uj⊆Uj) // F (Ui ∩Uj)
It is clear from the above definition that a sheaf is a special type of presheaf. In fact, given a
topological space X , Sh(X) is a full subcategory of SetsO(X)op. Similarly as SetsO(X)op, also Sh(X)
forms a topos.
14.1.0.1 Simple Example
A very simple example of a sheaf is the following. Consider a presheaf
C ∶ O(X) ∶ → Sets (14.1.2)
U ↦ C(U) ∶= {f Sf ∶ U → R if continuous } (14.1.3)
This is definitely a well defined presheaf in fact, for U
′ ⊆ U the presheaf maps can be defined through
restriction
C(U) → C(U ′) (14.1.4)
f ↦ f∣U ′ (14.1.5)
The reason C is also a sheaf follows from the continuity properties of the maps f . In fact if we consider
a covering Ui, i ∈ I of U , such that we have continuous functions fi ∶ Ui → R for all i ∈ I. Because of
continuity if follows that there exists at most one map f ∶ U → R such that f∣Ui = fi. Moreover, such a
map exists iff
fi(x) = fj(x) ∀ x ∈ Ui ∩Uj , (i, j ∈ I) (14.1.6)
It follows that the requirement of the map e ∶ C(U) →∐i∈I C(Ui) being an equaliser is satisfied, thus
C is a sheaf.
14.1.0.2 Connection Between Sheaves and Etale´ Bundles
From the definitions given above it seems hard to understand what the connection between sheaves
and an etale´ bundles might be. In order to understand this connection we need to introduce the notion
of germ of a function. Once we have introduced such a notion that it can be shown that each sheaf is
a sheaf of cross sections of a suitable bundle. All this will become clear as we proceed. So first thing
what is a germ? Germs represent constructions which define local properties of functions. In particular
they indicate how similar two functions are locally. Because of this locality requirement, germs are
generally defined on functions acting on topological spaces such that the word local acquires meaning.
For example one can consider measure of ‘locality’ to be a power series expansion of a function around
some fixed point. Thus, one can say that two holomorphic functions f, g ∶ U → C have the same germ
at a point a ∈ U iff the power series expansions around that point are the same. Thus f, g agree on
some neighbourhood of a, i.e., with respect to that neighbourhood they “look” the same.
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This definition obviously holds only if a power series expansion exists, however it is possible to gen-
eralise such a definition in a way that it only requires topological properties of the spaces involve. Thus
for example two functions f, g ∶ X → E have the same germ at x ∈X if there exist some neighbourhood
of x on which they agree. In this case we write2 germxf = germxg which implies that f(x) = g(x).
But the converse is not true.
How do we generalise such a definition of germs in the case of presheaves? Let us consider a presheaf
P ∶ O(X) → Sets ∈ SetsO(X)op where X is a topological space and O(X)op is the category of open
sets with reverse ordering (to the inclusion ordering). Given a point x ∈X and two neighbourhoods U
and V of x, the presheaf P assigns two sets P (U) and P (V ). Now consider two points t ∈ P (V ) and
s ∈ P (U). We then say that t and s have the same germ at x iff there exists some open W ⊆ U ∩ V
such that x ∈W and s∣W = t∣W ∈ P (W ).
The condition of having the same germ at x defines an equivalence class which is denoted as germxs.
Thus t ∈ germxs iff, given two opens U,V ∋ x then there exists some W ⊆ U ∩ V such that x ∈W and
t∣W = s∣W ∈ P (W ), where s ∈ P (U) and t ∈ P (V ). It follows that the set of all elements obtained
though the P presheaf get ‘quotient’ through the equivalence relation of “belonging to the same germ”.
Therefore, for each point x ∈X there will exist a collection of germs at x, i.e., a collection of equivalence
classes:
Px ∶= {germxsSs ∈ P (U), x ∈ U open in X} (14.1.7)
We can now collect all these set of germs for all points x ∈X defining
ΛP = ∐
x∈X
Px = {all germxsSs ∈X,s ∈ P (U)} (14.1.8)
Thus what we have done so far is basically divide the preheaf space in equivalence classes. We can
now define the map
p ∶ ΛP → X (14.1.9)
germxs ↦ x (14.1.10)
germys ↦ y (14.1.11)
which sends each germ to the point in which it is taken. It follows that each s ∈ P (U) defines a function
s˙ ∶ U → ΛP (14.1.12)
x ↦ germxs (14.1.13)
It is straight forward to see that s˙ is a section of p ∶ ΛP →X . Since the assignments s→ s˙ is unique, it
is possible to replace each element s in the original presheaf with a section s˙ to the set of germs ΛP .
We now define a topology on ΛP by considering as basis of open sets all the image sets s˙(U) ⊆ ΛP
for U open in X , i.e. open sets are unions of images of sections. Such a topology obviously makes p
continuous. In fact, given an open set U ⊆X then p−1(U) is open by definition of the topology on ΛP ,
since p−1(U) = ⋃si∈P (U) s˙i(U).
On the other hand it is also possible to show that the sections s˙ as defined above are continuous
with respect to the topology on ΛP . To understand this consider two elements t ∈ P (V ) and s ∈ P (U)
such that t˙(x) = s˙(x), i.e. germx(t) = germx(s) where x ∈ V ∩U . It then follows that there exists an
open set W ∋ x such that W ⊆ V ∩ U . If we considered all those elements y ∈ V ∩ U ⊆ X for which
s˙(y) = x˙(y) then all such elements will comprise the open set W ⊆ V ∩ U . Given this reasoning we
want to show that given an open O ∈ ΛP , then s˙−1(O) is open in X . Without loss of generality we can
choose O to be a basis set, i.e.
s˙(W ) = {germx(s)S∀x ∈W} (14.1.14)
Thus W consists of all those points x such that s˙(x) = t˙ for t, s ∈ germsx(s). It follows that W is open.
One can also show that s˙ is open and an injection
2This should be read as: the germ of f at x is the same as the germ of g at x.
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Proof. We want to show that s˙ is an injection and is open. The fact that it is open follows from the
definition of topology on Λp since the basis of open sets are all the image sets s˙(U) ⊆ ΛP for U open
in X . To show that it is injective we need to show that if germxs = germys then x = y. This follows
from the definition of germs at a point.
Putting all these results together we show that s˙ ∶ U → s˙(U) is a homeomorphism.
We have so managed to construct a bundle p ∶ ΛP →X which is a local homeomorphism since each
point germx(s) ∈ ΛP has an open neighbourhood s˙(U) such that p restricted to s˙(U) p ∶ s˙(U) → X
has a two sided inverse s˙ ∶ U → s˙(U):
p ○ s˙ = idX ; s˙ ○ p = idΛP (14.1.15)
Hence p is a local homeomorphism.
The above reasoning shows how, given a presheaf P it is possible to construct a bundle p ∶ ΛP →X
out of it. Given such a bundle, it is then possible to construct a sheaf in terms of it. In fact, consider
the following sheaf
Γ(ΛP ) ∶ Oop → Sets (14.1.16)
U ↦ {s˙Ss ∈ P (U)} (14.1.17)
Proof. We want to show that the presheaf
Γ(ΛP ) ∶ O(X)op → Sets (14.1.18)
U ↦ {s˙Ss ∈ P (U)} (14.1.19)
is actually a sheaf. To this end we should note that the maps are defined by restriction, i.e. given
Ui ⊆ U then
Γ(ΛP ) ∶ O(X)op → Sets (14.1.20)
Ui ↦ {s˙iSsi ∈ P (Ui)} (14.1.21)
where s˙↦ s˙i id defined via s˙i = P (iUiU)s. Now since
s˙ ∶ U → Λp(U) (14.1.22)
x ↦ germxs (14.1.23)
while
s˙i ∶ Ui → Λp(Ui) (14.1.24)
y ↦ germysi (14.1.25)
Since Ui ⊆ U then
s˙ ∶ Ui → Λp(Ui) (14.1.26)
yi ↦ germys (14.1.27)
Thus s˙i = s˙∣Ui .
In order to show that the above is indeed a sheaf we need to show that the diagram
Γ(Λp(U)) // e // ∏i Γ(Λp(Ui)) p //
q
// ∏i,j Γ(Λp(Ui ∩Uj))
is an equaliser. By applying the definition of the sheaf maps we obtain
e ∶ Γ(Λp(U)) → ∏
i
Γ(Λp(Ui)) (14.1.28)
s˙ → e(s˙) = {s˙Ui Si ∈ I} = {s˙iSi ∈ I} (14.1.29)
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On the other hand
p(s˙i) = {siSUi∩Uj} = {s∣Ui∩Uj} (14.1.30)
while
q(s˙j) = {sj SUi∩Uj} = {s∣Ui∩Uj} (14.1.31)
Γ(ΛP ) is called the sheaf of cross sections of the bundle p ∶ ΛP →X .
We can now define a map
η ∶ P → Γ ○ΛP (14.1.32)
such that for each context U ∈ O(X)op we obtain
ηU ∶ PU → Γ(ΛP )(U) (14.1.33)
s ↦ s˙ (14.1.34)
Theorem 14.1.1. If P is a sheaf then η is an isomorphism.
Proof. We need to show that η is 1:1 and onto.
1. One to one:
We want to show that if s˙ = t˙ then t = s. Given t, s ∈ P (U), s˙ = t˙ means that germx(s) = germx(t)
for all x ∈ U . Therefore there exists opens Vx ⊆ U such that x ∈ Vx and t∣Vx = s∣Vx . The collection
of these opens Vx for all x ∈ U form a cover of U such that sVx = t∣Vx . This implies that s, t agree
on the map P (U)→∐x∈U P (Vx). From the sheaf requirements it follows that t = s.
2. Onto:
We want to show that any section h ∶ U → Λp is of the form ηU(s) = s˙ for some s ∈ P (U). Thus
consider a section h ∶ U → Λp, this will pick for each x ∈ U an element say h(x) = germx(sx).
Therefore for each x ∈ U there will exist an open Ux ∋ x such that sx ∈ P (Ux). By definition
germx(sx) = s˙x(x) where s˙x is a continuous section therefore for each open Ux we get s˙x(Ux) ={germx(sx)S∀x ∈ Ux} which is open by definition. It follows that for each x ∈ Ux there will exist
some t, s ∈ germx(s) such that s˙(x) = t˙(x). This implies that there exists some open set Wx for
which x ∈ Wx ⊆ Ux ⊆ U and such that tWx = s∣Wx . These open sets Wx form a covering of U ,
i.e. U = ∐x∈UxWx with s∣Wx ∈ P (Wx) for each P (Wx). Moreover, since h(x) = germx(sx) for
x ∈ Ux it follows that h = s˙ for each Wx. Now consider two sections s˙x and s˙y for x ∈ P (Wx) and
y ∈ P (Wy) then on the intersection Wx ∩Wy, h agrees with both s˙x and s˙y therefore the latter
agree in the intersection. This means that germz(sx) = germz(sy) for z ∈ Wx ∩Wy , therefore
sxSWx∩Wy = sy SWx∩Wy
We thus obtain a family of elements sx for each x ∈ Ux such that they agree on both maps
P (Ux)⇆∐x∈Ux P (Wx)∩P (Wy). From the condition of being a sheaf it follows that there exists
an s ∈ P (U) such that sVx = sx. Then at each x ∈ U we have h(x) = germx(sx) = germx(s) = s˙(x).
Therefore h = s˙
It follows that all sheaves are sheaves of cross sections of some bundle.
Moreover it is possible to generalise the above process and define a pair of functors
SetsO(X)
op Λ
Ð→ Bund(X) ΓÐ→ Sh(X) (14.1.35)
Which if we combine together we get the so called sheafification functor :
ΓΛ ∶ SetsO(X)
op
→ Sh(X) (14.1.36)
Such a functor sends each presheaf P on X to the “best approximation” ΓΛP of P by a sheaf.
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In the case of etale´ bundles we then obtain the following equivalence of categories
Etale´(X)
Γ
22 Sh(X)
Λqq
The pair of functors Γ and Λ are an adjoint pair (see section 3.1). Where we have restricetd the
functors to act on Sh(X) ⊆ SetsO(X)op
14.2 Sheaves on a Partially Ordered Set
In the case at hand, since our base category V(H) is a poset we have an interesting result. In particular,
each poset P is equipped with an Alexandroff topology whose basis is given by the collection of all
lower sets in the poset P , i.e., by sets of the form ↓ p ∶= {p′ ∈ P Sp′ ≤ p}, p ∈ P 3.
The dual of such a topology is the topology of upper sets, i.e. the topology generated by the sets
↑ p ∶= {p′ ∈ P Sp′ ≤ p}. Given such a topology it is a standard result that, for any poset P ,
SetsP ≃ Sh(P +) (14.2.1)
where P + denotes the complete Heyting algebra of upper sets, which are the duals of lower sets. It
follows that
SetsP
op ≃ Sh((P op)+) ≃ Sh(P −) (14.2.2)
where P − denotes the set of all lower sets in P . In particular, for the poset V(H) we have
SetsV(H)
op ≃ Sh(V(H)−) (14.2.3)
Thus every presheaf in our theory is in fact a sheaf with respect to the topology V(H)−. We will denote
by A¯ the sheaves over V(H), while the respective presheaf will denote by A. Moreover, in order to
simplify the notation we will write Sh(V(H)−) as just Sh(V(H)).
We shall frequently use the particular class of lower sets in V(H) of the form
↓ V ∶= {V ′ SV ′ ⊆ V } (14.2.4)
where V ∈ Ob(V(H)). It is easy to see that the set of all of these is a basis for the topology V(H)−.
Moreover
↓ V1∩ ↓ V2 =↓ (V1 ∩ V2) (14.2.5)
i.e., these basis elements are closed under finite intersections.
It should be noted that ↓ V is the ‘smallest’ open set containing V , i.e., the intersection of all open
neighbourhoods of V is ↓ V . The existence of such a smallest open neighbourhood is typical of an
Alexandroff space.
If we were to include the minimal algebra C(1ˆ) in V(H) then, for any V1, V2 the intersection V1∩V2
would be non-empty. This would imply that V(H) is non Hausdorff. To avoid this, we will exclude
the minimal algebra from V(H). This means that, when V1 ∩ V2 equals C(1ˆ) we will not consider it.
More precisely the semi-lattice operation V1, V2 → V1 ∧ V2 becomes a partial operation which is
defined as V1 ∩ V2 only if V1 ∩ V2 ≠ C(1ˆ), otherwise it is zero.
This restriction implies that when considering the topology on the poset V(H) −C(1ˆ) we obtain
↓ V1∩ ↓ V2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
↓ (V1 ∩ V2) if V1 ∩ V2 ≠ C(1ˆ);
∅ otherwise.
(14.2.6)
There are a few properties regarding sheaves on a poset worth mentioning:
3Note that a function α ∶ P1 → P2 between posets P1 and P2 is continuous with respect to the Alexandroff topologies
on each poset, if and only if it is order preserving.
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1. When constructing sheaves it suffices to restrict attention to the basis elements of the form ↓ V ,
V ∈ Ob(V(H). For a given presheaf A, a key relation between its associated sheaf, A¯ is simply
A¯(↓ V ) ∶= AV (14.2.7)
where the left hand side is the sheaf using the topology V(H)− and the right hand side is the
presheaf on V(H).
Proof. We want to show that
A(↓ V ) ≃ AV (14.2.8)
Consider the open ↓ V , this forms a poset, thus we can define the presheaf A∣↓V . This has as
objects ai ∈ Vi for all Vi ∈↓ V and morphisms AV → AVj ; a↦ A(iV,Vj)a where Vj ∈↓ V . Moreover
for Vi ∩ Vj ⊆ V we have
AV → AVj∩Vj (14.2.9)
a ↦ A(iV,Vi∩Vj)a (14.2.10)
(14.2.11)
In order for such a presheaf to be a sheaf we require that
A(↓ V ) // e // ∏iA(↓ Vi) p //
q
// ∏i,j A(↓ (Vi ∩ Vj))
Indeed we have that
AV → AVi → A(Vi∩Vj) (14.2.12)
a ↦ A(iViV )(a)↦ A(iVi,Vi∩Vj )A(iViV )(a) = A(iV,Vi∩Vj)a (14.2.13)
on the other hand
AV → AVj → A(Vi∩Vj) (14.2.14)
a ↦ A(iVjV )(a)↦ A(iVi,Vi∩Vj )A(iVjV )(a) = A(iV,Vi∩Vj)a (14.2.15)
Thus
A(↓ V ) ≃ A∣↓V (14.2.16)
However, given the initial algebra V ∈↓ V , then from AV and the presheaf maps, we can retrieve
all of the elements in A∣↓V . Thus
A(↓ V ) ≃ AV (14.2.17)
Given a presheaf map, there is an associated restriction map for sheaves. In particular, given
iV1V ∶ V1 → V with associated presheaf map A(iV1V ) ∶ AV → AV1 , then the restriction map
ρV1V ∶ A¯(↓ V )→ A¯(↓ V1) for the sheaf A¯ is defined as
a∣↓V1 = ρV1V (a) ∶= A(iV1V )(a) (14.2.18)
for all a ∈ A¯(↓ V ) ≃ AV .
2. Given an open set O in V(H)− such a set is covered by the down set ↓ V , V ∈ Ob(V(H)).
Therefore we have
A¯(O) = lim
←ÐV ⊆O
A¯(↓ V ) = lim
←ÐV ⊆O
AV (14.2.19)
Where lim←Ð indicated the inverese limit.
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A direct consequence of the above is that
A¯(O) = ΓA∣O (14.2.20)
The connection with 14.2.7 is given by the fact that ΓA¯∣↓V ≃ AV .
3. For presheaves on partially ordered sets the sub-object classifier ΩV(H) has some interesting
properties. In particular, given the set Ω
V(H)
V of sieves on V , there exists a bijection between
sieves in Ω
V(H)
V and lower sets of V . To understand this let us consider any sieve S on V , we can
then define the lower set of V
LS ∶= ⋃
V1∈S
↓ V1 (14.2.21)
Conversely, given a lower set L of V we can construct a sieve on V
SL ∶= {V2 ⊆ V S ↓ V2 ⊆ L} (14.2.22)
However if ↓ V2 ⊆ LS then ↓ V2 ⊆ ⋃V1∈S ↓ V1, therefore V2 ∈ S. On the other hand if V2 ∈ SL (SL
sieve on V ), then V2 ⊆ V and ↓ V2 ⊆ L, therefore V2 ∈ ⋃V1∈S ↓ V1, i.e. V2 ∈ LS . This implies that
the above operations are inverse of each other. Therefore
Ω¯
V(H)(↓ V ) ∶= ΩV(H)V ≃ Θ(V ) (14.2.23)
where Θ(V ) is the collection of lower subsets (i.e. open subsets in V(H)) of V . This is equivalent
to the fact that, in a topological space X , we have that ΩX(O) is the set of all open subsets of
O ⊆X .
14.3 Geometric Morphisms
We will now introduce a very important concept in topos theory, namely the idea of geometric mor-
phisms. Such objects are very important because they allows to define maps between topoi in a way
that a lot of internal relations are preserved. In order to fully understand what a geometric morphisms
is we first have to introduce the concept of adjunction. This concept also is very important since
adjunctions arise pretty much everywhere when one does topos theory,.
14.3.1 Adjunctions
Consider two categories C and D and two functors between them going the opposite directions
F ∶ D → C and G ∶ C → D (14.3.1)
F is said to be left adjoint to G (or G is right adjoint to F ) iff given any two objects A ∈ C and X ∈ D
there exists a natural bijection between morphisms:
X
f
Ð→ G(A)
F (X) hÐ→ A (14.3.2)
What this means is that here is an exact correspondence between certain type of any maps, i.e.
to each map from X to G(A) there uniquely corresponds a map form F (X) to A. In other words f
uniquely determines h and vice versa. Therefore we can write the following bijection
θ ∶HomD(X,G(A)) ∼Ð→HomC(F (X),A) (14.3.3)
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Such a bijection is said to be natural in the sense that, given any morphisms α ∶ A → A
′
in C and
β ∶ X
′
→ X in D, then the composition between these arrows and f and h above creates yet another
correspondence:
X
′ β
Ð→X
f
Ð→ G(A) G(α)ÐÐÐ→ G(A′)
F (X ′) f(β)ÐÐ→ FX hÐ→ A αÐ→ A′ (14.3.4)
The symbol to indicate an adjunction relation between functors is F ⊣ G.
An important consequence of adjunctions is the existence of unit and co-unit morphisms. These
are defined as follows
Definition 14.3.1. Given an adjunction F ⊣ G with corresponding bijection 14.3.3, taking A = F (X)
then we obtain a unique map
ηX ∶ X → GF (X) (14.3.5)
such that θ(ηX) = idF (X). Such a map is called the unit of the adjunction. Moreover, given a map f ,
then h is uniquely determined such that the following diagram commutes
X
η //
f
!!❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈ GF (X)
G(h)

G(A)
F (X)
h

A
η is universal among the arrows which make the above diagram commute (i.e. any other such arrow
uniquely factors though η)
Similarly we also have the notion of co-unit of the adjuntion which is defined as follows
Definition 14.3.2. By taking G(A) =X in 14.3.3 and f the identity on G(A) then h becomes
ǫA ∶ FG(A)→ (A) (14.3.6)
Therefore θ−1(ǫA) = 1G(A). Moreover, given any g ∶ F (X) → A there exists a unique f such that ǫ is
universal amont the arrows which make the following diagram commute
X
η //
f
!!❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈ GF (X)
G(h)

G(A)
X
f

G(A)
14.3.1.1 Example
Posets
In a poset we can define an adjunction as follows. Suppose g ∶ Q → P is a monotone map between
posets. Then, given any element x ∈ P , We call a g-approximation of x (from above) an element y ∈ Q
such that x ≤ g(y). Moreover among all such approximations there will be the best one (is a bit similar
to how one defined greatest lower bound): a best g-approximation of x is an element y ∈ Q such that
x ≤ g(y) and ∀z ∈ Q(x ≤ g(z)⇒ y ≤ z) (14.3.7)
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If a best g-approximation exists then it is clearly unique since we are in a poset (at most one arrow
between any two elements). Moreover if it does exists, for all x ∈ P then we have a function f ∶ P →Q
such that, for all x ∈ P , z ∈ Q:
x ≤ g(z)⇔ f(x) ≤ z (14.3.8)
We say that f is the left adjoint of g, and g is the right adjoint of f . Again it is trivial to see that the
left adjoint of g, if it exists, is uniquely determined by g.
Exponential
Consider a category C in which product are defined. For a given object A ∈ C one can define the functor
A × − ∶ C → C (14.3.9)
B ↦ A ×B (14.3.10)
It is possible to define the right adjoint of such a functor, namely:
(−)A ∶ C → C (14.3.11)
B ↦ BA (14.3.12)
which is simply the exponential as defined in previous lectures. We then obtain the adjunction
A × − ⊣ (−)A (14.3.13)
The property of being an adjoint pair implies that there exists the bijection
C → BA
A ×C → B
(14.3.14)
In this context the co-unit map is
ǫ ∶ A ×BA → B (14.3.15)
such that, given any map h ∶ A ×C → B there exists a unique f ∶ C → BA such that ǫ ○ (1 × f) = h, i.e.
A ×BA
η // B
A ×C
h
==③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③
1×f
OO
commutes. Thus ǫ = ev and we get the usual definition of exponentiation.
14.3.2 Geometric Morphisms
Now that we have defined what an adjunction is we can define what a geometric morphism is.
Definition 14.3.3. A geometric morphism φ ∶ τ1 → τ2 between topoi τ1 and τ2 is defined to be a pair
of functors φ∗ ∶ τ1 → τ2 and φ
∗
∶ τ2 → τ1, called respectively the direct image and the inverse image part
of the geometric morphism, such that
1. φ∗ ⊣ φ∗ i.e., φ
∗ is the left adjoint of φ∗
2. φ∗ is left exact, i.e., it preserves all finite limits.
In the case of presheaf topoi, an important source of such geometric morphisms arises from functors
between the base categories, according to the following theorem.
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Theorem 14.3.1. A functor θ ∶ A→ B between two categories A and B, induces a geometric morphism
(also denoted θ)
θ ∶ SetsA
op
→ SetsB
op
(14.3.16)
of which the inverse image part θ∗ ∶ SetsB
op
→ SetsA
op
is such that
F ↦ θ∗(F ) ∶= F ○ θ (14.3.17)
14.4 Twisted Presheaves
In this section we will briefly analyse the problem of twisted presheaves. If we have time we will see
how it is possible to solve this problem by changing the topos we work with.
Given a groupG, its action on the base category V(H) is defined as lg(V ) ∶= UˆgV Uˆ−1g ∶= {UˆgAˆUˆ−1g SAˆ ∈
V }, g ∈ G. When considering the topos SetsV(H)op , for each g we obtain the functor l
Uˆg
∶ V(H)→ V(H)
with induces a geometric morphisms
l
Uˆg
∶ SetsV(H)
op
→ SetsV(H)
op
(14.4.1)
whose inverse image part is
l∗
Uˆg
∶ SetsV(H)
op
→ SetsV(H)
op
(14.4.2)
F ↦ l∗
Uˆg
(F ) ∶= F ○ l
Uˆg
(14.4.3)
The above geometric morphism acted on the spectral presheaf ΣV(H), the quantity value object R↔,
truth values and daseinisation. Let us analyse each of such actions in detail.
14.4.1 Group Action on the Presheaves
In this section we will describe the group action on the presheaves in SetsV(H) gives rise to the twisted
presheaves.
14.4.1.1 Spectral Presheaf
Given the speactral presheaf Σ ∈ SetsV(H)op, the action of each element of the group is given by the
following theorem:
Theorem 14.4.1. For each Uˆ ∈ U(H), there is a natural isomorphism ιUˆ ∶ Σ → ΣUˆ which is defined
through the following diagram:
ΣV
ιUˆV //
Σ
V
(i
V
′
V
)

ΣUˆV
ΣUˆ
V
(i
V
′
V
)

ΣV ′
ιUˆ
V
′
// ΣUˆ
V
′
where, at each stage V
(ιUˆV (λ))(Aˆ) ∶= ⟨λ, Uˆ AˆUˆ−1⟩ (14.4.4)
for all λ ∈ ΣV and Aˆ ∈ Vsa.
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The presheaf ΣUˆ is the twisted presheaf associated to the unitary operator Uˆ . Such a presheaf is
defined as follows:
Definition 14.4.1. The twisted presheaf ΣUˆ has as:
– Objects: for each V ∈ V(H) it assigns the Gel’fand spectrum of the algebra UˆV Uˆ−1, i.e., ΣUˆV ∶={λ ∶ UˆV Uˆ−1 → CSλ(1ˆ) = 1}.
– Morphisms: for each iV ′V ∶ V
′
→ V (V
′ ⊆ V ) it assigns the presheaf maps
ΣUˆ(iV ′V ) ∶ ΣUˆV → ΣUˆV ′ (14.4.5)
λ ↦ λ∣UˆV ′ Uˆ−1 (14.4.6)
14.4.1.2 Quantity Value Object
Similarly, for the quantity value object we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 14.4.2. For each Uˆ ∈ U(H), there exists a natural isomorphism kUˆ ∶ R↔ → (R↔)Uˆ , such
that for each V ∈ V(H) we obtain the individual components kUˆ ∶ R↔V → (R↔)UˆV defined as
kUˆV (µ, ν)(lUˆ(V ′)) ∶= (µ(V ′), ν(V ′)) (14.4.7)
for all V
′ ⊆ V
Here, µ ∈ R↔V is an order preserving function µ ∶↓ V → R such that, if V2 ⊆ V1 ⊆ V , then µ(V2) ≥
µ(V1) ≥ µ(V ), while ν is an order reversing function ν ∶↓ V → R such that, if V2 ⊆ V1 ⊆ V , then
ν(V2) ≤ ν(V1) ≤ ν(V ).
In the equation 14.4.7 we have used the bijection between the sets ↓ lUˆ(V ) and ↓ V .
14.4.1.3 Daseinisation
We recall the concept of daseinisation: given a projection operator Pˆ its daseinisation with respect to
each context V is
δo(Pˆ)V ∶= ⋀{Qˆ ∈ P(V )SQˆ ≥ Pˆ} (14.4.8)
where P (V ) represents the collection of projection operators in V .
If we then act upon it by any Uˆ we obtain
Uˆδo(Pˆ )V Uˆ−1 ∶= Uˆ⋀{Qˆ ∈ P(V )SQˆ ≥ Pˆ}Uˆ−1 (14.4.9)
= ⋀{UˆQˆUˆ−1 ∈ P(lUˆ(V ))SQˆ ≥ Pˆ} (14.4.10)
= ⋀{UˆQˆUˆ−1 ∈ P(lUˆ(V ))SUˆ QˆUˆ−1 ≥ Uˆ Pˆ Uˆ−1} (14.4.11)
= δo(Uˆ Pˆ Uˆ−1)lUˆ(V ) (14.4.12)
where the second and third equation hold since the map Qˆ → Uˆ QˆUˆ−1 is weakly continuous.
What this implies is that the clopen sub-objects which represent propositions, i.e., δ(Pˆ ), get mapped
to one another by the action of the group.
14.4.1.4 Truth Values
Now that we have defined the group action on daseinisation we can define the group action on the
truth values. We recall that for pure states the truth object at each stage V is defined as
T
∣ψ⟩
V ∶= {αˆ ∈ P(V )SProb(αˆ; Sψ⟩) = 1} (14.4.13)
= {αˆ ∈ P(V )S⟨ψSαˆSψ⟩ = 1} (14.4.14)
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For each context V ∈ V(H) the truth value is
v(δ(Pˆ ) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)V ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V Sδo(Pˆ)V ′ ∈ T∣ψ⟩V ′ } (14.4.15)
= {V ′ ⊆ V S⟨ψSδo(Pˆ )V ′ Sψ⟩ = 1} (14.4.16)
we now act upon it with a group element Uˆ obtaining
l
Uˆ
v(δo(Pˆ) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)V  ∶= lUˆ{V ′ ⊆ V S⟨ψSδo(Pˆ )V ′ Sψ⟩ = 1} (14.4.17)
= {l
Uˆ
V
′ ⊆ l
Uˆ
V S⟨ψSδo(Pˆ )V ′ Sψ⟩ = 1} (14.4.18)
= {l
Uˆ
V
′ ⊆ l
Uˆ
V S⟨ψSUˆ−1Uˆδo(Pˆ )V ′ Uˆ−1Uˆ Sψ⟩ = 1} (14.4.19)
= {l
Uˆ
V
′ ⊆ l
Uˆ
V S⟨ψSUˆ−1δo(Uˆ Pˆ Uˆ−1)lUˆ (V )Uˆ Sψ⟩ = 1} (14.4.20)
= v(δo(Uˆ Pˆ Uˆ−1) ∈ TUˆ ∣ψ⟩)lUˆ (V ) (14.4.21)
We thus obtain the following equality:
l
Uˆ
v(δo(Pˆ ) ∈ T∣ψ⟩)V  = v(δo(Uˆ Pˆ Uˆ−1) ∈ TUˆ ∣ψ⟩)lUˆ (V ) (14.4.22)
Thus truth values are invariant under the group transformations. This is the topos analogue of Dirac
covariance, i.e., given a state Sψ⟩ and a physical quantity Aˆ, we would obtain the same predictions if
we replaced the state by Uˆ Sψ⟩ and the quantity by Uˆ AˆUˆ−1
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Chapter 15
Lecture 16
In this lecture we will try understanding a possible way of solving the problem of twisted presheaves
This was done in [35]. In particular, we will change the base category to be the category of abelian
von-Neumann sub-algebras on which we assume that no group acts upon. We will then define the
topos of sheaves over such a category equipped with the Alexandroff topology. This will be the new
sheaf we will work with. It turns out that by using such a topos we will be able to define the concept
of a group and group transformations which does not lead to twisted presheaves.
15.1 In Need of a Different Base Category
When analysing the origin of the twisted presheaves, it is clear that the reason we do get a twist is
because the group moves the abelian algebras around, i.e. the group action is defined on the base
category itself. Thus a possible way of avoiding the occurrence of twists is by imposing that the group
does not act on the base category. The category of abelian von-Neumann sub-algebras with no group
acting on it will be denoted Vf(H) where we have added the subscript f (for fixed) to distinguish this
situation from the case in which the group does act. Obviously if one then just defined sheaves over
Vf(H), then there would be no group action at all. Therefore something extra is needed. As we will see
this ‘extra’ will be the introduction of an intermediate category which will be used as an intermediate
base category. On such an intermediate category the group is allowed to act, thus the sheaves defined
over it will admit a group action. Once this is done, everything is “pushed down” to the fixed category
Vf(H). A we will see, the sheaves defined in this way will admit a group action which now takes place
at an intermediate stage, but will not produce any twists since the final base category stays fixed.
Thus the first question to address is: what is this intermediate category?
15.2 The Sheaf of Faithful Representations
In our new approach we still use the poset V(H) as the base category but now we ‘forget’ the group
action. We now consider the collection,Homfaithful(Vf(H),V(H)), of all faithful poset representations
of Vf(H) in V(H) that come from the action of some transformation group G. Thus we have the
collection of all homomorphisms φg ∶ Vf(H)→ V(H), g ∈ G, such that
φg(V ) ∶= UˆgV Uˆg−1
We can ‘localise’Homfaithful(Vf(H),V(H)) by considering for each V , the setHomfaithful(↓ V,V(H)).
It is easy to see that this actually defines a presheaf overH; which we will denoteHomfaithful(Vf(H),V(H))
Now, for each algebra V there exists the fixed point group
GFV ∶= {g ∈ GS∀v ∈ V UˆgvUˆg−1 = v}
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This implies that the collection of all faithful representations for each V is actually the quotient space
G~GFV . This follows from the fact that the group homomorphisms φ ∶ G→ GL(V ) has to be injective,
but that would not be the case if we also considered the elements of GFV , since each such element
would give the same homomorphism.
Thus for each V we have that
Homfaithful(Vf(H),V(H))V ∶=Homfaithful(↓V,V(H)) ≅ G~GFV
As we will shortly see, there is a presheaf, G~GF , such that, as presheaves,
Homfaithful(Vf(H),V(H)) ≅ G~GF
whose local components are defined above. In the rest of this paper, unless otherwise specified,
Hom(Vf(H),V(H)) will mean Homfaithful(Vf(H),V(H))
Lemma 15.2.1. GFV is a normal subgroup of GV .
Proof 15.2.1. Consider an element g ∈ GFV , then given any other element gi ∈ GV we consider the
element gigg
−1
i . Such an element acts on each v ∈ V as follows:
Uˆgigg−1i
vUˆ(gigg−1i )−1
= Uˆgigg−1i vUˆgig−1g−1i (15.2.1)
= UˆgiUˆgUˆg−1
i
vUˆgi Uˆg−1Uˆg−1
i
= UˆgiUˆgv
′
Uˆg−1Uˆg−1
i
= Uˆgiv
′
Uˆg−1
i
= UˆgiUˆg−1
i
vUˆgi Uˆg−1
i
= v
where v
′ ∈ V because gi ∈ GV .
We then have the standard result that if G is a group and N a normal subgroup of G then the
coset space G~N has a natural group structure. In the Lie group case, G~N would only have a Lie
group structure if N is a closed subgroup of G. However, it is clear from the definition of GFV that it
is closed, and hence for each V we have a Lie group, G~GFV . We note en passant that G is a principal
fibre bundle over G~GFV with fiber GFV .
For us, the interesting aspect of the collection GFV , V ∈ V(H) is that, unlike the collection of
stability groups GV , V ∈ V(H), form the components of a presheaf over Vf(H) (or V(H)) defined as
follows:
Definition 15.2.1. The presheaf GF over Vf(H) has as
– Objects: for each V ∈ Vf(H) we define set GFV ∶= GFV = {g ∈ GS∀v ∈ V UˆgvUˆg−1 = v}
– Morphisms: given a map i ∶ V
′
→ V in Vf(H) (V ′ ⊆ V ) then we define the morphism GF (i) ∶
GFV → GFV ′ , as subgroup inclusion.
The morphisms GF (i) ∶ GFV → GFV ′ are well defined since if V ′ ⊆ V then clearly GFV ⊆ GFV ′ .
Associativity is obvious.
We now define the presheaf G~GF as follows:
Definition 15.2.2. The presheaf G~GF is defined as the presheaf with
– Objects: for each V ∈ Vf(H) we assign (G~GF )V ∶= G~GFV ≅ Hom(↓V,V(H)). An element of
G~GFV is an orbit wgV ∶= {g ⋅GFV } which corresponds to the unique homeomorphism φg.
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– Morphisms: Given a morphisms iV ′V ∶ V
′
→ V (V
′ ⊆ V ) in Vf(H) we define
G~GF (iV ′V ) ∶ G~GFV → G~GFV ′ (15.2.2)
w
g
V ↦ G~GF (iV ′V )(wgV ) (15.2.3)
as the projection maps πV ′V of the fibre bundles
GFV ′ ~GFV → G~GFV → G~GFV ′ (15.2.4)
with fibre isomorphic to GFV ′ ~GFV .
What this means is that to each wg
V
′ = g ⋅GFV ′ ∈ G~GFV ′ one obtains in G~GFV the fibre
π−1
V
′
V
(g ⋅GFV ′ ) ∶= σgV = {gi(g ⋅GFV )S∀gi ∈ GFV ′} (15.2.5)
= {lgi ⋅wgV S∀gi ∈ GFV ′} (15.2.6)
= {wgigV Sgi ∈ GFV ′} (15.2.7)
In the above expression we have used the usual action of the group G on an orbit:
lgi ⋅w
g
V = gi ⋅ (g ⋅GFV ) = gi ⋅ g ⋅GFV =∶ wgigV (15.2.8)
The fibre σgV is obviously isomorphic to GFV ′ ~GFV . Thus the projection map πV ′V projects
πV ′V (σgV ) = g ⋅GFV ′ = wgV ′ (15.2.9)
such that for individual elements we have
G~GF (iV ′V )(wgV ) ∶= πV ′V (σgV ) = wgV ′ (15.2.10)
Note that when gi ∈ GFV ′ but gi ∉ GFV then wgV = g ⋅GFV and wgV ′ = g ⋅GFV ′ = gigGFV ′ = wgigV ′ .
Therefore G~GF (iV ′V )wgV = wgV ′ = wgigV ′
It should be noted that the morphisms in the presheaf G~GF can also be defined in terms of the
homeomorphisms Hom(Vf(H),V(H)). Namely, given an element gj ∈ wgV we obtain the associated
homomorphisms φgj , such that
G~GF (iV ′V )φgj ∶= φgj ∣V ′ (15.2.11)
We will now define another presheaf which we will then show to be isomorphic to G~GF . To this
end we first of all have to introduce the constant presheaf G. This is defined as follows
Definition 15.2.3. The presheaf G over Vf(H) is defined on
• Objects: for each context V , GV is simply the entire group, i.e. GV = G
• Morphisms: given a morphisms i ∶ V
′ ⊆ V in V(H), the corresponding morphisms GV → GV ′ is
simply the identity map.
We are now ready to define the new presheaf.
Definition 15.2.4. The presheaf G~GF over Vf(H) is defined on
• Objects. For each V ∈ Vf(H) we obtain (G~GF )V ∶= G~GFV . Since as previously explained the
equivalence relation is computed context wise.
• Morphisms. For each map i ∶ V
′ ⊆ V we obtain the morphisms
(G~GF )V → (G~GF )V ′ (15.2.12)
G~GFV → G~GFV ′ (15.2.13)
These are defined to be the projection maps πV ′V of the fibre bundles
GFV ′ ~GFV → G~GFV → G~GFV ′ (15.2.14)
with fibre isomorphic to GFV ′ ~GFV .
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From the above definition it is trivial to show the following theorem.
Theorem 15.2.1.
G~GF ≃ G~GF (15.2.15)
Proof 15.2.2. We construct the map k ∶ G~GF → G~GF such that, for each context V we have
kV ∶ G~GF
V
→ G~GF V (15.2.16)
G~GFV ↦ G~GFV (15.2.17)
This follows from the definitions of the individual presheaves.
15.3 Changing Base Category
We know that given a sheaf over a poset we obtain the corresponding etale´ bundle. In our case the
sheaf in question is G~GF with corresponding etale´ bundle p ∶ ΛG~GF → Vf(H) where ΛG~GF is the
etale´ space. We will now equip the etale´ space Λ(G~GF ) = ∐V ∈VF (H)(G~GF )V with a poset structure.
The most obvious poset structure to use would be the partial order given by restriction, i.e.,
wV ≤ wV ′ iff V ⊆ V
′
and wgV = wgV ′ SV or equivalently g ⋅GFV = g ⋅ (GFV ∩GFV ′ ). We could write this
last condition as an inclusion of sets as follows: wV ⊆ w′V (g ⋅ GFV ⊆ g ⋅ GFV ′ ). However this poset
structure would not give a presheaf if we were to use it as the base category, rather it would give a
covariant functor. To solve this problem we adopt the order dual of the partially ordered set, which
is the same set but equipped with the inverse order which is itself a partial order. We thus define the
ordering on Λ(G~GF ) as follows:
Lemma 15.3.1. Given two orbits wg
V
∈ G~GFV and wgV ′ ∈ G~GFV ′ we define the partial ordering ≤,
by defining
w
g
V
′ ≤ wgV
iff
V
′ ⊆ V (15.3.1)
w
g
V ⊆ wgV ′ (15.3.2)
Note that the last condition is equivalent to wgV = wgV ′ SV (g ⋅GFV = g ⋅ (GFV ∩GFV ′ )).
It should be noted though that if wgV = wgV ′ SV then G~GF (iV ′V )(wgV ) = G~GF (iV ′V )(wgV ′ SV ) = wgV ′ .
In other words it is also possible to define the partial ordering in terms of the presheaf maps defined
above, i.e.,
w
g
V ≥ wgV ′ iff wgV ′ = G~GF (iV ′V )wgV (15.3.3)
We now show that the ordering defined on Λ(G~GF ) is indeed a partial order.
Proof 15.3.1.
1. Reflexivity. Trivially wgV ≤ wgV for all wgV ∈ ΛG~GF .
2. Transitivity. If wgV1 ≤ wgV2 and wgV2 ≤ wgV3 then V1 ⊆ V2 and V2 ⊆ V3. From the partial ordering
on V(H) it follows that V1 ⊆ V3. Moreover from the definition of ordering on Λ(G~GF ) we have
that wgV2 = wgV1 SV2 and wgV3 = wgV2 SV3 which implies that wgV3 = wgV1 SV3 . It follows that wV1 ≤ wV3 .
3. Antisymmetry. If wV1 ≤ wV2 and wV2 ≤ wV1 , it implies that V1 ≤ V2 and V2 ≤ V1 which, by
the partial ordering on V(H) implies that V1 = V2. Moreover the above conditions imply that
wV1 = wV2 SV1 and wV2 = wV1 SV2 , which by the property of subsets implies that wV1 = wV2 .
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Given the previously defined isomorphisms, Hom(↓V,V(H)) ≅ (G~GF )V for each V , then to each
equivalence class wgV there is associated a particular homeomorphism φg ∶↓V → V(H). Even though
w
g
V is an equivalence class, each element in it will give the same φg, i.e. it will pick out the same
Vi ∈ V(H). This is because the equivalence relation is defined in terms of the fixed point group for V .
Therefore it is also possible to define the ordering relation on Λ(G~GF ) in terms of the homeo-
morphisms φgi . First of all we introduce the bundle space ΛJ ≃ Λ(G~GF ) which is essentially the
same as Λ(G~GF ), but whose elements are now the maps φgi , i.e., ΛJ = Λ(Hom(Vf(H),V(H))). The
associated bundle map is pJ ∶ ΛJ → Vf(H). We then define the ordering on ΛJ as φgi ≤ φgj iff
pJ(φgi ) ⊆ pJ(φgj ) (15.3.4)
and
φ
g
i = φgj SpJ (φgi ) (15.3.5)
We now need to show that this does indeed define a partial order on ΛJ .
Proof 15.3.2.
1. Reflexivity. Trivially φgi ≤ φgi since pJ(φgi ) ⊆ pJ(φgi ) and φgi = φgi .
2. Transitivity. If φgi ≤ φgj and φgj ≤ φgk then pJ(φgi ) ⊆ pJ(φgj ) and pJ(φgj ) ⊆ pJ(φgk), therefore
pJ(φgi ) ⊆ pJ(φgk). Moreover we have that φgi = φgj SpJ (φgi ) and φgj = φgk SpJ (φgj ), therefore φgi =
φ
g
k
SpJ (φgi ).
3. Antisymmetry. If φgi ≤ φgj and φgj ≤ φgi it implies that pJ(φgi ) ⊆ pJ(φgj ) and pJ(φgj ) ⊆ pJ(φgi ), thus
pJ(φgi ) = pJ(φgj ). Moreover we have that φgi = φgj SpJ(φgi ) and φgj = φgi SpJ (φgj ), therefore φgi = φgj .
Given this ordering we can now define the corresponding ordering on Λ(G~GF ) as wgVi ≤ wgVj iff
φ
g
i ≤ φgj . We have again used the fact that to each wgVi there is associated a unique homeomorphism
φ
g
V ∶↓ V → V(H).
15.4 From Sheaves on the Old Base Category to Sheaves on
The New Base Category
In what follows we will move freely between the language of presheaves and that of sheaves which we
will both denote as A. Which of the two is being used should be clear from the context. The reason
we are able to do this is because our base categories are posets (see discussion at the end of section 2).
We are now interested in ‘transforming’ all the physically relevant sheaves on V(H) to sheaves over
Λ(G~GF ). Therefore we are interested in finding a functor I ∶ Sh(V(H))→ Sh(Λ(G~GF )). As a first
attempt we define:
I ∶ Sh(V(H)) → Sh(Λ(G~GF )) (15.4.1)
A ↦ I(A) (15.4.2)
such that for each context wgV ≃ φg we define
I(A)
w
g
V
∶= Aφg(V ) = (φg)∗(A)(V ) (15.4.3)
where φg ∶↓V → V(H) is the unique homeomorphism associated with the equivalence class wgV = g ⋅GFV .
We then need to define the morphisms. Thus, given iwg
V
′ ,w
g
V
∶ w
g
V
′ → w
g
V
(wg
V
′ ≤ wgV ) with corre-
sponding homeomorphisms φg2 ≤ φg2 (φg1 ∈ Hom(↓ V,V(H)) and φg2 ∈ Hom(↓ V ′ ,V(H))) we have the
associated morphisms IA(iwg
V
′ ,w
g
V
) ∶ I(A)
w
g
V
→ I(A)
w
g
V
′
defined as
(IA(iwg
V
′ ,w
g
V
))(a) = (IA(iφg
2
,φ
g
1
))(a) ∶= Aφg
1
(V ),φg
2
(V ′)(a) (15.4.4)
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for all a ∈ Aφg(V ). In the above equation V = pJ(φg1) and V ′ = pJ(φg2)1. Moreover, since φg2 ≤ φg1 is
equivalent to the condition wg
V
′ ≤ wgV , then φg2(V ′) ⊆ φg1(V ) and φg2 = φg1 SV ′ .
Theorem 15.4.1. The map I ∶ Sh(V(H))→ Sh(Λ(G~GF )) is a functor defined as follows:
(i) Objects: I(A)
w
g
V
∶= Aφg
1
(V ) = (φg)∗(A)(V ). If wgV ′ ≤ wgV with associated homeomorphisms
φ
g
2 ≤ φg1 (φg1 ∈Hom(↓V,V(H)) and φg2 ∈Hom(↓ V ′ ,V(H))), then
(IA(iwg
V
′ ,w
g
V
)) = IA(iφg
2
,φ
g
1
) ∶= Aφg
1
(V ),φg
2
(V ′) ∶ Aφg
1
(V ) → Aφg
2
(V ′)
where V = pJ(φg1) and V ′ = pJ(φg2).
(ii) Morphisms: if we have a morphisms f ∶ A → B in Sh(V(H)) we then define the corresponding
morphisms in Sh(Λ(G~GF )) as
I(f)wg
V
∶ I(A)wg
V
→ I(B)wg
V
(15.4.5)
fφg
1
∶ Aφg
1
(pJ(φ
g
1
)) → Bφg
1
(pJ(φ
g
1
)) (15.4.6)
Proof 15.4.1. Consider an arrow f ∶ A → B in Sh(V(H)) so that, for each V ∈ V(H), the local
component is fV ∶ AV → BV with commutative diagram
AV1
fV1 //
A
V1V2

BV1
B
V1V2

AV2 fV2
// BV2
for all pairs V1, V2 with V2 ≤ V1. Now suppose that wgV2 ≤ wgV1 with associated homeomorphisms φg2 ≤ φg1,
such that (i) pJ(φg2) ⊆ pJ(φg1); and (ii) φg2 = φg1 SpJ (φg2). We want to show that the action of the I functor
gives the commutative diagram
I(A)wg
V1
I(f)
w
g
V1 //
I(A)(i
w
g
V1
,w
g
V2
)

I(B)wg
V1
I(B)(i
w
g
V1
,w
g
V2
)

I(A)wg
V2 I(f)wg
V2
// I(B)wg
V2
for all V2 ⊆ V1. By applying the definitions we get
Aφg
1
(pJ(φ
g
1
))
f
φ
g
1
(pJ (φ
g
1
))
//
A
φ
g
1
(pJ (φ
g
1
)),φ
g
2
(pJ (φ
g
2
))

Bφg
1
(pJ(φ
g
1
))
B
φ
g
1
(pJ (φ
g
1
)),φ
g
2
(pJ (φ
g
2
))

Aφg
2
(pJ(φ
g
2
)) f
φ
g
2
(pJ (φ
g
2
))
// Bφg
2
(pJ(φ
g
2
))
1Recall that pJ ∶ ΛJ = Λ(Hom(Vf (H),V(H)) → Vf(H).
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which is commutative. Therefore I(f) is a well defined arrow in Sh(ΛG~GF ) from I(A) to I(B).
Given two arrows f, g in Sh(V(H)) then it follows that:
I(f ○ g) = I(f) ○ I(g) (15.4.7)
This proves that I is a functor from Sh(V(H)) to Sh(Λ(G~GF )).
From the above definition of the functor I we immediately have the following corollary:
Corollary 15.4.1. The functor I preserves monic arrows.
Proof 15.4.2. Given a monic arrow f ∶ A→ B in Sh(V(H)) then by definition
I(f)wg
V2
∶ I(A)wg
V2
→ I(B)wg
V2
(15.4.8)
fφg
2
(pJ(φ
g
2
)) ∶ Aφg
2
(pJ(φ
g
2
)) → Bφg
2
(pJ(φ
g
2
)) (15.4.9)
The fact that such a map is monic is straightforward.
Similarly we can show that
Corollary 15.4.2. The functor I preserves epic arrows.
Proof 15.4.3. Given an epic arrow f ∶ A→ B in Sh(V(H)) then by definition
I(f)wg
V2
∶ I(A)wg
V2
→ I(B)wg
V2
(15.4.10)
fφg
2
(pJ(φ
g
2
)) ∶ Aφg
2
(pJ(φ
g
2
)) → Bφg
2
(pJ(φ
g
2
)) (15.4.11)
The fact that such a map is epic is straightforward.
We would now like to know how such a functor behaves with respect to the terminal object. To
this end we define the following corollary:
Corollary 15.4.3. The functor I preserves the terminal object.
Proof 15.4.4. The terminal object in Sh(V(H)) is the objects 1Sh(V(H)) such that to each element
V ∈ V(H) it associates the singleton set {∗}. We now apply the I functor to such an object obtaining
I(1Sh(V(H)))wgV ∶= (1Sh(V(H)))φg(pJ(φg)) = {∗} (15.4.12)
where φg is the unique homeomorphism associated to the coset wg
V
.
Thus it follows that I(1Sh(V(H))) = 1Sh(Λ(G/GF ))
We now check whether I preserves the initial object. We recall that the initial object in Sh(V(H))
is simply the sheaf OSh(V(H)) which assigns to each element V the empty set {∅}. We then have
I(OSh(V(H)))wgV ∶= (OSh(V(H)))φg(pJ(φg)) = {∅} (15.4.13)
where φg ∈ Hom(↓V,V(H)) is the unique homeomorphism associated with the coset wgV .
It follows that:
I(OSh(V(H))) = OSh(Λ(G/GF )) (15.4.14)
From the above proof it transpires that the reason the functor I preserves monic, epic, terminal
object, and initial object is manly due to the fact that the action of I is defined component-wise as(I(A))φ ∶= Aφ(V ) for φ ∈ Hom(↓ V,V(H)). In particular, it can be shown that I preserves all limits
and colimits.
Theorem 15.4.2. The functor I preserves limits.
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In order to prove the above theorem we first of all have to recall some general results and definitions.
To this end consider two categories C and D, such that there exists a functor between them F ∶ C → D.
For a small index category J , we consider diagrams of type J in both C and D, i.e. elements in CJ and
DJ , respectively. The functor F then induces a functor between these diagrams as follows:
F J ∶ CJ → DJ (15.4.15)
A ↦ F J(A) (15.4.16)
such that (F J(A))(j) ∶= F (A(j)). Therefore, if limits of type J exist in C and D we obtain the diagram
CJ
lim←J //
FJ

C
F

DJ
lim
←J
// D
where the map
lim
←J
∶ CJ → C (15.4.17)
A ↦ lim
←J
(A) (15.4.18)
assigns, to each diagram A of type J in C, its limit lim←J(A) ∈ C. By the universal properties of limits
we obtain the natural transformation
αJ ∶ F ○ lim
←J
→ lim
←J
○F J (15.4.19)
We then say that F preserves limits if αJ is a natural isomorphisms.
For the case at hand, in order to show that the functor I preserves limits we need to show that there
exists a map
αJ ∶ I ○ lim
←J
→ lim
←J
○IJ (15.4.20)
which is a natural isomorphisms. Here IJ represents the map
IJ ∶ (Sh(V(H))J → Sh(Λ(G~GF ))J (15.4.21)
A ↦ IJ(A) (15.4.22)
where (IJ(A)(j))φ ∶= I(A(j))φ.
The proof of αJ being a natural isomorphisms will utilise a result derived in [5] where it is shown that
for any diagram A ∶ J → CD of type J in CD the following isomorphisms holds
 lim
←J
AD ≃ lim
←J
AD ∀D ∈ D (15.4.23)
where AD ∶ J → C is a diagram in D. With these results in mind we are now ready to prove theorem
15.4.2
Proof 15.4.5. Let us consider a diagram A ∶ J → SetsV(H) of type J in SetsV(H):
A ∶ J → SetsV(H) (15.4.24)
j ↦ A(j) (15.4.25)
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where A(j)(V ) ∶= AV (j) for AV ∶ j → Sets a diagram in Sets. Assume that L is a limit of type J for
A, i.e. L ∶ V(H)→ Sets such that lim←J A = J . We then construct the diagram
SetsV(H)J lim←J //
IJ

SetsV(H)
I

SetsΛ(G/GF )J
lim
←J
// SetsΛ(G/GF )
and the associated natural transformation
αJ ∶ I ○ lim
←J
→ lim
←J
○IJ (15.4.26)
For each diagram A ∶ J → SetsV(H) and φ ∈ Λ(G~GF ) we obtain
I ○ lim
←J
(A)
φ
= I lim
←J
A
φ
∶=  lim
←J
A
φ(V )
≃ lim
←J
Aφ(V ) (15.4.27)
where Aφ(V ) ∶ J → Sets, such that Aφ(V )(j) = A(j)(φV )2
On the other hand
 lim
←J
○IJA
φ
=  lim
J
(IJ(A))
φ
≃ lim
←J
(IJ(A))φ = lim
←J
Aφ(V ) (15.4.28)
where
IJ(A) ∶ J → SetsΛ(G/GF ) (15.4.29)
j ↦ IJ(A)(j) (15.4.30)
such that for all φ ∈ Λ(G~GF ) we have IJ(A(j))φ = I(A(j))φ = A(j)φ(V ).
It follows that
I ○ lim
←J
≃ lim
←J
○IJ (15.4.31)
Similarly one can show that
Theorem 15.4.3. The functor I preserves all colimits
Since colimits are simply duals to the limits, the proof of this theorem is similar to the proof given
above. However, for completeness sake we will, nonetheless, report it here.
Proof 15.4.6. We first of all construct the analogue of the diagram above:
SetsV(H)J lim→J //
IJ

SetsV(H)
I

SetsΛ(G/GF )J
lim→J
// SetsΛ(G/GF )
2Recall that A ∶ J → SetsV(H) is such that AV (j) = A(j)(V ), therefore (I(A(j)))φ ∶= A(j)φ(V ) = Aφ(V )(j)
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where lim→J ∶ SetsV(H)I → SetsV(H) represents the map which assigns colimits to all diagrams in
SetsV(H)I .
We now need to show that the associated natural transformation
βJ ∶ I ○ lim
→J
→ lim
→J
○IJ (15.4.32)
is a natural isomorphisms.
For any diagram A ∈ SetsV(H)I and φ ∈ Λ(G~GF ) we compute
I ○ lim
→J
(A)
φ
= I(lim
→J
A)
φ
=  lim
→J
A
φ(V )
≃ lim
→J
Aφ(V ) (15.4.33)
where  lim→J A
φ(V )
≃ lim→J Aφ(V ) is the dual of 15.4.23. On the other hand
(lim
→J
○IJ)(A)
φ
=  lim
→J
(IJ(A))
φ
≃ lim
→J
(IJ(A))φ = lim
→J
Aφ(V ) (15.4.34)
It follows that indeed βJ is a natural isomorphisms.
15.5 The Adjoint Pair
It is a standard result that, given a map f ∶ X → Y between topological spaces X and Y , we obtain a
geometric morphisms
f∗ ∶ Sh(Y ) → Sh(X) (15.5.1)
f∗ ∶ Sh(X) → Sh(Y ) (15.5.2)
and we know that f∗ ⊣ f∗, i.e., f
∗ is the left-adjoint of f∗. If f is an etale´ map, however, there also
exists the left adjoint f ! to f∗, namely
f ! ∶ Sh(X)→ Sh(Y ) (15.5.3)
with f ! ⊣ f∗ ⊣ f∗.
In the appendix we will show that
f !(pA ∶ A→X) = f ○ pA ∶ A→ Y (15.5.4)
so that we combine the etale´ bundle pA ∶ A→X with the etale´ map f ∶ X → Y to give the etale´ bundle
f ○ pA ∶ A → Y . Here we have used the fact that sheaves can be defined in terms of etale´ bundles. In
fact in previous lectures it was shown that there exists an equivalence of categories Sh(X) ≃ Etale(X)
for any topological space X .
Given a map α ∶ A → B of etale´ bundles over X , we obtain the map f !(α) ∶ f !(A) → f !(B)
which is defined as follows. We start with the collection of fibre maps αx ∶ Ax → Bx, x ∈ X , where
Ax ∶= p−1A({x}). Then, for each y ∈ Y we want to define the maps f !(α)y ∶ f !(A)y → f !(B)y, i.e.,
f !(α)y ∶ p−1A(f−1{y})→ p−1B(f−1{y}). This are defined as
f !(α)y(a) ∶= αpA(a)(a) (15.5.5)
for all a ∈ f !(A)y = p−1A(f−1{a}).
For the case of interest we obtain the left adjoint functor pJ ! ∶ Sh(Λ(G~GF )) → Sh(Vf(H)) of
p∗J ∶ Sh(Vf(H)) → Sh(Λ(G~GF )). The existence of such a functor enables us to define the composite
functor
F ∶= pJ ! ○ I ∶ Sh(V(H))→ Sh(Vf(H)) (15.5.6)
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Such a functor sends all the original sheaves we had defined over V(H) to new sheaves over Vf(H).
Thus, denoting the sheaves over Vf(H) as A˘ we have
Σ˘ ∶= F (Σ) = pJ ! ○ I(Σ) (15.5.7)
What happens to the terminal object? Given 1V(H) we obtain
F (1V(H)) = pJ ! ○ I(1V(H)) = pJ !(1Λ(G/GF )) (15.5.8)
Now the etale´ bundle associated to the sheaf 1Λ(G/GF ) is p1 ∶ Λ({∗}) → Λ(G~GF )) where Λ({∗})
represents the collection of singletons, one for each wgV ∈ Λ(G~GF ). Obviously the etale´ bundle
p1 ∶ Λ({∗})→ Λ(G~GF )) is nothing but Λ(G~GF ). Thus by applying the definition of pJ ! we then get
pJ !(1Λ(G/GF )) = G~GF (15.5.9)
It follows that the functor F does not preserve the terminal object therefore it can not be a right
adjoint. In fact we would like F to be left adjoint. However so far that does not seem the case. We
have seen above that the functor I preserves colimits (initial object) and limits. Since F = pJ ! ○ I and
pJ ! is left adjoint thus preserves colimits, it follows that F will preserve colimits.
Of particular importance to us is the following: each object A ∈ Sh(V(H)) has associated to it
the unique arrow !A ∶ A → 1V(H). This arrow is epic thus F (!A) ∶ F (A) → F (1V(H)) is also epic. In
particular we obtain
F (!A) ∶ F (A) → F (1V(H)) (15.5.10)
A˘ → G~GF (15.5.11)
such that for each V ∈ V(H) we get
A˘V → (G~GF )V (15.5.12)
∐
w
g
V
∈(G/GF )V
Awg
V
→ G~GFV (15.5.13)
However, since we are considering sub-objects of the state object presheaf Σ˘ we would like the F
functor to also preserve monic arrows. And indeed it does.
Lemma 15.5.1. The functor F ∶ Sh(V(H))→ Sh(Vf(H)) preserves monics.
Proof 15.5.1. Let i ∶ A→ B be a monic arrow in Sh(V(H)), then we have that
F (i) = pJ !(I(i)) (15.5.14)
However, the I functor preserves monics, as a consequence I(i) is monic in Sh(Λ(G~GF )).
Moreover, from the defining equation 15.5.5, it follows that if f ∶ X → Y is etale´ and pA ∶ A → X is
etale´ then, since i ∶ A→ B is monic then so is f !(i) ∶ f !(A) → f !(B). Therefore applying this reasoning
to our case it follows that F (i) = pJ !(I(i)) is monic.
15.6 From Sheaves over V(H) to Sheaves over V(Hf)
Now that we have defined the functor F we will map all the sheaves in our original formalism
(Sh(V(H))) to sheaves over Vf(H). We will then analyse how the truth values behave under such
mappings.
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15.6.1 Spectral Sheaf
Given the spectral sheaf Σ ∈ Sh(V(H)) we define the following:
Σ˘ ∶= F (Σ) = pI ! ○ I(Σ) (15.6.1)
This will be our new spectral sheaf. The definition given below will be in terms of the corresponding
presheaf (which we will still denote Σ˘)), where we have used the correspondence between sheaves and
presheaves induced by the fact that the base category is a poset (see lecture 14)
Definition 15.6.1. The spectral presheaf Σ˘ is defined on
– Objects: For each V ∈ Vf(H) we have
Σ˘V ∶= ∐
w
gi
V
∈Λ(G/GF )V
Σwgi
V
≃ ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
Σφ(V ) (15.6.2)
which represents the disjoint union of the Gel’fand spectrum of all algebras related to V via a
group transformation
– Morphisms: Given a morphism i ∶ V
′
→ V , (V
′ ⊆ V ) in Vf(H) the corresponding spectral presheaf
morphism is
Σ˘(iV ′V ) ∶ Σ˘V → Σ˘V ′ (15.6.3)
∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
Σφi(V ) → ∐
φj∈Hom(↓V
′
,V(H))
Σφ(V ′) (15.6.4)
such that given λ ∈ Σφi(V ) we obtain Σ˘(iV ′V )(λ) ∶= Σφi(V ),φj(V ′)λ = λ∣φj(V ′)
Thus in effect Σ˘(iV ′V ) is actually a co-product of morphisms Σφi(V ),φj(V ′), one for each φi ∈
Hom(↓V,V(H)).
From the above definition it is clear that the new spectral sheaf contains the information of all
possible representations of a given abelian von-Neumann algebra at the same time. It is such an idea
that will reveal itself fruitful when considering how quantisation is defined in a topos.
15.6.1.1 Topology on The State Space
We would now like to analyse what kind of topology the sheaf Σ˘ ∶= F (Σ) has. We know that for each
V ∈ Vf(H) we obtain the collection ∐wgi
V
∈G/GFV
Σwgi
V
, where each Σwgi
V
∶= Σφgi(V ) is equipped with the
spectral topology. Thus, similarly as was the case of the sheaf Σ ∈ Sh(V(H)), we could equip Σ˘ with
the disjoint union topology or with the spectral topology. In order to understand the spectral topology
we should recall that the functor F ∶ Sh(V(H)) → Sh(Vf(H)) preserves monics, thus if S ⊆ Σ, then
S˘ ∶= F (S) ⊆ Σ˘ ∶= F (Σ). We can then define the spectral topology on Σ˘ as follows
Definition 15.6.2. The spectral topology on Σ˘ has as basis the collection of clopen sub-objects S˘ ⊆ Σ˘
which are defined for each V ∈ Vf(H) as
S˘V ∶= ∐
w
gi
V
∈G/GFV
Swgi
V
= ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
Sφi(V ) (15.6.5)
From the definition it follows that on each element Σwgi
V
of the stalks we retrieve the standard
spectral topology.
It is easy to see that the map p ∶ ∐wgi
V
∈Λ(G/GF )
Σwgi
V
→ Vf(H) is continuous since p−1(↓ V ) ∶=
∐wgi
V
′ ∈↓w
gi
V
∣∀w
gi
V
∈G/GFV
Σwgi
V
′
is the clopen sub-object which has value ∐wgi
V
′ ∈G/GFV ′
Σwgi
V
′
at each context
V
′ ∈↓ V and ∅ everywhere else.
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Similarly, as was the case for the topology on Σ ∈ Sh(V(H)), the spectral topology defined above is
weaker than the product topology and it has the advantage that if takes into account both the ‘vertical’
topology on the fibres and the ‘horizontal’ topology on the base space Vf(H).
A moment of thought will reveal that also with respect to the disjoint union topology the map p
is continuous, however because of the above argument, from now on we will use the spectral topology
on the spectral presheaf.
15.6.2 Quantity Value Object
We are now interested in mapping the quantity value objects R↔ ∈ Sh(V(H)) to an object in
Sh(Vf(H)) via the F functor. We thus define:
Definition 15.6.3. The quantity value objects R˘
↔
∶= F (R↔) = pI ! ○ I(R↔) is an R-valued presheaf of
order-preserving and order-reversing functions on Vf(H) defined as follows:
– On objects V ∈ Vf(H) we have
(F (R↔))V ∶= ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
R↔φi(V ) (15.6.6)
where each
R↔φi(V ) ∶= {(µ, ν)Sµ ∈ OP (↓ φi(V ),R) , µ ∈ OR(↓ φi(V ),R), µ ≤ ν} (15.6.7)
The downward set ↓ φi(V ) comprises all the sub-algebras V ′ ⊆ φi(V ). The condition µ ≤ ν implies
that for all V
′ ∈↓φi(V ), µ(V ′) ≤ ν(V ′).
– On morphisms iV ′V ∶ V
′
→ V (V
′ ⊆ V ) we get:
R˘
↔(iV ′V ) ∶ R˘↔V → R˘↔V ′ (15.6.8)
∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
R↔φi(V ) → ∐
φj∈Hom(↓V
′
,V(H))
R↔
φj(V
′ ) (15.6.9)
where for each element (µ, ν) ∈ R↔φi(V ) we obtain
R˘
↔(iV ′V )(µ, ν) ∶= R↔(iφi(V ),φj(V ′ ))(µ, ν) (15.6.10)
= (µ∣φi(V ′), ν∣φj(V ′ )) (15.6.11)
where µ∣φi(V ′ ) denotes the restriction of µ to ↓ φj(V ′) ⊆↓ φi(V ), and analogously for ν∣φj(V ′).
15.6.2.1 Topology on the Quantity Value Object
We are now interested in defining a topology for our newly defined quantity value object R˘. Similarly,
as was done for the spectral sheaf, we define the set
R = ∐
V ∈Vf (H)
R˘
↔
V = ⋃
V ∈Vf(H)
{V } × R˘↔V (15.6.12)
where each R˘
↔
V ∶= ∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))R↔φi(V ).
The above represents a bundle over Vf(H) with bundle map pR ∶R→ Vf(H) such that pR(µ, ν) = V =
pJ(φi), where V is the context such that (µ, ν) ∈ R↔φi(V ). In this setting p−1R (V ) = R˘↔V are the fibres of
the map pR.
We would like to define a topology onR with the minimal require that the map pR is continuous. We
know that the category Vf(H) has the Alexandroff topology whose basis open sets are of the form ↓ V
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for some V ∈ Vf(H). Thus we are looking for a topology such that the pullback p−1R (↓ V ) ∶= ∐V ′∈↓V R˘V ′
is open in R.
Following the discussion at the end of section 2.1 we know that each R↔ is equipped with the
discrete topology in which all sub-objects are open (in particular each R↔V has the discrete topology).
Since the F functor preserves monics, if Q ⊆ R↔ is open then F (Q) ⊆ F (R↔) is open, where F (Q) ∶=
∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))Qφi(V ).
Therefore we define a sub-sheaf, Q˘, of R˘
↔
to be open if for each V ∈ Vf(H) the set Q˘
V
⊆ R˘V is
open, i.e., each Q
φi(V )
⊆ R↔φi(V ) is open in the discrete topology on R↔φi(V ). It follows that the sheaf
R˘
↔
gets induced the discrete topology in which all sub-objects are open. In this setting the ‘horizontal’
topology on the base category Vf(H) would be accounted for by the sheave maps.
For each ↓ V we then obtain the open set p−1R (↓ V ) which has value R˘V ′ at contexts V ′ ∈↓ V and ∅
everywhere else
15.6.3 Truth Values
We now want to see what happens to the truth values when they are mapped via the functor F . In
particular, given the sub-object classifier ΩV(H) ∈ Sh(V(H)) we want to know what F (ΩV(H)) is. Since
F (ΩV(H)) = pJ ! ○ I(ΩV(H)) (15.6.13)
we first of all need to analyse what I(ΩV(H)) is. Applying the definition for each wgi
V
∈ Λ(G~GF ) we
obtain (I(ΩV(H)))wgi
V
∶= ΩV(H)
φi(V )
(15.6.14)
Where φi ∈ Hom(↓V,V(H)) is the unique homeomorphism associated to the equivalence class wgiV ∈
G~GFV . If we then consider another element wgjV ∈ G~GFV , we then have
(I(ΩV(H)))
w
gj
V
∶= ΩV(H)
φj(V )
(15.6.15)
where now φi(V ) ≠ φj(V )). What this implies is that once we apply the functor pJ ! to push everything
down to Vf(H), the distinct elements ΩV(H)φi(V ) and ΩV(H)φj(V ) will be pushed down to the same V , since
both φi, φj ∈ Hom(↓V,V(H)). It follows that, for every V ∈ Vf(H), F (ΩV(H)) is defined as
F (ΩV(H))V ∶= ∐
w
gi
V
∈G/GFV
Ω
V(H)
w
gi
V
≃ ⋃
w
gi
V
∈G/GFV
{wgi
V
} ×ΩV(H)
w
gi
V
≃ ⋃
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
{φi} ×ΩV(H)φi(V ) (15.6.16)
Thus it seems that for each V ∈ Vf(H), F (ΩV(H))V assigns the disjoint union of the collection of
sieves for each algebra Vi ∈ V(H) such that Vi = φi(V ), where φi are the unique homeomorphisms
associated to each wgi
V
∈ G~GFV . This leads to the following conjecture:
Conjecture 15.6.1. F (ΩV(H)) ≃ G~GF ×ΩV(H)
It should be noted that Vf(H) ≃ V(H) since Vf(H) and V(H) are in fact the same categories only
that in the former there is no group action on it. Thus it also follows trivially that ΩVf(H) ≃ ΩV(H).
Having said that we can now prove the above conjecture
Proof 15.6.1. For each V ∈ Vf(H) we define the map
iV ∶ F (ΩV(H))V → G~GFV ×ΩV(H)V (15.6.17)
S ↦ (wgiV , lg−1i S) (15.6.18)
where S ∈ ΩV(H)
w
gi
V
= ΩV(H)
φi(V )
for φi ∈Hom(↓ V,V(H)) and φi(V ) ∶= lgiV while lg−1
i
S ∈ ΩV(H)V .
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Such a map is one to one since if (wgiV , lg−1i S1) = (wgiV , lg−1i S2) then lg−1i S1 = lg−1i S2 and S1 = S2. The
fact that it is onto follows form the definition.
We now construct, for each V ∈ V(H) the map
j ∶ G~GFV ×ΩV(H)V → F (ΩV(H))V (15.6.19)(wgiV , S) ↦ lgi(S) (15.6.20)
where S ∈ ΩV(H)V and lgiS ∈ ΩV(H)lgiV for lgiV = φi(V ) thus lgiS ∈ ΩV(H)wgiV
A moment of thought reveals that j = i−1
From the above result we obtain the following conjecture:
Conjecture 15.6.2. ΩVf(H) ≃ F (ΩV(H))~G
Before proving the above conjecture we, first of all, need to define what a quotient presheaf is.
This is simply a presheaf in which the quotient is computed context wise, thus, in the case at hand
the quotient is computed for each V ∈ Vf(H). In order to understand the definition of the quotient
presheaf we will analyse what the equivalence classes look like.
We already know that for presheaves over Vf(H) the group action is at the level of the base category
Λ(G~GF ). In particular for each g ∈ G we have
(l∗g(ΩV(H)))φ(V ) ∶= ΩV(H)lg(φ(V )) (15.6.21)
where φ ∈ Hom(↓ V,V(H)). Therefore by defining for each V ∈ V(H) the equivalence relation on
∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))ΩV(H)φi(V ) =∶ (F (ΩV(H)))V by the action of G, the elements in (F (ΩV(H)))V ~GV =
∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))ΩV(H)φi(V )~G will be equivalence classes of sieves, i.e.,
[Si] ∶= {lg(Si)Sg ∈ G} (15.6.22)
for each Si ∈ ΩV(H)φi(V ) ∈ ∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))Ω
V(H)
φi(V )
. In the above we used the action of the group G on
sieves which is defined as lgS ∶= {lgV ′ SV ′ ∈ S}. We are now ready to define the presheaf F (ΩV(H))~G.
Definition 15.6.4. The Presheaf F (ΩV(H))~G is defined:
• On objects: for each context V ∈ Vf(H) we have the object
(F (ΩV(H)))V ~GV ∶=  ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
Ω
V(H)
φi(V )
~(G) (15.6.23)
whose elements are equivalence classes of sieves [Si], i.e., S1, S2 ∈ [Si] iff S1 ∶= {lgS2Sg ∈ G} and
S2 ∈ ΩV(H)φi(V ) and S1 = Ω
V(H)
lgφi(V )
, i.e. each equivalence class will contain only one sieve for each
algebra. This definition of equivalence condition follows from the fact that the group action of
G moves each set Ω
V(H)
φi(V )
to another set Ω
V(H)
lgφi(V )
in the same stork F (ΩV(H)))V , i.e. the group
action is at the level of the base category Λ(G~GF ).
• On morphisms: for each V
′ ⊆ V we then have the corresponding morphisms
αV V ′ ∶  ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
Ω
V(H)
φi(V )
~(G) →  ∐
φj∈Hom(↓V
′
,V(H))
Ω
V(H)
φj(V
′)
~(G) (15.6.24)
[S] ↦ αV V ′ ([S]) ∶= [S ∩ V ′] (15.6.25)
where [S ∩V ′] ∶= {lg(S ∩V ′)Sg ∈ G}, and we choose as the representative for the equivalence class
S ∈ ΩV(H)V for V = φi(V ) where φi ∈Hom(↓ V,V(H)) is associated to some g ∈ GV
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We can now prove the above conjecture (15.6.2), i.e., we will show that the functor
β ∶ ΩVf (H) → F (ΩV(H))~(G) (15.6.26)
is an isomorphism.
In particular for each context V ∈ V(H) we define
βV ∶ Ω
Vf(H)
V
→ F (ΩV(H))V ~(G)V (15.6.27)
S ↦ [S] (15.6.28)
where [S] denotes the equivalence class to which the sieve S belongs to, i.e., [S] ∶= {lgSSg ∈ G}.
First we need to show that β is indeed a functor, i.e., we need to show that the following diagram
commutes
Ω
Vf (H)
V
βV //
Ω
Vf (H)(i
V
′
V
)

F (ΩV(H))V ~G
α
V V
′

Ω
Vf (H)
V
′
β
V
′
// F (ΩV(H))V ~G
Thus for each S we obtain for one direction
βV ′ ○ΩVf (H)(iV ′V )(S) = βV ′ (S ∩ V ′) = [S ∩ V ′] (15.6.29)
where the first equality follows from the definition of the sub-object classifier ΩVf(H) [21].
Going the opposite direction we get
αV V ′ ○ βV S = αV V ′ [S] = [S ∩ V ′] (15.6.30)
It follows that indeed the above diagram commutes. Now that we have showed that β is a functor we
need to show that it is an isomorphisms. We consider each individual component βV , V ∈ Vf(H).
1. The map βV is one-to-one.
Given S1, S2 ∈ ΩVf(H)V , if βV (S1) = βV (S2) then [S1] = [S2], thus both S1 and S2 belong to
the same equivalence class. Each equivalence class is of the form [S] = {lgSSg ∈ G}, therefore
S1 = lgS2 for some g ∈ G. However, the definition of the equivalence classes of sieves implied that
for each equivalence class there is one and only one sieve for each algebra. Thus if [S1] = [S2]
and both S1, S2 ∈ ΩVf (H)V , then S1 = S2.
2. The map βV is onto. This follows at once from the definition.
3. The map βV has an inverse.
We now need to define an inverse. We choose
γ ∶ F (ΩV(H))~G→ ΩVf(H) (15.6.31)
such that for each context we get
γV ∶ F (ΩV(H))V ~G → ΩVf (H)V (15.6.32)[S] ↦ [S] ∩ V (15.6.33)
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where [S]∩V ∶= {lg(S)∩V Sg ∈ G} represents the only sieve in the equivalence class which belongs
to Ω
Vf(H)
V
. We first of all have to show that this is indeed a functor. Thus we need to show that,
for each V
′ ⊆ V the following diagram commutes
F (ΩV(H))V ~G
α
V V
′

γV // Ω
Vf (H)
V
Ω
Vf (H)(i
V
′
V
)

F (ΩV(H))V ~G γV ′ // ΩVf(H)V ′
Chasing the diagram around for each S we obtain
ΩVf(H)(iV ′V ) ○ γV ([S]) = ΩVf(H)(iV ′V )([S] ∩ V ) = ([S] ∩ V ) ∩ V ′ = [S] ∩ V ′ (15.6.34)
On the other hand we have
γV ′ ○ αV V ′ [S] = γV ′ [S ∩ V ′] = [S ∩ V ′] ∩ V ′ = [S] ∩ V ′ (15.6.35)
where the last equality follows since [S ∩V ′]∩V ′ ∶= {lg(S ∩V ′)Sg ∈ G}∩V ′ and the only sieve in
[S] belonging to ΩVf(H)
V
′ is S ∩ V
′
. Therefore the map γ is a functor.
It now remains to show that, for each V ∈ Vf(H) and each S ∈ ΩV(H)V , γV is the inverse of βV .
Thus
γV ○ βV (S) = γV ([S]) = [S] ∩ V = S (15.6.36)
where the last equality follows from the fact that in each equivalence class of sieves there is one
and only one referred to each context lgV . On the other hand we have
βV ○ γV ([S]) = βV ○ ([S] ∩ V ) = βV (S) = [S] (15.6.37)
The functor β is indeed an isomorphism.
15.6.4 Group Action on the New Sheaves
We would now like to analyse what the group action on the new sheaves is. In particular we will show
how the action of the group G on the sheaves define on Vf(H) via the F functor will not induce twisted
sheaves.
15.6.4.1 Spectral Sheaf
The action of the group G on the new spectral sheaf Σ˘ ∶= F (Σ) is given by the following map:
G × Σ˘ → Σ˘ (15.6.38)
defined for each context V ∈ Vf(H) as
GV × Σ˘V → Σ˘V (15.6.39)(g, λ) ↦ lgλ (15.6.40)
where Σ˘V ∶= ∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))Σφi(V ) such that if λ ∈ Σφi(V ) we define lgλ ∈ lgΣφi(V ) ∶= Σlg(φi(V )) by
(lg(λ))Aˆ ∶= ⟨λ, Uˆ(g)−1AˆUˆ(g)⟩ (15.6.41)
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for all g ∈ G, Aˆ ∈ Vsa(self adjoint operators in V ) and V ∈ V(H).
However from the definition of Σ˘, both Σφi(V ) and Σlg(φi(V )) belong to the same stalk, i.e., belong
to Σ˘V .
We thus obtain a well defined group action which does not induce twisted presheaves.
We would now like to check whether such a group action is continuous with respect to the spectral
topology, i.e., if the map
ρ ∶ G × Σ˘ → Σ˘ (15.6.42)
is continuous. In particular we want to check if for each V ∈ Vf(H) the local component
ρV ∶ GV × Σ˘V → Σ˘V (15.6.43)
is continuous, i.e., if ρ−1V S˘V = ρ−1V ∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H)) Sφi(V ) is open for S˘V open.
ρ−1V  ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
Sφi(V ) = {(gj, Sφi(V ))Slgj(Sφi(V )) ∈ S˘V } (15.6.44)
= (G, S˘V ) (15.6.45)
where lgj(Sφi(V )) ∶= Slgjφi(V ) = Slgj (φi(V )). It follows that the action is continuous.
Moreover it seems that the sub-objects S˘ actually remain invariant under the group action. In
fact, for each V ∈ Vf(H), S˘V = ∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H)) Sφi(V ) where the set Hom(↓V,V(H)) contains all G
related homeomorphisms, i.e. all lgj (φi) ∀ gj ∈ G, (lgj (φ)(V ) ∶= lgj(φ(V ))).
It follows that the sub-objects S˘ ⊆ Σ˘ are invariant under the group action.
This is an important result when considering propositions which are identified with clopen sub-
objects coming from daseinisation. In this context the group action is defined, for each V ∈ Vf(H),
as:
GV × δP˘V → δP˘V (15.6.46)
GV × ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
δo(Pˆ )φi(V ) → ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
δo(Pˆ )φi(V ) (15.6.47)
(g, δo(Pˆ )φi(V )) ↦ δo(UˆgPˆ Uˆ−1g )lg(φi(V )) (15.6.48)
Thus for each g ∈ G we get a collection of transformations each similar to those obtained in the original
formalism. However, since the effect of such a transformation is to move the objects around within a
stalk, when considering the action of the entire G, the stalk, as an entire set, remains invariant, i.e.,
the collection of local component of the propositions stays the same.
Moreover the fact that individual sub-objects S˘ ⊆ Σ˘ are invariant under the group action, implies
that the action G × Σ˘ → Σ˘ is not transitive. In fact the transitivity of the action of a group sheaf is
defined as follows
Definition 15.6.5. Given a group G, we say that the action of G on any other sheaf A is transitive
iff there are no invariant sub-objects of A.
Thus although the group actions moves the elements around in each stalk, it never moves elements
in between different stalks, thus each sub-object is left invariant.
15.6.4.2 Sub-object Classifier
We now are interested in defining the group action on the sub-object classifier ΩVf(H). However, by
definition, there is no action on such object. The only action which could be defined would be the
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action on Ω˘ ∶= F (ΩV(H)). In this case, for each V ∈ Vf(H), we have
αV ∶ GV × Ω˘V → Ω˘V (15.6.49)
GV × ∐
w
gi
V
∈G/GFV
Ωwgi
V
→ ∐
w
gi
V
∈G/GFV
Ωwgi
V
GV × ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
Ωφi(V ) → ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
Ωφi(V )
(g,S) ↦ lg(S) (15.6.50)
where lg(S) ∶= {lgV SV ∈ S}.
If S ∈ Ωφi(V ) ∈ ∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))Ωφi(V ), then lg(S) is a sieve on lgφi(V ), i.e., lg(S) ∈ Ωlgφi(V ) ∈∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))Ωφi(V ).
It follows that the action of the group G is to move sieves around in each stalk but never to move
sieves to different stalks.
The next question is to define a topology on Ω˘ and check whether the action is continuous or not.
A possible topology would be the topology whose basis are the collection of open sub-sheaves of Ω˘. If
we assume that each Ωφ(V ) has the discrete topology, coming from the fact that it can be seen as an
etale´ bundle, then the topology on Ω˘ will be the topology in which each sub-sheaf is open, i.e., the
discrete topology.
Given such a topology we would like to check if the group action is continuous. To this end we need
to show that α−1V (S˘V ) is open for S˘V open sub-object. We recall that S˘V = ∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H) Sφi(V ).
We then obtain
α−1V (S˘V ) = {(g,S)Slg(S) ∈ S˘V } (15.6.51)
= (GV , S˘V ) (15.6.52)
which is open.
15.6.4.3 Quantity Value Object
We would now like to analyse how the group acts on the new quantity value object R˘
↔
. This is defined
via the map
G × R˘
↔
→ R˘
↔
(15.6.53)
which, for each V ∈ Vf(H), has local components
GV × R˘
↔
V → R˘
↔
V (15.6.54)
GV × ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
R↔φi(V ) → ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
R↔φi(V )
g, (µ, ν) ↦ (lgµ, lgν)
where (µ, ν) ∈ R↔φi(V ), while (lgµ, lgν) ∈ R↔lg(φi(V )). Therefore lgµ ∶↓ lg(φi(V )) → R and lgν ∶↓
lg(φi(ν)) → R.
As it can be easily deduced, even in this case the action of the G group is to map elements around
in the same stalk but never to map elements between different stalks. Thus yet again we do not obtain
twisted sheaves.
We would now like to check whether the group action is continuous with respect to the discrete
topology on R˘ defined in section 12.2.1. Thus we have to check whether for V ∈ Vf(H) the following
map is continuous
ΦV ∶ GV × R˘V → R˘V (15.6.55)(g, (µ, ν)) → (lgµ, lgν) (15.6.56)
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A typical open set in R˘V is of the form Q˘V ∶= ∐φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H)Qφi(V ) where each Qφi(V ) ⊆ R
↔
φi(V )
is
open. Therefore
Φ−1V (Q˘V ) = {gi, (µ, ν)S(lgiµ, lgiν) ∈ Q˘V } (15.6.57)
= (G, Q˘
V
) (15.6.58)
Therefore the group action with respect to the discrete topology is continuous.
15.6.4.4 Truth Object
The new truth value object for pure states obtained through the action of the F functor is
T˘
∣ψ⟩
∶= F (T∣ψ⟩) (15.6.59)
which is defined as follows:
Definition 15.6.6. The truth object F (T∣ψ⟩) is the presheaf defined on
– Objects: for each V ∈ Vf(H) we get
F (T∣ψ⟩) ∶= ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
T
∣ψ⟩
φi(V )
(15.6.60)
where T
∣ψ⟩
φi(V )
∶= {αˆ ∈ P (φi(V ))S⟨ψSαˆSψ⟩ = 1} and P (φi(V )) denotes the collection of all projection
operators in φi(V ).
– Morphisms: given V
′ ⊆ V the corresponding map is
T˘
∣ψ⟩(iV ′V ) ∶ ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
T
∣ψ⟩
φi(V )
→ ∐
φj∈Hom(↓V
′
,V(H))
T
∣ψ⟩
φj(V
′)
(15.6.61)
such that, given S ∈ T∣ψ⟩
φi(V )
, then
T˘
∣ψ⟩(iV ′V )S ∶= T∣ψ⟩(iφi(V ),φj(V ′))S = S ∣φj(V ′ ) (15.6.62)
where φj ≤ φi thus φj(V ′) ⊆ φi(V ) and φj(V ′) = φi ∣V ′ (V ′).
15.6.5 New Representation of Physical Quantities
We are now interested in understanding the action of the F functor on physical quantities. We thus
define the following
F (δ˘(Aˆ)) ∶ Σ˘→ R˘↔ (15.6.63)
which, at each context V , is defined as
F (δ˘(Aˆ))V ∶ ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
Σφi(V ) → ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
R↔φi(V ) (15.6.64)
such that for a given λ ∈ Σφi(V ) we obtain
F (δ˘(Aˆ))V (λ) ∶= δ˘(Aˆ)φi(V )(λ) (15.6.65)
= (δ˘i(Aˆ)φi(V )(⋅), δ˘o(Aˆ)φi(V )(⋅))(λ) = (µλ, νλ)
Thus in effect the map F (δ˘(Aˆ))V is a co-product of maps of the form F (δ˘(Aˆ))φi(V ) for all φi ∈Hom(↓
V,V(H)).
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From this definition it is straightforward to understand how the group acts on such physical quan-
tities. In particular, for each context V ∈ Vf(H) we obtain a collection of maps
F (δ˘(Aˆ))V ∶ ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
Σφi(V ) → ∐
φi∈Hom(↓V,V(H))
R↔φi(V ) (15.6.66)
and the group action is to map individual maps in such a collection into one another. Thus, for
example, if we consider the component
δ˘(Aˆ)φi(V ) ∶ Σφi(V ) → R↔φi(V ) (15.6.67)
by acting on it by an element of the group we would obtain
lgδ˘(Aˆ)φi(V ) ∶ lgΣφi(V ) → lgR↔φi(V ) (15.6.68)
Σlg(φi(V )) → R
↔
lg(φi(V ))
(15.6.69)
Let us now analyse what exactly is lg δ˘(Aˆ))φi(V ).
We know that it is comprised of two functions, namely
lgδ˘(Aˆ)φi(V ) = lgδ˘i(Aˆ))φi(V )(⋅),lg δ˘o(Aˆ))φi(V )(⋅) (15.6.70)
We will consider each of them separately. Given λ ∈ Σlg(φi(V )) we obtain
lgδ˘i(Aˆ)φi(V )(λ) = λlgδi(Aˆ)φi(V ) (15.6.71)
= λUˆgδi(Aˆ)φi(V )Uˆ−1g 
= λδi(UˆgAˆUˆ−1g )lg(φi(V ))
= δ˘i(UˆgAˆUˆ−1g )lg(φi(V ))(λ)
Similarly for the order reversing function we obtain
lgδ˘o(Aˆ)φi(V )(λ) = δ˘o(UˆgAˆUˆ−1g )lg(φi(V ))(λ) (15.6.72)
Thus putting the two results together we have
lgδ˘(Aˆ)φi(V ) = δ˘(UˆgAˆUˆ−1g )lg(φi(V )) (15.6.73)
This is the topos analogue of the standard transformation of self adjoint operators in the canonical
formalism of quantum theory. In particular, given a self adjoint operator δ˘(Aˆ) its local component in
the context V is δ˘(Aˆ)V . This ‘represents’ the pair of self adjoint operators (δi(Aˆ)V , δo(Aˆ)V ) which live
in V . By acting with a unitary transformation we obtain the transformed quantity lgδ˘(Aˆ) with local
components δ˘(UˆgAˆUˆ−1g )lgV , V ∈ Vf(H). Such a quantity represents the pair (δi(UˆgAˆUˆ−1g )lg(V ), δo(UˆgAˆUˆ−1g )lg(V ))
of self adjoint operators living in the transformed context lg(V ).
15.7 Appendix
Theorem 15.7.1. Given the etale´ map f ∶ X → Y the left adjoint functor f ! ∶ Sh(X) → Sh(Y ) is
defined as follows
f !(pA ∶ A→X) = f ○ pA ∶ A→ Y (15.7.1)
for pA ∶ A→ Y an etale´ bundle
182
Proof 15.7.1. In the proof we will first define the functor f ! for general presheaf situation, then
restrict our attention to the case of sheaves (Sh(X) ⊆ SetsXop) and f etale´.
Consider the map f ∶ X → Y , this gives rise to the functor f ! ∶ SetsX
op
→ SetsY
op
. The standard
definition of f ! is as follows:
f ! ∶= − ⊗X (fX●) (15.7.2)
which is defined on objects A ∈ SetsXop as
A⊗X (fY ●) (15.7.3)
This is a presheaf in SetsY
op
, thus for each element y ∈ Y we obtain the set
(A⊗X (fY ●))y ∶= A⊗X (fY ●)(−, y) (15.7.4)
where (fY ●) is the presheaf (fY ●) ∶ X × Y op → Sets (15.7.5)
This presheaf derives from the composition of f ×idY op ∶X ×Y
op → Y ×Y op ((f ×idY op)∗ ∶ SetsY ×Y op →
SetsX×Y
op
) with ●Y ● ∶ Y × Y op → Sets, i.e.,
(fY ●) ∶= (f × idY op)∗(●Y ●) =● Y ● ○ (f × idY op) (15.7.6)
where ●Y ● is the bi-functor
●Y ● ∶ Y × Y op → Sets (15.7.7)
(y, y′) ↦ HomY (y′ , y) (15.7.8)
Now coming back to our situation we then have the restricted functor
(fY ●)(−, y) ∶ (X,y) → Sets (15.7.9)
(x, y) ↦ (fY ●)(x, y) (15.7.10)
which from the definition given above is
(fY ●)(x, y) =● Y ● ○ (f × idY op)(x, y) =● Y ●(f(x), y) =HomY (y, f(x)) (15.7.11)
Therefore putting all the results together we have that for each y ∈ Y we obtain A ⊗X (fY ●)(−, y),
defined for each x ∈X as
A(−)⊗X (fY ●)(x, y) ∶= A(x)⊗X HomY (y, f(x)) (15.7.12)
This represents the presheaf A defined over the element x, plus a collection of maps in Y mapping the
original y to the image of x via f .
In particular A(x)⊗X (fX●) = A(x)⊗X HomY (y, f(−)) represents the following equaliser:
∐x,x′ A(x) ×HomX(x′ , x) ×HomY (y, f(x′) τ //
θ
// ∐xA(x) ×HomY (y, f(x))
σ

A(−)⊗X HomY (y, f(−))
Such that given a triplet (a, g, h) ∈ A(x) ×HomX(x′ , x) ×HomY (y, f(x′) we then obtain that
τ(a, g, h) = (ag,h) = θ(a, g, h) = (a, gh) (15.7.13)
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Therefore A(−) ⊗X HomY (y, f(−)) is the quotient space of ∐xA(x) ×HomY (y, f(x)) by the above
equivalence conditions.
We now consider the situation in which A is a sheaf on X, in particular it is an etale´ bundle
pA ∶ A → X and f is an etale´ map which means that it is a local homeomorphism, i.e. for each x ∈ X
there is an open set V such that x ∈ V and such that f∣V ∶ V → f(V ) is a homeomorphism. It follows
that for each xi ∈ V there is a unique element yi such that f∣V (xi) = yi. In particular for each V ⊂ X
then f∣V (V ) = U for some U ⊂ Y .
It can be the case that f∣Vi(Vi) = f∣Vj (Vj) even if Vi ≠ Vj , since the condition of being a homeomorphism
is only local, however in these cases the restricted etal’e maps have to agree on the intersections, i.e.
f∣Vi(Vi ∩ Vj) = f∣Vj(Vj ∩ Vj)
Let us now consider an open set V with local homeomorphism f∣V . In this setting each element
yi ∈ f∣V (V ) will be of the form f(xi) for a unique xi. Moreover, if we consider two open sets V1, V2 ⊆ V ,
then to each map V1 → V2 in X, with associated bundle map A(V2) → A(V1), there corresponds a map
f∣V V1 → f∣V (V2) in Y . Therefore evaluating A(−) ⊗X HomY (−, f(−)) at the open set f∣V (V ) ⊂ Y
we get, for each Vi ⊆ V the equivalence classes [A(Vi) ×X HomY (f∣V (V ), f∣V (Vi))] where A(Vj) ×X
HomY (f∣V (V ), f∣V (Vj)) ≃ A(Vk)×X HomY (f∣V (V ), f∣V (Vk)) iff there exists a map f∣V (Vj) → f∣V (Vk)
(which combines giving f∣V (V ) → f∣V (Vk)) and corresponding bundle map A(Vk) → A(Vj) (which
combine giving A(Vk) → A(V )) given by the map Vj → Vk ( which combined gives V → Vk) in X. A
moment of thought reveals that such an equivalence class is nothing but p−1A (V ) (the fibre of pA at V )
with associated fibre maps induced from the base maps.
We will now denote such an equivalence class by [A(V )×XHomY (f∣V (V ), f∣V (V ))], since obviously
in each equivalence class there will be the element [A(V ) ×X HomY (f∣V (V ), f∣V (V ))]
We apply the same procedure for each open set Vi ⊂X. We can obtain two cases:
i) f∣Vi(Vi) = U ≠ fV (V ). In that case we simply get an independent equivalence class for U .
ii) If f∣Vi(Vi) = U = fV (V ) and there is no map i ∶ V → Vi in X then, in this case, we ob-
tain for U two distinct equivalence classes [A(Vi) ×X HomY (f∣Vi(Vi), f∣Vi(Vi))] and [A(V ) ×X
HomY (f∣V (V ), f∣V (V ))].
Thus the sheaf A(−)⊗X(fY ●) is defined for each open set fV (V ) ⊂ Y as the set [A(V )×XHomY (f∣V (V ), f∣V (V ))] ≃
A(V ))), and for each map fV ′ (V ′) → fV (V ) in Y (with associated map V ′ → V in X), the correspond-
ing maps [A(V )×XHomY (f∣V (V ), f∣V (V ))] ≃ A(V )→ [A(V ′)×XHomY (f∣V ′ (V )′ , f∣V ′ (V ′))] ≃ A(V ′)
This is precisely what the etale´ bundle f ○ pA ∶ A→ Y is.
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Chapter 16
Lecture 17
In this lecture we will define the topos analogue of probabilities. To this end we will have to introduce
a new topos namely the topos of sheaves over the category V(H) × (0,1)L
16.1 Topos Reformulation of Probabilities
We will now delineate how probabilities can be described in terms of truth values in a given topos.
In such a formulation logical concepts are seen as fundamental, while probabilities become derived
concepts.
This view is very useful in quantum theory, in as much that it overcomes the problems related to the
relative frequency interpretation of probabilities.
In particular, in the topos approach truth values can be assigned to any proposition in quantum theory
and, since probabilities are defined in terms of truth values, probabilities can always be assigned even
in the context of closed systems.
For the interested reader, the full analysis of these ideas can be found in [14].
16.2 General Definition of Probabilities in the Language of
Topos Theory
In this section we will outline the general way in which probabilities can be described in a topos.
How this general definition will apply to classical physics and quantum physics will be described in
subsequent sections.
What we will do in this section is to define a possible topos in which probabilities can be expressed
in terms of truth values in that topos. What we are looking for is a way to combine on the one hand
probabilities, which are described by numbers in the interval [0,1] and, on the other hand, truth values
expressed in a topos τ , which are defined as global elements of the sub-object classifier Ωτ .
What this amounts to is to find a topos τ such that the following holds
[0,1] ≃ ΓΩτ (16.2.1)
If we are able to achieve this, it will mean that we have found a bijective correspondence between
probabilities and truth values in a topos τ .
The way in which the equivalence in 16.2.1 is achieved is as follows:
the first step is to define the topological space (0,1), whose open sets are the intervals (0, r) for
0 ≤ r ≤ 1. This topological space is denoted as (0,1)L and the collection of open sets as O((0,1)L).
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This is a category under inclusion. One can then define a bijection
β ∶ [0,1] → O((0,1)L) (16.2.2)
r ↦ (0, r) (16.2.3)
The strategy is then to associate open sets (0, r) with truth values in a certain topos. Such open sets
will then, in turn, be associated with the probability r.
In this way we will not be loosing anything by considering open sets (0, r) which don’t actually con-
tain r instead of closed sets (0, r] or [0, r]. Moreover, if we were to consider either (0, r] or [0, r] we
would run into troubles. In fact, if we had chosen [0, r] we would have obtained situations in which
all propositions are totally true with probability zero, even the totally false proposition (more details
later on). If instead we had chosen (0, r] we wouldn’t have obtained a topology, since these sets do not
close under arbitrary unions.
Having chosen the topology on our space, we then know from topos theory that, for any topological
space X , there is the following isomorphisms of Heyting algebras
O(X) ≃ ΓΩSh(X) (16.2.4)
where Sh(X) identifies the topos of sheaves over the topological space X . Therefore, in order to obtain
equation 16.2.1, a possible topos which could be used is τ = Sh((0,1)L).
In such a topos the isomorphisms we are after is
σ ∶O((0,1)L) → ΓΩSh((0,1)L) (16.2.5)
(0, p) ↦ σ(0, p) ∶= (l(p) ∶ 1→ ΩSh((0,1)L) (16.2.6)
such that for each stage/context (0, r) ∈ O((0,1)L) we have the truth value
l(p)(0,r) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{(0, r′) ∈ O((0,1)L)Sr′ ≤ r} = ΩSh((0,1)L)(0,r) if p ≥ r{(0, r′) ∈ O((0,1)L)Sr′ ≤ p} if 0 < p < r
∅ if p = 0
(16.2.7)
If we use the isomorphisms {(0, r′) ∈ O(0,1)LSr′ ≤ r} ≃ [0, r] the we can write the above as
l(p)(0,r) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[0, r] = ΩSh((0,1)L)
(0,r)
if p ≥ r
[0, p] if 0 < p < r
∅ if p = 0
(16.2.8)
As can be seen from the definition, l is nothing but the combination of β and σ. Thus l ∶ [0,1] →
ΓΩSh((0,1)L) is a bijection between probabilities and truth values:
[0,1] βÐ→ O((0,1)L) σÐ→ ΓΩSh((0,1)L) (16.2.9)
p ↦ (0, p)↦ l(p) (16.2.10)
It can also be shown that l is an order preserving isomorphisms. This implies that probabilities are
faithfully represented as truth values in the topos Sh((0,1)L).
16.3 Example for Classical Probability Theory
In this section we will apply the topos theoretic description of probabilities defined in the previous
section to a classical system. As a first step we will define truth values of propositions regarding a
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classical system and, then, show how such truth values are related to classical probabilities.
Let us consider a proposition (A ∈ ∆) meaning that the value of the quantity A lies in ∆. We want to
define the truth value of such a proposition with respect to a given state s ∈ X , where X is the state
space. Recall that in classical theory, the truth value of the above proposition in the state s is given
by
v(A ∈∆; s) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 iff s ∈ A−1(∆)
0 otherwise
where A−1(∆) ⊆X is the subset of the state space for which the proposition (A ∈ ∆) is true.
Another way of defining truth values is through the truth object Ts which is state dependent. The
definition of the truth object was defined in previous lecture, but we will report here for clarity reasons:
for each state s, we define the set
T
s
∶= {S ⊆X Ss ∈ S}
Since (s ∈ A−1(∆)) iff A−1(∆) ∈ Ts, we can now write the truth value above in the following equivalent
way
v(A ∈∆; s) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 iff A−1(∆) ∈ Ts
0 otherwise
It follows that the truth value v(A ∈ ∆; s) is equivalent to the truth value of the mathematical statement[[A−1(∆) ∈ Ts]].
We would now like to relate the above defined truth values to probability measures. To this end we
associate to the space X the probability measure
µ ∶ Sub(X)→ [0,1] (16.3.1)
where Sub(X) denotes the measurable subsets of X .
It is now possible to define a measure dependent truth object as follows:
T
µ
r ∶= {S ⊆X Sµ(S) ≥ r} (16.3.2)
for all r ∈ (0,1]1. What the above truth object defines, is all those proposition which are true with
probability equal or greater than r.
So far, the objects we have defined are simply sets. However, we would like to find their analogue in
the topos Sh(O(0,1)L), which was used to define probabilities, so that truth values and probabilities
have a common ground in which to be compared. Thus what we are looking for is a way of expressing
both truth object Tµ and the truth values v(A ∈ ∆; s) as objects in Sh(O(0,1)L).
To this end we perform the following “translations”:
First of all we map the state space X to the constant sheaf
X →X (16.3.3)
What this means is that for all (0, r) ∈ O((0,1)L)
X(0, r) =X (16.3.4)
For any measurable set S ∈ Sub(X) we define the constant sheaf S → S; S(0, r) = S. Thus obtaining
the map
∆ ∶ Sub(X) → SubSh(O((0,1)L))(X) (16.3.5)
S ↦ S (16.3.6)
1Note that we will not include the value r=0. The reason, as will be explained later on, is to avoid obtaining situations
in which all propositions are totally true with probability zero.
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The analogue of the truth object in Sh(O((0,1)L)) is then: Tµ(0,r) ∶= {S ⊆ X Sµ(S)(0,r) ≥ r} for all(0, r) ∈ O((0,1)L).
Now that we have defined the analogue of the relevant object in the topos Sh(O((0,1)L)) we can
define the truth value of a proposition (A ∈∆ ∶= S) ⊆X as a global section of ΩSh(O((0,1)L)):
[[S ∈ Tµ]](0, r) ∶= {(0, r′) ≤ (0, r)SS(0,r′) ∈ Tµ(0,r′)} (16.3.7)
= {(0, r′) ≤ (0, r)Sµ(S) ≥ r′} (16.3.8)
= [0, µ(S)] ∩ (0, r] (16.3.9)
= [0,min{µ(S), r}] (16.3.10)
which is an element of ΩSh(O((0,1)L))(0, r). Thus, globally, we get
[[S ∈ Tµ]] ∈ Γ(ΩSh(O((0,1)L)
It is easy to see that for any set S ⊆ X the value µ(S) can be recovered by the valuation [[S ∈
T
µ]] ∈ Γ(ΩSh(O((0,1)L))). This means that probabilities can be replaced by truth values without any
information being lost.
In particular, in the topos Sh(O((0,1)L)) the probability measure µ ∶ Sub(X)→ [0,1] can be uniquely
expressed through the map ǫµ (defined below) in the sense that there exists a bijective correspondence
between µ and ǫµ, i.e. for each µ we get:
ǫµ ∶ SubSh(O((0,1)L))(X) → Γ(ΩSh(O((0,1)L))) (16.3.11)
S ↦ [[S ∈ Tµ]] (16.3.12)
What this means is that we have effectively replaced the probability measure µ ∶ Sub(X) → [0,1]
with the collection of truth values Γ(ΩSh(O((0,1)L))).
Since Γ(ΩSh(O((0,1)L))) is a Heyting algebra, probabilities are now interpreted in the context of intu-
itionistic logic.
What has been done so far can be summarised by the following commutative diagram:
Sub(X) µ //
∆

[0,1]
l

SubSh(O((0,1)L))(X) ǫµ // ΓΩSh(O((0,1)L))
By chasing the diagram around we now have the following equalities
[l ○ µ(S)](r) = l(µ(S))(r) = {(0, r′) ⊆ (0, r)Sµ(S) ≥ r′} (16.3.13)
= [[S ∈ Tµ]](r) = ǫµ(∆(S))(r) (16.3.14)
It was also shown in [14] that it is possible to define the logical analogue of the σ-additivity of the
measure µ. We recall that the σ-additivity of a measure µ is defined as follows:
for any countable family (Si)i∈N of pairwise disjoint, measurable subsets of X (the space where the
measure is defined), we have
µ(⋃
i
Si) = ∑
i
µ(Si) (16.3.15)
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Let us now consider a countable increasing family (S˜i)i∈N of measurable subsets of X defined as
follows
S˜i ∶= S˜i−1 ∪ S˜i for i > 0 while S˜0 ∶= S0 (16.3.16)
Then equation 16.3.15 becomes
µ(⋁
i
S˜i) = µ(⋃
i
S˜i) = sup
i
µ(S˜i) = ⋁
i
µ(S˜i) (16.3.17)
i.e., µ preserves countable joins (suprema).
The logical analogue of this is as follows:
Given a countable increasing family of measurable subsets (S˜i)i∈N of X we then have
(ǫµ ○∆)(⋁
i
S˜i) = (l ○ µ)(⋁
i
(S˜i) (16.3.18)
We know that µ preserves countable joins, we now want to show that l does. To this end we will
explicitly compute, for each context (0, r) how l acts on countable unions. Since µ ∶ sub(X) → [0,1]
then µ(⋁i(S˜i)) 16.3.17= ⋁i(µ(S˜i)) = ⋁i pi where pi∈I is some family of real numbers in the interval [0,1].
Thus the question is what is l(⋁i pi) as computed for each context (0, r)?
By applying the definition we obtain
l(⋁
i
pi)(0,r) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Ω
Sh((0,1)L)
(0,r)
if ⋁i pi ≥ r
{(0, r′) ∈ O((0,1)L)Sr′ ≤ ⋁i pi} if 0 < ⋁i pi < r
∅ if ⋁i pi = 0
(16.3.19)
Or equivalently
l(⋁
i
pi)(0,r) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[0, r] = ΩSh((0,1)L)
(0,r)
if ⋁i pi ≥ r
[0,⋁i pi] if 0 < ⋁i pi < r
∅ if ⋁i pi = 0
(16.3.20)
On the other hand if we computed ⋁i l(pi)(0,r) for all contexts (0, r) ∈ O((0,1)L) we would obtain
⋁
i
l(pi)(0,r) = ⋁
i
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Ω
Sh((0,1)L)
(0,r)
if pi ≥ r
{(0, r′) ∈ O((0,1)L)Sr′ ≤ pi} if 0 < pi < r
∅ if pi = 0
(16.3.21)
Or equivalently
⋁
i
l(pi)(0,r) = ⋁
i
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[0, r] = ΩSh((0,1)L)
(0,r)
if pi ≥ r
[0, pi] if 0 < pi < r
∅ if pi = 0
(16.3.22)
Thus it follows that ⋁i l(pi)(0,r) = l(⋁i pi)(0,r) for all contexts (0, r) ∈ O((0,1)L) thus
(l ○ µ)(⋁
i
(S˜i)) = ⋁
i
(l ○ µ)(S˜i) (16.3.23)
It follows that the logical description of the σ-additivity is
(ǫµ ○∆)(⋁
i
S˜i) = ⋁
i
(l ○ µ)(S˜i) (16.3.24)
So far we have only described the classical aspects of the topos interpretation of probability. However,
it is possible to extend such ideas to the quantum case.
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16.4 Quantum Case
We now would like to show how the interpretation of probabilities as truth values in an appropriate
topos can be applied to the quantum case. So far, in the literature it was shown how, within the
topos Sh(V(H))2 (the topos formed by the collection of sheaves on the poset V(H) of all abelian von
Neumann algebras of a given Hilbert space H) the truth value of a proposition A ∈∆, given a state ψ,
is defined as3
v(A ∈∆, ψ)(V ) = [[δ(Eˆ[A ∈∆]) ∈org T∣ψ⟩]]V ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V S⟨ψSδ(Eˆ[A ∈∆])V ′ Sψ⟩ = 1} ∈ ΩSh(V(H))V
(16.4.1)
where, for the quantum case, the truth object is the sheaf orgT∣ψ⟩ which is defined, for each context
V ∈ V(H) as the set
org
T
∣ψ⟩
V ∶= {αˆ ∈ P (V )S⟨ψSαˆSψ⟩ = 1} (16.4.2)
This definition of truth value works perfectly well when we consider a pure state Sψ⟩. However, if we
consider mixed states with associate density matrix say ρ = ∑Ni=1 riSψ⟩⟨ψS, then the obvious analogue
of 16.4.1, namely
v(A ∈ ∆, ρ)(V ) = [[δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) ∈org Tρ]]V ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V Str(ρEˆ[A ∈ ∆])V ′ = 1} ∈ ΩSh(V(H))V (16.4.3)
doesn’t work since it does not separate the states ρ.
In this case the truth object is
org
T
ρ
V ∶= {αˆ ∈ P (V )Str(ραˆ) = 1} (16.4.4)
To see why this is the case consider our usual example for H = C4 and consider two density matrices
ρ1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
3~4 0 0 0
0 1~4 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
ρ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
3~5 0 0 0
0 2~5 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Then the condition for tr(ρPˆ ) = 1 is that Pˆ ≥ Pˆ1+Pˆ2 where Pˆ1 = diag(1,0,0,0) and Pˆ2 = diag(0,1,0,0).
Similarly the condition for tr(ρ1Pˆ ) = 1 is that Pˆ ≥ Pˆ1 + Pˆ2. It follows that ρ and ρ1 have the same
support , namely Pˆ1 + Pˆ2. However, from the definition of truth values, the element v(A ∈ ∆, ρ)(V )
depends only on the support of ρ, and ρ1, thus it is not possible to distinguish the two.
On the other hand, truth values that do separate the density matrices ρ are the one parameter
family of truth values
v(A ∈ ∆, ρ)r(V ) ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V Str(ρEˆ[A ∈∆])V ′ ≥ r} ∈ ΩSh(V(H))V (16.4.5)
for r ∈ (0,1]. As we can see from the above formula, such truth values introduce truth probabilities
different from one. In particular, what 16.4.5 expresses is the truth value for the proposition A ∈ ∆ to
be true with probability at least r.
However, the problem with such one parameter family is that it represents a collection of objects, one
for each r. So we need to group, somehow, these objects together and show that such a family can be
considered as a single object. This can be done by enlarging the topos Sh(V(H))V .
So the main steps needed, in order to correctly express probabilities as truth values of quantum
propositions in an appropriate topos are:
2Although in the previous lectures we have used the topos SetV(H), we know that given the Alexandrov topology on
V(H) then Sh(V(H)) ≃ SetsV(H). So, in the following we will alternate freely between sheaves and presheaves.
3Note that here we have added a suffix org to indicate original since we will now change the formulation of truth
objects.
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1) Define the truth values which separate the density matrices so as to be an object in the topos.
This, as was hinted to above, can be done by enlarging the topos we are working with.
2) Define a correct probability measure on the state space Σ.
3) Find a way to relate 1) and 2).
16.4.1 Measure on the Topos State Space
We are now interested in constructing a measure µ on the state space Σ. As such it should some how
define a size or weight for each sub-object of Σ. However we will not consider all sub-objects of Σ
but only a collection of them which we define as “measurable”. These collection of “measurable”sub-
objects of Σ will be the collection of all clopen sub-objects of Σ. The reason being that we are yet
again taking ideas form classical physics. There we know that a proposition is defined as a measurable
subset of the state space. Hence in the topos formulation of quantum theory we ascribe the status of
“measurable” to all clopen sub-objects of Σ, i.e., all propositions. It could be the case that one can
consider a larger collection of sub-objects, but surely Subcl(Σ) is the minimal such collection. In any
case we will define a probability measure on Subcl(Σ) such that Σ will have measure 1 and 0 will have
measure zero.
As we will see, the measure defined on Σ will be such that there exists a bijective correspondence
between such a measure and states of the quantum system, i.e. µ ↦ ρµ is a bijection
4 (for ρ a density
matrix).
So the question is : how is this measure defined? A suitable measure on Σ is defined as follows:
for each density matrix ρ we have
µρ ∶ Subcl(Σ) → Γ[0,1]⪰ (16.4.6)
S = (SV )V ∈V(H) ↦ µρ(S) ∶= (tr(ρPˆSV ))V ∈V(H) (16.4.7)
where [0,1]⪰ is the sheaf of order-reversing functions from V(H) to [0,1]. Recall that PˆSV = S−1SV
where
S ∶ P (V )→ Subcl(Σ)V (16.4.8)
The detailed definition of the sheaf [0,1]⪰ is as follows
Definition 16.4.1. The presheaf [0,1]⪰ ∶ V(H)→ Sets is defined on:
1. Objects: For each context V we obtain [0,1]⪰
V
∶= {f ∶↓ V → [0,1]Sf is order reversing} which is a
set of order-reversing functions.
2. Morphisms: given i ∶ V
′ ⊆ V then the corresponding presheaf map is
[0,1]⪰(iV ′V ) ∶ [0,1]⪰V → [0,1]⪰V ′ (16.4.9)
f ↦ f∣↓V ′ (16.4.10)
Thus the measure µρ defined in 16.4.6 takes a clopen sub-object of Σ and defines an order reversing
function
µρ(S) ∶ V(H)→ [0,1] (16.4.11)
4It should be notes at this point that the correspondence between measures and state is present also in the context
of classical physics. In fact in that case, as we have seen in previous lectures, a pure state (i.e. a point) is identified with
the Dirac measure, while a general state is simply a probability measure on the state space. Such a probability measure
assigns a number in the interval [0,1] called the weight and that in a sense tells you the ‘size’ of the measurable set.
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such that for each V ∈ V(H), µρ(S)(V ) defined the expectation value, with respect to ρ, of the
projection operators PˆS
V
to which the sub-object S corresponds to in V . Therefore, given two contexts
V
′ ⊆ V , since PˆS
V
′ ≥ PˆSV then tr(ρPˆSV ′ ) ≥ tr(ρPˆSV ). In detail we have, for each V ∈ V(H)
µρ(S)(V ) ∶ 1V → [0,1]⪰ (16.4.12)
{∗} ↦ µρ(S)(V )({∗}) ∶= µρ(S)(V ) (16.4.13)
where µρ(S)(V ) ∶↓ V → [0,1].
It is worth mentioning some properties of µρ
1. For each V ∈ V(H) then µρ(0)(V ) = tr(ρ0ˆ) = 0 therefore globally
µρ(0) = (0)V ∈V(H) (16.4.14)
2. For each V ∈ V(H) then µρΣ(V ) = tr(ρ1ˆ) = 1 therefore globally
µρ(Σ) = (1)V ∈V(H) (16.4.15)
3. Given two disjoint clopen sub-objects S and T of Σ we then have for each context V ∈ V(H) that
µρ(S ∨ T )(V ) = µρ((S ∨ T )V ) (16.4.16)
= µρ(SV ∪ TV ) (16.4.17)
= tr(ρ(PˆS
V
∨ PˆT
V
)) (16.4.18)
= tr(ρ(PˆS
V
+ PˆT
V
)) (16.4.19)
= tr(ρ(PˆS
V
) + tr(ρPˆT
V
)) (16.4.20)
= µρ(S)(V ) + µρ(T )(V ) (16.4.21)
It follows globally that
µρ(S ∨ T ) = µρ(S)(V ) + µρ(T ) (16.4.22)
This is the property of finite additivity.
4. A generalisation of the above property, i.e. a property of which 16.4.16 is a special case is the
following: given two arbitrary clopen sub-objects S and T of Σ, for all V ∈ V(H) we obtain
µρ(S ∨ T )(V ) + µρ(S ∧ T )(V ) = tr(ρ(PˆS
V
∨ PˆT
V
)) + tr(ρ(PˆS
V
∧ PˆT
V
)) (16.4.23)
= tr(ρ(PˆS
V
∨ PˆT
V
+ PˆS
V
∧ PˆT
V
)) (16.4.24)
= tr(ρ(PˆS
V
+ PˆT
V
)) (16.4.25)
= tr(ρ(PˆS
V
)) + tr(ρ(PˆT
V
)) (16.4.26)
= µρ(S)(V ) + µρ(T )(V ) (16.4.27)
which globally gives
µρ(S ∨ T ) + µρ(S ∧ T ) = µρ(S) + µρ(T ) (16.4.28)
5. Because the collection of clopen sub-objects of Σ forms a Heyting algebra and not a Boolean
algebra it follows that since
S ∨ ¬S < Σ (16.4.29)
then
µρ(S ∨ ¬S) < 1V ∈V(H) (16.4.30)
6. The closest one can get to σ-additivity is the following: given a countable infinite family (Si)i∈I
for open sub-objects such that for each context V ∈ V(H) the clopen subsets (Si)V ⊆ ΣV (for all
i ∈ I) are pairwise disjoint then we have
(µρ)⋁
i∈I
Si))(V ) = tr(ρ(⋁
i∈I
PˆS
i
)) = tr(ρ(∑
i∈I
PˆS
i
)) =∑
i∈I
tr(ρPˆS
i
) = ∑
i∈I
µρ(Si)(V ) (16.4.31)
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16.4.2 Deriving a State from a Measure
So far we have defined a particular measure given a quantum state ρ. We are now interested in doing
the opposite, since in the end we want to show that there is a bijection between the two. Thus we
would like to first give an abstract characterisation of a measure with no reference to a state and then
show how such a measure can uniquely determine a state ρ.
Thus the abstract characterisation of a measure is as follows
Definition 16.4.2. A measure µ on the state space Σ is a map
µ ∶ Subcl(Σ)Σ → Γ[0,1]≥ (16.4.32)
S = (SV )V ∈ V(H) ↦ (µ(SV ))V ∈V(H) (16.4.33)
such that the following condition hold
1. µ(Σ) = 1V (H)
2. for all S and T in Subcl(Σ) then µ(S ∨ T ) + µ(S ∧ T ) = µ(S) + µ(T )
Given such an abstract definition of measure all properties defined in the previous section follow.
We now want to show that each such measure µ uniquely determines a state ρµ. Since above we show
that each state ρ determined a measure, then combining the two result we end up with a bijective
correspondence between the space of states ρ and the space of measures µ on Σ.
Theorem 16.4.1. Given a measure µ as defined above then there exist a unique state ρ “associated”
to that measure.
Proof. Let us define
m ∶ P (H) → [0,1] (16.4.34)
P ↦ m(p) (16.4.35)
such that i) m(1ˆ) = 1; ii) if Pˆ Qˆ = 0 (are orthogonal) then m(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ) =m(Pˆ + Qˆ) =m(Pˆ ) +m(Qˆ) such
a map is called in the literature afinitely additive probability measure on the projections of V . We now
want to define a unique such finite additive measure given the probability measure µ. To this end we
define
m(Pˆ ) ∶= µ(S
Pˆ
)(V ) = µ(S
Pˆ
)V (16.4.36)
such that m(1ˆ) ∶= 1. In the above formula S is some clopen sub-object S ⊆ Σ such that for V we have
S
−1(SV ) = Pˆ .
In order for this definition to be well defined it has to be independent on which sub-object of Σ is
chosen to represent the projection operator. In fact it could be the case that for a contexts V and V
′
we have that SV and TV ′ both correspond to the same projection operator Pˆ =S−1(SV ) =S−1(TV ′ ).
If this is the case then we need to show that µ(S
Pˆ
)V = µ(T Pˆ )V ′ . To show this we first take the case
for which here exist to sub-objects of Σ such that they correspond to the same projector at the same
context5 V , i.e. TV = SV . We then obtain that
µ(S)(V ) + µ(T )(V ) 16.4.2= µ(S ∨ T )(V ) + µ(S ∧ T )(V ) (16.4.37)
= µ(S ∨ T )V + µ(S ∧ T )V (16.4.38)
= µ(SV ∪ TV ) + µ(SV ∩ TV ) (16.4.39)
= µ(SV ) + µ(SV ) (16.4.40)
= µ(S)(V ) + µ(S)(V ) (16.4.41)
5In our usual sample of C4 this is the case for δo(Pˆ1)V
Pˆ2
and δo(Pˆ3)V
Pˆ2
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Therefore
µ(S)(V ) = µ(T )(V ) (16.4.42)
So for the same context we manage to prove the result. What about different contexts? Let us consider
the case in which SV = TV ′ and they both correspond to the projection operator Pˆ . This means that
Pˆ ∈ V and Pˆ ∈ V ′ therefore Pˆ ∈ V ∩V ′ . So for example δ(Pˆ )V = SV = TV . We should not that although
δo(Pˆ )V ′∩V = Pˆ it is not the case that S−1(SV ′∩V ) = Pˆ or S−1(TV ′∩V ). Given such situation we obtain
µ(S)(V ) 16.4.42= µ(δ(Pˆ ))(V ) (16.4.43)
= µ(δ(Pˆ ))(V ′ ∩ V ) (16.4.44)
= µ(δ(Pˆ ))(V ′) (16.4.45)
16.4.42= µ(T )(V ′) (16.4.46)
Hence, the definition in 16.4.36 is well defined. We next have to show that m is actually a finitely
additive probability measure on the projections in H. To this end consider two orthogonal projection
operators Pˆ and Qˆ, such that S−1(TV ) = Qˆ and S−1(SV ) = Pˆ . Then (S ∨ T )V corresponds to the
projection operator Pˆ ∨ Qˆ. We then obtain
m(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ) ∶= µ(S ∨ T )(V ) (16.4.47)
= µ(S)(V ) + µ(T )(V ) + µ(S ∧ T )(V ) (16.4.48)
= µ(S)(V ) + µ(T )(V ) (16.4.49)
=∶ m(Pˆ) +m(Qˆ) (16.4.50)
Finally it is easy to show that m(0ˆ) = 0. These results together prove that, given a measure µ on
Σ we can uniquely defined a finitely additive probability measure on the projections in H. Through
Gleason’s theorem6 it is possible to show that such a probability measure corresponds to a state ρµ.
Thus we have the following chain: µ↦m↦ ρµ.
We have so managed to show that there exists a one to one correspondence between states and
measures as defined in 16.4.2. We are now ready to tackle issue number 3): how to relate such a
measure with a generalised version of 16.4.5.
One thing to notice is that the measure in 16.4.6 is defined on all clopen sub-objects of the state space
Σ, not only those deriving from the process of daseinisation, while the truth objects 16.4.2, 16.4.4 and
thus the truth values 16.4.1, 16.4.3, are only defined on those particular sub-objects which are derived
from daseinisation. Thus another issues to solve is the following:
4) Enlarge the truth objects in 16.4.2, 16.4.4 so as to include all clopen sub-objects of the state
space Σ.
We will tackle this issue in the following section.
16.4.3 New Truth Object
We now would like to define a truth object which takes into account all clopen sub-objects of the
state space Σ, not only those coming from daseinisation. This is because the measure µ described in
previous sections is defined in all clopen sub-objects of Σ which in this context correspond to measurable
sub-objects.
Both the truth objects orgT∣ψ⟩ and orgTρ are defined in such a way (see previous lectures) such that
the global sections Γ(orgT∣ψ⟩) give all the clopen sub-objects of Σ coming from daseinisation.
We now would like to enlarge T∣ψ⟩ such that the global sections of the enlarged truth object give us all
the sub-objects of the state space, i.e. what we are looking for is an object T, such that
6Sucha theorem shows that a quantum state is uniquely determined by the values it takes on projections. Since clopen
sub-objects have components which correspond to projections, Gleason’s theorem applies.
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1. ΓT = SubclΣ
2. orgT∣ψ⟩ ∈ ΓT
Without going into the details of the proof that can be found in [14], we will simply state the results
of their findings.
16.4.3.1 Pure State Truth Object
As mentioned above, we would like to be able to define truth values for all clopen sub-objects of Σ, not
just those coming from daseininsation. Thus the truth object T∣ψ⟩ has to now be defined as a general
sub-object of Pcl(Σ), such that ΓT∣ψ⟩ = Subcl(Σ).
Thus the general truth object as referred to a state Sψ⟩ is the sheaf T∣ψ⟩, such that for a given
context V we have7
T
∣ψ⟩
V
∶= {S ∈ Subcl(Σ∣↓V )S∀V ′ ⊆ V, Sψ⟩⟨ψS ≤ PˆSV ′ } (16.4.51)
In words, what this truth object tells you is a condition in terms of which any sub-object S of the
state space Σ can be said to be true. In particular, for a sub-object S ⊆ Σ to be totally true in a given
state Sψ⟩ it has to be such that for all V ∈ V(H) (i.e. locally) it corresponds to a projection operator
PˆSV ∈ P (V ) which corresponds to an available proposition in V . This proposition is then required to
be true with respect to Sψ⟩, i.e. ⟨ψSPˆSV Sψ⟩ = 1.
The corresponding global elements are
Γ(T∣ψ⟩) = {S ∈ Subcl(Σ)S∀V ′ ⊆ V(H), Sψ⟩⟨ψS ≤ PˆSV } (16.4.52)
From the above definitions it is easy to see that indeed conditions 1. and 2. above are satisfied, namely
Γ(T∣ψ⟩) = SubclΣ
and
org
T
∣ψ⟩ ∈ ΓT∣ψ⟩
So we have managed to solve problem 4) and define a state dependent truth object for all sub-objects
of the state space, not only those derived from daseinisation. This implies that now the expression[[S ∈ T∣ψ⟩]] makes sense and can be evaluated also for S ≠ δP .
The truth value in 16.4.1 now becomes
v(A ∈∆, Sψ⟩) = [[δ(Eˆ[A ∈∆]) ∈ T∣ψ⟩]] (16.4.53)
16.4.3.2 Density Matrix Truth Object
The enlarged truth object as referred to a density matrix ρ is the sheaf Tρ,r such that, for each context
V ∈ V(H) we have
T
ρ,r
V ∶= {S ∈ Subcl(Σ∣↓V )S∀V ′ ⊆ V, tr(ρPˆSV ′ ) ≥ r} (16.4.54)
The corresponding global elements are
Γ(Tρ,r) ∶= {S ∈ Subcl(Σ)S∀V ⊆ V(H), tr(ρPˆSV ) ≥ r} (16.4.55)
What these global elements tell you is which (general) propositions, represented by sub-objects of the
state space are true with probability at least r.
Moreover, if we have two distinct numbers r1 ≤ r2 ≤ 1, then
T
ρ,r2 ⊆ Tρ,r1
7Note that Σ∣↓V indicates the sheaf Σ defined on the lower set ↓ V .
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Proof. From the definition in equation 16.4.54 Tρ,r2 is a family of clopen sub-objects S ⊆ Σ↓V such
that for all V
′ ∈↓ V we have tr(ρPˆS
V
′ ) ≥ r2. However r1 ≤ r2 therefore tr(ρPˆS
V
′ ) ≥ r1, for all V ′ ∈↓ V .
It follows that Tρ,r2 ⊆ Tρ,r1
This means that the collection of sub-objects (propositions) of the state space, which are true with
probability at least r1, are more than the collection of sub-objects (propositions) of the state space
which are true with a bigger probability (at least r2).
Similarly, as above, conditions 1. and 2. are satisfied by the newly defined object 16.4.54.
Therefore, also for a density matrix truth object we have managed to solve problem 4), i.e. we have
managed to define a density matrix dependent truth object for all sub-objects of the state space, not
only those derived from daseinisation.
Thus the expression [[S ∈ Tρ,r]] makes sense and can be evaluated for all S ∈ Sub(Σ).
Equation 16.4.5 now becomes
v(A ∈∆, ρ)r(V ) = [[δ(Eˆ[A ∈∆]) ∈ Tρ,r]]V ∶= {V ′ ⊆ V Str(ρEˆ[A ∈∆])V ′ ≥ r} ∈ ΩSh(V(H))V (16.4.56)
16.4.4 Generalised Truth Values
We now try tackling issue number 1), i.e. how to put together the one parameter family of truth values
in 16.4.5, so as to be itself an object in a topos. To this end one needs to extend the topos from
Sh(V(H) to Sh(V(H) × (0,1)L), so that now the stages/contexts are pairs ⟨V, r⟩. Such a category
V(H) × (0,1)L can be given the structure of a poset as follow:
⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩ iff V ′ ≤ V , and r′ ≤ r (16.4.57)
Being a poset V(H) × (0,1)L is equipped with the (lower) Alexander topology, where the basic open
are (↓ V × (0, r))
This enlargement makes sense intuitively, since we are trying to combine the topos definition of prob-
abilities outlined in section 16.2, which makes use of the topos Sh((0,1)L)) and the concept of truth
values which makes use of the topos Sh(V(H)). In particular, what we are trying to combine is the
following:
• The one parameter family of truth values
v(A ∈∆, ρ)r(V ) = {V ′ ⊆ V Str(ρδ(Eˆ[A ∈∆])V ′ ≥ r} ∈ ΩSh(V(H))V (16.4.58)
which gives us sieves for each stage V in ΩSh(V(H)).
• The topos definition of probabilities
[[S ∈ Tµ]](0, r) ∶= {(0, r′) ≤ (0, r)Sµ(S) ≥ (0, r′)} ∈ ΩSh(O((0,1)L) (16.4.59)
which gives us, for each context (0, r), a sieve in ΩSh(O(0,1)L).
In order to meaningfully combine the two objects above we first need to go back to the the way in
which topos probabilities where implemented for classical physics. In this context we ended up with
the commuting diagram
Sub(X) µ //
∆

[0,1]
l

SubSh(O((0,1)L))(X) ǫµ // ΓΩSh(V(H)×O((0,1)L))
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We are now looking for a quantum analogue of this. We already have the definition of a measure on
the state space. The next step is to define the map of Heyting algebras
l ∶ Γ[0,1]≥ → ΓΩSh(V(H)×O((0,1)L)) (16.4.60)
Which is defined as:
l ∶ Γ[0,1]≥ → ΓΩSh(V(H)×O((0,1)L)) (16.4.61)
γ ↦ l(γ) (16.4.62)
where l(γ)(⟨V, r⟩) ∶= {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Sγ(V ′) ≥ r′}.
{⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Sγ(V ′) ≥ r′} is a sieve on ⟨V, r⟩ ∈ O(V(H)× (0,1)L) since γ is a nowhere increasing
function. In fact, to each density matrix ρ and to each projection operator Pˆ there corresponds a
global element γ
Pˆ ,ρ
∈ Γ[0,1]≥ defined by
γ
Pˆ ,ρ
(V ) ∶= tr(ρδo(Pˆ )V ) (16.4.63)
When applying the map l to such section we obtain, for each context ⟨V, ρ⟩:
l(γ
Pˆ ,r
)(⟨V, ρ⟩) = {⟨V ′ , r′ ⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Sγ
Pˆ ,ρ
(V ′) ≥ r′} (16.4.64)
= {⟨V ′ , r′ ⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Str(ρδo(Pˆ )V ′ ) ≥ r′} (16.4.65)
If Pˆ = δ([Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) then we get
l(γδ([Eˆ[A∈∆]),ρ)(⟨V, ρ⟩) = {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Sγδ([Eˆ[A∈∆]),ρ(V ′) ≥ r′} (16.4.66)
= {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Str(ρδ([Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])V ′ ) ≥ r′} (16.4.67)
An important result is the following
Theorem 16.4.2. The map l as defined in 16.4.61 separated the elements in Γ[0,1]≥, i.e. it is
injective.
Proof. Assume that γ1 ≠ γ2. Then there will exist a context Vi such that γ1(Vi) ≠ γ2(Vi). Let us
assume that γ1(Vi) > γ2(Vi). If we then apply the l map we obtain respectively
l(γ2)(⟨Vi, γ2(Vi)⟩) ∶= {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨Vi, γ2(Vi)⟩Sγ2(V ′) ≥ r′} =↓ ⟨Vi, γ2(Vi)⟩} (16.4.68)
and
l(γ1)(⟨Vi, γ2(Vi)⟩) ∶= {⟨V ′ , r′⟨≤ ⟨Vi, γ2(Vi)⟩Sγ1(V ′) ≥ r′} ⊂↓ ⟨Vi, γ2(Vi)⟩} (16.4.69)
Therefore l(γ1) ≠ l(γ2)
Since the map l represents the quantum analogue of the classical map l ∶ [0,1]→ Γ(Ω(0,1)) used to
define probabilities we would like to check if the quantum l has the same properties, in particular if it
preserves joins. To this end consider a family (γi)i∈I of global section of [0,1]≥. We then obtain for
each context (⟨V, r⟩)
l(⋁
i
γi)(⟨V, r⟩) = {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩S(⋁
i
γi)(V ′) ≥ r′} (16.4.70)
= {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩S sup
i
γi(V ′) ≥ r′} (16.4.71)
= ⋃
i
{⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Sγi(V ′) ≥ r′} (16.4.72)
= ⋁
i
l(γi)(⟨V, r⟩) (16.4.73)
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It follows that
l(⋁
i
γi) = ⋁
i
l(γi) (16.4.74)
Now that we have both maps µ and l we can combine the two sieves defined in 16.4.58 and 16.4.59
in a unique sieve in ΩSh(V(H)×(0,1)L) by composing the maps µρ and l as follows
l ○ µρ(δ(Pˆ)) ∈ Γ(ΩSh(V(H)×(0,1)L)) (16.4.75)
Therefore, for each context ⟨V, r⟩ we obtain
l ○ µρ(δ(Pˆ))(⟨V, r⟩) = l(γ
δ(Pˆ),ρ)(⟨V, r⟩) (16.4.76)
= {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Sγδ(Pˆ ),ρ(V ′) ≥ r′} (16.4.77)
= {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Str(ρδ(Pˆ )V ′ ) ≥ r′} (16.4.78)
In other words, for each context ⟨V, r⟩ we obtain the following truth value
v(A ∈ ∆, ρ)(⟨V, r⟩) ∶= {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Str(ρδ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])V ′ ≥ r} (16.4.79)
∶= {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Sµρ(δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])V ′ ) ≥ r} (16.4.80)
Mathematically, this is a well defined element (sieve) of ΩSh(V(H)×(0,1)L). Moreover, it was shown that
such a truth value separates the density matrices and thus separates the measures.
However, in order to give physical meaning to the above expression, as representing the truth value of a
quantum proposition regarding a physical system, we need to translate all the other objects which were
defined in the topos Sh(V(H)), to objects in the topos Sh(V(H)×(0,1)L). This will be done by defining
the quantum analogues of the maps ∆ and ǫ which we are still missing. In this way we can effectively
obtain the quantum analogue of the commuting classical diagram above. In particular, the quantum
map ∆ will be identified through the geometric morphisms p∗1 ∶ Sh(H(V)) → Sh(V(H) × (0,1)L)
induced by the projection map p1 ∶ V(H)× (0,1)L → V(H). Therefore we obtain
p∗1 ∶ SubclΣ
Sh(V(H)) → Subcl(ΣSh(V(H)×(0,1)L)) (16.4.81)
Where ΣSh(V(H)) ∈ Sh(V(H)) while ΣSh(V(H)×(0,1)L) ∈ Sh(V(H)× (0,1)L)
In particular, we will obtain the following:
• State space
Σ
Sh(V(H)×(0,1)L)
⟨V,r⟩
∶= (p∗1ΣSh(H(V)))⟨V,r⟩ = ΣSh(H(V))p1(⟨V,r⟩) = ΣSh(H(V))V
• Propositions
δ(Pˆ)Sh(V(H)×(0,1)L)
⟨V,r⟩
∶= (p∗1δ(Pˆ )Sh(H(V)))⟨V,r⟩ = δ(Pˆ )Sh(H(V))p1(⟨V,r⟩) = δ(Pˆ )
Sh(H(V))
V
• Truth Object
T
ρ
Sh(V(H)×(0,1)L)
(⟨V, r⟩) ∶= Tρ,rV = {S ∈ Subcl(Σ∣↓V )S∀V ′ ⊆ V , tr(ρPˆSV ′ ≥ r}
Equation 16.4.79 now becomes
v(A ∈∆, ρ)(⟨V, r⟩) = [[p∗1δ(Eˆ[A ∈∆]) ∈ Tρ]](⟨V, r⟩) (16.4.82)
∶= {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Str(ρδ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])V ′ ≥ r} (16.4.83)
∶= {⟨V ′ , r′⟩ ≤ ⟨V, r⟩Sµρ(δ(Eˆ[A ∈∆])V ′ ) ≥ r} (16.4.84)
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Having done that we can complete our commuting diagram by defining
ǫρ ∶ Subcl(ΣSh(V(H)×(0,1)L) → ΓΩSh(V(H)×(0,1)L) (16.4.85)
S ↦ [[S ∈ Tρ]] (16.4.86)
Thus the quantum version of the above diagram is
Subcl(ΣSh(V(H)) µρ //
p∗1

Γ[0,1]≥
l

Subcl(ΣSh(V(H)×(0,1)L)) ǫρ // ΓΩSh(V(H)×O((0,1)L))
We then have that
ǫρ(p∗1δ(Pˆ)) = [[p∗1δ(Pˆ) ∈ Tρ]] = l ○ µρ(δ(Pˆ )) (16.4.87)
This equation gives the precise statement of the relation between truth values and probability measures
in a topos. Moreover, we know that, given a state ρ then the measure µρ has the σ-additivity property
such that for a cauntable increasing family of clopen sub-objects (Si)i∈N then
µρ(⋁
i
Si) = ⋁
i
µρ(Si) (16.4.88)
If we then combine this result with the fact that l preserves joins we then get that
(l ○ µρ)(⋁
i
Si) = ⋁
i
(l ○ µρ)(Si) (16.4.89)
However from the commutativity of the above diagram it follows that
(ǫρ ○ p∗1)(⋁
i
Si) = (l ○ µρ)(⋁
i
Si) = ⋁
i
(l ○ µρ)(Si) (16.4.90)
This represents the logical reformulation of σ-additivity.
So we have seen that even in the quantum case there is a clear relation between truth values and
probability measures.
Thus in both classical and quantum theory, probabilities can be faithfully expressed in terms of truth
values in sheaf topoi with an intuitionistic logic.
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